Evolution and persistence of obligate mutualists and exploiters: competition for partners and evolutionary immunization

Mutualisms are ubiquitous in nature, as is their exploitation by both conspecific and heterospecific cheaters. Yet, evolutionary theory predicts that cheating should be favoured by natural selection. Here, we show theoretically that asymmetrical competition for partners generally determines the evolutionary fate of obligate mutualisms facing exploitation by third-species invaders. When asymmetry in partner competition is relatively weak, mutualists may either exclude exploiters or coexist with them, in which case their co-evolutionary response to exploitation is usually benign. When asymmetry is strong, the mutualists evolve towards evolutionary attractors where they become extremely vulnerable to exploiter invasion. However, exploiter invasion at an early stage of the mutualism's history can deflect mutualists' co-evolutionary trajectories towards slightly different attractors that confer long-term stability against further exploitation. Thus, coexistence of mutualists and exploiters may often involve an historical effect whereby exploiters are co-opted early in mutualism history and provide lasting 'evolutionary immunization' against further invasion.     

The cancellation effect at the group level

Group selection models combine selection pressure at the individual level with selection pressure at the group level. Cooperation can be costly for individuals, but beneficial for the group, and therefore, if individuals are sufficiently much assorted, and cooperators find themselves in groups with disproportionately many other cooperators, cooperation can evolve. The existing literature on group selection generally assumes that competition between groups takes place in a well-mixed population of groups, where any group competes with any other group equally intensely. Competition between groups however might very well occur locally; groups may compete more intensely with nearby than with far-away groups. We show that if competition between groups is indeed local, then the evolution of cooperation can be hindered significantly by the fact that groups with many cooperators will mostly compete against neighboring groups that are also highly cooperative, and therefore harder to outcompete. The existing empirical method for determining how conducive a group structured population is to the evolution of cooperation also implicitly assumes global between-group competition, and therefore gives (possibly very) biased estimates.     

Siderophore-mediated cooperation and virulence in Pseudomonas aeruginosa

Why should organisms cooperate with each other? Helping close relatives that are likely to share the same genes (kin selection) is one important explanation that is likely to apply across taxa. The production of metabolically costly extracellular iron-scavenging molecules (siderophores) by microorganisms is a cooperative behaviour because it benefits nearby conspecifics. We review experiments focusing on the production of the primary siderophore (pyoverdin) of the opportunistic bacterial pathogen, Pseudomonas aeruginosa, which test kin selection theories that seek to explain the evolution of cooperation. First, cooperation is indeed favoured when individuals interact with their close relatives and when there is competition between groups of cooperators and noncooperators, such that the benefit of cooperation can be realized. Second, the relative success of cheats and cooperators is a function of their frequencies within populations. Third, elevated mutation rates can confer a selective disadvantage under conditions when cooperation is beneficial, because high mutation rates reduce how closely bacteria are related to each other. Fourth, cooperative pyoverdin production is also shown to be favoured by kin selection in vivo (caterpillars), and results in more virulent infections. Finally, we briefly outline ongoing and future work using this experimental system.     

The evolution of generalized reciprocity on social interaction networks

Generalized reciprocity (help anyone, if helped by someone) is a minimal strategy capable of supporting cooperation between unrelated individuals. Its simplicity makes it an attractive model to explain the evolution of reciprocal altruism in animals that lack the information or cognitive skills needed for other types of reciprocity. Yet, generalized reciprocity is anonymous and thus defenseless against exploitation by defectors. Recognizing that animals hardly ever interact randomly, we investigate whether social network structure can mitigate this vulnerability. Our results show that heterogeneous interaction patterns strongly support the evolution of generalized reciprocity. The future probability of being rewarded for an altruistic act is inversely proportional to the average connectivity of the social network when cooperators are rare. Accordingly, sparse networks are conducive to the invasion of reciprocal altruism. Moreover, the evolutionary stability of cooperation is enhanced by a modular network structure. Communities of reciprocal altruists are protected against exploitation, because modularity increases the mean access time, that is, the average number of steps that it takes for a random walk on the network to reach a defector. Sparseness and community structure are characteristic properties of vertebrate social interaction patterns, as illustrated by network data from natural populations ranging from fish to primates.     

Spatial invasion of cooperation

The evolutionary puzzle of cooperation describes situations where cooperators provide a fitness benefit to other individuals at some cost to themselves. Under Darwinian selection, the evolution of cooperation is a conundrum, whereas non-cooperation (or defection) is not. In the absence of supporting mechanisms, cooperators perform poorly and decrease in abundance. Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework to address the problem of cooperation using the prisoner's dilemma. One well-studied possibility to maintain cooperation is to consider structured populations, where each individual interacts only with a limited subset of the population. This enables cooperators to form clusters such that they are more likely to interact with other cooperators instead of being exploited by defectors. Here we present a detailed analysis of how a few cooperators invade and expand in a world of defectors. If the invasion succeeds, the expansion process takes place in two stages: first, cooperators and defectors quickly establish a local equilibrium and then they uniformly expand in space. The second stage provides good estimates for the global equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and defectors. Under hospitable conditions, cooperators typically form a single, ever growing cluster interspersed with specks of defectors, whereas under more hostile conditions, cooperators form isolated, compact clusters that minimize exploitation by defectors. We provide the first quantitative assessment of the way cooperators arrange in space during invasion and find that the macroscopic properties and the emerging spatial patterns reveal information about the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

Evolution of cooperative cross-feeding could be less challenging than originally thought

The act of cross-feeding whereby unrelated species exchange nutrients is a common feature of microbial interactions and could be considered a form of reciprocal altruism or reciprocal cooperation. Past theoretical work suggests that the evolution of cooperative cross-feeding in nature may be more challenging than for other types of cooperation. Here we re-evaluate a mathematical model used previously to study persistence of cross-feeding and conclude that the maintenance of cross-feeding interactions could be favoured for a larger parameter ranges than formerly observed. Strikingly, we also find that large populations of cross-feeders are not necessarily vulnerable to extinction from an initially small number of cheats who receive the benefit of cross-feeding but do not reciprocate in this cooperative interaction. This could explain the widespread cooperative cross-feeding observed in natural populations.     

Temporal Structure in Cooperative Interactions: What Does the Timing of Exploitation Tell Us about Its Cost?

Exploitation in cooperative interactions both within and between species is widespread. Although it is assumed to be costly to be exploited, mechanisms to control exploitation are surprisingly rare, making the persistence of cooperation a fundamental paradox in evolutionary biology and ecology. Focusing on between-species cooperation (mutualism), we hypothesize that the temporal sequence in which exploitation occurs relative to cooperation affects its net costs and argue that this can help explain when and where control mechanisms are observed in nature. Our principal prediction is that when exploitation occurs late relative to cooperation, there should be little selection to limit its effects (analogous to “tolerated theft” in human cooperative groups). Although we focus on cases in which mutualists and exploiters are different individuals (of the same or different species), our inferences can readily be extended to cases in which individuals exhibit mixed cooperative-exploitative strategies. We demonstrate that temporal structure should be considered alongside spatial structure as an important process affecting the evolution of cooperation. We also provide testable predictions to guide future empirical research on interspecific as well as intraspecific cooperation.     

For whom is it more beneficial to stop interactions with defectors: Cooperators or defectors?

Cooperation is a mysterious evolutionary phenomenon and its mechanisms require elucidation. When cooperators can stop interactions with defectors, the evolution of cooperation becomes possible; this is one mechanism that facilitates the evolution of cooperation. Here, stopping interactions with defectors is beneficial not only for cooperators but also for defectors. The question then arises, for whom is stopping interactions with defectors more beneficial: cooperators or defectors? By utilizing evolutionary game theory, I addressed this question using a two-player game involving four strategies: (1) cooperators who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector, (2) cooperators who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone, (3) defectors who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector, and (4) defectors who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone. Our results show that, at equilibrium, the ratio of cooperators who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector to cooperators who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone is larger than the ratio of defectors who stop the interaction if the current partner is a defector to defectors who attempt to maintain a relationship with anyone. Thus, cooperators rather than defectors are more likely to stop interactions with defectors at equilibrium. This result is consistent with a previous experimental study in which a positive correlation was detected between the degree of individuals’ cooperativeness and how accurately the individuals recognize whether other individuals are cooperators or defectors. Thus, the theoretical work presented in this study provides relevant insights into the natural phenomena of cooperation and recognition.     

Repression of competition favours cooperation: experimental evidence from bacteria

Repression of competition (RC) within social groups has been suggested as a key mechanism driving the evolution of cooperation, because it aligns the individual’s proximate interest with the interest of the group. Despite its enormous potential for explaining cooperation across all levels of biological organization, ranging from fair meiosis, to policing in insect societies, to sanctions in mutualistic interactions between species, there has been no direct experimental test of whether RC favours the spread of cooperators in a well‐mixed population with cheats. To address this, we carried out an experimental evolution study to test the effect of RC upon a cooperative trait – the production of iron‐scavenging siderophore molecules – in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We found that cooperation was favoured when competition between siderophore producers and nonsiderophore‐producing cheats was repressed, but not in a treatment where competition between the two strains was permitted. We further show that RC altered the cost of cooperation, but did not affect the relatedness among interacting individuals. This confirms that RC per se, as opposed to increased relatedness, has driven the observed increase in bacterial cooperation.     

Kin selection may inhibit the evolution of reciprocation

Kin selection and reciprocal cooperation provide two candidate explanations for the evolution of cooperation. Models of the evolution of cooperation have typically focussed on one or the other mechanism, despite claims that kin selection could pave the way for the evolution of reciprocal cooperation. We describe a computer simulation model that explicitly supports both kin selection and reciprocal cooperation. The model simulates a viscous population of discrete individuals with social interaction taking the form of the Prisoner's Dilemma and selection acting on performance in these interactions. We recount how the analytical and empirical study of this model led to the conclusion that kin selection may actually inhibit the evolution of effective strategies for establishing reciprocal cooperation.     

The social evolution of dispersal with public goods cooperation

Selection can favour the evolution of individually costly dispersal if this alleviates competition between relatives. However, conditions that favour altruistic dispersal also mediate selection for other social behaviours, such as public goods cooperation, which in turn is likely to mediate dispersal evolution. Here, we investigate – both experimentally (using bacteria) and theoretically – how social habitat heterogeneity (i.e. the distribution of public goods cooperators and cheats) affects the evolution of dispersal. In addition to recovering the well‐known theoretical result that the optimal level of dispersal increases with genetic relatedness of patch mates, we find both mathematically and experimentally that dispersal is always favoured when average patch occupancy is low, but when average patch occupancy is high, the presence of public goods cheats greatly alters selection for dispersal. Specifically, when public goods cheats are localized to the home patch, higher dispersal rates are favoured, but when cheats are present throughout available patches, lower dispersal rates are favoured. These results highlight the importance of other social traits in driving dispersal evolution.     

Proteases hold the key to an exclusive mutualism

Mutualisms, cooperative interactions between species, generally involve an economic exchange: species exchange commodities that are cheap for them to provide, for ones that cannot be obtained affordably or at all. But these associations can only succeed if effective partners can be enticed to interact. In some mutualisms, partners can actively seek one another out. However, plants, which use mutualists for a wide array of essential life history functions, do not have this option. Instead, natural selection has repeatedly favoured the evolution of rewards – nutritional substances (such as sugar‐rich nectar and fleshy fruit) with which plants attract certain organisms whose feeding activities can then be co‐opted for their own benefit. The trouble with rewards, however, is that they are usually also attractive to organisms that confer no benefits at all. Losing rewards to ‘exploiters’ makes a plant immediately less attractive to the mutualists it requires; if the reward cannot be renewed quickly (or at all), then mutualistic service is precluded entirely. Thus, it is in plants' interests to either restrict rewards to only the most beneficial partners or somehow punish or deter exploiters. Yet, at least in cases where the rewards are highly nutritious, we can expect counter‐selection for exploiter traits that permit them to skirt such control. How, then, can mutualisms persist? In this issue, Orona‐Tamayo et al. ( 2013 ) describe a remarkable adaptation that safeguards one particularly costly reward from nonmutualists. Their study helps to explain the evolutionary success of an iconic interaction and illuminates one way in which mutualism as a whole can persist in the face of exploitation.     

Invasion and expansion of cooperators in lattice populations: Prisoner's dilemma vs. snowdrift games

The evolution of cooperation is an enduring conundrum in biology and the social sciences. Two social dilemmas, the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game have emerged as the most promising mathematical metaphors to study cooperation. Spatial structure with limited local interactions has long been identified as a potent promoter of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma but in the spatial snowdrift game, space may actually enhance or inhibit cooperation. Here we investigate and link the microscopic interaction between individuals to the characteristics of the emerging macroscopic patterns generated by the spatial invasion process of cooperators in a world of defectors. In our simulations, individuals are located on a square lattice with Moore neighborhood and update their strategies by probabilistically imitating the strategies of better performing neighbors. Under sufficiently benign conditions, cooperators can survive in both games. After rapid local equilibration, cooperators expand quadratically until global saturation is reached. Under favorable conditions, cooperators expand as a large contiguous cluster in both games with minor differences concerning the shape of embedded defectors. Under less favorable conditions, however, distinct differences arise. In the prisoner's dilemma, cooperators break up into isolated, compact clusters. The compact clustering reduces exploitation and leads to positive assortment, such that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators than with defectors. In contrast, in the snowdrift game, cooperators form small, dendritic clusters, which results in negative assortment and cooperators interact more frequently with defectors than with other cooperators. In order to characterize and quantify the emerging spatial patterns, we introduce a measure for the cluster shape and demonstrate that the macroscopic patterns can be used to determine the characteristics of the underlying microscopic interactions.     

Three-way coexistence in obligate mutualist-exploiter interactions: the potential role of competition

Many mutualisms host "exploiter" species that consume the benefits provided by one or both mutualists without reciprocating. Exploiters have been widely assumed to destabilize mutualisms, yet they are common. We develop models to explore conditions for local coexistence of obligate plant/pollinating seed parasite mutualisms and nonpollinating exploiters. As the larvae of both pollinators and (at a later time) exploiters consume seeds, we examine the importance of intraspecific and (asymmetric) interspecific competition among and between pollinators and exploiters for achieving three-way coexistence. With weak intra- and interspecific competition, exploiters can invade the stable mutualism and coexist with the mutualists (either stably or with oscillations), provided the exploiters' intrinsic birthrate (b(E)) slightly exceeds that of the pollinators. At higher b(E), all three species go locally extinct. When facing strong interspecific competition, exploiters cannot invade and coexist with the mutualists if intraspecific competition in pollinators and exploiters is weak. However, strong intraspecific competition in pollinators and exploiters facilitates exploiter invasion and coexistence and greatly expands the range of b(E) over which stable coexistence occurs. Our results suggest that mutualist/exploiter coexistence may be more easily achieved than previously thought, thus highlighting the need for a better understanding of competition among and between mutualists and exploiters.     

Interaction effects of cell diffusion,cell density and public goods properties on the evolution of cooperation in digital microbes

Microbial cooperation typically consists in the sharing of secreted metabolites (referred to as public goods) within the community. Although public goods generally promote population growth, they are also vulnerable to exploitation by cheating mutants, which no longer contribute, but still benefit from the public goods produced by others. Although previous studies have identified a number of key factors that prevent the spreading of cheaters, little is known about how these factors interact and jointly shape the evolution of microbial cooperation. Here, we address this issue by investigating the interaction effects of cell diffusion, cell density, public good diffusion and durability (factors known to individually influence costs and benefits of public goods production) on selection for cooperation. To be able to quantify these effects across a wide parameter space, we developed an individual‐based simulation platform, consisting of digital cooperator and cheater bacteria inhabiting a finite two‐dimensional continuous toroidal surface. Our simulations, which closely mimic microbial microcolony growth, revealed that: (i) either reduced cell diffusion (which keeps cooperators together) or reduced public good diffusion (which keeps the public goods closer to the producer) is not only essential but also sufficient for cooperation to be promoted; (ii) the sign of selection for or against cooperation can change as a function of cell density and in interaction with diffusion parameters; and (iii) increased public goods durability has opposing effects on the evolution of cooperation depending on the level of cell and public good diffusion. Our work highlights that interactions between key parameters of public goods cooperation give rise to complex fitness landscapes, a finding that calls for multifactorial approaches when studying microbial cooperation in natural systems.     

Co‐evolutionary dynamics between public good producers and cheats in the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa

The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is cheating – the exploitation of public goods by nonproducing mutants. Here, we examine co‐evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron‐scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that cooperators managed to co‐exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co‐existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific adaptions to the co‐evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole‐genome resequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly pyoverdine‐signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we observed parallel evolution, where co‐existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions.     

An empirical test of partner choice mechanisms in a wild legume-rhizobium interaction

Mutualisms can be viewed as biological markets in which partners of different species exchange goods and services to their mutual benefit. Trade between partners with conflicting interests requires mechanisms to prevent exploitation. Partner choice theory proposes that individuals might foil exploiters by preferentially directing benefits to cooperative partners. Here, we test this theory in a wild legumerhizobium symbiosis. Rhizobial bacteria inhabit legume root nodules and convert atmospheric dinitrogen (N2) to a plant available form in exchange for photosynthates. Biological market theory suits this interaction because individual plants exchange resources with multiple rhizobia. Several authors have argued that microbial cooperation could be maintained if plants preferentially allocated resources to nodules harbouring cooperative rhizobial strains. It is well known that crop legumes nodulate non-fixing rhizobia, but allocate few resources to those nodules. However, this hypothesis has not been tested in wild legumes which encounter partners exhibiting natural, continuous variation in symbiotic benefit. Our greenhouse experiment with a wild legume, Lupinus arboreus, showed that although plants frequently hosted less cooperative strains, the nodules occupied by these strains were smaller. Our survey of wild-grown plants showed that larger nodules house more Bradyrhizobia, indicating that plants may prevent the spread of exploitation by favouring better cooperators.     

Co-evolution of behaviour and social network structure promotes human cooperation

The ubiquity of cooperation in nature is puzzling because cooperators can be exploited by defectors. Recent theoretical work shows that if dynamic networks define interactions between individuals, cooperation is favoured by natural selection. To address this, we compare cooperative behaviour in multiple but independent repeated games between participants in static and dynamic networks. In the latter, participants could break their links after each social interaction. As predicted, we find higher levels of cooperation in dynamic networks. Through biased link breaking (i.e. to defectors) participants affected their social environment. We show that this link-breaking behaviour leads to substantial network clustering and we find primarily cooperators within these clusters. This assortment is remarkable because it occurred on top of behavioural assortment through direct reciprocity and beyond the perception of participants, and represents a self-organized pattern. Our results highlight the importance of the interaction between ecological context and selective pressures on cooperation.     

Selection for restraint in competitive ability in spatial competition systems

The absence of 'super competitors' in nature is usually attributed to organisms facing trade-offs in resource allocation. Here we identify another mechanism, dependent on indirect interactions among species and non-random spatial organization, in which selection favours restraint in competitive ability. In simple spatial models of a three-species intransitive network, indirect interactions favour slower growth and selection limits the difference in growth rate among species. The mechanism involves a trade-off between selection at the individual level, which selects for increased growth rate, and at the community level, which acts to limit growth rate to less than the maximum possible. If the difference in growth rates among species becomes too large, then the community becomes unstable and collapses to a monoculture of the slowest growing species. The mechanism requires both the intransitive network structure and self-organized spatial structure in the system. Similar behaviours arise in more complex systems of more than three species, and where there are reversals in interaction outcomes between species pairs. The work suggests that spatial self-structuring, indirect interactions and selection acting on community properties can be important in evolution. It provides a partial explanation of the high level of species coexistence and apparent restraint in interspecific interactions evident in some assemblages of sessile marine colonial organisms.