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151.
Joseph P. Wynne Jinhua Wu Wenjuan Su Adam Mor Nikolaos Patsoukis Vassiliki A. Boussiotis Stevan R. Hubbard Mark R. Philips 《The Journal of cell biology》2012,199(2):317-329
Adaptive immunity depends on lymphocyte adhesion that is mediated by the integrin lymphocyte functional antigen 1 (LFA-1). The small guanosine triphosphatase Rap1 regulates LFA-1 adhesiveness through one of its effectors, Rap1-interacting adapter molecule (RIAM). We show that RIAM was recruited to the lymphocyte plasma membrane (PM) through its Ras association (RA) and pleckstrin homology (PH) domains, both of which were required for lymphocyte adhesion. The N terminus of RIAM inhibited membrane translocation. In vitro, the RA domain bound both Rap1 and H-Ras with equal but relatively low affinity, whereas in vivo only Rap1 was required for PM association. The PH domain bound phosphoinositol 4,5-bisphosphate (PI(4,5)P2) and was responsible for the spatial distribution of RIAM only at the PM of activated T cells. We determined the crystal structure of the RA and PH domains and found that, despite an intervening linker of 50 aa, the two domains were integrated into a single structural unit, which was critical for proper localization to the PM. Thus, the RA-PH domains of RIAM function as a proximity detector for activated Rap1 and PI(4,5)P2. 相似文献
152.
A recent proposal to reform the EU''s policy on the use of genetically modified
crops looks good at first sight, but there are dangers for science lurking in the
background.Anglerfish are predators that live in the eternal darkness of the deep oceans and have a
distinctive way of catching their prey. They use a long light-emitting filament that
extends from their head to lure organisms in the darkness. Those attracted to the
shimmering light and movement are then unwittingly caught in front of the
anglerfish''s wide-open jaws. Such is the nature of the European Commission
(EC)''s proposal for a new European Union (EU) policy on the regulation of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs)—it looks alluring at first glance, but there
are hidden dangers lurking in the background.After years of protracted conflict between the EC and several EU member states over the
import of GM food and the use of GM crops in agriculture, a new regulatory approach to
the approval and cultivation of GMOs is currently moving through the legislative
process. In July 2010, the EC proposed the inclusion of a new article (Article 26b) in
Directive 2001/18/EC that regulates the deliberate environmental release of GMOs. It
would give member states autonomy to make their own decisions about cultivating GM
crops, independently of EC authorizations (EC, 2010).
However, member states would not be able to make such decisions on the grounds of
scientific assessments of health and environmental risk because these are performed by
the EU''s scientific advisory body, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA). The
EC''s rationale for this proposed policy change is to address the bitter resistance
to GM crops in some member states and break the resulting long-standing regulatory and
policy deadlock.In July 2011, the European Parliament (EP) overwhelmingly voted to endorse the principle
of member-state freedom, but rejected the EC''s attempt to completely prevent member
states from using scientific arguments to ban GMOs (Sidebar A).
Whereas the EC wished to protect a centralized and singular voice of science for EU
policy (namely the EFSA), the EP asserted that the different conditions across the EU
could allow a rational scientific approach to reach different conclusions, especially on
matters of environmental risk. In its amendments, the EP also implicitly accepted other
points of criticism of the EFSA and EC processes; for example, that there are normative
choices being made in EU GM policy, but under the false name of science.
Sidebar A | Development of the proposal for EU GM regulatory reform
4 December 2008Council identifies areas for improvement in the European Union (EU) framework for authorizing genetically modified organisms (GMOs), including fuller environmental assessment and socio-economic appraisal.2 March 2009A Dutch proposal is made to the Environment Council (of EU Member State Ministers) that the decision to cultivate GM crops should be left to individual member states.24 June 2009A group of 13 member states requests that the European Commission (EC) give member states the freedom to decide on the cultivation of GM plants based on “relevant socio-economic aspects”.3 September 2009EC President José Manuel Barroso suggests “it should be possible to combine a Community authorisation system, based on science, with freedom for Member States to decide whether or not they wish to cultivate GM crops on their territory” (Barroso, 2009).13 July 2010In response to the Council of Ministers, the EC proposes amendments to Directive 2001/18/EC through the addition of Article 26b, allowing member states to restrict or prohibit GMO cultivation on grounds other than adverse effects to health and the environment.September 2010Ad hoc working party is established by COREPER (The Committee of Permanent Representatives of Member State Governments) to consider the EC''s proposal, taking into account the recommendation on coexistence.7 September 2010Delegates to the ad hoc working party raise concerns about the legality of the proposal within international trade law, as well as the need for enhanced clarity on the proposed acceptable grounds for member state restrictions of GMO cultivation.27 September and 14 October 2010Councils on Agriculture and Fisheries and Environment reiterate concerns of the COREPER working party and the opinion of the Council Legal Service is requested.5 November 2010Council Legal Service opinion concludes that the EC''s proposal might not be compatible with international treaties or with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).23 November 2010Commission Services disagrees with legal service opinion and argues that the EC''s proposal is a way to ensure smooth functioning of the internal market in accordance with Article 114 of the EU Constitution—the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon—and that grounds other than ethics might be invoked; for example, public order or public interest to preserve cultural traditions, or ‘public morals'' as permitted under GATT.8 December 2010COREPER working party argues that a list of grounds that could be used by member states to restrict GMOs under the new proposal needs to be provided by the EC.9 December 2010EU Economic and Social Committee (2011) concludes that the proposal will “create more vagueness than certainty and could in practice result in a proliferation of (legally unstable) measures adopted by States” and also calls for more clearly specified grounds for restrictions.8 February 2011Commission Services (2011) release an open but not exhaustive list of possible reasons that could be invoked to restrict or prohibit GMO cultivation under the new proposal, including: public morals, public order, avoiding presence in other products, social policy objectives, land-use planning, cultural policy and general environmental policy objectives (other than assessment of adverse effects of GMOs on the environment) such as maintenance of certain types of landscape features, ecosystems or ecosystem services.12 April 2011European Parliament (EP) Environment Committee votes to submit to the full EP its amendments to the EC legislative proposal to include scientifically justified environmental impacts complementary to those assessed by the EFSA as legitimate grounds for member state restrictions or prohibitions. This includes prevention of pesticide resistance, invasiveness and/or biodiversity loss; maintenance of seed purity, local biodiversity, unviability of coexistence regimes, ecosystem and agricultural sustainability; and/or presence of persistent uncertainty through data absence or contradictions (Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, 2011).5 July 2011 (originally scheduled for 9 June)Parliament plenary vote on the EC''s proposal and the EP Environment Committee amendments. Large majority votes in favour of Environment Committee amendments (548 for, 84 against, 31 abstentions). This Parliamentary verdict goes to the Council of Ministers for agreement on a final legal schedule.There are inherent dangers with the EC''s goal of pursuing a political and economic union for Europe that increasingly depends on claims about a unitary, singular, deterministic and independent quality to scientific risk analysis. We argue that such claims are confused, false and ultimately self-defeating, despite the honourable intent of the original reasons for moving towards political union. …the EC wished to protect a centralized and singular voice of science for EU policy…In recent years, several EU member states have used the ‘safeguard clause'', Article 23 of EC Directive 2001/18, to ban the cultivation of GM crops in their territories, despite safety approvals from the EFSA. Article 23 allows ‘temporary'' prohibitions if there is new scientific knowledge indicating a potential risk to human health or the environment. However, the EFSA has assessed and declared that all such current prohibitions by member states lack sufficient scientific support and are therefore illegal under the original EC authorizations. Nonetheless, various member states uphold these bans, thereby formally violating European law and creating an escalating sense of crisis. This has seen the attempt to establish a centralized authority for the regulation of GMOs fall into disarray, as bans are met with EC legal threats, and these are met with further member state intransigence. Disagreement between the EC and member states has typically focused on the EFSA, which acts as scientific authority to its policy client, the EC''s Directorate-General for Consumer Health and Protection. The EFSA''s central responsibility for risk assessment effectively makes it the EC''s scientific authority for GM policy, and it is the risk science of the EFSA''s GM panel that has been publicly disputed in member states'' justifications of their Article 23 prohibitions.Disputed science is crucial in disagreements over GMOs, but the dispute is not limited to facts revealed by researchIn September 2009, EC President José Manuel Barroso urged a reconsideration of the EU constitutional principle of subsidiarity in GMO policy: “It should be possible to combine a Community authorisation system, based on science, with freedom for Member States to decide whether or not they wish to cultivate GM crops on their territory” (Barroso, 2009). In July 2010, the EC (2010) proposed amendments to Directive 2001/18 to create a formal basis for member states to restrict or prohibit the cultivation in their territory of GMOs authorized at the EU level. The EC proposal turns the existing situation on its head: instead of prohibitions only being permitted on the basis of potential risks to human health or the environment, the new proposal would allow bans only on “grounds other than those related to the assessment of the adverse effect on health and environment” (EC, 2010). The implication is that the EFSA adequately assesses health and environmental risks. Yet, this was, and remains, precisely the main issue for those member states that refuse to accept the scientific adequacy of EFSA authorizations.This separation of risk science from other concerns has been misinterpreted by some commentators as allowing EU member states to make “arbitrary” decisions, “without explanation” and “based on irrational criteria” (Sabalza et al, 2011). This ignores other rational grounds for decision-making—for example, socio-economic and/or ethical considerations. Moreover, it fails to recognize the contingencies that pervade risk assessment: that is, the possibility for divergent scientific assessments depending on different framing commitments, including the way such commitments define relevant factors, interpretive criteria and implicit burden-of-proof assumptions (Wynne, 1989; Stirling, 1998). The impossibility of separating scientific risk knowledge from normative questions, assumptions and commitments is neither a failing of that science nor those institutions. It is an unavoidable reality that needs to be addressed in an enlightened and accountable way.Disputed science is crucial in disagreements over GMOs, but the dispute is not limited to facts revealed by research. It is also about the normative commitments that scientists make and how these shape what are deemed to be salient and reliable facts; for example, the choices made concerning the relevant questions to ask, the appropriate methods to employ, the pertinent baselines for comparison and so on. The EC''s proposal embodies a confusion of risk science with an idealized model of pure scientific research unaffected by normative considerations, and which, therefore, supposedly speaks only in the singular voice of Nature. Thus the EC produces a framework that asserts that current scientific and regulatory institutions, namely the EFSA in this case, are sufficiently capable of exhaustively defining and assessing such risks in an impartial, objective and over-arching way. However, not only are there legitimate scientific differences in environmental, agronomic and health risk assessment situations across Europe, there are also unacknowledged social, ethical and political commitments embedded in the supposedly singular EC risk science (Brunk et al, 1991; EU, 2007). An unavoidable effect of this confusion is that member states'' legitimate differences with EFSA''s ‘science'' (which stands for EC–EU policy), are arbitrarily rendered ‘unscientific'' and illegitimate.The EC''s proposal embodies a confusion of risk science with an idealized model of pure scientific research…The conflation of risk, science and rationality into the combined position that risk represents the only legitimate ground for social concern, current scientific and regulatory institutions are capable of defining and assessing such risks in an impartial and objective way, and scientific risk assessment as performed by existing institutions is the only rational basis for decision-making, is arguably exactly the institutional mindset that has created the current paralysis in EU GMO regulation and policy, and therefore the need for reform. Thus the same mindset that created the paralysing conflict in the first place is informing the EC''s approach to revising legislation.At first sight, then, the EC''s proposal seems to be a positive move to accept different member state policies on GM cultivation, particularly as it includes socio-economic and/or ethical considerations as legitimate grounds for these. Closer examination, however, suggests that it might be a trap. The EC''s proposal attempts to create a rigid boundary between a supposed singular, objective, non-contingent and universal scientific knowledge on risk, and diverse ‘non-scientific'' social, ethical, religious and/or political concerns. This framing of a rigid division between the scientific and ‘non-scientific'', corresponding with a ‘rational (universal)'' over ‘irrational (local)'' standpoint, ignores that risk science is actually shaped by unacknowledged normative commitments and contingencies, which are manifested through uncertainty, ambiguity, indeterminacy and ignorance (Wynne, 1992; Brunk et al, 1991). This scientism as a form of politics undermines an enlightened, scientifically informed democratic cultureThe EC proposal draws on ideals of impartiality in research science (Daston & Galison, 2007; Lacey, 2005), but uses these to claim authority for what is a different knowledge culture, namely regulatory science (Jasanoff, 1990). The EC has been here before (Laurence & Wynne, 1989), and its stance seems to express that economic and political union is achievable through scientific authority—as if science can declare unionist policy ends as a revelation of Nature rather than as a reasonably argued but contestable human aim. This scientism as a form of politics undermines an enlightened, scientifically informed democratic culture.In April 2011, the Environment Committee of the EP recommended significant amendments to the EC''s proposal. These amendments allowed contextually variable definitions of environmental harm, recognized the intertwined character of nature and culture in agriculture, and acknowledged the significance of scientific uncertainties. In doing so, these proposed amendments permitted non-scientific as well as scientific reasons for bans by member states (Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety, 2011; Sidebar B). On 5 July 2011, the EP followed these recommendations and voted down the original EC proposal (EP, 2011).Sidebar B | Legal text of the EC legislative proposal and EP amendments
Original wording of the European Commission proposalArticle 26b“Member States may adopt measures restricting or prohibiting the cultivation of all or particular [genetically modified organisms, GMOs] […] in all or part of their territory, provided that:(a) those measures are based on grounds other than those related to the assessment of the adverse effect on health and environment which might arise from the deliberate release or the placing on the market of GMOs”.Amendments voted by the European Parliament“Member States may adopt, after a case-by-case examination, measures restricting or prohibiting the cultivation of particular GMOs or of groups of GMOs defined by crop or trait or of all GMOs […] in all or part of their territory, provided that:(a) those measures are based on(i) duly justified grounds relating to local or regional environmental impacts which might arise from the deliberate release or placing on the market of GMOs, and which are complementary to the environmental impacts examined during the scientific assessment of the impacts on the environment conducted under Part C of this Directive [that is, by the EFSA]; or grounds relating to risk management. Those grounds may include:- the prevention of the development of pesticide resistance among weeds and pests;
- the invasiveness or persistence of a GM variety, or the possibility of interbreeding with domestic cultivated or wild plants;
- the prevention of negative impacts on the local environment caused by changes in agricultural practices linked to the cultivation of GMOs;
- the maintenance and development of agricultural practices which offer a better potential to reconcile production with ecosystem sustainability;
- the maintenance of local biodiversity, including certain habitats and ecosystems, or certain types of natural and landscape features;
- the absence or lack of adequate data concerning the potential negative impacts of the release of GMOs on the local or regional environment of a Member State, including on biodiversity;
- the impracticability or the high costs of coexistence measures or the impossibility of implementing coexistence measures due to specific geographical conditions such as small islands or mountain zones;
- the need to protect the diversity of agricultural production; or
- the need to ensure seed purity;
153.
R. L. Wynne 《BMJ (Clinical research ed.)》1947,1(4502):528-529
154.
155.
It is widely accepted that the kinetochore is built on CENP-A–marked centromeric chromatin in a hierarchical order from inner to outer kinetochore. Recruitment of many kinetochore proteins depends on microtubule attachment status, but it remains unclear how their assembly/disassembly is orchestrated. Applying 3D structured illumination microscopy to Xenopus laevis egg extracts, here we reveal that in the absence of microtubule attachment, proteins responsible for lateral attachment and spindle checkpoint signaling expand to form micrometer-scale fibrous structures over CENP-A–free chromatin, whereas a core module responsible for end-on attachment (CENP-A, CENP-T, and Ndc80) does not. Both outer kinetochore proteins (Bub1, BubR1, Mad1, and CENP-E) and the inner kinetochore component CENP-C are integral components of the expandable module, whose assembly depends on multiple mitotic kinases (Aurora B, Mps1, and Plx1) and is suppressed by protein phosphatase 1. We propose that phospho-dependent coexpansion of CENP-C and outer kinetochore proteins promotes checkpoint signal amplification and lateral attachment, whereas their selective disassembly enables the transition to end-on attachment. 相似文献
156.
J. Darley Wynne 《BMJ (Clinical research ed.)》1904,1(2265):1243-1245
157.
158.
Persistence of an Escherichia coli-Shigella flexneri Hybrid in the Intestinal Tract of Macaca mulatta
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A live oral vaccine prepared from an Escherichia coli-Shigella flexneri 4b hybrid was administered by gavage to Macaca mulatta. In the three main studies involving 160 monkeys, three doses were used, generally consisting of 5 x 10(9) to 60 x 10(9) cells per dose, with an interval between doses of 6, 7, or 14 days. Rectal swab cultures at the time of the last vaccine dose, and 14 to 58 days later, revealed that the hybrid persisted in the intestinal tract for at least 7 days in 16%, and for at least 21 days in 8%, of the monkeys. Our findings are comparable to those of Formal et al. for shedding of an E. coli-S. flexneri 2a hybrid. Protection studies with the E. coli-S. flexneri 4b hybrid are indicated. 相似文献
159.
Bullwhip and mini-bullwhip cells are unconventional types of retinal neurons that utilize the neuropeptides glucagon, glucagon-like peptide 1 (GLP1) and substance P. These cells have been implicated in regulating the proliferation of neural progenitors in the circumferential marginal zone (CMZ) of the chicken retina. The purpose of this study was to investigate the roles of the bullwhip cells in regulating ocular size and shape. We found that intravitreal delivery of colchicine at postnatal day 7 destroys the vast majority (approximately 98%) of the bullwhip and mini-bullwhip cells and their peptidergic terminals that are concentrated in the CMZ near the equator of the eye. Interestingly, colchicine-treatment resulted in excessive ocular growth that involved the expansion of equatorial diameter, but not axial length. Intraocular injections of glucagon completely prevented the equatorial expansion that occurs with colchicine-treatment. In eyes with undamaged retinas, exogenous glucagon suppressed equatorial eye growth, whereas glucagon receptor antagonists caused excessive equatorial growth. Furthermore, visual stimuli that increase or decrease rates of ocular growth caused a down- or up-regulation, respectively, of the immediate early gene Egr1 in the bullwhip cells; indicating that the activity of the bullwhip cells is regulated by growth-guiding visual cues. We found that the glucagon receptor was expressed by cells in the fibrous and cartilaginous sclera in equatorial regions of the eye. Taken together, these findings suggest that glucagon peptide released from the terminals of the bullwhip and mini-bullwhip cells regulates the growth of the equatorial sclera in a vision-dependent manner. Although the bullwhip and mini-bullwhip cells are not abundant, less than 1000 cells per retina, their influence on the development of the eye is substantial and includes vision-guided ocular growth. 相似文献
160.