Evaluation of an alternative IMS dissociation procedure for use with Method 1622: detection of Cryptosporidium in water

U.S. EPA Methods 1622 and 1623 are used to detect and quantify Cryptosporidium oocysts in water. The protocol consists of filtration, immunomagnetic separation (IMS), staining with a fluorescent antibody, and microscopic analysis. Microscopic analysis includes detection by fluorescent antibody and confirmation by the demonstration of 1-4 sporozoites or nuclei after staining with 4',6-diamidino-2-phenyl indole dihydrochloride (DAPI). The purpose of this study was to evaluate a new IMS dissociation, a 10-min incubation at 80 degrees C. Heat dissociation improved the average oocyst recovery from 41% to 71% in seeded reagent water, and from 10% to 51% in seeded river samples. The average DAPI confirmation rate improved from 49% to 93% in reagent water, and from 48% to 73% in river samples. This modification improved both oocyst recovery and confirmation.     

Prion protein gene polymorphisms in Saccharomyces cerevisiae

The yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae genome encodes several proteins that, in laboratory strains, can take up a stable, transmissible prion form. In each case, this requires the Asn/Gln-rich prion-forming domain (PrD) of the protein to be intact. In order to further understand the evolutionary significance of this unusual property, we have examined four different prion genes and their corresponding PrDs, from a number of naturally occurring strains of S. cerevisiae. In 4 of the 16 strains studied we identified a new allele of the SUP35 gene (SUP35delta19) that contains a 19-amino-acid deletion within the N-terminal PrD, a deletion that eliminates the prion property of Sup35p. In these strains a second prion gene, RNQ1, was found to be highly polymorphic, with eight different RNQ1 alleles detected in the six diploid strains studied. In contrast, for one other prion gene (URE2) and the sequence of the NEW1 gene encoding a PrD, no significant degree of DNA polymorphism was detected. Analysis of the naturally occurring alleles of RNQ1 and SUP35 indicated that the various polymorphisms identified were associated with DNA tandem repeats (6, 12, 33, 42 or 57 bp) within the coding sequences. The expansion and contraction of DNA repeats within the RNQ1 gene may provide an evolutionary mechanism that can ensure rapid change between the [PRION+] and [prion-] states.     

The 5' stem-loop regulates expression of collagen alpha1(I) mRNA in mouse fibroblasts cultured in a three-dimensional matrix

The stability of collagen α1(I) mRNA is regulated by its 5′ stem–loop, which binds a cytoplasmic protein in a cap-dependent manner, and its 3′-untranslated region (UTR), which binds αCP. When cultured in a three-dimensional gel composed of type I collagen, mouse fibroblasts had decreased collagen α1(I) mRNA steady-state levels, which resulted from a decreased mRNA half-life. In cells cultured in gel, hybrid mouse–human collagen α1(I) mRNA with a wild-type 5′ stem–loop decayed faster than the same mRNA with a mutated stem–loop. When the 5′ stem–loop was placed in a heterologous mRNA, the mRNA accumulated to a lower level in cells grown in gel than in cells grown on plastic. This suggests that the 5′ stem–loop down-regulates collagen α1(I) mRNA. Protein binding to the 5′ stem–loop was reduced in cells grown in gel, which was associated with destabilization of the collagen α1(I) mRNA. In addition to the binding of a cytoplasmic protein, there was also a nuclear binding activity directed to the collagen α1(I) 5′ stem–loop. The nuclear binding was increased in cells grown in gel, suggesting that it may negatively regulate expression of collagen α1(I) mRNA. Binding of αCP, a protein involved in stabilization of collagen α1(I) mRNA, was unchanged by the culture conditions.     

Rnq1: an epigenetic modifier of protein function in yeast

Two protein-based genetic elements (prions) have been identified in yeast. It is not clear whether other prions exist, nor is it understood how one might find them. We established criteria for searching protein databases for prion candidates and found several. The first examined, Rnq1, exists in distinct, heritable physical states, soluble and insoluble. The insoluble state is dominant and transmitted between cells through the cytoplasm. When the prion-like region of Rnq1 was substituted for the prion domain of Sup35, the protein determinant of the prion [PSI+], the phenotypic and epigenetic behavior of [PSI+] was fully recapitulated. These findings identity Rnq1 as a prion, demonstrate that prion domains are modular and transferable, and establish a paradigm for identifying and characterizing novel prions.     

Analysis of plastid DNA-like sequences within the nuclear genomes of higher plants

A wide-ranging examination of plastid (pt)DNA sequence homologies within higher plant nuclear genomes (promiscuous DNA) was undertaken. Digestion with methylation-sensitive restriction enzymes and Southern analysis was used to distinguish plastid and nuclear DNA in order to assess the extent of variability of promiscuous sequences within and between plant species. Some species, such as Gossypium hirsutum (cotton), Nicotiana tabacum (tobacco), and Chenopodium quinoa, showed homogenity of these sequences, while intraspecific sequence variation was observed among different cultivars of Pisum sativum (pea), Hordeum vulgare (barley), and Triticum aestivum (wheat). Hypervariability of plastid sequence homologies was identified in the nuclear genomes of Spinacea oleracea (spinach) and Beta vulgaris (beet), in which individual plants were shown to possess a unique spectrum of nuclear sequences with ptDNA homology. This hypervariability apparently extended to somatic variation in B. vulgaris. No sequences with ptDNA homology were identified by this method in the nuclear genome of Arabidopsis thaliana.      

The Ubiquitin Proteasome System Plays a Role in Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus Infection

Many viruses have been implicated in utilizing or modulating the Ubiquitin Proteasome System (UPS) to enhance viral multiplication and/or to sustain a persistent infection. The mosquito-borne Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus (VEEV) belongs to the Togaviridae family and is an important biodefense pathogen and select agent. There are currently no approved vaccines or therapies for VEEV infections; therefore, it is imperative to identify novel targets for therapeutic development. We hypothesized that a functional UPS is required for efficient VEEV multiplication. We have shown that at non-toxic concentrations Bortezomib, a FDA-approved inhibitor of the proteasome, proved to be a potent inhibitor of VEEV multiplication in the human astrocytoma cell line U87MG. Bortezomib inhibited the virulent Trinidad donkey (TrD) strain and the attenuated TC-83 strain of VEEV. Additional studies with virulent strains of Eastern equine encephalitis virus (EEEV) and Western equine encephalitis virus (WEEV) demonstrated that Bortezomib is a broad spectrum inhibitor of the New World alphaviruses. Time-of-addition assays showed that Bortezomib was an effective inhibitor of viral multiplication even when the drug was introduced many hours post exposure to the virus. Mass spectrometry analyses indicated that the VEEV capsid protein is ubiquitinated in infected cells, which was validated by confocal microscopy and immunoprecipitation assays. Subsequent studies revealed that capsid is ubiquitinated on K48 during early stages of infection which was affected by Bortezomib treatment. This study will aid future investigations in identifying host proteins as potential broad spectrum therapeutic targets for treating alphavirus infections.     

Multigeneration Cross Contamination of Mail with Bacillus Species Spores by Tumbling

In 2001, envelopes loaded with Bacillus anthracis spores were mailed to Senators Daschle and Leahy as well as to the New York Post and NBC News buildings. Additional letters may have been mailed to other news agencies because there was confirmed anthrax infection of employees at these locations. These events heightened the awareness of the lack of understanding of the mechanism(s) by which objects contaminated with a biological agent might spread disease. This understanding is crucial for the estimation of the potential for exposure to ensure the appropriate response in the event of future attacks. In this study, equipment to simulate interactions between envelopes and procedures to analyze the spread of spores from a “payload” envelope (i.e., loaded internally with a powdered spore preparation) onto neighboring envelopes were developed. Another process to determine whether an aerosol could be generated by opening contaminated envelopes was developed. Subsequent generations of contaminated envelopes originating from a single payload envelope showed a consistent two-log decrease in the number of spores transferred from one generation to the next. Opening a tertiary contaminated envelope resulted in an aerosol containing 10³ B. anthracis spores. We developed a procedure for sampling contaminated letters by a nondestructive method aimed at providing information useful for consequence management while preserving the integrity of objects contaminated during the incident and preserving evidence for law enforcement agencies.In September and October of 2001, letters containing Bacillus anthracis spores were distributed through the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), resulting in contamination of the mail processing and distribution center in Hamilton, NJ, as well as affiliated processing centers in Washington, DC, in New York City, NY, and in Wallingford, CT, as well as postal facilities along the path transited by letters mailed to a targeted media company in Florida. Subsequently, 22 individuals, including postal workers, persons who received or handled the contaminated letters, and persons exposed to environments contaminated by the letters, developed cases of anthrax, including both the inhalation and cutaneous forms of the disease (5, 18-20). Five of these cases of anthrax resulted in death (4, 7). There have been investigations into the relationships of infection and exposure in areas where known exposures occurred (1, 6, 8). However, for two of the individuals who developed inhalational anthrax, an elderly woman in Connecticut and a nurse in New York City, no B. anthracis spores were detected (based on environmental sampling) on their mail or in their homes (2, 17, 19, 20). A third individual, a bookkeeper from New Jersey, survived a cutaneous anthrax infection, and only a single positive environmental sample in her workplace was identified (19).For the three specific cases mentioned above, the authors of the corresponding studies hypothesized that infection may have resulted from exposure to mail cross contaminated by mail that went through the same sorting equipment around the time that the letters to Senators Leahy and Daschle were processed. Without evidence of B. anthracis spores in their homes and other areas they were known to have frequented and the lack of additional cases in these geographic areas, there is no way to confirm the route of their exposure. We hypothesize that these people may have been exposed by inhaling spores released from envelopes that they tore open and then discarded. The delay between exposure and disease would have been sufficient to permit the discarded items to enter into the solid waste or recycling stream, and any residual spores may have been removed by normal housekeeping activities. Alternatively, the true source of exposure may have been undetectable due to a low concentration of spores.Those cases of anthrax raise the question of what, if any, hazards may have been encountered in handling mail with secondary and tertiary contamination. These cases raise particular questions concerning the ability of disease-causing organisms to spread through cross contamination of second- and even third-generation fomites in sufficient numbers to cause infection and possible death.Following the attacks, numerous studies were conducted in the contaminated postal buildings to assess the degree of contamination and to better understand sampling methodologies. Subsequent laboratory studies have been performed to improve B. anthracis sample collection and detection (11, 16, 22, 24, 30). Programs have monitored aerosols within federal buildings, hospitals, and mail facilities (10, 15, 25, 27). Additionally, studies of mail sorting machinery and the potential of this machinery to cross contaminate mail have been done (3, 10). However, to date, no laboratory studies that examined the potential for cross contamination of mail through contact or mixing with contaminated letters have been published.Reaerosolization in general is a poorly studied phenomenon. Characterization of reaerosolization under a variety of circumstances was undertaken following the B. anthracis incidents in 2001 (21, 29). The concept of fomite-to-fomite transference of powdered pathogen residues has been even less well studied.The settling of a primary aerosol comprised of charged particles may be due at least in part to an increase in the mass of these charged particles that occurs when they interact with oppositely charged particles. Once deposited on a surface, several factors may act against reaerosolization. Charged particles that have interacted with oppositely charged particles and have effectively increased in mass may be substantially more difficult to entrain in an aerosol than the initial particles. For charged particles that have not interacted with other particles, there may be a direct electrostatic interaction between the charged particle and the surface on which it has landed which would tend to hold these particles onto the surface. Both of these effects should reduce the potential for reaerosolization.Particulate preparations have a variety of properties, such as hydrophobicity, zeta potential, particle shape, and other characteristics that may also affect the potential for reaerosolization. It would be interesting to characterize a large number of powders, to create a database of the characteristics and their potential for aerosol formation and reaerosolization of these powders, and to use this database of information for comparison of unknown powders. Knowing this information may assist in the public health and risk management decision making processes. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive database for these characteristics, nor is there any well-accepted unifying theory for deriving the likelihood of reaerosolization from the characteristics of powders that are commonly measured. In addition, there may be unknown variables that have an impact on aerosolization or reaerosolization that become known over time with improvements in understanding the theory of aerosolization and technology for measurement of these variables. A further confounding factor would be the inability to collect this information from the actual material used in any incident. In the case of the 2001 attacks (and likely in future incidents), there was (and will likely be) little material available for such study. The material used in the attacks is inherently hazardous and must be handled in highly controlled settings. The material is therefore difficult and expensive to work with (23). Material used in an attack is also generally sequestered as evidentiary material, and information concerning preparation of a biological weapon used in an attack may be considered too sensitive for public release. This sensitivity may include unwillingness to provide access to information on the efficacy of a specific preparation method to malevolent individuals and the requirement to preserve information for use in successful identification and prosecution of the perpetrator of such an attack. However, it may be possible to collect fomites contaminated with trace amounts of the agent in the course of public health investigations. The current study details a method for dealing with these contaminated fomites to yield information useful for public health protection.A confounding factor in these cases may be the necessity to treat as much of the available bulk material as can be collected as evidence. As evidence, even small amounts of this material may not be available for scientific testing. There may also be restrictions on the handling and treatment of fomites contaminated with residual traces of biological threat agents. For instance, the owners of the fomites may value them highly and may not wish to see them destroyed in the hope that the object may be somehow decontaminated and returned or the owner may wish to prevent public disclosure of the nature or contents of a contaminated object, such as a letter. It is therefore incumbent upon researchers to develop methods that are as minimally invasive and destructive as possible to investigate the potential for fomite-to-fomite transmission.We constructed a device designed to expose uncontaminated fomites to envelopes bearing a powdered preparation of spores or to fomites that had been exposed to other fomites contaminated by the initial powder-bearing envelope. Specifically, fomites used in this study were envelopes containing a piece of paper. This device was designed to conduct the exposure in a consistent, reproducible manner and to allow investigation of the interaction and cross contamination that might be encountered between a “payload” letter (a letter that had been loaded internally with a powdered spore preparation) and other pieces of mail. Uncontaminated envelopes were tumbled with a single envelope containing a payload of milled Bacillus atrophaeus subsp. globigii spores. After tumbling three successive generations of envelopes, CFU counts from the outsides of the envelopes were taken. These estimates of spore loads on the outside of these envelopes may be compared to published human 50% lethal dose (LD₅₀) estimates for aerosolized B. anthracis spores (12, 13). An additional series of envelopes was exposed to envelopes that had been contaminated during this first round of exposures, and those envelopes were found to be externally contaminated as well. We also studied opening an envelope that had been exposed to a payload envelope with either a finger or a letter opener to determine if these activities caused an aerosolization or reaerosolization of a sufficient number of spores to pose a risk of disease through inhalation.It is difficult to balance the concerns of making information public during a public health response and providing sufficient information for information risk management decision making while at the same time preserving the evidence for use by law enforcement agencies for eventual prosecution of individuals accused of committing crimes. We identified a nondestructive procedure by which contaminated mail can be analyzed and biological material collected while still preserving evidence for law enforcement agencies, allowing the payload envelope to be used as evidence while still permitting an assessment of its biological contaminant burden.