Modeling evolutionary dynamics of epigenetic mutations in hierarchically organized tumors

The cancer stem cell (CSC) concept is a highly debated topic in cancer research. While experimental evidence in favor of the cancer stem cell theory is apparently abundant, the results are often criticized as being difficult to interpret. An important reason for this is that most experimental data that support this model rely on transplantation studies. In this study we use a novel cellular Potts model to elucidate the dynamics of established malignancies that are driven by a small subset of CSCs. Our results demonstrate that epigenetic mutations that occur during mitosis display highly altered dynamics in CSC-driven malignancies compared to a classical, non-hierarchical model of growth. In particular, the heterogeneity observed in CSC-driven tumors is considerably higher. We speculate that this feature could be used in combination with epigenetic (methylation) sequencing studies of human malignancies to prove or refute the CSC hypothesis in established tumors without the need for transplantation. Moreover our tumor growth simulations indicate that CSC-driven tumors display evolutionary features that can be considered beneficial during tumor progression. Besides an increased heterogeneity they also exhibit properties that allow the escape of clones from local fitness peaks. This leads to more aggressive phenotypes in the long run and makes the neoplasm more adaptable to stringent selective forces such as cancer treatment. Indeed when therapy is applied the clone landscape of the regrown tumor is more aggressive with respect to the primary tumor, whereas the classical model demonstrated similar patterns before and after therapy. Understanding these often counter-intuitive fundamental properties of (non-)hierarchically organized malignancies is a crucial step in validating the CSC concept as well as providing insight into the therapeutical consequences of this model.     

Complexity and dynamics of HIV-1 quasispecies

The human immunodeficiency virus type 1 (HIV-1) envelope glycoproteins mediate virus entry into target cells by binding receptors of the cell membrane and fusing viral and cellular structures. In particular, recent crystallographic studies have clarified the complex role of the glycoprotein gp120 in the early phase of the infection. In this context the inter- and intra-host variability of the HIV-1 gp120 poses a major problem for the development of effective methods of immunization against this virus. In the present report, the relevant aspects emerging from the study of HIV-1 variability are addressed and several methodological approaches to evaluate HIV-1 diversity discussed.     

Modeling adaptive regulatory T-cell dynamics during early HIV infection

Regulatory T-cells (Tregs) are a subset of CD4(+) T-cells that have been found to suppress the immune response. During HIV viral infection, Treg activity has been observed to have both beneficial and deleterious effects on patient recovery; however, the extent to which this is regulated is poorly understood. We hypothesize that this dichotomy in behavior is attributed to Treg dynamics changing over the course of infection through the proliferation of an 'adaptive' Treg population which targets HIV-specific immune responses. To investigate the role Tregs play in HIV infection, a delay differatial equation model was constructed to examine (1) the possible existence of two distinct Treg populations, normal (nTregs) and adaptive (aTregs), and (2) their respective effects in limiting viral load. Sensitivity analysis was performed to test parameter regimes that show the proportionality of viral load with adaptive regulatory populations and also gave insight into the importance of downregulation of CD4(+) cells by normal Tregs on viral loads. Through the inclusion of Treg populations in the model, a diverse array of viral dynamics was found. Specifically, oscillatory and steady state behaviors were both witnessed and it was seen that the model provided a more accurate depiction of the effector cell population as compared with previous models. Through further studies of adaptive and normal Tregs, improved treatments for HIV can be constructed for patients and the viral mechanisms of infection can be further elucidated.     

HIV quasispecies dynamics during pro-active treatment switching: impact on multi-drug resistance and resistance archiving in latent reservoirs

The human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) can be suppressed by highly active anti-retroviral therapy (HAART) in the majority of infected patients. Nevertheless, treatment interruptions inevitably result in viral rebounds from persistent, latently infected cells, necessitating lifelong treatment. Virological failure due to resistance development is a frequent event and the major threat to treatment success. Currently, it is recommended to change treatment after the confirmation of virological failure. However, at the moment virological failure is detected, drug resistant mutants already replicate in great numbers. They infect numerous cells, many of which will turn into latently infected cells. This pool of cells represents an archive of resistance, which has the potential of limiting future treatment options. The objective of this study was to design a treatment strategy for treatment-naive patients that decreases the likelihood of early treatment failure and preserves future treatment options. We propose to apply a single, pro-active treatment switch, following a period of treatment with an induction regimen. The main goal of the induction regimen is to decrease the abundance of randomly generated mutants that confer resistance to the maintenance regimen, thereby increasing subsequent treatment success. Treatment is switched before the overgrowth and archiving of mutant strains that carry resistance against the induction regimen and would limit its future re-use. In silico modelling shows that an optimal trade-off is achieved by switching treatment at days after the initiation of antiviral therapy. Evaluation of the proposed treatment strategy demonstrated significant improvements in terms of resistance archiving and virological response, as compared to conventional HAART. While continuous pro-active treatment alternation improved the clinical outcome in a randomized trial, our results indicate that a similar improvement might also be reached after a single pro-active treatment switch. The clinical validity of this finding, however, remains to be shown by a corresponding trial.     

Multi-species evolutionary dynamics

Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of mutations and natural selection has mostly been addressed through the use of the continuously stable strategy (CSS) concept for species evolutionary games in which strategies are drawn from a continuum, and by the adaptive trait dynamics method. We address the issue of dynamical attainability of an ESS in coevolving species through the use of the concept of an ESNIS. It is shown that the definition of an ESNIS coalition for coevolving species is not in general equivalent to other definitions for CSS given in the literature. We show under some additional conditions that, in a dynamic system which involves the strategies of a dimorphic ESNIS coalition and at most two strategies that are not members of ESNIS coalition, the ESNIS coalition will emerge as the winner. In addition an ESNIS will be approached because of the invasion structure of strategies in its neighborhood. This proves that under the above conditions an ESNIS has a better chance of being attained than a strategy coalition which is a CSS. The theory developed is applied to a class of coevolutionary game models with Lotka–Volterra type interactions and we show that for such models, an ESS coalition will be dynamically attainable through mutations and natural selection if the ESS coalition is also an ESNIS coalition.Co-ordinating editor: Metz     

Single species evolutionary dynamics

Not long after the introduction of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) concept, it was noticed that dynamic selection did not always lead to the establishment of the ESS. The concept of continuously stable strategy (CSS) was thereafter developed. It was generally accepted that dynamic selection leads to the establishment of an ESS if it is a CSS. Examination of an evolutionary stability concept which is called neighborhood invader strategy (NIS) shows that it may be impossible for an ESS to be established through dynamic selection even if it is a CSS and no polymorphisms occur. We will examine the NIS concept and its implications for two evolutionary game models: root-shoot allocation in plant competition and Lotka–Volterra competition. In the root-shoot model we show that an ESS will be attained through dynamic selection if it is a NIS. Similarly for the Lotka–Volterra model, we show that an ESS will be attained through dynamic selection even if protected dimorphisms occur during the evolutionary process if it is an NIS.     

Temporal fluctuations in HIV quasispecies in vivo are not reflected by sequential HIV isolations

A genetic study has been made of the HIV tat gene from sequential HIV-1 isolates and the corresponding infected peripheral blood mononuclear cells. DNA was amplified by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) and cloned into a eukaryotic expression vector. Twenty clones were sequenced from each sample. Comparing the sequential HIV isolates, abrupt differences were seen between the major forms of each isolate. These progressive changes were not reflected at all among the in vitro samples. The fluctuation in the quasispecies in vivo may suggest a much more dynamic role for latently infected mononuclear cells. High frequencies of functionally defective tat genes were identified. Given such complexity and the evident differences between quasispecies in vivo and in vitro, the task of defining HIV infection in molecular terms will be difficult.     

Modeling social and evolutionary games

When game theory was introduced to biology, the components of classic game theory models were replaced with elements more befitting evolutionary phenomena. The actions of intelligent agents are replaced by phenotypic traits; utility is replaced by fitness; rational deliberation is replaced by natural selection. In this paper, I argue that this classic conception of comprehensive reapplication is misleading, for it overemphasizes the discontinuity between human behavior and evolved traits. Explicitly considering the representational roles of evolutionary game theory brings to attention areas of overlap that are often neglected, and so a range of evolutionary possibilities that are often overlooked. The clarifications this analysis provides are well illustrated by-and particularly valuable for-game theoretic treatments of the evolution of social behavior.     

Game dynamics and evolutionary transitions

An evolutionary model based on the Taylor-Jonker game dynamics is presented. A set of strategies is compatible if there exists a dynamical equilibrium between its members and there is an evolutionary transition to another compatible set if new mutant strategies bring about a passage to another equilibrium. We apply these concepts to supergame strategies, which play repeatedly a given matrix game and at each time step choose their pure strategy according to the preceding moves of the opponent. We investigate the patterns of evolution in zero-sum games, games of partnership, the prisoner's dilemma and the hawkdove game.     

Stochastic tunnels in evolutionary dynamics

We study a situation that arises in the somatic evolution of cancer. Consider a finite population of replicating cells and a sequence of mutations: type 0 can mutate to type 1, which can mutate to type 2. There is no back mutation. We start with a homogeneous population of type 0. Mutants of type 1 emerge and either become extinct or reach fixation. In both cases, they can generate type 2, which also can become extinct or reach fixation. If mutation rates are small compared to the inverse of the population size, then the stochastic dynamics can be described by transitions between homogeneous populations. A "stochastic tunnel" arises, when the population moves from all 0 to all 2 without ever being all 1. We calculate the exact rate of stochastic tunneling for the case when type 1 is as fit as type 0 or less fit. Type 2 has the highest fitness. We discuss implications for the elimination of tumor suppressor genes and the activation of genetic instability. Although our theory is developed for cancer genetics, stochastic tunnels are general phenomena that could arise in many circumstances.     

Error correction of next-generation sequencing data and reliable estimation of HIV quasispecies

Next-generation sequencing technologies can be used to analyse genetically heterogeneous samples at unprecedented detail. The high coverage achievable with these methods enables the detection of many low-frequency variants. However, sequencing errors complicate the analysis of mixed populations and result in inflated estimates of genetic diversity. We developed a probabilistic Bayesian approach to minimize the effect of errors on the detection of minority variants. We applied it to pyrosequencing data obtained from a 1.5-kb-fragment of the HIV-1 gag/pol gene in two control and two clinical samples. The effect of PCR amplification was analysed. Error correction resulted in a two- and five-fold decrease of the pyrosequencing base substitution rate, from 0.05% to 0.03% and from 0.25% to 0.05% in the non-PCR and PCR-amplified samples, respectively. We were able to detect viral clones as rare as 0.1% with perfect sequence reconstruction. Probabilistic haplotype inference outperforms the counting-based calling method in both precision and recall. Genetic diversity observed within and between two clinical samples resulted in various patterns of phenotypic drug resistance and suggests a close epidemiological link. We conclude that pyrosequencing can be used to investigate genetically diverse samples with high accuracy if technical errors are properly treated.     

The evolutionary dynamics of endogenous retroviruses

Endogenous retroviruses (ERVs) are vertically transmitted intragenomic elements derived from integrated retroviruses. ERVs can proliferate within the genome of their host until they either acquire inactivating mutations or are lost by recombinational deletion. We present a model that unifies current knowledge of ERV biology into a single evolutionary framework. The model predicts the possible long-term outcomes of retroviral germline infection and can account for the variable patterns of observed ERV genetic diversity. We hope the model will provide a useful framework for understanding ERV evolution, enabling the testing of evolutionary hypotheses and the estimation of parameters governing ERV proliferation.     

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics on two levels

We consider a population that is subdivided into groups. Individuals reproduce proportional to their fitness. When a group reaches a certain size it has a probability to split into two groups while another group is eliminated. In this stochastic process, the number of groups is constant, while the total population size fluctuates between well-defined bounds. We calculate the fixation probability of newly introduced mutants under constant selection. We show that the described population structure acts as a suppressor of selection compared to an unstructured population of the same size. The maximum suppression of selection is obtained, when the number of groups equals the number of individuals per group. We also study opposing selection on two or more levels by analysing the evolutionary dynamics of hierarchically embedded Moran processes.     

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity

Evolutionary game theory is the study of frequency-dependent selection. The success of an individual depends on the frequencies of strategies that are used in the population. We propose a new model for studying evolutionary dynamics in games with a continuous strategy space. The population size is finite. All members of the population use the same strategy. A mutant strategy is chosen from some distribution over the strategy space. The fixation probability of the mutant strategy in the resident population is calculated. The new mutant takes over the population with this probability. In this case, the mutant becomes the new resident. Otherwise, the existing resident remains. Then, another mutant is generated. These dynamics lead to a stationary distribution over the entire strategy space. Our new approach generalizes classical adaptive dynamics in three ways: (i) the population size is finite; (ii) mutants can be drawn non-locally and (iii) the dynamics are stochastic. We explore reactive strategies in the repeated Prisoner''s Dilemma. We perform ‘knock-out experiments’ to study how various strategies affect the evolution of cooperation. We find that ‘tit-for-tat’ is a weak catalyst for the emergence of cooperation, while ‘always cooperate’ is a strong catalyst for the emergence of defection. Our analysis leads to a new understanding of the optimal level of forgiveness that is needed for the evolution of cooperation under direct reciprocity.     

The evolutionary dynamics of grammar acquisition

Grammar is the computational system of language. It is a set of rules that specifies how to construct sentences out of words. Grammar is the basis of the unlimited expressibility of human language. Children acquire the grammar of their native language without formal education simply by hearing a number of sample sentences. Children could not solve this learning task if they did not have some pre-formed expectations. In other words, children have to evaluate the sample sentences and choose one grammar out of a limited set of candidate grammars. The restricted search space and the mechanism which allows to evaluate the sample sentences is called universal grammar. Universal grammar cannot be learned; it must be in place when the learning process starts. In this paper, we design a mathematical theory that places the problem of language acquisition into an evolutionary context. We formulate equations for the population dynamics of communication and grammar learning. We ask how accurate children have to learn the grammar of their parents' language for a population of individuals to evolve and maintain a coherent grammatical system. It turns out that there is a maximum error tolerance for which a predominant grammar is stable. We calculate the maximum size of the search space that is compatible with coherent communication in a population. Thus, we specify the conditions for the evolution of universal grammar.     

The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations provide a new framework for studying selection of traits with frequency-dependent fitness. Recently, a "one-third law" of evolutionary dynamics has been described, which states that strategy A fixates in a B-population with selective advantage if the fitness of A is greater than that of B when A has a frequency 13. This relationship holds for all evolutionary processes examined so far, from the Moran process to games on graphs. However, the origin of the "number"13 is not understood. In this paper we provide an intuitive explanation by studying the underlying stochastic processes. We find that in one invasion attempt, an individual interacts on average with B-players twice as often as with A-players, which yields the one-third law. We also show that the one-third law implies that the average Malthusian fitness of A is positive.     

The evolutionary dynamics of self-incompatibility systems

Self-incompatible flowering plants reject pollen that expresses the same mating specificity as the pistil (female reproductive tract). In most plant families, pollen and pistil mating specificities segregate as a single locus, the S locus. In at least two self-incompatibility systems, distinct pollen and pistil specificity genes are embedded in an extensive nonrecombining tract. To facilitate consideration of how new S locus specificities arise in systems with distinct pollen and pistil genes, we present a graphical model for the generation of hypotheses. It incorporates the evolutionary principle that nonreciprocal siring success (cross-pollinations between two plants produce seeds in only one direction) tends to favor the rejecting partner. This model suggests that selection within S-allele specificity classes could accelerate the rate of nonsynonymous (amino acid-changing) substitutions, with periodic selective sweeps removing segregating variation within classes. Accelerated substitution within specificity classes could also promote the origin of new S-allele specificities.