Evolutionary naturalistic justifications of morality: A matter of faith and works

Robert Richards has presented a detailed defense of evolutionary ethics, a revised version of Darwin's views and a major modification of E. O. Wilson's. He contends that humans have evolved to seek the community welfare by acting altruistically. And since the community welfare is the highest moral good, humans ought to act altruistically. Richards asks us to take his empirical premises on faith and aims to show how they can justify an ethical conclusion. He identifies two necessary conditions for a naturalistic justification of morality (NJ): its premises (1) must be empirical and (2) concerned with morally relevant causal factors. I argue that these two conditions are insufficient. An NJ must also appeal to teleogical or teleonomic laws which identify proper effects and reliable causes of these effects. So I supplement biological faith with an NJ that I believe has a better chance of working since faith without works is dead.     

Corticotropin-releasing hormone: from endocrinology to psychobiology

Corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) is a brain neuropeptide which coordinates the endocrine, autonomic and behavioral responses to stress. We review the abnormal response to exogenous CRH in various psychiatric syndromes, including major depression and anorexia nervosa. We also contrast pituitary responses to CRH in patients with depression versus Cushing's disease. We hypothesize that CRH may play a role in the pathogenesis of various psychiatric syndromes which are characterized during their course by the symptom of depression.     

Evolutionary innovation: a bone-eating marine symbiosis

Symbiotic associations between microbes and invertebrates have resulted in some of the most unusual physiological and morphological adaptations that have evolved in the animal world. We document a new symbiosis between marine polychaetes of the genus Osedax and members of the bacterial group Oceanospirillales, known for heterotrophic degradation of complex organic compounds. These organisms were discovered living on the carcass of a grey whale at 2891 m depth in Monterey Canyon, off the coast of California. The mouthless and gutless worms are unique in their morphological specializations used to obtain nutrition from decomposing mammalian bones. Adult worms possess elaborate posterior root-like extensions that invade whale bone and contain bacteriocytes that house intracellular symbionts. Stable isotopes and fatty acid analyses suggest that these unusual endosymbionts are likely responsible for the nutrition of this locally abundant and reproductively prolific deep-sea worm.     

Evolutionary autonomous agents: a neuroscience perspective

In this article, I discuss the use of neurally driven evolutionary autonomous agents (EAAs) in neuroscientific investigations. Two fundamental questions are addressed. Can EAA studies shed new light on the structure and function of biological nervous systems? And can these studies lead to the development of new tools for neuroscientific analysis? The value and significant potential of EAA modelling in both respects is demonstrated and discussed. Although the study of EAAs for neuroscience research still faces difficult conceptual and technical challenges, it is a promising and timely endeavour.     

Behavioral endocrinology: lighting up peptidergic neurons that mediate a complex behavior

A recent study in which a calcium-sensitive fluorescent protein was expressed in transgenic Drosophila has shown that a command neuropeptide that turns on a complex behavioral sequence elicits a spatially and temporally complex pattern of neuropeptide signals.     

Evolutionary arguments against moral realism: Why the empirical details matter (and which ones do)

The aim of this article is to identify the strongest evolutionary debunking argument (EDA) against moral realism and to assess on which empirical assumptions it relies. In the recent metaethical literature, several authors have de-emphasized the evolutionary component of EDAs against moral realism: presumably, the success or failure of these arguments is largely orthogonal to empirical issues. I argue that this claim is mistaken. First, I point out that Sharon Street’s and Michael Ruse’s EDAs both involve substantive claims about the evolution of our moral judgments. Next, I argue that combining their respective evolutionary claims can help debunkers to make the best empirical case against moral realism. Some realists have argued that the very attempt to explain the contents of our endorsed moral judgments in evolutionary terms is misguided, and have sought to escape EDAs by denying their evolutionary premise. But realists who pursue this reply can still be challenged on empirical grounds: debunkers may argue that the best, scientifically informed historical explanations of our moral endorsements do not involve an appeal to mind-independent truths. I conclude, therefore, that the empirical considerations relevant for the strongest empirically driven argument against moral realism go beyond the strictly evolutionary realm; debunkers are best advised to draw upon other sources of genealogical knowledge as well.