Rawlsian Justice and Palliative Care

Palliative care serves both as an integrated part of treatment and as a last effort to care for those we cannot cure. The extent to which palliative care should be provided and our reasons for doing so have been curiously overlooked in the debate about distributive justice in health and healthcare. We argue that one prominent approach, the Rawlsian approach developed by Norman Daniels, is unable to provide such reasons and such care. This is because of a central feature in Daniels' account, namely that care should be provided to restore people's opportunities. Daniels' view is both unable to provide pain relief to those who need it as a supplement to treatment and, without justice‐based reasons to provide palliative care to those whose opportunities cannot be restored. We conclude that this makes Daniels' framework much less attractive.     

Phenotypic integration: studying the ecology and evolution of complex phenotypes

Phenotypic integration refers to the study of complex patterns of covariation among functionally related traits in a given organism. It has been investigated throughout the 20th century, but has only recently risen to the forefront of evolutionary ecological research. In this essay, I identify the reasons for this late flourishing of studies on integration, and discuss some of the major areas of current endeavour: the interplay of adaptation and constraints, the genetic and molecular bases of integration, the role of phenotypic plasticity, macroevolutionary studies of integration, and statistical and conceptual issues in the study of the evolution of complex phenotypes. I then conclude with a brief discussion of what I see as the major future directions of research on phenotypic integration and how they relate to our more general quest for the understanding of phenotypic evolution within the neo‐Darwinian framework. I suggest that studying integration provides a particularly stimulating and truly interdisciplinary convergence of researchers from fields as disparate as molecular genetics, developmental biology, evolutionary ecology, palaeontology and even philosophy of science.     

Power and corruption

Cooperation is ubiquitous in the natural world. What seems nonsensical is why natural selection favors a behavior whereby individuals would lose out by benefiting their competitor. This conundrum, for almost half a century, has puzzled scientists and remains a fundamental problem in biology, psychology, and economics. In recent years, the explanation that punishment can maintain cooperation has received much attention. Individuals who punish noncooperators thrive when punishment does not entail a cost to the punisher. However when punishment is costly, cooperation cannot be preserved. Most literature on punishment fails to consider that punishers may act corruptly by not cooperating when punishing noncooperators. No research has considered that there might be power asymmetries between punishers and nonpunishers that turn one of these type of individuals more or less susceptible to experiencing punishment. Here, we formulate a general game allowing corruption and power asymmetries between punishers and nonpunishers. We show that cooperation can persist if punishers possess power and use it to act corruptly. This result provides a new interpretation of recent data on corrupt policing in social insects and the psychology of power and hypocrisy in humans. These results suggest that corruption may play an important role in maintaining cooperation in insects and human societies. In contrast with previous research, we contend that costly punishment can be beneficial for social groups. This work allows us to identify ways in which corruption can be used to the advantage of a society.     

Conceptualising ‘fossiliferous deposit’ against ‘palaeontological deposit’: some semantic (and epistemological) considerations

This short essay intends to provide insight into the concepts of ‘fossiliferous deposit’ and ‘palaeontological deposit’ by identifying some of their semantic differences. From the moment that fossiliferous deposits are technically accessible to the palaeontologist, they are ‘palaeontological’ ones, but not before. However, not all palaeontological deposits must inevitably be ‘fossiliferous’ deposits in the sense of containing mineralised remains of the anatomical parts of organisms. As a consequence of the existence of fossiliferous deposits, the science of palaeontology exists, with the result that fossiliferous deposits become ‘palaeontological deposits’, together with the non-fossiliferous strata that are able to provide data on the ecological and/or ethological conditions of fossil beings from remains that are not ‘fossils’. From the point of view of philosophy of science, fossiliferous and palaeontological deposits should be considered as two different epistemological (as well as ontological) categories. Consequently, by identifying semantic differences, the concepts of ‘fossiliferous deposit’ and ‘palaeontological deposit’ can be framed better within the philosophical development of the palaeontological sciences. In addition to the central issue addressed in this essay, a brief discussion on the epistemic value of the dichotomy ‘to deposit’ versus ‘to reposit’ applied to palaeontological museology is brought up.     

Science and Restoration Under a Big, Demon Haunted Tent: Reply to Giardina et al. (2007)

In a recent editorial, I discussed how the culture of science, heterogeneity of nature, and real‐world human complexities can limit the practical relevance of formal scientific research and argued that less formal approaches might often be more efficient and effective. Giardina et al. criticized this editorial and argued that formal science has and increasingly will play a central role in ecological restoration in particular and human progress in general. Here, I respond to these arguments and expand upon the ideas presented in my previous editorial. I further illustrate how despite superficial appearances the utilitarian value of formal science may often be largely indirect. I also argue that the complexities of ecological and human systems combined with the subjective values and political beliefs underlying restoration make transforming this discipline into a unified “hard science” virtually impossible. Because values and politics also underlie most environmental conflicts, and scientific inquiry is inherently unsuitable for resolving these kinds of disputes, the future success of restoration may depend more on political support than scientific progress. Dogmatic, nonfalsifiable faith in the universal superiority of “rigorous” scientific knowledge and methodologies can foster arrogance and intolerance and blind us to the ephemeral nature of scientific “truths” and the double‐edged sword of scientific “progress.” My hope is that Society for Ecological Restoration International (SERI) will remain a big inclusive tent that embraces a healthy diversity of foci and approaches that emulate the extraordinary diversity we find within the natural ecosystems and human cultures we strive to preserve, restore, and reconnect.     

Some Nonhuman Animals Can Have Pains in a Morally Relevant Sense

In a series of works, Peter Carruthers has argued for the denial of the title proposition. Here, I defend that proposition by offering direct support drawn from relevant sciences and by undercutting Carruthers argument. In doing the latter, I distinguish an intrinsic theory of consciousness from Carruthers relational theory of consciousness. This relational theory has two readings, one of which makes essential appeal to evolutionary theory. I argue that neither reading offers a successful view.     

A semiotical reflection on biology,living signs and artificial life

It is argued, that theory sf signs, especially in the tradition of the great philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) can inspire the study of central problems in the philosophy of biology. Three such problems are considered: (1) The nature of biology as a science, where a semiotically informed pluralistic approach to the theory of science is introduced. (2) The peculiarity of the general object of biology, where a realistic interpretation of sign- and information-concepts is required to see sign-processes as immanent in nature. (3) The possibility of an artificial construction of life, hereby discussed as a conceptual problem in the present form of the artificial life project and its implied definition of life.     

EPIDEMIOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN LIGHT OF SOCIAL DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH RESEARCH

The present article identifies how social determinants of health raise two categories of philosophical problems that also fall within the smaller domain of ethics; one set pertains to the philosophy of epidemiology, and the second set pertains to the philosophy of health and social justice. After reviewing these two categories of ethical concerns, the limited conclusion made is that identifying and responding to social determinants of health requires inter-disciplinary reasoning across epidemiology and philosophy. For the reasoning used in epidemiology to be sound, for its scope and (moral) purpose as a science to be clarified as well as for social justice theory to be relevant and coherent, epidemiology and philosophy need to forge a meaningful exchange of ideas that happens in both directions.