Modularity, comparative cognition and human uniqueness

Darwin's claim 'that the difference in mind between man and the higher animals … is certainly one of degree and not of kind' is at the core of the comparative study of cognition. Recent research provides unprecedented support for Darwin's claim as well as new reasons to question it, stimulating new theories of human cognitive uniqueness. This article compares and evaluates approaches to such theories. Some prominent theories propose sweeping domain-general characterizations of the difference in cognitive capabilities and/or mechanisms between adult humans and other animals. Dual-process theories for some cognitive domains propose that adult human cognition shares simple basic processes with that of other animals while additionally including slower-developing and more explicit uniquely human processes. These theories are consistent with a modular account of cognition and the 'core knowledge' account of children's cognitive development. A complementary proposal is that human infants have unique social and/or cognitive adaptations for uniquely human learning. A view of human cognitive architecture as a mosaic of unique and species-general modular and domain-general processes together with a focus on uniquely human developmental mechanisms is consistent with modern evolutionary-developmental biology and suggests new questions for comparative research.     

In Defense of Some `Cartesian' Assumptions Concerning the Brain and Its Operation

I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland's bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by dynamical systems theory and situated robotics to the effect that cognitive activity does not involve representations. Both of these strands depend not only on a shift of emphasis from higher cognitive functions to things like sensorimotor processes, but also depend on a certain understanding of how sensorimotor processes are implemented - as closed-loop control systems. I describe a much more sophisticated model of sensorimotor processing that is not only more powerful and robust than simple closed-loop control, but for which there is great evidence that it is implemented in the nervous system. The is the emulation theory of representation, according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensorimotor counterfactuals. I then show that the emulation framework is immune to the radical arguments, and makes apparent why the brain is a component in the cognitive activity, and exactly what the representations are in sensorimotor control.     

Darwin in mind: new opportunities for evolutionary psychology

Evolutionary Psychology (EP) views the human mind as organized into many modules, each underpinned by psychological adaptations designed to solve problems faced by our Pleistocene ancestors. We argue that the key tenets of the established EP paradigm require modification in the light of recent findings from a number of disciplines, including human genetics, evolutionary biology, cognitive neuroscience, developmental psychology, and paleoecology. For instance, many human genes have been subject to recent selective sweeps; humans play an active, constructive role in co-directing their own development and evolution; and experimental evidence often favours a general process, rather than a modular account, of cognition. A redefined EP could use the theoretical insights of modern evolutionary biology as a rich source of hypotheses concerning the human mind, and could exploit novel methods from a variety of adjacent research fields.     

Transport of the ADP/ATP carrier of mitochondria from the TOM complex to the TIM22.54 complex.

Members of the mitochondrial carrier family such as the ADP/ATP carrier (AAC) are composed of three structurally related modules. Here we show that each of the modules contains a mitochondrial import signal recognized by Tim10 and Tim12 in the intermembrane space. The first and the second module are translocated across the outer membrane independently of the membrane potential, DeltaDeltapsipsi, but they are not inserted into the inner membrane. The third module interacts tightly with the TOM complex and thereby prevents complete translocation of the precursor across the outer membrane. At this stage, binding of a TIM9.10 complex confers a topology to the translocation intermediate which reflects the modular structure of the AAC. The precursor is then transferred to the TIM9.10.12 complex, still interacting with the TOM complex. Release of the precursor from the TOM complex and insertion into the inner membrane by the TIM22.54 complex requires a DeltaDeltapsipsi-responsive signal in the third module.     

Hebbian learning in parallel and modular memories

Many cognitive and sensorimotor functions in the brain involve parallel and modular memory subsystems that are adapted by activity-dependent Hebbian synaptic plasticity. This is in contrast to the multilayer perceptron model of supervised learning where sensory information is presumed to be integrated by a common pool of hidden units through backpropagation learning. Here we show that Hebbian learning in parallel and modular memories is more advantageous than backpropagation learning in lumped memories in two respects: it is computationally much more efficient and structurally much simpler to implement with biological neurons. Accordingly, we propose a more biologically relevant neural network model, called a tree-like perceptron, which is a simple modification of the multilayer perceptron model to account for the general neural architecture, neuronal specificity, and synaptic learning rule in the brain. The model features a parallel and modular architecture in which adaptation of the input-to-hidden connection follows either a Hebbian or anti-Hebbian rule depending on whether the hidden units are excitatory or inhibitory, respectively. The proposed parallel and modular architecture and implicit interplay between the types of synaptic plasticity and neuronal specificity are exhibited by some neocortical and cerebellar systems. Received: 13 October 1996 / Accepted in revised form: 16 October 1997     

Developmental objections to evolutionary modularity

Evolutionary psychologists argue that selective pressures in our ancestral environment yield a highly specialized set of modular cognitive capacities. However, recent papers in developmental psychology and neuroscience claim that evolutionary accounts of modularity are incompatible with the flexibility and plasticity of the developing brain. Instead, they propose cortical and neuronal brain structures are fixed through interactions with our developmental environment. Buller and Gray Hardcastle contend that evolutionary accounts of cognitive development are unacceptably rigid in light of evidence of cortical plasticity. The developing structure of the brain is both too random and too sensitive to external stimuli to be the product of a fixed genetic mechanism. They also claim that the complexity of the human brain cannot be explained in terms of our meager genetic endowment. There simply are not enough genes to program the intricate neuronal structures that are essential to cognition. I argue that neither of these arguments are persuasive. Small numbers of genes can function to determine diverse phenotypical outcomes through evolutionarily selected developmental systems. Similarly, theories of modularity do not rule out the possibility that innate cognitive systems exploit environmental regularities to guide the developing structure of the brain. Consequently, the anti-adaptionist consequences of these positions should be rejected.     

Identification of novel subunits of the TOM complex from Arabidopsis thaliana

The preprotein translocase of the outer mitochondrial membrane (also called TOM complex) from Arabidopsis thaliana was characterized by Blue-native gel electrophoresis (BN-PAGE) and Electrospray Tandem Mass Spectrometry (ESI-MS/MS). BN-PAGE allows to prepare a very stable 390 kDa complex that includes six different protein types: the 34 kDa translocation pore TOM40, the 21/23 kDa preprotein receptor TOM20, the small TOM component TOM7 and three further subunits of 10, 6.3 and 6.0 kDa. Primary structures of all TOM subunits were elucidated. The 10 kDa subunit represents a truncated version of the TOM22 preprotein receptor and the two 6 kDa proteins represent subunits possibly homologous to fungal TOM6 and TOM5, although sequence conservation is at the borderline of significance. TOM40, TOM7 and one or both of the 6 kDa subunits form a subcomplex of about 100 kDa. The six TOM proteins from Arabidopsis are encoded by 12 genes, at least 11 of which are expressed. While the subunit composition of the TOM complex from fungi, animals and plants is remarkably conserved, the domain structure of individual TOM proteins differs, e.g. acidic domains in TOM22 and the 6 kDa TOM subunits from Arabidopsis are absent. The domain structure of the Arabidopsis TOM complex does not support the so-called ‘acid chain hypothesis’, which explains the translocation of proteins across the outer mitochondrial membrane of mitochondria by the binding of preproteins to acidic protein domains within the TOM complex. Functional implications are discussed.     

Preprotein translocase of the outer mitochondrial membrane: reconstituted Tom40 forms a characteristic TOM pore

Tom40 is the central pore-forming component of the translocase of the outer mitochondrial membrane (TOM complex). Different views exist about the secondary structure and electrophysiological characteristics of Tom40 from Saccharomyces cerevisiae and Neurospora crassa. We have directly compared expressed and renatured Tom40 from both species and find a high content of beta-structure in circular dichroism measurements in agreement with refined secondary structure predictions. The electrophysiological characterization of renatured Tom40 reveals the same characteristics as the purified TOM complex or mitochondrial outer membrane vesicles, with two exceptions. The total conductance of the TOM complex and outer membrane vesicles is twofold higher than the total conductance of renatured Tom40, consistent with the presence of two TOM pores. TOM complex and outer membrane vesicles possess a strongly enhanced sensitivity to a mitochondrial presequence compared to Tom40 alone, in agreement with the presence of several presequence binding sites in the TOM complex, suggesting a role of the non-channel Tom proteins in regulating channel activity.     

A Modular Mind? A Test Using Individual Data from Seven Primate Species

It has long been debated whether the mind consists of specialized and independently evolving modules, or whether and to what extent a general factor accounts for the variance in performance across different cognitive domains. In this study, we used a hierarchical Bayesian model to re-analyse individual level data collected on seven primate species (chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, gorillas, spider monkeys, brown capuchin monkeys and long-tailed macaques) across 17 tasks within four domains (inhibition, memory, transposition and support). Our modelling approach evidenced the existence of both a domain-specific factor and a species factor, each accounting for the same amount (17%) of the observed variance. In contrast, inter-individual differences played a minimal role. These results support the hypothesis that the mind of primates is (at least partially) modular, with domain-specific cognitive skills undergoing different evolutionary pressures in different species in response to specific ecological and social demands.     

Endofin recruits TOM1 to endosomes

Endofin is an endosomal protein implicated in regulating membrane trafficking. It is characterized by the presence of a phosphatidylinositol 3-phosphate-binding FYVE domain positioned in the middle of the molecule. To determine its potential effectors or binding partners, we used the carboxyl-terminal half of endofin as bait to screen a human brain cDNA library in a yeast two-hybrid system. Three clones that encode TOM1 were recovered. TOM1 is a protein closely related to the VHS (VPS-27, Hrs, and STAM) domain-containing GGA family. Although the function of the GGAs in mediating Golgi to lysosomal trafficking is well established, the subcellular localization and function of TOM1 remain unknown. Glutathione S-transferase pull-down assays as well as co-immunoprecipitation experiments confirmed that the carboxyl-terminal half of endofin binds specifically to the carboxyl-terminal region of TOM1. Neither SARA nor Hrs, two other FYVE domain proteins, interact with this region of TOM1. Moreover, endofin does not interact with the analogous region of two other members of the TOM1 protein family, namely, TOM1-like 1 (TOM1-L1) or TOM1-like 2 (TOM1-L2). The carboxyl-terminal region of TOM1 was used as immunogen to generate TOM1-specific antibody. This antibody can distinguish TOM1 from the other family members as well as coimmunoprecipitate endogenous endofin. It also revealed the primarily cytosolic distribution of TOM1 in a variety of cell types by immunofluorescence analyses. In addition, sucrose density gradient analysis showed that both TOM1 and endofin can be detected in cellular compartments marked by the early endosomal marker EEA1. A marked recruitment of TOM1 to endosomes was observed in cells overexpressing endofin or its carboxyl-terminal fragment, indicating TOM1 to be an effector for endofin and suggesting a possible role for TOM1 in endosomal trafficking.     

Sculpting the Intrinsic Modular Organization of Spontaneous Brain Activity by Art

Artistic training is a complex learning that requires the meticulous orchestration of sophisticated polysensory, motor, cognitive, and emotional elements of mental capacity to harvest an aesthetic creation. In this study, we investigated the architecture of the resting-state functional connectivity networks from professional painters, dancers and pianists. Using a graph-based network analysis, we focused on the art-related changes of modular organization and functional hubs in the resting-state functional connectivity network. We report that the brain architecture of artists consists of a hierarchical modular organization where art-unique and artistic form-specific brain states collectively mirror the mind states of virtuosos. We show that even in the resting state, this type of extraordinary and long-lasting training can macroscopically imprint a neural network system of spontaneous activity in which the related brain regions become functionally and topologically modularized in both domain-general and domain-specific manners. The attuned modularity reflects a resilient plasticity nurtured by long-term experience.     

The Developmental Basis of Variational Modularity: Insights from Quantitative Genetics,Morphometrics, and Developmental Biology

Groups of correlated characters (variational modules) often are considered to be the result of dissociated local developmental factors, i.e., of a modular genotype–phenotype map. But certain sets of pleiotropic factors can equally well induce modular phenotypic variation—no local developmental factors are necessary for a modular covariance structure. It is thus not possible to infer genetic or developmental modularity from standing variation alone. Yet, only for approximately linear genotype–phenotype maps is the induced covariance structure stable over changes of the phenotypic mean. For larger genetic and phenotypic variation, such as on a macroevolutionary level, developmental effects often are nonlinear and variational modularity remains stable only when it is realized by local dissociated developmental factors with no overlap of pleiotropic ranges. The evo-devo concept of modularity concurs only at this macroevolutionary level with the quantitative notion of variational modularity. Empirical evidence on the genetic and developmental architecture underlying phenotypic variation is inconclusive and partly subject to methodological problems. Many studies seem to indicate modularized phenotypic variation and local clusters of QTL effects, whereas other studies find support for several alternative models of modularity and report continuous distributions of QTL effects. This inconsistency partly results from the neglect of spatial relationships among the measured traits. Given the complex development of higher organisms, a combination of pleiotropic factors and more local developmental effects with a hierarchical, overlapping, and more or less continuous distribution appears most likely.     

Protein import into mitochondria of Neurospora crassa

Biogenesis of mitochondria requires import of several hundreds of different nuclear-encoded preproteins needed for mitochondrial structure and function. Import and sorting of these preproteins is a multistep process facilitated by complex proteinaceous machineries located in the mitochondrial outer and inner membranes. The translocase of the mitochondrial outer membrane, the TOM complex, comprises receptors which specifically recognize mitochondrial preproteins and a protein conducting channel formed by TOM40. The TOM complex is able to insert resident proteins into the outer membrane and to translocate proteins into the intermembrane space. For import of inner membrane or matrix proteins, the TOM complex cooperates with translocases of the inner membrane, the TIM complexes. During the past 30 years, intense research on fungi enabled the identification and mechanistic characterization of a number of different proteins involved in protein translocation. This review focuses on the contributions of the filamentous fungus Neurospora crassa to our current understanding of mitochondrial protein import, with special emphasis on the structure and function of the TOM complex.     

Two Modular Forms of the Mitochondrial Sorting and Assembly Machinery Are Involved in Biogenesis of α-Helical Outer Membrane Proteins

The mitochondrial outer membrane contains two translocase machineries for precursor proteins—the translocase of the outer membrane (TOM complex) and the sorting and assembly machinery (SAM complex). The TOM complex functions as the main mitochondrial entry gate for nuclear-encoded proteins, whereas the SAM complex was identified according to its function in the biogenesis of β-barrel proteins of the outer membrane. The SAM complex is required for the assembly of precursors of the TOM complex, including not only the β-barrel protein Tom40 but also a subset of α-helical subunits. While the interaction of β-barrel proteins with the SAM complex has been studied in detail, little is known about the interaction between the SAM complex and α-helical precursor proteins. We report that the SAM is not static but that the SAM core complex can associate with different partner proteins to form two large SAM complexes with different functions in the biogenesis of α-helical Tom proteins. We found that a subcomplex of TOM, Tom5-Tom40, associates with the SAM core complex to form a new large SAM complex. This SAM-Tom5/Tom40 complex binds the α-helical precursor of Tom6 after the precursor has been inserted into the outer membrane in an Mim1 (mitochondrial import protein 1)-dependent manner. The second large SAM complex, SAM-Mdm10 (mitochondrial distribution and morphology protein), binds the α-helical precursor of Tom22 and promotes its membrane integration. We suggest that the modular composition of the SAM complex provides a flexible platform to integrate the sorting pathways of different precursor proteins and to promote their assembly into oligomeric complexes.     

Purification and characterization of the preprotein translocase of the outer mitochondrial membrane from Arabidopsis. Identification of multiple forms of TOM20

The translocase of the outer mitochondrial membrane (TOM) complex is a preprotein translocase that mediates transport of nuclear-encoded mitochondrial proteins across the outer mitochondrial membrane. Here we report the purification of this protein complex from Arabidopsis. On blue-native gels the Arabidopsis TOM complex runs at 230 kD and can be dissected into subunits of 34, 23, 21, 8, 7, and 6 kD. The identity of four subunits could be determined by immunoblotting and/or direct protein sequencing. The 21- and the 23-kD subunits exhibit significant sequence homology to the TOM20 preprotein receptor from other organisms. Analysis by two-dimensional isoelectric focusing/Tricine sodium dodecyl sulfide-polyacrylamide gel electrophoresis revealed the presence of further forms for Arabidopsis TOM20. All TOM20 proteins comprise a large cytoplasmically exposed hydrophilic domain, which is degraded upon trypsination of intact mitochondria. Clones encoding four different forms of Arabidopsis TOM20 were identified and sequenced. The deduced amino acid sequences are rather conserved in the N-terminal half and in the very C-terminal part, but include a highly variable glycine-rich region close to the C terminus. Implications on the function of plant TOM complexes are discussed. Based on peptide and nucleic acid sequence data, the primary structure for Arabidopsis TOM40 is presented.     

Infants’ Somatotopic Neural Responses to Seeing Human Actions: I’ve Got You under My Skin

Human infants rapidly learn new skills and customs via imitation, but the neural linkages between action perception and production are not well understood. Neuroscience studies in adults suggest that a key component of imitation–identifying the corresponding body part used in the acts of self and other–has an organized neural signature. In adults, perceiving someone using a specific body part (e.g., hand vs. foot) is associated with activation of the corresponding area of the sensory and/or motor strip in the observer’s brain–a phenomenon called neural somatotopy. Here we examine whether preverbal infants also exhibit somatotopic neural responses during the observation of others’ actions. 14-month-old infants were randomly assigned to watch an adult reach towards and touch an object using either her hand or her foot. The scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded and event-related changes in the sensorimotor mu rhythm were analyzed. Mu rhythm desynchronization was greater over hand areas of sensorimotor cortex during observation of hand actions and was greater over the foot area for observation of foot actions. This provides the first evidence that infants’ observation of someone else using a particular body part activates the corresponding areas of sensorimotor cortex. We hypothesize that this somatotopic organization in the developing brain supports imitation and cultural learning. The findings connect developmental cognitive neuroscience, adult neuroscience, action representation, and behavioral imitation.     

Thinking in circuits: toward neurobiological explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Cognitive theory has decomposed human mental abilities into cognitive (sub) systems, and cognitive neuroscience succeeded in disclosing a host of relationships between cognitive systems and specific structures of the human brain. However, an explanation of why specific functions are located in specific brain loci had still been missing, along with a neurobiological model that makes concrete the neuronal circuits that carry thoughts and meaning. Brain theory, in particular the Hebb-inspired neurocybernetic proposals by Braitenberg, now offers an avenue toward explaining brain–mind relationships and to spell out cognition in terms of neuron circuits in a neuromechanistic sense. Central to this endeavor is the theoretical construct of an elementary functional neuronal unit above the level of individual neurons and below that of whole brain areas and systems: the distributed neuronal assembly (DNA) or thought circuit (TC). It is shown that DNA/TC theory of cognition offers an integrated explanatory perspective on brain mechanisms of perception, action, language, attention, memory, decision and conceptual thought. We argue that DNAs carry all of these functions and that their inner structure (e.g., core and halo subcomponents), and their functional activation dynamics (e.g., ignition and reverberation processes) answer crucial localist questions, such as why memory and decisions draw on prefrontal areas although memory formation is normally driven by information in the senses and in the motor system. We suggest that the ability of building DNAs/TCs spread out over different cortical areas is the key mechanism for a range of specifically human sensorimotor, linguistic and conceptual capacities and that the cell assembly mechanism of overlap reduction is crucial for differentiating a vocabulary of actions, symbols and concepts.     

A Sensorimotor Model for Computing Intended Reach Trajectories

The presumed role of the primate sensorimotor system is to transform reach targets from retinotopic to joint coordinates for producing motor output. However, the interpretation of neurophysiological data within this framework is ambiguous, and has led to the view that the underlying neural computation may lack a well-defined structure. Here, I consider a model of sensorimotor computation in which temporal as well as spatial transformations generate representations of desired limb trajectories, in visual coordinates. This computation is suggested by behavioral experiments, and its modular implementation makes predictions that are consistent with those observed in monkey posterior parietal cortex (PPC). In particular, the model provides a simple explanation for why PPC encodes reach targets in reference frames intermediate between the eye and hand, and further explains why these reference frames shift during movement. Representations in PPC are thus consistent with the orderly processing of information, provided we adopt the view that sensorimotor computation manipulates desired movement trajectories, and not desired movement endpoints.     

Toward a Phenomenological Account of Embodied Subjectivity in Autism

Sensorimotor research is currently challenging the dominant understanding of autism as a deficit in the cognitive ability to ‘mindread’. This marks an emerging shift in autism research from a focus on the structure and processes of the mind to a focus on autistic behavior as grounded in the body. Contemporary researchers in sensorimotor differences in autism call for a reconciliation between the scientific understanding of autism and the first-person experience of autistic individuals. I argue that fulfilling this ambition requires a phenomenological understanding of the body as it presents itself in ordinary experience, namely as the subject of experience rather than a physical object. On this basis, I investigate how the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty can be employed as a frame of understanding for bodily experience in autism. Through a phenomenological analysis of Tito Mukhopadhyay’s autobiographical work, How can I talk if my lips don’t move (2009), I illustrate the relevance and potential of phenomenological philosophy in autism research, arguing that this approach enables a deeper understanding of bodily and subjective experiences related to autism.