The “evolutionary argument” and the metaphilosophy of commonsense

Recently in these pages it has been argued that a relatively straightforward version of an old argument based on evolutionary biology and psychology can be employed to support the view that innate ideas are a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge. While sympathetic to the view that the “evolutionary argument” is pregnant with philosophical implications, I show in this paper how it needs to be developed and deployed in order to avoid serious philosophical difficulties and unnecessary complications. I sketch a revised version of the evolutionary argument, place it in a new context, and show that this version in this context is not vulnerable to the standard criticisms levelled against arguments of this general type. The philosophical import of this version of the argument lies not in any metaphysical conclusions it sanctions directly, but in the support it lends to the metaphilosophy of commonsense.     

Evolutionary Theory and the Social uses of Biology

Stephen Jay Gould is rightly remembered for many different kinds of contributions to our intellectual life. I focus on his criticisms of uses of evolutionary ideas to defend inegalitarian doctrines and on his attempts to expand the framework of Darwinian evolutionary theory. I argue that his important successes in the former sphere are applications of the idea of local critique, grounded in careful attention to the details of the inegalitarian proposals. As he became more concerned with the second project, Gould was inclined to suggest that the abuses of evolutionary ideas rested on an insufficiently expanded Darwinism. I suggest that what is valuable in Gould's contribution to general evolutionary theory is the original claim about punctuated equilibrium (advanced, with Niles Eldredge in1972), and the careful defense of that claim through the accumulation of paleontological evidence. I try to show that the more ambitious program of a hierarchical expansion of neo-Darwinism is misguided, and that the endeavor to go beyond local critique fails.     

Toward a phylogenetic system of biological nomenclature

Despite the widely held belief that modem biological taxonomy is evolutionary, some of the most fundamental concepts and principles in the current system of biological nomenclature are based on a nonevolutionary convention that pre-dates widespread acceptance of an evolutionary world view by more than a century. The development of a phylogenetic system of nomenclature requires reformulating these concepts and principles so that they are no longer based on the Linnean categories but on the tenet of common descent.     

Evolutionary psychiatry and the schizophrenia paradox: a critique

Evolutionary psychiatrists invariably consider schizophrenia to be a paradox: how come natural selection has not yet eliminated the infamous ‘genes for schizophrenia’ if the disorder simply crushes the reproductive success of its carriers, if it has been around for thousands of years already, and if it has a uniform prevalence throughout the world? Usually, the answer is that the schizophrenic genotype is subject to some kind of balancing selection: the benefits it confers would then outbalance the obvious damage it does. In this paper, however, I will show that the assumptions underlying such evolutionary accounts of schizophrenia are at least implausible, and sometimes even erroneous. First of all, I will examine some factual assumptions, in particular about schizophrenia’s impact on reproductive success, its genetics, its history, and its epidemiology. Secondly, I will take a critical look at a major philosophical assumption in evolutionary psychiatric explanations of schizophrenia. Indeed, evolutionary psychiatrists take it for granted that schizophrenia is a natural kind, i.e. a bounded and objectively real entity with discrete biological causes. My refutation of this natural kind view suggests that schizophrenia is in fact a reified umbrella concept, covering a heterogeneous group of disorders. Therefore, schizophrenia, as we now know it, simply doesn’t have an evolutionary history.     

The evolution of costly displays,cooperation and religion: credibility enhancing displays and their implications for cultural evolution

This paper lays out an evolutionary theory for the cognitive foundations and cultural emergence of the extravagant displays (e.g., ritual mutilation, animal sacrifice and martyrdom) that have so tantalized social scientists, as well as more mundane actions that influence cultural learning and historical processes. In Part I, I use the logic of natural selection to build a theory for how and why seemingly costly displays influence the cognitive processes associated with cultural learning — why do “actions speak louder than words?” The core idea is that cultural learners can both avoid being manipulated by their models (those they are inclined to learn from) and more accurately assess their belief commitment by attending to displays or actions by the model that would seem costly to the model if he held beliefs different from those he expresses verbally. Part II examines the implications for cultural evolution of this learning bias in a simple evolutionary model. The model reveals the conditions under which this evolved bias can create stable sets of interlocking beliefs and practices, including quite costly practices. Part III explores how cultural evolution, driven by competition among groups or institutions stabilized at alternative sets of these interlocking belief-practice combinations, has led to the association of costly acts, often in the form of rituals, with deeper commitments to group beneficial ideologies, higher levels of cooperation within groups, and greater success in competition with other groups or institutions. I close by discussing the broader implications of these ideas for understanding various aspects of religious phenomena.     

Evolution as a cognition process: Towards an evolutionary epistemology

Recently, biologist and philosophers have been much attracted by an evolutionary view of knowledge, so-called evolutionary epistemology. Developing this insight, the present paper argues that our cognitive abilities are the outcome of organic evolution, and that, conversely, evolution itself may be described as a cognition process. Furthermore, it is argued that the key to an adequate evolutionary epistemology lies in a system-theoretical approach to evolution which grows from, but goes beyond, Darwin's theory of natural selection.     

The geometric theory of adaptive evolution: trade-off and invasion plots

The purpose of this paper is to take an entirely geometrical path to determine the evolutionary properties of ecological systems subject to trade-offs. In particular we classify evolutionary singularities in a geometrical fashion. To achieve this, we study trade-off and invasion plots (TIPs) which show graphically the outcome of evolution from the relationship between three curves. The first invasion boundary (curve) has one strain as resident and the other strain as putative invader and the second has the roles of the strains reversed. The parameter values for one strain are used as the origin with those of the second strain varying. The third curve represents the trade-off. All three curves pass through the origin or tip of the TIP. We show that at this point the invasion boundaries are tangential. At a singular TIP, in which the origin is an evolutionary singularity, the invasion boundaries and trade-off curve are all tangential. The curvature of the trade-off curve determines the region in which it enters the singular TIP. Each of these regions has particular evolutionary properties (EUS, CS, SPR and MI). Thus we determine by direct geometric argument conditions for each of these properties in terms of the relative curvatures of the trade-off curve and invasion boundaries. We show that these conditions are equivalent to the standard partial derivative conditions of adaptive dynamics. The significance of our results is that we can determine whether the singular strategy is an attractor, branching point, repellor, etc. simply by observing in which region the trade-off curve enters the singular TIP. In particular we find that, if and only if the TIP has a region of mutual invadability, is it possible for the singular strategy to be a branching point. We illustrate the theory with an example and point the way forward.     

Evolutionary Psychology, Human Universals, and the Standard Social Science Model

Proponents of evolutionary psychology take the existence of humanuniversals to constitute decisive evidence in favor of their view. Ifthe same social norms are found in culture after culture, we have goodreason to believe that they are innate, they argue. In this paper Ipropose an alternative explanation for the existence of humanuniversals, which does not depend on them being the product of inbuiltpsychological adaptations. Following the work of Brian Skyrms, I suggestthat if a particular convention possesses even a very small advantageover competitors, whatever the reason for that advantage, we shouldexpect it to become the norm almost everywhere. Tiny advantages aretranslated into very large basins of attraction, in the language of gametheory. If this is so, universal norms are not evidence for innatepsychological adaptations at all. Having shown that the existence ofuniversals is consistent with the so-called Standard Social ScienceModel, I turn to a consideration of the evidence, to show that thisstyle of explanation is preferable to the evolutionary explanation, atleast with regard to patterns of gender inequality.     

Darwin and the linguists: the coevolution of mind and language, part 2. The language-thought relationship

This paper examines Charles Darwin's idea that language-use and humanity's unique cognitive abilities reinforced each other's evolutionary emergence-an idea Darwin sketched in his early notebooks, set forth in his Descent of man (1871), and qualified in Descent's second (1874) edition. Darwin understood this coevolution process in essentially Lockean terms, based on John Locke's hints about the way language shapes thinking itself. Ironically, the linguist Friedrich Max Müller attacked Darwin's human descent theory by invoking a similar thesis, the German romantic notion of an identity between language and thought. Although Darwin avoided outright contradiction, when he came to defend himself against Müller's attacks, he undercut some of his own argumentation in favor of the coevolution idea. That is, he found it difficult to counter Müller's argument while also making a case for coevolution. Darwin's efforts in this area were further complicated by British and American writers who held a naturalistic view of speech origins yet still taught that language had been invented by fully evolved homo sapiens, thus denying coevolution.     

Generalized selection to overcome innate immunity selects for host breadth in an RNA virus

Virus‐host coevolution has selected for generalized host defense against viruses, exemplified by interferon production/signaling and other innate immune function in eukaryotes such as humans. Although cell‐surface binding primarily limits virus infection success, generalized adaptation to counteract innate immunity across disparate hosts may contribute to RNA virus emergence potential. We examined this idea using vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV) populations previously evolved on strictly immune‐deficient (HeLa) cells, strictly immune competent (MDCK) cells, or on alternating deficient/competent cells. By measuring viral fitness in unselected human cancer cells of differing innate immunity, we confirmed that HeLa‐adapted populations were specialized for innate immune‐deficient hosts, whereas MDCK‐adapted populations were relatively more generalized for fitness on hosts of differing innate immune capacity and of different species origin. We also confirmed that HeLa‐evolved populations maintained fitness in immune‐deficient nonhuman primate cells. These results suggest that innate immunity is more prominent than host species in determining viral fitness at the host‐cell level. Finally, our prediction was inexact that selection on alternating deficient/competent hosts should produce innate viral generalists. Rather, fitness differences among alternating host‐evolved VSV populations indicated variable capacities to evade innate immunity. Our results suggest that the evolutionary history of innate immune selection can affect whether RNA viruses evolve greater host‐breadth.     

Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity

The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.     

The Case for Conserving Disability

It is commonly believed that disability disqualifies people from full participation in or recognition by society. This view is rooted in eugenic logic, which tells us that our world would be a better place if disability could be eliminated. In opposition to this position, I argue that that disability is inherent in the human condition and consider the bioethical question of why we might want to conserve rather than eliminate disability from our shared world. To do so, I draw together an eclectic, rather than systematic, configuration of counter-eugenic arguments for conserving disability. The idea of preserving intact, keeping alive, and even encouraging to flourish denoted by conserve suggests that disabilities would be better understood as benefits rather than deficits. I present, then, a reading of disability as a potentially generative resource rather than unequivocally restrictive liability. In other words, what I consider here is the cultural and material contributions disability offers to the world.     

Two puzzles for Marquis's conservative view on abortion

Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong in most cases since it deprives the fetus of the value of its future. I criticize Marquis’s argument for the modified conservative view by adopting an argumentative strategy in which I work within his basic account: if it is granted that his fundamental idea is sound, what follows about the morality of abortion? I conclude that Marquis is faced with a dilemma: either his position must shift towards the extreme conservative view on which abortion is never morally permissible, or he must abandon any recognizably conservative view. This dilemma suggests that Marquis’s view is either deeply implausible or that he cannot use this argument to successfully support his preferred position.     

‘Alive by default’: An exploration of Velleman’s unfair burdens argument against state sanctioned euthanasia

In this article we critically evaluate an argument against state-sanctioned euthanasia made by David Velleman in his 1992 paper ‘Against the right to die’. In that article, Velleman argues that legalizing euthanasia is morally problematic as it will deprive eligible patients of the opportunity of staying ‘alive by default’. That is to say, those patients who are rendered eligible for euthanasia as a result of legislative reform will face the burden of having to justify their continued existence to their epistemic peers if they are to be perceived as ‘reasonable’. We discuss potential criticisms that could be made of the argument, and consider how a defender of the view might respond. Velleman’s argument is particularly interesting as it is a consequentialist argument against state-sanctioned euthanasia, challenging the many consequentialist arguments that have been made in favour of legalizing the procedure. We conclude by suggesting that further research on the question of unfair burdens is important to adequately evaluating the potential harms of legalizing euthanasia for patients at the end of life.     

The effect of learning on experimental evolution of resource preference in Drosophila melanogaster

Abstract Learning is thought to be adaptive in variable environments, whereas constant, predictable environments are supposed to favor unconditional, genetically fixed responses. A dichotomous view of behavior as either learned or innate ignores a potential evolutionary interaction between the learned and innate components of a behavioral response. We addressed this interaction in the context of oviposition substrate choice in Drosophila melanogaster, asking two main questions. First, will learning also evolve in a constant environment in which it always pays to show the same choice? Second, how does an opportunity to learn affect the evolution of the innate (genetic) component of oviposition substrate choice? We exposed experimental populations to four selection regimes, involving selection on oviposition substrate preference (an orange versus a pineapple medium). In two selection regimes the flies were selected for preference either for the orange medium, or for the pineapple medium. In the remaining two selection regimes the flies were also selected for preference for either orange or pineapple, but additionally could use past experience (aversion learning) to decide which medium it paid to avoid. Lines exposed to the latter selection regimes evolved improved learning ability, indicating that learning may be advantageous even if the same behavioral response is favored every generation. Furthermore, of the two selection regimes that favored oviposition on the pineapple medium, the regime that allowed for learning led to the evolution of a stronger innate preference for pineapple, than the regime that did not allow for learning. In contrast, of the two regimes that selected for oviposition on the orange medium, the one that allowed for learning led to a smaller evolutionary change of the innate preference. Thus, an opportunity to learn facilitated the evolution of innate preference under selection for preference for pineapple, but hindered it under selection for preference for orange. We discuss possible mechanisms for this effect.     

The Environments of Our Hominin Ancestors, Tool-usage, and Scenario Visualization

In this paper, I give an account of how our hominin ancestors evolved a conscious ability I call scenario visualization that enabled them to manufacture novel tools so as to survive and flourish in the ever-changing and complex environments in which they lived. I first present the ideas and arguments put forward by evolutionary psychologists that the mind evolved certain mental capacities as adaptive responses to environmental pressures. Specifically, Steven Mithen thinks that the mind has evolved cognitive fluidity, viz., an ability to exchange information flexibly between and among mental modules. Showing the deficiency in Mithen’s view, I then argue that the flexible exchange of information between and among modules together with scenario visualization is what explains the ability to construct the novel tools needed to survive and flourish in the environments in which our hominin ancestors resided. Finally, I trace the development of the multi-purposed javelin, from its meager beginnings as a stick, in order to illustrate scenario visualization in novel tool manufacturing.     

An untold story in biology: the historical continuity of evolutionary ideas of Muslim scholars from the 8th century to Darwin’s time

Textbooks on the history of biology and evolutionary thought do not mention the evolutionary ideas of Muslim scholars before Darwin’s time. This is part of a trend in the West to minimise the contributions of non-Western scientists to biology, human anatomy and evolutionary biology. Therefore, this paper focuses on the contributions of pre-Darwinian Muslim scholars to the history of evolutionary thought. Our review of texts from a wide range of historical times, and written in various languages, reveals that there were in fact several Muslim scholars who postulated evolutionary ideas, some with remarkable similarities to Darwin’s theory. These ideas included the adaptation and survival of the fittest, a specific origin of humans from apes/monkeys, the notion of evolutionary constraints, the occurrence of extinctions within taxa and hereditary variability. Moreover, while both the scientific community and the broader public generally base their knowledge on Western textbooks, several parts of the Muslim world have indicated an overall rejection of biological–including human–evolution. Therefore, to improve historical accuracy and create a better understanding of scientific history, the world’s diverse civilisations and their philosophies, this untold story should be widely disseminated to the scientific community and the general public.     

Natural hybridization and conservation

This review deals with natural hybridization, an important subject in conservation biology. Natural hybridization is defined as the secondary contact between two populations that have evolved separately over a long period of time. This process is uncommon in terms of the total number of individuals involved, but is much less unusual if we consider the number of species that hybridize. Thus, natural hybridization may be an important process in the shaping of the evolutionary trajectories of many plant and animal species. The possible consequences of natural hybridization, which can either promote or prevent evolutionary divergence between taxa and will involve many ecological factors, are analysed here. I question whether natural hybridization poses always a problem in conservation and try to answer when conservation biologists and managers do have a responsibility to take decisions. Several examples of hybridization related to management strategies are also discussed. In conclusion, I believe that it is impossible to provide conservation managers with a simple handbook explaining how to proceed in cases of hybridization––each case is unique and should be analyzed individually. The only advice is that the more we know about hybridization and the factors involved, the better we will be able to assess each situation, to establish the possible consequences and even to estimate the probability of success of any particular conservation strategy.     

Investigating the properties of bio-chemical networks of artificial organisms with opposing behaviours

Organisms, be it singled-celled organisms or multi-cellular organisms, are constantly faced with opposing objectives requiring different sets of behaviours. These behaviours can be classified into two, predatory behaviours or anti-prey behaviours, with one set of behaviours causing an opposite effect to the other. A healthy organism aims to achieve its equilibrium state or to be in homeostasis. Homeostasis is achieved when a balance between the two opposing behaviours is created and maintained. This raises some questions: is there an innate mechanism that encodes for these categories of behaviours? Is there also an innate mechanism(s) that resolves conflicts and allows switching between these two opposing behaviours? If we consider artificial organisms as single-celled organisms, how do the organisms’ gene regulatory network, metabolic network and/or signalling network (their biochemical networks) maintain homeostasis of the organisms? This paper investigates the properties of the networks of best evolved artificial organisms, in order to help answer these questions, and guide the evolutionary development of controllers for artificial systems.