REVIEW ARTICLE: Maurice Godelier in the Company of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Emmanuelle Loyer

ABSTRACT

This article takes the occasion of the publication of two lengthy volumes about the life and work of Claude Lévi-Strauss to assess certain elements of Maurice Godelier’s Marxist encounter with structuralism. While providing an overall view of each book, and the way they speak to each other, I also explore particular dimensions of Godelier’s engagement with Lévi-Strauss, including in relation to Godelier’s attempt to introduce psychoanalysis into his Marxist-structuralist equations. Four broad themes are addressed: the horizontal and vertical dimensions of kinship as alliance and descent; domination and the so-called ‘exchange of women’; Godelier’s limited appeal to Freud, especially in relation to his near occlusion of Lacan; and Godelier’s ‘suspicious’ humanist relationship to sacred belief as ideological illusion. This last matter leads to a concluding section which, drawing on Loyer’s biography, contrasts Godelier’s version of late Enlightenment humanism with what was arguably the more radically expanded humanism of the mature Lévi-Strauss.     

Introduction: Reclaiming Paradigms Lost

This introduction is a critical response to claims made about the demise and revival of the sub‐discipline of kinship studies. Contemporary calls to a reclaimed and revitalised area rest, ironically, on a misplaced concentration on the preoccupations of dominant cultures, one of the grounds used to discard kinship in the past. It is argued that many of the issues debated up to the 1970s in the domain of kinship involve more general problems such as arguments about structure and process, gender and biology and the way in which indigenous categories are to be apprehended and accommodated in a genuinely comparative discipline. The case is also made that kinship's demise is largely an Anglocentric phenomenon and that the continuing importance of many of the issues debated in the past, such as the relationship between people and land and its local ideological representations and global consequences, make knowledge of kinship's more exotic manifestations vital to contemporary graduates. The final section introduces the papers in the volume, each of which addresses, in a contemporary and critical way, an area that was important to previous kinship debates and remains of interest in the present.     

Gouldian arguments and the sources of contingency

‘Gouldian arguments’ appeal to the contingency of a scientific domain to establish that domain’s autonomy from some body of theory. For instance, pointing to evolutionary contingency, Stephen Jay Gould suggested that natural selection alone is insufficient to explain life on the macroevolutionary scale. In analysing contingency, philosophers have provided source-independent accounts, understanding how events and processes structure history without attending to the nature of those events and processes. But Gouldian Arguments require source-dependent notions of contingency. An account of contingency is source-dependent when it is indexed to (1) some pattern (i.e., microevolution or macroevolution) and (2) some process (i.e., Natural Selection, species sorting, etc.). Positions like Gould’s do not turn on the mere fact of life’s contingency—that life’s shape could have been different due to its sensitivity to initial conditions, path-dependence or stochasticity. Rather, Gouldian arguments require that the contingency is due to particular kinds of processes: in this case, those which microevolutionary theory cannot account for. This source-dependent perspective clarifies both debates about the nature and importance of contingency, and empirical routes for testing Gould’s thesis.     

Maori hapuu and their History

Current research by historians and lawyers in Maori land and fisheries claims is broaching issues of Maori kinship calling for renewed social anthropological research. In this essay I review the history of social anthropological research in Maori kinship through 1975, a lapse in this research until the late 1980s, and a recent revival. A central problem of this research has been the conceptualisation of Maori hapuu (‘subtribes’) or cognatic descent groups. A critique of the recent analyses suggests that the early failure of social anthropologists to understand hapuu in historical context continues, although in different theoretical forms. The burgeoning research by historians and lawyers, while lacking fundamental anthropological insights, suggests that hapuu cannot be separated from their specific history.     

Refusing to Sing: Gender,Kinship and Patriliny in Macedonia

The issue of whether formal kinship structures and sentiments reflect the reality of social relations was of particular concern to specialists at the height of the kinship debates in the 1960s and 1970s, as it continues to be in some contemporary studies. So too, the classifications ‘patrilineal’ or ‘matrilineal’ have clearly been shown to be problematic given that there are multiple levels of discourse and relational and ideational realities in any given society. For many contemporary kinship specialists in fact no simple correlation can be made between type of descent system and actual social relations, especially relations between men and women. However, some anthropologists continue to argue that patrilineal kinship systems are somehow indicative of control or domination by men or, put inversely, of women's lack of power and authority. It is argued in this paper that even where the formal kinship structures and ideological discourses are dominated by agnation as appears to be the case in south Slav societies generally, and Macedonian in particular, this is not automatically mirrored in gender relations between men and women. In short, there is a long leap from patriliny to patriarchy.     

ONTOLOGY OR PHENOMENOLOGY? HOW THE LVAD CHALLENGES THE EUTHANASIA DEBATE

This article deals with the euthanasia debate in light of new life‐sustaining technologies such as the left ventricular assist device (LVAD). The question arises: does the switching off of a LVAD by a doctor upon the request of a patient amount to active or passive euthanasia, i.e. to ‘killing’ or to ‘letting die’? The answer hinges on whether the device is to be regarded as a proper part of the patient's body or as something external. We usually regard the switching off of an internal device as killing, whereas the deactivation of an external device is seen as ‘letting die’. The case is notoriously difficult to decide for hybrid devices such as LVADs, which are partly inside and partly outside the patient's body. Additionally, on a methodological level, I will argue that the ‘ontological’ arguments from analogy given for both sides are problematic. Given the impasse facing the ontological arguments, complementary phenomenological arguments deserve closer inspection. In particular, we should consider whether phenomenologically the LVAD is perceived as a body part or as an external device. I will support the thesis that the deactivation of a LVAD is to be regarded as passive euthanasia if the device is not perceived by the patient as a part of the body proper.     

RETRACTED ARTICLE: Comment on Anthropology: Why it Matters

We, the Editors and Publisher of Anthropological Forum, have retracted the following article:

Maurice Godelier (2019) Comment on Anthropology: Why it Matters, Anthropological Forum, DOI:10.1080/00664677.2019.1615255

Due to some communication issues, another version of this review has been published elsewhere. Accordingly, this version of the review has been retracted from publication.

We have been informed in our decision-making by our policy on publishing ethics and integrity and the COPE guidelines on retractions.

The retracted article will remain online to maintain the scholarly record, but it will be digitally watermarked on each page as “Retracted”.     

Kinship and Cooperation

Chagnon’s analysis of a well-known axe fight in the Yanomamö village of Mishimishiböwei-teri (Chagnon and Bugos 1979) is among the earliest empirical tests of kin selection theory for explaining cooperation in humans. Kin selection theory describes how cooperation can be organized around genetic kinship and is a fundamental tool for understanding cooperation within family groups. Previous analysis on groups of cooperative Lamaleran whale hunters suggests that the role of genetic kinship as a principle for organizing cooperative human groups could be less important in certain cases than previously thought (Alvard Human Nature 14:129–163, 2003b). Evidence that supports a strong role for genetic kinship—groups are found to be more related than expected by chance—may be spurious because of the correlation between social structure and genetic kinship. Reanalysis of Chagnon’s data using matrix regression techniques, however, confirms that genetic kinship was the primary organizing principle in the axe fight; affinal relations were also important, whereas lineage identity explained nothing.     

Senegalese immigrant families’ ‘regroupement’ in France and the im/possibility of reconstituting family across multiple temporalities and spatialities

This paper interrogates the structural conditions, macropolitics and governmentality of family ‘regroupement’ in France in an era of shifting immigration policies in Europe and the imaginative possibilities that Senegalese immigrants exercise to maintain family and kinship ties with those left behind. It argues that while the need to maintain ties from diasporic locations is mediated by policies, material and emotive transnational practices, the materiality of displacement as well as the state's politics of immigration render more elusive possibilities of maintaining family in situ. What tensions and creative strategies emerge? How is ‘home’, the primordial site of family structure, reimagined and reconstituted? Taking into account state's politics and immigrants’ entrapment within multiple spheres of power and their active agency as determinants, this paper uncovers how displacement gives rise to multiple ruptures while simultaneously motivating a search for active agency to reconstruct and reimagine kinship, family and conjugality across multiple temporalities and spatialities.     

Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide.     

Surfing the third wave of whiteness studies: reflections on Twine and Gallagher

The influential special issue and overview essay co-edited and co-authored respectively, by Winddance Twine and Charles Gallagher, set out their interpretation of whiteness studies’ genealogy, development and future. In this essay I identify their arguments and critique them in the light of a further eight years’ work on the racialization of white identities produced by the global academy. Particular attention is paid to the proliferation of micro studies about an ever-increasing array of sites, both in thematic and international terms, and to the corpus’ addressing of power relations. Moreover, I underscore Twine and Gallagher’s prescience on the strand of the work they review that bears on the racial project of recuperating white supremacy in a variety of ways, a project that is enjoying heightened visibility in 2016.     

Reply to dickemann

This paper is a response to Dickemann’s review ofPedophilia: Biosocial Dimensions. Her main criticism of the book is its inappropriate application of ethology to human sexology and its natural variations. She proposes instead the superiority of the “social constructionist” perspective. The “Phylogenetic Fallacy” of which her review speaks results from her erroneously having attributed ethological arguments about the phylogeny of coordinated motor patterns and sensory releasing stimuli to higher levels of behavioral-ecological strategies to which such arguments were never applied. Because no convincingly adaptive function of human pedophilia could be found at this higher level, as a working hypothesis, variant erotic age and gender orientations were both tentatively conceptualized as by-products of Darwinian natural selection for heterosexual “adultophilia.” The social and political implications of this perspective, when compared to social constructionism, are discussed.     

Enjeux psychosociaux du don de sperme: le point de vue des couples

The French national debate, which took place during the review of bioethical laws, concerns the issue of anonymity of gametes donations, among other questions. More specifically, the debate was focused on sperm donations in which numerous arguments have advocated for a partial opening of sperm donor’s anonymity. But what about couples who are implicated in donation programs? What do they want? What sort of practical changes occur for receiving couples in countries which take away the donor’s anonymity? Our article presents some results of recent social psychological research conducted on a significant sample of French receiving couples. Results focus as much on their experience and their intention to share the secret of conception through sperm donation, as on specific aspects of this type of donation and its defining legislative principles in France. Finally, we question the organizing principles of their stand regarding donator’s anonymity and the convergence of parental strategies in dissident legal frameworks, through the lens of international scientific literature.     

When ‘blood speaks’: naming the father and the mystics of kinship in Dominica,Eastern Caribbean

This article explores the mystical implication of fathers in reproduction in Dominica, Eastern Caribbean. It traces naming acts that assign paternity at various points in the filial life course, each attempting to disambiguate paternity. Confronting a recurring anthropological problematic – the problem of paternity (paternity's inherent putativity) – the article argues that Dominicans contest uncertain physical fatherhood through the proverb ‘blood speaks’. The article elaborates how relatedness reveals itself in the subtle bodies of kin at three moments: through a local version of the couvade (‘sympathetic pregnancy’); in elders’ post-partum ritual scrutiny of children's bodies for familial resemblances; and during serendipitous encounters in later life. The article highlights how physical fatherhood is disclosed in fathers’ and children's symptoms, appearances, and sensations, revealing their kinship in transpersonal terms. Therefore, blood ‘speaks’ to counter broad-brushed narratives of Caribbean fatherly absence by revealing the physical and spiritual significance of fatherhood. Herein, the article revives classic anthropological debates on legitimacy, the couvade, and Caribbean kinship, whilst contributing to contemporary theorizations of blood and naming.     

Autonomy,Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.     

Complexity,adaptive complexity and the Creative View of natural selection

In this paper, I respond to arguments proposed by Brunnander in this journal issue concerning my position regarding the Creative View of natural selection (Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Brunnander argues that (i) the Creative View we defend does not serve to answer William Paley’s question because (ii) Paley’s question is “why there are complex things rather than simple ones” and (iii) natural selection cannot answer this question. Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) defend a Non-creative View of natural selection (sensu Razeto-Barry & Frick, 2011). Here I claim that Brunnander’s arguments for (iii) are mistaken and I also argue that even accepting (iii) we do not have to accept (i), given that statement (ii) is historically and conceptually flawed. Thus here I analyze Paley’s question from a historical point of view and from a contemporary perspective in a quest for the potential conceptual relevance of Paley’s question today. In this vein I argue that from a contemporary point of view statement (iii) may be correct but for different reasons than those adduced by Brunnander.     

Statistical consistency and phylogenetic inference: a brief review

The claim that parsimony can be statistically inconsistent remains the chief criticism of the cladistic approach, and also the main justification for alternative model‐based approaches such as maximum likelihood and Bayesian inference. Despite its refutation in the 1980s, this persistent myth of parsimony's Achilles’ heel is entrenched in the primary literature, and has metastasized into textbooks, as well. Here, I review historical controversies, and offer three short arguments as to why statistical consistency is not only irrelevant to systematics, but to empirical science in general.