Cluster randomization and political philosophy

In this paper, I will argue that, while the ethical issues raised by cluster randomization can be challenging, they are not new. My thesis divides neatly into two parts. In the first, easier part I argue that many of the ethical challenges posed by cluster randomized human subjects research are clearly present in other types of human subjects research, and so are not novel. In the second, more difficult part I discuss the thorniest ethical challenge for cluster randomized research--cases where consent is genuinely impractical to obtain. I argue that once again these cases require no new analytic insight; instead, we should look to political philosophy for guidance. In other words, the most serious ethical problem that arises in cluster randomized research also arises in political philosophy.     

Reuniting philosophy and science to advance cancer research

Cancers rely on multiple, heterogeneous processes at different scales, pertaining to many biomedical fields. Therefore, understanding cancer is necessarily an interdisciplinary task that requires placing specialised experimental and clinical research into a broader conceptual, theoretical, and methodological framework. Without such a framework, oncology will collect piecemeal results, with scant dialogue between the different scientific communities studying cancer. We argue that one important way forward in service of a more successful dialogue is through greater integration of applied sciences (experimental and clinical) with conceptual and theoretical approaches, informed by philosophical methods. By way of illustration, we explore six central themes: (i) the role of mutations in cancer; (ii) the clonal evolution of cancer cells; (iii) the relationship between cancer and multicellularity; (iv) the tumour microenvironment; (v) the immune system; and (vi) stem cells. In each case, we examine open questions in the scientific literature through a philosophical methodology and show the benefit of such a synergy for the scientific and medical understanding of cancer.     

A QUESTION OF JUSTICE: ASSESSING NURSE MIGRATION FROM A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

The intensified nurse migration leads to severe problems for the health care systems in many developing countries. Using the Philippines as an example, this paper will address the question of global nurse migration from a philosophical perspective. John Rawls' liberal and Michael Walzer's communitarian theory of justice will be examined in view of the ethical problem of nurse migration. In line with Rawls' A Theory of Justice, nurse migration undermines the ability of the people in developing countries to make use of their basic rights and liberties. Walzer's communitarian assessment of nurse migration, on the other hand, will stress the shared ‘thin’ morality, as well as the shared history between the ‘donating’ and receiving countries. This paper argues that the commonality of a shared history and common values implies the moral obligation to ensure a fairer distribution of nurses.     

The merits of similarity reconsidered

In addition to congruence, Colin Patterson made special similarity (topology, connectivity, ontogeny) and the absence of conjunction a condition for homology. Similarity without theory, such as at the hands of pheneticists, has been recognized as empty. Because of the threat of theoretical emptiness, the current trend in systematics is to eschew special similarity in favor of a purely operational‐algorithmic approach to character analysis. The present contribution shows that special similarity is indispensable for systematics, even in the face of seemingly severe criticism.     

Restoring the Narrative of American Environmentalism

The conventional narrative of American environmentalism is no longer very helpful for conservationists and restorationists seeking philosophical justification and guidance for their work. The tradition has often been cropped into a narrower and simplified account of the battle between the philosophies of wise use and preservation, a move bolstered by the turn to historical images of President Teddy Roosevelt and John Muir visiting California's Yosemite National Park in the early years of the twentieth century. This cropped conservation picture needs to be restored and widened to engage the pragmatism that has always been a part of the U.S. environmental tradition, but that became eclipsed by preservationist ideology with the rise of the fields of environmental history and environmental philosophy in the late twentieth century. Restoring this lost pragmatism to the environmental tradition will prove vital to recovering the value of environmental history and philosophy for conservation and restoration practice and to reclaiming a more holistic and useful narrative of people, culture, and environment.     

Quests for cures: A history of tourism for climate and health

This paper creates a framework for the study of the history of tourism for climate and health. It traces the ways in which people have both moved away from detrimental health conditions and towards places thought to provide climatic cures. It brings to light the complex issues that have affected the course of the tourist trade. In this way it helps to explain that the modern geographical distribution of the highly fashionable resort areas of the world owe a great deal to past and present interpretations of the HippocraticCorpus.     

Critical analysis of the immunological self/non-self model and of its implicit metaphysical foundations

An examination of the concepts used in immunology prompts us to wonder about the origins and the legitimacy of the notions of self and non-self, which constitute the core of the dominant theoretical model in this science. All theoretical reflection concerning immunology must aim at determining a criterion of immunogenicity, that is, an operational definition of the conditions in which an immune reaction occurs or does not occur. By criticizing both conceptually and experimentally the self/non-self vocabulary, we can demonstrate the inaccuracy and even the inadequacy of the dichotomy of self/non-self. Accordingly, the self/non-self model must be reexamined, or even rejected. On the basis of this critique, we can suggest an alternative theoretical hypothesis for immunology, based on the notion of continuity. The 'continuity hypothesis' developed here attempts to give a criterion of immunogenicity that avoids the reproaches leveled at the self model.     

Panpsychic Organicism: Sewall Wright’s Philosophy for Understanding Complex Genetic Systems

Sewall Wright first encountered the complex systems characteristic of gene combinations while a graduate student at Harvard’s Bussey Institute from 1912 to 1915. In Mendelian breeding experiments, Wright observed a hierarchical dependence of the organism’s phenotype on dynamic networks of genetic interaction and organization. An animal’s physical traits, and thus its autonomy from surrounding environmental constraints, depended greatly on how genes behaved in certain combinations. Wright recognized that while genes are the material determinants of the animal phenotype, operating with great regularity, the special nature of genetic systems contributes to the animal phenotype a degree of spontaneity and novelty, creating unpredictable trait variations by virtue of gene interactions. As a result of his experimentation, as well as his keen interest in the philosophical literature of his day, Wright was inspired to see genetic systems as conscious, living organisms in their own right. Moreover, he decided that since genetic systems maintain ordered stability and cause unpredictable novelty in their organic wholes (the animal phenotype), it would be necessary for biologists to integrate techniques for studying causally ordered phenomena (experimental method) and chance phenomena (correlation method). From 1914 to 1921 Wright developed his “method of path coefficient” (or “path analysis”), a new procedure drawing from both laboratory experimentation and statistical correlation in order to analyze the relative influence of specific genetic interactions on phenotype variation. In this paper I aim to show how Wright’s philosophy for understanding complex genetic systems (panpsychic organicism) logically motivated his 1914–1921 design of path analysis.     

IS POST‐MORTEM HARM POSSIBLE? UNDERSTANDING DEATH HARM AND GRIEF

The purpose of this article is not to affirm or deny particular philosophical positions, but to explore the limits of intelligibility about what post-mortem harm means, especially in the light of improper post-mortem procedures at Bristol and Alder Hey hospitals in the late 1990s. The parental claims of post-mortem harm to dead children at Alder Hey Hospital are reviewed from five different philosophical perspectives, eventually settling on a crucial difference of perspective about how we understand harm to the dead. On the one hand there is the broadly 'analytical' tradition ¹ of thinking that predicates the notion of harm on the basis of an existing subject. Since the dead are non-existent persons, it makes little sense to view the dead as being harmed. On the other hand, there is a phenomenological perspective, where the dead, in respect to the experience of grief, are existentially absent. This forms the basis that it is possible to harm grieving parent's experiences of how their dead are treated. The article ends with a short examination of what harming the dead implies for traditional bioethical concerns, namely, obtaining informed consent from significant others when planning medical research on the newly dead.     

Moral Philosophy,Moral Expertise,and the Argument from Disagreement

Several recent articles have weighed in on the question of whether moral philosophers can be counted as moral experts. One argument denying this has been rejected by both sides of the debate. According to this argument, the extent of disagreement in modern moral philosophy prevents moral philosophers from being classified as moral experts. Call this the Argument From Disagreement (AD). In this article, I defend a version of AD. Insofar as practical issues in moral philosophy are characterized by disagreement between moral philosophers who are more or less equally well credentialed on the issue, non‐philosophers have no good reasons to defer to their views.