When Intuition is Not Enough. Why the Principle of Procreative Beneficence Must Work Much Harder to Justify Its Eugenic Vision

The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB) claims that we have a moral obligation, where choice is possible, to choose to create the best child we can. The existence of this moral obligation has been proposed by John Harris and Julian Savulescu and has proved controversial on many levels, not least that it is eugenics, asking us to produce the best children we can, not for the sake of that child's welfare, but in order to make a better society. These are strong claims that require robust justification that can be open to scrutiny and debate. This article argues that robust justifications are currently lacking in the work of Savulescu and Harris. The justifications provided for their conclusions about this obligation to have the best child possible rely heavily on Derek Parfit's Non‐Identity Problem and the intuitive response this provokes in many of us. Unfortunately Harris and Savulescu do not embrace the entirety of the Non‐Identity Problem and the puzzle that it presents. The Non‐Identity Problem actually provides a refutation of PPB. In order to establish PPB as a credible and defendable principle, Harris and Savulescu need to find what has eluded Parfit and many others: a solution to the Non‐Identity Problem and thus an overturning of the refutation it provides for PPB. While Harris and Savulescu do hint at possible but highly problematic solutions to the Non‐Identity Problem, these are not developed or defended. As a result their controversial is left supported by little more than intuition.     

A new species of fossil Scutus Montfort, 1810 from New Zealand (Mollusca: Gastropoda: Fissurellidae)

ABSTRACT

A new fossil species of the genus Scutus (Scutus mirus n. sp.) is described from five Late Oligocene to Early Miocene (Waitakian to Altonian; 25.2–15.9?Ma) localities in the South Island, New Zealand. It is one of the oldest fossil species of Scutus known and probably inhabited very shallow, sub-tropical waters surrounding Zealandia during this time. The holotype of Scutus petrafixus Finlay, 1930 is re-examined; it is possibly from All Day Bay, Kakanui (Waitakian 25.2–21.7?Ma). The New Zealand species documented herein significantly expand our understanding of the fossil record of this shallow-marine molluscan lineage, and by proxy, also indicate the presence of very shallow coastal marine environments around the late Oligocene and early Miocene in southern Zealandia.     

ENHANCING EVOLUTION AND ENHANCING EVOLUTION

It has been claimed in several places that the new genetic technologies allow humanity to achieve in a generation or two what might take natural selection hundreds of millennia in respect of the elimination of certain diseases and an increase in traits such as intelligence. More radically, it has been suggested that those same technologies could be used to instil characteristics that we might reasonably expect never to appear due to natural selection alone. John Harris, a proponent of this genomic optimism, claims in his book Enhancing Evolution that we not only have it in our power to enhance evolution, but that we also have a duty to do so. In this paper, I claim that Harris' hand is strong but that he overplays it nevertheless. He is correct to dismiss the arguments of the anti‐enhancement lobby and correct to say that enhancement is permissible; but ‘good’ is different from ‘permissible’ and his argument for the goodness of enhancement is less convincing. Moreover, he is simply wrong to claim that it generates a duty to enhance.     

Nematode communities inhabiting the soft deep-sea sediment in polymetallic nodule fields: do they differ from those in the nodule-free abyssal areas?

This study addresses whether or not nematode assemblages inhabiting the soft sediment in abyssal nodule fields are unique and differ from those occurring in the nodule-free abyssal areas. This question is important for the evaluation of possible diversity losses caused by nodule mining operations. The analysis involved seven datasets at genus-level of nematode assemblages from three nodule-bearing abyssal areas in the Pacific (the Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone or CCFZ, and the Peru Basin) and the Indian Ocean (CIOB), and five datasets from nodule-free abyssal regions (the Atlantic Ocean). Only individuals identified to valid genera were used in the analysis. Overall, more than 20,000 nematode individuals from 90 samples were analysed. The analyses showed that the nematode communities in the nodule fields did differ from those in the nodule-free abyss. The nodule fields are characterized by a higher microhabitat heterogeneity, which resulted in a higher diversity of nematode communities inhabiting the nodule fields. However, one set of dominant taxa (Monhysteridae, Microlaimus, Acantholaimus, Theristus and Desmoscolex) was identical for both the nodule-bearing and nodule-free abyss, although some genera were strongly and significantly associated with either the nodule-free abyss (Microlaimus) or the nodule-bearing abyssal regions (Capsula). On the other hand, nematode assemblages at nodule-bearing and nodule-free sites within the nodule-bearing abyss proved to be similar at the genus level. This makes it possible for the nodule-free sites to serve as donors of colonizers for the mining-impacted nodule-bearing abyss. However, this suggestion has to be treated with caution, because the species-level differences have not been tested yet.     

Will more organs save more lives? Cost‐effectiveness and the ethics of expanding organ procurement

The assumption that procuring more organs will save more lives has inspired increasingly forceful calls to increase organ procurement. This project, in contrast, directly questions the premise that more organ transplantation means more lives saved. Its argument begins with the fact that resources are limited and medical procedures have opportunity costs. Because many other lifesaving interventions are more cost‐effective than transplantation and compete with transplantation for a limited budget, spending on organ transplantation consumes resources that could have been used to save a greater number of other lives. This argument has not yet been advanced in debates over expanded procurement and could buttress existing concerns about expanded procurement. To support this argument, I review existing empirical data on the cost‐effectiveness of transplantation and compare them to data on interventions for other illnesses. These data should motivate utilitarians and others whose primary goal is maximizing population‐wide health benefits to doubt the merits of expanding organ procurement. I then consider two major objections: one makes the case that transplant candidates have a special claim to medical resources, and the other challenges the use of cost‐effectiveness to set priorities. I argue that there is no reason to conclude that transplant candidates’ medical interests should receive special priority, and that giving some consideration to cost‐effectiveness in priority setting requires neither sweeping changes to overall health priorities nor the adoption of any specific, controversial metric for assessing cost‐effectiveness. Before searching for more organs, we should first ensure the provision of cost‐effective care.     

History of Ichnology: John Joly (1857–1933) on Oldhamia: Poetic and Scientific Observations

John Joly was an Irish engineer and geologist who in the 1880s attempted to explain the formation of Cambrian markings known as Oldhamia to the freezing of sediment and the development of surface frost. He also noted differences in the preservation of two forms of Oldhamia when found together in the same bed; these were either as a positive or negative. Oldhamia also inspired Joly to write a sonnet in which he considered geochronology, denudation and the history of life. A detailed interpretation of Joly's sonnet is provided for the first time.     

A sufficiency threshold is not a harm principle: A better alternative to best interests for overriding parental decisions

Douglas Diekema influentially argues that interference with parental decisions is not in fact guided by the child’s best interests, but rather by a more permissive standard, which he calls the harm principle. This article first seeks to clarify this alternative position and defend it against certain existing criticisms, before offering a new criticism and alternative. This ‘harm principle’ has been criticized for (i) lack of adequate moral grounding, and (ii) being as indeterminate as the best interest standard that it seeks to replace. I argue that these are not serious problems. I take Diekema’s negative point to be right—our actual standard for intervention is not literally the best interests of the child—but I disagree with his proposed replacement. First, Diekema’s proposed harm threshold should be more carefully distinguished from Mill’s harm principle. Second, there is no reason to assume that the standard for permissible intervention coincides with the threshold for harm (or serious harm). Thus, I propose that the best alternative to the best interests standard is not a harm principle, but rather a sufficiency threshold between adequate (or ‘good enough’) and inadequate (or ‘substandard’) parenting.