A game theoretical model of deforestation in human-environment relationships

We studied a two-person game regarding deforestation in human-environment relationships. Each landowner manages a single land parcel where the state of land-use is forested, agricultural, or abandoned. The landowner has two strategies available: forest conservation and deforestation. The choice of deforestation provides a high return to the landowner, but it degrades the forest ecosystem services produced on a neighboring land parcel managed by a different landowner. Given spatial interactions between the two landowners, each landowner decides which strategy to choose by comparing the expected discounted utility of each strategy. Expected discounted utility is determined by taking into account the current and future utilities to be received, according to the state transition on the two land parcels. The state transition is described by a Markov chain that incorporates a landowner's choice about whether to deforest and the dynamics of agricultural abandonment and forest regeneration. By considering a stationary distribution of the Markov chain for land-use transitions, we derive explicit conditions for Nash equilibrium. We found that a slow regeneration of forests favors mutual cooperation (forest conservation). As the forest regenerates faster, mutual cooperation transforms to double Nash equilibria (mutual cooperation and mutual defection), and finally mutual defection (deforestation) leads to a unique Nash equilibrium. Two different types of social dilemma emerge in our deforestation game. The stag-hunt dilemma is most likely to occur under an unsustainable resource supply, where forest regenerates extremely slowly but agricultural abandonment happens quite rapidly. In contrast, the prisoner's dilemma is likely under a persistent or circulating supply of resources, where forest regenerates rapidly and agricultural abandonment occurs slowly or rapidly. These results show how humans and the environment mutually shape the dilemma structure in forest management, implying that solutions to dilemmas depend on environmental properties.     

Theft in an ultimatum game: chimpanzees and bonobos are insensitive to unfairness

Humans, but not chimpanzees, punish unfair offers in ultimatum games, suggesting that fairness concerns evolved sometime after the split between the lineages that gave rise to Homo and Pan. However, nothing is known about fairness concerns in the other Pan species, bonobos. Furthermore, apes do not typically offer food to others, but they do react against theft. We presented a novel game, the ultimatum theft game, to both of our closest living relatives. Bonobos and chimpanzee ‘proposers’ consistently stole food from the responders'' portions, but the responders did not reject any non-zero offer. These results support the interpretation that the human sense of fairness is a derived trait.     

The dynamical attainability of ESS in evolutionary games

In this paper, the attainability of ESS of the evolutionary game among n players under the frequency-independent selection is studied by means of a mathematical model describing the dynamical development and a concept of stability (strongly determined stability). It is assumed that natural selection and small mutations cause the phenotype to change gradually in the direction of fitness increasing. It is shown that (1) the ESS solution is not always evolutionarily attainable in the evolutionary dynamics, (2) in the game where the interaction between two species is completely competitive, the Nash solution is always attainable, and (3) one of two species may attain the state of minimum fitness as a result of evolution. The attainability of ESS is also examined in two game models on the sex ratio of wasps and aphids in light of our criterion of the attainability of ESS.     

Cooperation enhanced by the ‘survival of the fittest’ rule in prisoner's dilemma games on complex networks

Prevalence of cooperation within groups of selfish individuals is puzzling in that it contradicts with the basic premise of natural selection, whereby we introduce a model of strategy evolution taking place on evolving networks based on Darwinian ‘survival of the fittest’ rule. In the present work, players whose payoffs are below a certain threshold will be deleted and the same number of new nodes will be added to the network to maintain the constant system size. Furthermore, the networking effect is also studied via implementing simulations on four typical network structures. Numerical results show that cooperators can obtain the biggest boost if the elimination threshold is fine-tuned. Notably, this coevolutionary rule drives the initial networks to evolve into statistically stationary states with a broad-scale degree distribution. Our results may provide many more insights for understanding the coevolution of strategy and network topology under the mechanism of nature selection whereby superior individuals will prosper and inferior ones be eliminated.     

Spatial effects in social dilemmas

Social dilemmas and the evolutionary conundrum of cooperation are traditionally studied through various kinds of game theoretical models such as the prisoner's dilemma, public goods games, snowdrift games or by-product mutualism. All of them exemplify situations which are characterized by different degrees of conflicting interests between the individuals and the community. In groups of interacting individuals, cooperators produce a common good benefitting the entire group at some cost to themselves, whereas defectors attempt to exploit the resource by avoiding the costly contributions. Based on synergistic or discounted accumulation of cooperative benefits a unifying theoretical framework was recently introduced that encompasses all games that have traditionally been studied separately (Hauert, Michor, Nowak, Doebeli, 2005. Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol., in press.). Within this framework we investigate the effects of spatial structure with limited local interactions on the evolutionary fate of cooperators and defectors. The quantitative effects of space turn out to be quite sensitive to the underlying microscopic update mechanisms but, more general, we demonstrate that in prisoner's dilemma type interactions spatial structure benefits cooperation-although the parameter range is quite limited-whereas in snowdrift type interactions spatial structure may be beneficial too, but often turns out to be detrimental to cooperation.     

New food sources,conservation of biodiversity and sustainable development: can unconventional animal species contribute to feeding the world?

There is increasing interest in the potential of animal species that do not currently fall within the scope of conventional livestock farming to supplement the production of animal protein for human consumption. This paper provides an overview of the current situation and the conditions the led to it, and offers an analysis of the future of wildlife usage within the general framework of sustainable development.     

岷江上游生态补偿的博弈论

为了建立合理的生态补偿机制,制定更为科学的生态补偿政策,以岷江上游退耕还林补偿为例,运用博弈论模型考察了岷江上游现有生态补偿机制,以及在补偿政策实践过程中补偿主体与补偿对象之间的决策和行为过程.结果表明:(1)长期来看,生态补偿政策的实施效果不完全在于补偿金额的大小,仅仅依靠提高对生态建设者(保护者)的补偿标准来保护环境是不明智的;(2)生态补偿年限对岷江上游地区生态补偿政策的实施效果起着重要作用,政府制定生态补偿政策时应该将补偿年限纳入政策制定范畴中,并作为重点考虑的因素;(3)岷江上游地区第三产业的发展水平及生态建设者(保护者)外出务工收入水平的高低直接影响生态建设工程实施的效果;(4)对生态补偿的重要策略是应该通过建立相应的配套措施来增加农民务工的机会.     

自然条件下同级消费者中种群平均规模的博弈论研究

给出了一种新的博弈——非合作n人条件博弈,并给出了它的求解方法．以这种博弈为工具,在适当的假定下研究了无人类的理想地域上同级消费者中各个种群的平均规模．结论是:当个体的平均食量充分小时,该种群的平均规模等于前一级消费者或生产者的最大承受量;否则该种群的平均规模与前一级消费者或生产者的最大承受量成正比,与个体的平均食量和该级消费者中种群的数目都成反比．     

Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.