The asynchrony of consciousness.

We present below a simple hypothesis on what we believe is a characteristic of visual consciousness. It is derived from facts about the visual brain revealed in the past quarter of a century, but it relies most especially on psychophysical evidence which shows that different attributes of the visual scene are consciously perceived at different times. This temporal asynchrony in visual perception reveals, we believe, a plurality of visual consciousnesses that are asynchronous with respect to each other, reflecting the modular organization of the visual brain. We further hypothesize that when two attributes (e.g. colour and motion) are presented simultaneously, the activity of cells in a given processing system is sufficient to create a conscious experience of the corresponding attribute (e.g. colour), without the necessity for interaction with the activities of cells in other processing systems (e.g. motion). Thus, any binding of the activity of cells in different systems should be more properly thought of as a binding of the conscious experiences generated in each system.     

The neural correlate of consciousness

I propose that we are only aware of changes in our underlying cognition. This hypothesis is based on four lines of evidence. (1) Without changes in visual input (including fixational eye movements), static images fade from awareness. (2) Consciousness appears to be continuous, but is actually broken up into discrete cycles of cognition. Without continuity, conscious awareness disintegrates into a series of isolated cycles. The simplest mechanism for creating continuity is to track the changes between the cycles. (3) While these conscious vectors are putative, they have a clear source: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC). The DLPFC is active during awareness of changes, and this awareness is disrupted by repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation. (4) When the DLPFC and the orbital and inferior parietal cortices are deactivated during dreaming, conscious awareness is absent even though the rest of the brain is active. Moreover, Lau and Passingham showed that activation of the DLPFC, but no other brain region, correlates with awareness. In summary, if the DLPFC and conscious vectors are the neural correlate of consciousness, then we are only aware of changes in our underlying cognition. The glue that holds conscious awareness together is conscious awareness.     

The transmission sense of information

Biologists rely heavily on the language of information, coding, and transmission that is commonplace in the field of information theory developed by Claude Shannon, but there is open debate about whether such language is anything more than facile metaphor. Philosophers of biology have argued that when biologists talk about information in genes and in evolution, they are not talking about the sort of information that Shannon’s theory addresses. First, philosophers have suggested that Shannon’s theory is only useful for developing a shallow notion of correlation, the so-called “causal sense” of information. Second, they typically argue that in genetics and evolutionary biology, information language is used in a “semantic sense,” whereas semantics are deliberately omitted from Shannon’s theory. Neither critique is well-founded. Here we propose an alternative to the causal and semantic senses of information: a transmission sense of information, in which an object X conveys information if the function of X is to reduce, by virtue of its sequence properties, uncertainty on the part of an agent who observes X. The transmission sense not only captures much of what biologists intend when they talk about information in genes, but also brings Shannon’s theory back to the fore. By taking the viewpoint of a communications engineer and focusing on the decision problem of how information is to be packaged for transport, this approach resolves several problems that have plagued the information concept in biology, and highlights a number of important features of the way that information is encoded, stored, and transmitted as genetic sequence.     

The voluntary regulation of consciousness levels

A capability for voluntary regulation of the intensity of spontaneous mental verbal associations (without external feedback) was found in several persons from 28 examined subjects. Due to this capability, these persons could control the level of consciousness and voluntary produce the corresponding EEG changes from the EEG enhancement to substantial decrease in its power (to appearance of the flattened EEG).     

Time of consciousness, consciousness of time

Time shapes our behavior: we must estimate the duration of events in our environment in order to anticipate changes and time our activity in function of these changes. However, there is no sensory modality devoted to the perception of time, therefore the question is to know which mechanisms underlie the consciousness that time flows and allow us to estimate time precisely. This article proposes a brief overview of psychological, neuropsychological and brain imaging studies which rely on theoretical models postulating the existence of an internal timer. These studies examine the different components--time base, counter and memory--of this timer: particularly they are aimed at characterising the relationships between the evolution of these components with age or their pathological alterations and changes in temporal judgements. They also attempt to specify the neural bases of these components. From this brief overview comes the idea that, if an internal timer exits, it does not mark objective time but a multitude of subjective times.     

The neuronal basis for consciousness.

Attempting to understand how the brain, as a whole, might be organized seems, for the first time, to be a serious topic of inquiry. One aspect of its neuronal organization that seems particularly central to global function is the rich thalamocortical interconnectivity, and most particularly the reciprocal nature of the thalamocortical neuronal loop function. Moreover, the interaction between the specific and non-specific thalamic loops suggests that rather than a gate into the brain, the thalamus represents a hub from which any site in the cortex can communicate with any other such site or sites. The goal of this paper is to explore the basic assumption that large-scale, temporal coincidence of specific and non-specific thalamic activity generates the functional states that characterize human cognition.     

The "bright spot of consciousness"

I.P. Pavlov considered consciousness as an area of optimum excitability moving over the human cerebral cortex depending on the character of performed mental activity. Contemporary methods of computer analysis of electrical activity and brain thermal production have allowed to turn this metaphor into experimentally observed reality. It is shown that preservation of connections of cortical gnostic zones with verbal structures of the left hemisphere is the obligatory condition for consciousness functioning. These data reinforce the determination of consciousness as operation with knowledge, which by means of words, mathematic symbols and art images can be transmitted to other people. Communicative origin of consciousness creates possibility of mental dialogue with oneself, i.e. leads to the appearance of self-consciousness of the personality.     

The evolution of man's sense of time

It is shown that in the evolution of man's «sense of time» the conceptDATE played an important role. Inthe first part of the paper, time concepts, such as present, period, duration, change and date, are related to each other in a conceptualstructure, which is represented bothgraphically and by means ofpropositions. That conceptual structure also illustrates the relationship of the concepts of time to theflow of time in theevolution of the cosmos and of life on earth. This flow of time is measured by means of the date concept. In thesecond part, the limited «sense of time» of apes is analyzed. The ability of apes to project their experiences intoforesights of the future is illustrated graphically in a conceptual structure. In thethird part, it is shown that man has the additional ability tochoose from such foresights aplan for the future. Plans are made by assigning a specificdate to future time. The relationship between foresights, plans and dates is also illustrated in a conceptual structure. Finally, thefourth part discusses how man's ability to assign dates to the flow of time evolved simultaneously with his hunting activities and with his faculty to communicate by means of language.