Influence of seeing a female on the male–male interactions of a jumping spider, Hypoblemum albovittatum

An important prediction from game theory is that resource value influences the level to which competitors will escalate conflict. An earlier study considered whether this prediction applies to the male–male interactions of Hypoblemum albovittatum, a jumping spider (Salticidae) from New Zealand. The males of this species escalated conflicts in the presence of a moving mount made from a conspecific female. However, because the control was only a similar-sized motionless cork, an alternative hypothesis (that the cue for escalation is seeing movement of any female-size object, rather than seeing specifically a female) was not ruled out. Here we show that a moving cork, without a mount present, is indeed sufficient to cause males to escalate, but a moving mount (made from a conspecific female) causes males to escalate further. The level of escalation in the presence of a moving mount made from prey (housefly) or from a rival (conspecific male) did not differ significantly from the level of escalation when only a moving cork was present. These findings suggest that, although seeing a moving object similar in size to a conspecific female is sufficient for priming males to escalate, males can also discern by sight that specifically a female is present and, when they have this precise information, they make strategic decisions to escalate conflict further.     

Water and molecular chaperones act as weak links of protein folding networks: energy landscape and punctuated equilibrium changes point towards a game theory of proteins

Water molecules and molecular chaperones efficiently help the protein folding process. Here we describe their action in the context of the energy and topological networks of proteins. In energy terms water and chaperones were suggested to decrease the activation energy between various local energy minima smoothing the energy landscape, rescuing misfolded proteins from conformational traps and stabilizing their native structure. In kinetic terms water and chaperones may make the punctuated equilibrium of conformational changes less punctuated and help protein relaxation. Finally, water and chaperones may help the convergence of multiple energy landscapes during protein-macromolecule interactions. We also discuss the possibility of the introduction of protein games to narrow the multitude of the energy landscapes when a protein binds to another macromolecule. Both water and chaperones provide a diffuse set of rapidly fluctuating weak links (low affinity and low probability interactions), which allow the generalization of all these statements to a multitude of networks.     

Old World monkeys are more similar to humans than New World monkeys when playing a coordination game

There is much debate about how humans' decision-making compares with that of other primates. One way to explore this is to compare species' performance using identical methodologies in games with strategical interactions. We presented a computerized Assurance Game, which was either functionally simultaneous or sequential, to investigate how humans, rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys used information in decision-making. All species coordinated via sequential play on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating that information about the partner's choice improved decisions. Furthermore, some humans and rhesus monkeys found the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in the simultaneous game, even when it was the first condition presented. Thus, Old World primates solved the task without any external cues to their partner's choice. Finally, when not explicitly prohibited, humans spontaneously used language to coordinate on the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium, indicating an alternative mechanism for converting a simultaneous move game into a sequential move game. This phylogenetic distribution implies that no single mechanism drives coordination decisions across the primates, while humans' ability to spontaneously use language to change the structure of the game emphasizes that multiple mechanisms may be used even within the same species. These results provide insight into the evolution of decision-making strategies across the primates.     

Is maximization of molar yield in metabolic networks favoured by evolution?

Stoichiometric analysis of metabolic networks allows the calculation of possible metabolic flux distributions in the absence of kinetic data. In order to predict which of the possible fluxes are present under certain conditions, additional constraints and optimization principles can be applied. One approach of calculating unknown fluxes (frequently called flux balance analysis) is based on the optimality principle of maximizing the molar yield of biotransformations. Here, the relevance and applicability of that approach are examined, and it is compared with the principle of maximizing pathway flux. We discuss diverse experimental evidence showing that, often, those biochemical pathways are operative that allow fast but low-yield synthesis of important products, such as fermentation in Saccharomyces cerevisiae and several other yeast species. Together with arguments based on evolutionary game theory, this leads us to the conclusion that maximization of molar yield is by no means a universal principle.     

Rabbit populations and game management: the situation after 15 years of rabbit haemorrhagic disease in central-southern Spain

Over recent decades wild rabbit populations have undergone a sharp decline in Spain with consequent negative impact both on a game-based economy, and on the conservation of threatened species that depend on rabbits. We investigated the relationships between rabbit population change and habitat and game management in central-southern Spain. To determine recent rabbit population changes we revisited 60 localities during summer 2002 to repeat surveys previously carried out in 1993. Each survey consisted of 4-km walked transects to record indices of rabbit abundance. The percentage of vegetation cover and of different soil types were also estimated during these transects. In the same areas, the type and intensity of game management practices were obtained by interviewing hunting managers, hunters or gamekeepers. Rabbit populations were stable or increasing only in 26.6% of the studied populations, more commonly in areas with soft soils where warren building is easier for rabbits and where rabbits were an important game species and managed to increase their numbers. Although we could not establish causality, habitat management and predator removal were the main management practices related to rabbit population change. Rabbit scarcity in Spain constitutes a serious problem for conservation, so hunters, researchers and policy makers need to reach a consensus to establish a long-term program to monitor rabbit population trends and share results obtained, especially when intense manage programs are being carried out to improve rabbit abundance.     

Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms

This paper provides strong evidence challenging the self-interest assumption that dominates the behavioral sciences and much evolutionary thinking. The evidence indicates that many people have a tendency to voluntarily cooperate, if treated fairly, and to punish noncooperators. We call this behavioral propensity “strong reciprocity” and show empirically that it can lead to almost universal cooperation in circumstances in which purely self-interested behavior would cause a complete breakdown of cooperation. In addition, we show that people are willing to punish those who behaved unfairly towards a third person or who defected in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a third person. This suggests that strong reciprocity is a powerful device for the enforcement of social norms involving, for example, food sharing or collective action. Strong reciprocity cannot be rationalized as an adaptive trait by the leading evolutionary theories of human cooperation (in other words, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, indirect reciprocity, and costly signaling theory). However, multilevel selection theories of cultural evolution are consistent with strong reciprocity.     

The local enhancement conundrum: In search of the adaptive value of a social learning mechanism

Social learning mechanisms are widely thought to vary in their degree of complexity as well as in their prevalence in the natural world. While learning the properties of a stimulus that generalize to similar stimuli at other locations (stimulus enhancement) prima facie appears more useful to an animal than learning about a specific stimulus at a specific location (local enhancement), empirical evidence suggests that the latter is much more widespread in nature. Simulating populations engaged in a producer–scrounger game, we sought to deploy mathematical models to identify the adaptive benefits of reliance on local enhancement and/or stimulus enhancement, and the alternative conditions favoring their evolution. Surprisingly, we found that while stimulus enhancement readily evolves, local enhancement is advantageous only under highly restricted conditions: when generalization of information was made unreliable or when error in social learning was high. Our results generate a conundrum over how seemingly conflicting empirical and theoretical findings can be reconciled. Perhaps the prevalence of local enhancement in nature is due to stimulus enhancement costs independent of the learning task itself (e.g. predation risk), perhaps natural habitats are often characterized by unreliable yet highly rewarding payoffs, or perhaps local enhancement occurs less frequently, and stimulus enhancement more frequently, than widely believed.     

A model of food stealing with asymmetric information

Many animals acquire food by stealing it from others. There are species of specialist thieves, but more commonly animals will search for both food items and items already found by others, often conspecifics, that can be stolen. This type of behaviour has previously been modelled using a range of approaches. One of these is the Finder–Joiner model, where one animal, the “Finder”, discovers a food patch that takes some time to be consumed. Before consumption of the patch can be completed, another individual, the “Joiner”, discovers the Finder and its food patch, and has the opportunity to attempt to steal it. Depending upon how large the patch was, and how long the Finder has been alone on the patch, there may be much or little food remaining. In this paper, building on previous work, we consider a version of this game where the Finder knows the value of the remaining food patch, but the Joiner does not. We see that depending upon the model parameters, the extra information possessed by the Finder can be beneficial or detrimental in comparison to the case where both individuals have full information.