Automated vocabulary discovery for geo-parsing online epidemic intelligence

Background  

Automated surveillance of the Internet provides a timely and sensitive method for alerting on global emerging infectious disease threats. HealthMap is part of a new generation of online systems designed to monitor and visualize, on a real-time basis, disease outbreak alerts as reported by online news media and public health sources. HealthMap is of specific interest for national and international public health organizations and international travelers. A particular task that makes such a surveillance useful is the automated discovery of the geographic references contained in the retrieved outbreak alerts. This task is sometimes referred to as "geo-parsing". A typical approach to geo-parsing would demand an expensive training corpus of alerts manually tagged by a human.     

SARS冠状病毒主要结构蛋白的研究进展

严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)因其传染性强、危害性大而受到广泛关注。世界各国密切合作,在对SARS的研究方面取得了许多突破。本文针对2005年前后的相关研究进展,综述了对S、N、M和E等4种SARS冠状病毒的结构蛋白的功能、实际应用等研究情况,其中对S、N蛋白进行了更为详细的介绍,重点阐述了主要结构蛋白的特征性功能区域、特异性蛋白、特征性反应、实验研究技术的改进以及疫苗研发等进展。     

Preparedness for SARS in the UK in 2003

Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) has been described as the first major emerging infectious disease of the twenty-first century. Having initially emerged, almost unnoticed, in southern China, it rapidly spread across the globe. It severely tested national public health and health systems. However, it also resulted in rapid, intensive international collaboration, led by the World Health Organization, to elucidate its characteristics and cause and to contain its spread. The UK mounted a vigorous public health response. Some particular issues concerned: the practicalities of implementing exit screening had this been required; the likely efficacy of this and other control measures; the legal base for public health action; and the surge capacity in all systems should the disease have taken hold in the UK. We have used this experience of 2003 to inform our preparation of a framework for an integrated, escalating response to a future re-emergence of SARS according to the levels of disease activity worldwide. Recent cases confirm that SARS has not "gone away". We cannot be complacent about our contingency planning.     

SARS相关冠状病毒及其基因组

正在全球部分地区流行的严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS),由于其传染性强、危害性大而引起了广泛关注。各国实验室密切协作,在数月时间内分离出了SARS冠状病毒(SARSCoV),测定了病毒基因组序列,并在猴体内初步再现出SARSCoV所致肺部疾病与人相似,这些工作为遏制SARS的蔓延发挥了重要作用。现就SARSCoV的鉴定、基因组及其产物的结构与功能做一综述。     

What have we learnt from SARS?

With outbreaks of infectious disease emerging from animal sources, we have learnt to expect the unexpected. We were, and are, expecting a new influenza A pandemic, but no one predicted the emergence of an unknown coronavirus (CoV) as a deadly human pathogen. Thanks to the preparedness of the international network of influenza researchers and laboratories, the cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was rapidly identified, but there is no complacency over the global or local management of the epidemic in terms of public health logistics. The human population was lucky that only a small proportion of infected persons proved to be highly infectious to others, and that they did not become so before they felt ill. These were the features that helped to make the outbreak containable. The next outbreak of another kind of transmissible disease may well be quite different.     

Development of Veterinary Laboratory Networks for Avian Influenza and Other Emerging Infectious Disease Control: The Southeast Asian Experience

The outbreak of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza, with its international spread, confirmed that emerging infectious disease control must be underpinned by effective laboratory services. Laboratory results are the essential data underpinning effective surveillance, case diagnosis, or monitoring of responses. Importantly, laboratories are best managed within national and international networks of technological support rather than in isolation. A well planned laboratory network can deliver both a geographical spread of testing capacity and also a cost effective hierarchy of capability. Hence in the international context regional networks can be particularly effective. Laboratories are an integral part of a country’s veterinary services and their role and function should be clearly defined in the national animal health strategy and supporting government policies. Not every laboratory should be expected to deliver every possible service, and integration into regional and broader international networks should be a part of the overall strategy. The outputs required of each laboratory should be defined and then ensured through accredited quality assurance. The political and scientific environment in which laboratories operate changes continuously, not only through evolving national and regional animal health priorities but also through new test technologies and enhancements to existing technologies. Active networks help individual laboratories to monitor, evaluate, and respond to such challenges and opportunities. The end result is enhanced emerging infectious disease preparedness across the region.     

Emerging infectious diseases associated with bat viruses

Bats play important roles as pollen disseminators and pest predators. However, recent interest has focused on their role as natural reservoirs of pathogens associated with emerging infectious diseases. Prior to the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), about 60 bat virus species had been reported. The number of identified bat viruses has dramatically increased since the initial SARS outbreak, and most are putative novel virus species or genotypes. Serious infectious diseases caused by previously identified bat viruses continue to emerge throughout in Asia, Australia, Africa and America. Intriguingly, bats infected by these different viruses seldom display clinical symptoms of illness. The pathogenesis and potential threat of bat-borne viruses to public health remains largely unknown. This review provides a brief overview of bat viruses associated with emerging human infectious diseases.     

Challenges to global surveillance and response to infectious disease outbreaks of international importance

This article presents a notional scheme of global surveillance and response to infectious disease outbreaks and reviews 14 international surveillance and response programs. In combination, the scheme and the programs illustrate how, in an ideal world and in the real world, infectious disease outbreaks of public health significance could be detected and contained. Notable practices and achievements of the programs are cited; these may be useful when instituting new programs or redesigning existing ones. Insufficiencies are identified in four critical areas: health infrastructure; scientific methods and concepts of operation; essential human, technical, and financial resources; and international policies. These insufficiencies challenge global surveillance of and response to infectious disease outbreaks of international importance. This article is intended to help policymakers appreciate the complexity of the problem and assess the impact and cost-effectiveness of proposed solutions. An assessment of the potential contribution of appropriate diagnostic tests to surveillance and response is included.     

Impact of quarantine on the 2003 SARS outbreak: a retrospective modeling study

During the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak, traditional intervention measures such as quarantine and border control were found to be useful in containing the outbreak. We used laboratory verified SARS case data and the detailed quarantine data in Taiwan, where over 150,000 people were quarantined during the 2003 outbreak, to formulate a mathematical model which incorporates Level A quarantine (of potentially exposed contacts of suspected SARS patients) and Level B quarantine (of travelers arriving at borders from SARS affected areas) implemented in Taiwan during the outbreak. We obtain the average case fatality ratio and the daily quarantine rate for the Taiwan outbreak. Model simulations is utilized to show that Level A quarantine prevented approximately 461 additional SARS cases and 62 additional deaths, while the effect of Level B quarantine was comparatively minor, yielding only around 5% reduction of cases and deaths. The combined impact of the two levels of quarantine had reduced the case number and deaths by almost a half. The results demonstrate how modeling can be useful in qualitative evaluation of the impact of traditional intervention measures for newly emerging infectious diseases outbreak when there is inadequate information on the characteristics and clinical features of the new disease-measures which could become particularly important with the looming threat of global flu pandemic possibly caused by a novel mutating flu strain, including that of avian variety.     

Introducing One Health to the Ethical Debate About Zoonotic Diseases in Southeast Asia

Pandemic plans recommend phases of response to an emergent infectious disease (EID) outbreak, and are primarily aimed at preventing and mitigating human‐to‐human transmission. These plans carry presumptive weight and are increasingly being operationalized at the national, regional and international level with the support of the World Health Organization (WHO). The conventional focus of pandemic preparedness for EIDs of zoonotic origin has been on public health and human welfare. However, this focus on human populations has resulted in strategically important disciplinary silos. As the risks of zoonotic diseases have implications that reach across many domains outside traditional public health, including anthropological, environmental, and veterinary fora, a more inclusive ecological perspective is paramount for an effective response to future outbreaks.     

The experience of the 2003 SARS outbreak as a traumatic stress among frontline healthcare workers in Toronto: lessons learned

The outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the first half of 2003 in Canada was unprecedented in several respects. Understanding the psychological impact of the outbreak on healthcare workers, especially those in hospitals, is important in planning for future outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases. This review draws upon qualitative and quantitative studies of the SARS outbreak in Toronto to outline the factors that contributed to healthcare workers' experiencing the outbreak as a psychological trauma. Overall, it is estimated that a high degree of distress was experienced by 29-35% of hospital workers. Three categories of contributory factors were identified. Relevant contextual factors were being a nurse, having contact with SARS patients and having children. Contributing attitudinal factors and processes were experiencing job stress, perceiving stigmatization, coping by avoiding crowds and colleagues, and feeling scrutinized. Pre-existing trait factors also contributed to vulnerability. Lessons learned from the outbreak include: (i) that effort is required to mitigate the psychological impact of infection control procedures, especially the interpersonal isolation that these procedures promote; (ii) that effective risk communication is a priority early in an outbreak; (iii) that healthcare workers may have a role in influencing patterns of media coverage that increase or decrease morale; (iv) that healthcare workers benefit from resources that facilitate reflection on the effects of extraordinary stressors; and (v) that healthcare workers benefit from practical interventions that demonstrate tangible support from institutions.     

Temporal Variability and Social Heterogeneity in Disease Transmission: The Case of SARS in Hong Kong

The extent to which self-adopted or intervention-related changes in behaviors affect the course of epidemics remains a key issue for outbreak control. This study attempted to quantify the effect of such changes on the risk of infection in different settings, i.e., the community and hospitals. The 2002–2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Hong Kong, where 27% of cases were healthcare workers, was used as an example. A stochastic compartmental SEIR (susceptible-exposed-infectious-removed) model was used: the population was split into healthcare workers, hospitalized people and general population. Super spreading events (SSEs) were taken into account in the model. The temporal evolutions of the daily effective contact rates in the community and hospitals were modeled with smooth functions. Data augmentation techniques and Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods were applied to estimate SARS epidemiological parameters. In particular, estimates of daily reproduction numbers were provided for each subpopulation. The average duration of the SARS infectious period was estimated to be 9.3 days (±0.3 days). The model was able to disentangle the impact of the two SSEs from background transmission rates. The effective contact rates, which were estimated on a daily basis, decreased with time, reaching zero inside hospitals. This observation suggests that public health measures and possible changes in individual behaviors effectively reduced transmission, especially in hospitals. The temporal patterns of reproduction numbers were similar for healthcare workers and the general population, indicating that on average, an infectious healthcare worker did not infect more people than any other infectious person. We provide a general method to estimate time dependence of parameters in structured epidemic models, which enables investigation of the impact of control measures and behavioral changes in different settings.     

Lack of peripheral memory B cell responses in recovered patients with severe acute respiratory syndrome: a six-year follow-up study

Six years have passed since the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Previous studies indicated that specific Abs to SARS-related coronavirus (SARS-CoV) waned over time in recovered SARS patients. It is critical to find out whether a potential anamnestic response, as seen with other viral infections, exists to protect a person from reinfection in case of another SARS outbreak. Recovered SARS patients were followed up to 6 y to estimate the longevity of specific Ab. The specific memory B cell and T cell responses to SARS-CoV Ags were measured by means of ELISPOT assay. Factors in relation to humoral and cellular immunity were investigated. Six years postinfection, specific IgG Ab to SARS-CoV became undetectable in 21 of the 23 former patients. No SARS-CoV Ag-specific memory B cell response was detected in either 23 former SARS patients or 22 close contacts of SARS patients. Memory T cell responses to a pool of SARS-CoV S peptides were identified in 14 of 23 (60.9%) recovered SARS patients, whereas there was no such specific response in either close contacts or healthy controls. Patients with more severe clinical manifestations seemed to present a higher level of Ag-specific memory T cell response. SARS-specific IgG Ab may eventually vanish and peripheral memory B cell responses are undetectable in recovered SARS patients. In contrast, specific T cell anamnestic responses can be maintained for at least 6 y. These findings have applications in preparation for the possible reemergence of SARS.     

Electronic outbreak surveillance in Germany: a first evaluation for nosocomial norovirus outbreaks

Background

In Germany, surveillance for infectious disease outbreaks is integrated into an electronic surveillance system. For 2007, the national surveillance database contains case-based information on 201,224 norovirus cases, three-quarters of which are linked to outbreaks. We evaluated the data quality of the national database in reflecting nosocomial norovirus outbreak (NNO) data available in 19 Hessian local public health authorities (LPHAs) and the influence of differences between LPHA''s follow-up procedures for laboratory notifications of Norovirus positive stool samples on outbreak underascertainment.

Methods

Data on NNO beginning in 2007 and notified to the 19 LPHAs were extracted from the national database, investigated regarding internal validity and compared to data collected from LPHAs for a study on NNO control. LPHAs were questioned whether they routinely contacted all persons for whom a laboratory diagnosis of norovirus infection was notified. The number of outbreaks per 1,000 hospital beds and the number of cases within NNOs for acute care and rehabilitation hospitals were compared between counties with and without complete follow-up.

Results

The national database contained information on 155 NNOs, including 3,115 cases. Cases were missed in the national database in 58 (37%) of the outbreaks. Information on hospitalisation was incorrect for an estimated 47% of NNO cases. Information on county of infection was incorrect for 24% (199/820) of cases being forwarded between LPHAs for data entry. Reported NNO incidence and number of NNO cases in acute care hospitals was higher in counties with complete follow-up (incidence-rate ratio (IRR) 2.7, 95% CI 1.4–5.7, p-value 0.002 and IRR 2.1, 95% CI 1.9–2.4, p-value 0.001, respectively).

Conclusions

Many NNOs are not notified by hospitals and differences in LPHA procedures have an impact on the number of outbreaks captured in the surveillance system. Forwarding of case-by-case data on Norovirus outbreak cases from the local to the state and national level should not be required.     

新型人冠状病毒HCoV—NL63和HCoV-HKU1的研究进展

多年来,人们公认的人冠状病毒包括HCoV-229E和HCoV-0C43等2株。但2002-2003年,由一种新型人冠状病毒SARS-CoV所引发的全球范围的严重急性呼吸综合征（SARS）的流行,使多国蒙受巨大损失,由此,冠状病毒又成为研究的焦点。随着分子生物学技术的发展,2004-2005年,又发现了2种新型人冠状病毒HCoV-NL63和HCoV-HKU1。在此,就这2种病毒的发现、流行情况,及其与疾病的相关性做一简要综述。     

Constructing Rigorous and Broad Biosurveillance Networks for Detecting Emerging Zoonotic Outbreaks

Determining optimal surveillance networks for an emerging pathogen is difficult since it is not known beforehand what the characteristics of a pathogen will be or where it will emerge. The resources for surveillance of infectious diseases in animals and wildlife are often limited and mathematical modeling can play a supporting role in examining a wide range of scenarios of pathogen spread. We demonstrate how a hierarchy of mathematical and statistical tools can be used in surveillance planning help guide successful surveillance and mitigation policies for a wide range of zoonotic pathogens. The model forecasts can help clarify the complexities of potential scenarios, and optimize biosurveillance programs for rapidly detecting infectious diseases. Using the highly pathogenic zoonotic H5N1 avian influenza 2006-2007 epidemic in Nigeria as an example, we determined the risk for infection for localized areas in an outbreak and designed biosurveillance stations that are effective for different pathogen strains and a range of possible outbreak locations. We created a general multi-scale, multi-host stochastic SEIR epidemiological network model, with both short and long-range movement, to simulate the spread of an infectious disease through Nigerian human, poultry, backyard duck, and wild bird populations. We chose parameter ranges specific to avian influenza (but not to a particular strain) and used a Latin hypercube sample experimental design to investigate epidemic predictions in a thousand simulations. We ranked the risk of local regions by the number of times they became infected in the ensemble of simulations. These spatial statistics were then complied into a potential risk map of infection. Finally, we validated the results with a known outbreak, using spatial analysis of all the simulation runs to show the progression matched closely with the observed location of the farms infected in the 2006-2007 epidemic.     

Epidemiology, transmission dynamics and control of SARS: the 2002-2003 epidemic

This paper reviews current understanding of the epidemiology, transmission dynamics and control of the aetiological agent of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). We present analyses of data on key parameters and distributions and discuss the processes of data capture, analysis and public health policy formulation during the SARS epidemic are discussed. The low transmissibility of the virus, combined with the onset of peak infectiousness following the onset of clinical symptoms of disease, transpired to make simple public health measures, such as isolating patients and quarantining their contacts, very effective in the control of the SARS epidemic. We conclude that we were lucky this time round, but may not be so with the next epidemic outbreak of a novel aetiological agent. We present analyses that help to further understanding of what intervention measures are likely to work best with infectious agents of defined biological and epidemiological properties. These lessons learnt from the SARS experience are presented in an epidemiological and public health context.     

Using Combined Diagnostic Test Results to Hindcast Trends of Infection from Cross-Sectional Data

Infectious disease surveillance is key to limiting the consequences from infectious pathogens and maintaining animal and public health. Following the detection of a disease outbreak, a response in proportion to the severity of the outbreak is required. It is thus critical to obtain accurate information concerning the origin of the outbreak and its forward trajectory. However, there is often a lack of situational awareness that may lead to over- or under-reaction. There is a widening range of tests available for detecting pathogens, with typically different temporal characteristics, e.g. in terms of when peak test response occurs relative to time of exposure. We have developed a statistical framework that combines response level data from multiple diagnostic tests and is able to ‘hindcast’ (infer the historical trend of) an infectious disease epidemic. Assuming diagnostic test data from a cross-sectional sample of individuals infected with a pathogen during an outbreak, we use a Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach to estimate time of exposure, and the overall epidemic trend in the population prior to the time of sampling. We evaluate the performance of this statistical framework on simulated data from epidemic trend curves and show that we can recover the parameter values of those trends. We also apply the framework to epidemic trend curves taken from two historical outbreaks: a bluetongue outbreak in cattle, and a whooping cough outbreak in humans. Together, these results show that hindcasting can estimate the time since infection for individuals and provide accurate estimates of epidemic trends, and can be used to distinguish whether an outbreak is increasing or past its peak. We conclude that if temporal characteristics of diagnostics are known, it is possible to recover epidemic trends of both human and animal pathogens from cross-sectional data collected at a single point in time.     

Use of the internet to enhance infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation

Modernization of electronic communication systems to facilitate infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation became a priority after the 2001 anthrax attacks. However, the extent to which communicable disease investigators are using web-based information resources, e-mail notifications, or secure information exchange systems to facilitate surveillance is unknown. To address this question, we conducted a survey in 2004 of state and local communicable disease investigators responsible for infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation in three states. The majority (70.7%) of the 297 respondents accessed the Internet for information regarding infectious disease surveillance and outbreaks at least weekly. Most (74%) respondents who searched for information from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) website reported that they found what they were looking for 75-100% of the time, compared with 54% who found the information from their state health department websites 75-100% of the time. One-third of respondents read e-mail notifications regarding outbreaks under investigation in their state less frequently than monthly; 34% of those enrolled in CDC's Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) read e-mail notifications of new reports less frequently than monthly. Forty-seven (18%) respondents read ProMED-mail at least monthly, while 46% indicated they had never consulted MEDLINE/PubMed. Some progress has been made in use of the Internet to facilitate communication in infectious disease surveillance and outbreak investigation. Addressing barriers to access and usability of new information systems in conjunction with training and technical support could enhance infectious disease surveillance and timely investigation of outbreaks and bioterrorism events.