When the Background Matters: Using Scenarios from Integrated Assessment Models in Prospective Life Cycle Assessment

Prospective life cycle assessment (LCA) needs to deal with the large epistemological uncertainty about the future to support more robust future environmental impact assessments of technologies. This study proposes a novel approach that systematically changes the background processes in a prospective LCA based on scenarios of an integrated assessment model (IAM), the IMAGE model. Consistent worldwide scenarios from IMAGE are evaluated in the life cycle inventory using ecoinvent v3.3. To test the approach, only the electricity sector was changed in a prospective LCA of an internal combustion engine vehicle (ICEV) and an electric vehicle (EV) using six baseline and mitigation climate scenarios until 2050. This case study shows that changes in the electricity background can be very important for the environmental impacts of EV. Also, the approach demonstrates that the relative environmental performance of EV and ICEV over time is more complex and multifaceted than previously assumed. Uncertainty due to future developments manifests in different impacts depending on the product (EV or ICEV), the impact category, and the scenario and year considered. More robust prospective LCAs can be achieved, particularly for emerging technologies, by expanding this approach to other economic sectors beyond electricity background changes and mobility applications as well as by including uncertainty and changes in foreground parameters. A more systematic and structured composition of future inventory databases driven by IAM scenarios helps to acknowledge epistemological uncertainty and to increase the temporal consistency of foreground and background systems in LCAs of emerging technologies.     

Taxonomy and nomenclature of five hitherto inadequately-known genera of mealybugs (Homoptera: Coccoidea: Pseudococcidae)

Abstract The type-species of four genera of Pseudococcidae are studied. Fonscolombia Lichtenstein is redefined, the type-species, Fonscolombia graminis Lichtenstein is assigned to the Pseudococcidae, redescribed and a lectotype designated. Laboulbenia Lichtenstein is accepted as an objective synonym of Antonina Signoret. Tetrura Lichtenstein ( non : Lesson) is accepted as an objective synonym of Coccura Sulc. The adult female of the material of this species which Lichtenstein misidentified as Tetrura rubi (Schrank) is redescribed and illustrated. Brevennia Goux is redefined, and the type-species Ripersia (Brevennia) tetrapora Goux redescribed. The characteristics of Asphodelococcus Morrison are discussed, the type-species Ripersia asphodeli Bodenheimer redescribed and a neotype designated; A.meoconcitae Tranfaglia & Marotta is a new synonym of A. asphodeli .     

Mind Architecture and Brain Architecture

The use of the computer metaphor has led to the proposal of mind architecture (Pylyshyn 1984; Newell 1990) as a model of the organization of the mind. The dualist computational model, however, has, since the earliest days of psychological functionalism, required that the concepts mind architecture and brain architecture be remote from each other. The development of both connectionism and neurocomputational science, has sought to dispense with this dualism and provide general models of consciousness – a uniform cognitive architecture –, which is in general reductionist, but which retains the computer metaphor. This paper examines, in the first place, the concepts of mind architecture and brain architecture, in order to evaluate the syntheses which have recently been offered. It then moves on to show how modifications which have been made to classical functionalist mind architectures, with the aim of making them compatible with brain architectures, are unable to resolve some of the most serious problems of functionalism. Some suggestions are given as to why it is not possible to relate mind structures and brain structures by using neurocomputational approaches, and finally the question is raised of the validity of reductionism in a theory which sets out to unite mind and brain architectures.