Could a "philosophical fitness landscape" foster Wilsonian consilience in biosystems debates?

A digital interpretation of Edward O. Wilson's principle of "consilience"-knowledge will grow out of interdisciplinary accommodation-is attempted by modeling it with 32 pixels on a "philosophical fitness landscape" (PFL). This approach partially answers a need expressed by Wilson to develop useful consilience methodology, including maps and other orientation devises. Responding also to his call for more imagination, a "virtual roundtable" discussion is convened among 13 scientific luminaries to debate the meaning of biological life and its origin. This is done to test (subjectively) the null hypothesis that a PFL would be insensitive to the diversity of perspectives engaged in such a debate. Rejecting the null hypothesis, an argument is made that an appropriate PFL might help to foster Wilsonian consilience in biosystems debates, where it is needed most.     

Book notices

Book reviewed in this article:
THE POLLINATION OF FLOWERS BY INSECTS. Edited by A. J. Richards.
THE DYNAMICS OF ARTHROPOD PREDATOR–PREY SYSTEMS. By Michael P. Hassell.
HONEYBEE PESTS, PREDATORS, AND DISEASES. Edited by Roger A. Morse.
FUNDAMENTALS OF APPLIED ENTOMOLOGY, 3rd edn. Edited by Robert E. Pfadt.
CASTE AND ECOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL INSECTS. By George F. Oster and Edward O. Wilson.     

Colleagues in conflict: An ‘in vivo’ analysis of the sociobiology controversy

Edward O. Wilson's forays into human sociobiology have been the target of persistent, vehement attack by his Harvard colleague in evolutionary biology, Richard C. Lewontin. Through examination of existing documents in the case, together with in-depth personal interviews of Wilson, Lewontin, and other biologists, the reasons for Wilson's stance and Lewontin's criticisms are uncovered. It is argued that the dispute is not primarily personally or politically motivated, but involves a conflict between long-term scientific-cum-moral agendas, with the reductionist program as a key issue. It is concluded that it is in the interest of both disputants to keep the controversy alive.     

Edward O. Wilson and the Organicist Tradition

Edward O. Wilson’s recent decision to abandon kin selection theory has sent shockwaves throughout the biological sciences. Over the past two years, more than a hundred biologists have signed letters protesting his reversal. Making sense of Wilson’s decision and the controversy it has spawned requires familiarity with the historical record. This entails not only examining the conditions under which kin selection theory first emerged, but also the organicist tradition against which it rebelled. In similar fashion, one must not only examine Wilson’s long career, but also those thinkers who influenced him most, especially his intellectual grandfather, William Morton Wheeler (1865–1937). Wilson belongs to a long line of organicists, biologists whose research highlighted integration and coordination, many of whom struggled over the exact same biological riddles that have long defined Wilson’s career. Drawing inspiration (and sometimes ideas) from these intellectual forebears, Wilson is confident that he has finally identified the origin of the social impulse.     

Epistemology, necessity, and evolution: a critical review of Michael Ruse��s Philosophy After Darwin

Michael Ruse??s new anthology Philosophy After Darwin provides great history and background in the major impacts Darwinism has had on philosophy, especially in ethics and epistemology. This review focuses on epistemology understood through the lens of evolution by natural selection. I focus on one of Ruse??s own articles in the collection, which responds to two classic articles by Konrad Lorenz and David Hull on the two major forms of evolutionary epistemology. I side with Ruse against Lorenz??s account of the necessity we think our principles of reasoning have, though I disagree with Ruse??s particular example. I also argue that Ruse??s alternative explanation is lacking. Against Hull, I side with Ruse in his doubts that a sociobiological approach to science will prove fruitful, though I point out that it has certain advantages other approaches do not have. Although I side with Ruse on the issue, I conclude that the two views do not really come into direct conflict and so one needs not reject either. Finally, I discuss Ruse??s positive view and raise questions for his conception of evolutionary epistemology. I conclude that his arguments are insufficient to overcome opposing views and his view has at least as many unintuitive conclusions as the alternatives.     

Dehorning the Darwinian dilemma for normative realism

Normative realists tend to consider evolutionary debunking arguments as posing epistemological challenges to their view. By understanding Sharon Street’s ‘Darwinian dilemma’ argument in this way, they have overlooked and left unanswered her unique scientific challenge to normative realism. This paper counters Street’s scientific challenge and shows that normative realism is compatible with an evolutionary view of human evaluative judgment. After presenting several problems that her adaptive link account of evaluative judgments faces, I outline and defend an evolutionary byproduct perspective on evaluative judgment. I then argue that a consideration of levels of analysis in biological–behavioral explanation suggests that the realist who adopts the byproduct perspective I outline is not at a prima facie disadvantage to the normative anti-realist on grounds of parsimony. This perspective, I suggest, can enable normative realists to answer evolutionary challenges to their view.     

Taking the ‘Error’ Out of Ruse‘s Error Theory

Michael Ruses Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails moral nihilism. However, I argue here that people generally have justified true beliefs about which acts promote their most coherent set of moral values, and hence, by definition, about which acts are right. What the evolutionary story explains is the existence of these values, but it is not an error theory for moral beliefs. Ordinary beliefs correspond to real moral properties, though these are not objective or absolute properties independent of anyones subjective states. On its best footing, therefore, a Darwinian metaethics of the type Ruse offers is not an error theory and does not entail moral nihilism.     

Health as Normal Function: a Weak Link in Daniels's Theory of Just Health Distribution

Drawing on Christopher Boorse's Biostatistical Theory (BST), Norman Daniels contends that a genuine health need is one which is necessary to restore normal functioning – a supposedly objective notion which he believes can be read from the natural world without reference to potentially controversial normative categories. But despite his claims to the contrary, this conception of health harbors arbitrary evaluative judgments which make room for intractable disagreement as to which conditions should count as genuine health needs and therefore which needs should be met. I begin by offering a brief summary of Boorse's BST, the theory to which Daniels appeals for providing the conception of health as normal functioning upon which his overall distributive scheme rests. Next, I consider what I call practical objections to Daniels's use of Boorse's theory. Finally I recount Elseljin Kingma's theoretical objection to Boorse's BST and discuss its impact on Daniels's overall theory. Though I conclude that Boorse's view, so weakened, will no longer be able to sustain the judgments which Daniels's theory uses it to reach, in the end, I offer Daniels an olive branch by briefly sketching an alternative strategy for reaching suitably objective conclusions regarding the health and/or disease status of various conditions.     

Can biology make ethics objective?

A familiar position regarding the evolution of ethics is that biology can explain the origin of morals but that in doing so it removes the possibility of their having objective justification. This position is set fourth in detail in the writings of Michael Ruse (1986, 1987, 1989, 1990a, 1990b) but it is also taken by many others, notably, Jeffrie Murphy (1982), Andrew Oldenquist (1990), and Allan Gibbard (1990), I argue the contrary view that biology provides a justification of the existence of morals which is objective in the sense of being independent of people's moral views and their particular desires and preferences. Ironically, my argument builds on the very premises which are supposed to undermine the objectivity of morals. But my argument stops short of claiming that biology can give us a basis for justifying some particular system of morals. Drawing on an analogy with social contract theory, I offer a general reason why this more ambitious project cannot be expected to succeed if the argument is pursued along the same lines. Finally, I give reasons why the possibility of objective justification for a particular morality cannot be ruled out in general on evolutionary grounds.     

Evolutionary arguments against moral realism: Why the empirical details matter (and which ones do)

The aim of this article is to identify the strongest evolutionary debunking argument (EDA) against moral realism and to assess on which empirical assumptions it relies. In the recent metaethical literature, several authors have de-emphasized the evolutionary component of EDAs against moral realism: presumably, the success or failure of these arguments is largely orthogonal to empirical issues. I argue that this claim is mistaken. First, I point out that Sharon Street’s and Michael Ruse’s EDAs both involve substantive claims about the evolution of our moral judgments. Next, I argue that combining their respective evolutionary claims can help debunkers to make the best empirical case against moral realism. Some realists have argued that the very attempt to explain the contents of our endorsed moral judgments in evolutionary terms is misguided, and have sought to escape EDAs by denying their evolutionary premise. But realists who pursue this reply can still be challenged on empirical grounds: debunkers may argue that the best, scientifically informed historical explanations of our moral endorsements do not involve an appeal to mind-independent truths. I conclude, therefore, that the empirical considerations relevant for the strongest empirically driven argument against moral realism go beyond the strictly evolutionary realm; debunkers are best advised to draw upon other sources of genealogical knowledge as well.     

Ruse's Darwinian meta-ethics: A critique

Michael Ruse, in Taking Darwin Seriously seeks to establish that taking Darwin seriously requires us to treat morality as subjective and naturalistic. I argue that, if morality is not objective, then we have no good reason for being moral if we can avoid detection and punishment. As a consequence, we will only continue to behave morally as long as we remain ignorant of Ruse's theory, that is, as long as the cat is not let out of the bag. Ruse offers a number of arguments to show that his theory can overcome such problems. I argue that they all fail. Ruse also argues that he can offer a naturalistic account of ethics which steps around the naturalistic fallacy and avoids the confusion of reasons with causes. His principal argument for this view is an analogy between spiritualism and morality. I argue that this analogy fails.     

Michael Ruse's Design for Living

The eminent historian and philosopher ofbiology, Michael Ruse, has writtenseveral books that explore the relationship ofevolutionary theory to its larger scientificand cultural setting. Among the questions hehas investigated are: Is evolution progressive? What is its epistemologicalstatus? Most recently, in Darwin and Design:Does Evolution have a Purpose?,Ruse has provided a history of the concept ofteleology in biological thinking, especially inevolutionary theorizing. In his book, he moves quickly from Plato and Aristotle to Kantand such British thinkers as Paley andWhewell. His main focus, though, is on Darwin'stheory and its subsequent fate. Ruserests his history on some shaky historical andphilosophic assumptions, particularly theunexamined notion that evolutionary theory isan abstract entity that isunproblematically realized in differenthistorical periods. He also assumes that Darwinconceived nature as if it were a Manchesterspinning loom – a clanking, dispassionatemachine. A more subtle analysis, which Ruseeschews, might discover that Darwin'sconception of nature owed a strong debt toGerman Romanticism and that he contrivedto infuse nature with moral and aestheticvalues, not to suck them from nature. Ruseproves he is a thinker to contend with, and this essayis quite contentious.     

The natural selection of altruistic traits

Proponents of the standard evolutionary biology paradigm explain human “altruism” in terms of either nepotism or strict reciprocity. On that basis our underlying nature is reduced to a function of inclusive fitness: human nature has to be totally selfish or nepotistic. Proposed here are three possible paths to giving costly aid to nonrelatives, paths that are controversial because they involve assumed pleiotropic effects or group selection. One path is pleiotropic subsidies that help to extend nepotistic helping behavior from close family to nonrelatives. Another is “warfare”—if and only if warfare recurred in the Paleolithic. The third and most plausible hypothesis is based on the morally based egalitarian syndrome of prehistoric hunter-gatherers, which reduced phenotypic variation at the within-group level, increased it at the between-group level, and drastically curtailed the advantages of free riders. In an analysis consistent with the fundamental tenets of evolutionary biology, these three paths are evaluated as explanations for the evolutionary development of a rather complicated human social nature. This paper (in a series of drafts) has profited from comments by Michael Boehm, Donald T. Campbell, Bruce Knauft, Jane Lancaster, Martin Muller, Peter J. Richerson, Gary Seaman, Craig Stanford, George Williams, Edward O. Wilson, David Sloan Wilson, and two reviewers for Human Nature. Christopher Boehm is a professor of anthropology and the director of the Jane Goodall Research Center, University of Southern California. His research interests in political anthropology concern egalitarianism, feuding, warfare, and conflict resolution (humans and chimpanzees). In biosocial anthropology he is interested in altruism, group selection, and decisions.     

Evolutionary naturalism and the objectivity of morality

We propose an objective and justifiable ethics that is contingent on the truth of evolutionary theory. We do not argue for the truth of this position, which depends on the empirical question of whether moral functions form a natural class, but for its cogency and possibility. The position we propose combines the advantages of Kantian objectivity with the explanatory and motivational advantages of moral naturalism. It avoids problems with the epistemological inaccessibility of transcendent values, while avoiding the relativism or subjectivism often associated with moral naturalism. Our position emerges out of criticisms of the contemporary sociobiological views of morality found in the writings of Richard Alexander, Michael Ruse, and Robert Richards.     

Biology intersects religion and morality

Michael Ruse's writings explore what sociobiology says about morality. Further, he claims that sociobiology undermines the base for Christian morality. After responding to criticisms of Ruse, especially those of Arthur Peacocke, I lay a base for meeting his challenge.     

Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others

Human social interaction requires the recognition that other people are governed by the same types of mental states-beliefs, desires, intentions-that guide one's own behavior. We used functional neuroimaging to examine how perceivers make mental state inferences when such self-other overlap can be assumed (when the other is similar to oneself) and when it cannot (when the other is dissimilar from oneself). We observed a double dissociation such that mentalizing about a similar other engaged a region of ventral mPFC linked to self-referential thought, whereas mentalizing about a dissimilar other engaged a more dorsal subregion of mPFC. The overlap between judgments of self and similar others suggests the plausibility of "simulation" accounts of social cognition, which posit that perceivers can use knowledge about themselves to infer the mental states of others.     

Edmund B. Wilson's the cell and cell theory between 1896 and 1925

Edmund Beecher Wilson is generally celebrated for his contribution to chromosome theory and genetics, whereas opinion concerning his cytological thinking is often restricted to the idea that he provided evidence for the dominant role of the nucleus. But Wilson's cell theory was much more. It was a child of the German Zellforschung, and its attempt to provide a comprehensive cellular answer to a wide range of biological and physiological questions. Wilson developed a corpuscular, micromeristic and preformistic concept, and treated the cell as an organism subject to ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes. He defended his comprehensive theory even in the 1920's, when cytological research had become specialised and directed at more practical goals. For many of his younger readers this concept might have seemed antiquated, but today many of its features sound surprisingly modern.