基于演化博弈的煤炭矿区生态修复管理机制研究

地方政府环境监管部门和煤炭企业是煤炭矿区生态修复保证金制度实施的重要责任主体。从演化博弈论的研究视角探讨了地方政府与煤炭企业在生态修复保证金制度实施中的决策演化过程,构建了地方政府与煤炭企业演化博弈模型,根据复制动态方程规律得到了参与者的行为演化规律和行为演化稳定策略,分析了生态修复保证金制度实施的策略选择影响因素。选择龙口矿区为研究对象进行了实证研究,结果表明:地方政府的监管力度随煤炭企业的生态修复比例变化而变化,生态修复初期比例低;随着地方政府监管力度加大,生态修复比例相应提高,地方政府可以适当放松监管,但监管力度应保持在一定范围内,确保系统向最优状态演化。可通过动态调节保证金收缴金额,增加税收优惠,降低煤炭企业的治理成本,加强对地方政府环保政绩考核,引导地方政府与煤炭企业共同促进煤炭矿区生态修复工作有效实施。     

Analytical Results for Individual and Group Selection of Any Intensity

The idea of evolutionary game theory is to relate the payoff of a game to reproductive success (= fitness). An underlying assumption in most models is that fitness is a linear function of the payoff. For stochastic evolutionary dynamics in finite populations, this leads to analytical results in the limit of weak selection, where the game has a small effect on overall fitness. But this linear function makes the analysis of strong selection difficult. Here, we show that analytical results can be obtained for any intensity of selection, if fitness is defined as an exponential function of payoff. This approach also works for group selection (= multi-level selection). We discuss the difference between our approach and that of inclusive fitness theory.     

基于Logistic模型的煤电产业共生系统稳定性分析

煤电产业共生系统中煤炭企业与电力企业之间的关系与生物种群中物种之间的互利共生关系存在一定的相似性,煤电产业共生系统要实现自身的完善与稳定发展,其内部互利共生关系的企业间必须达到利益上的均衡。借鉴自然界生物种群竞争与合作的共生演化理论与思想,用企业产值来反映煤电产业共生系统演化过程的外生变量,建立了企业产值增长的竞争与合作型Logistic模型。在厘清稳定点的条件之后,通过协同演化博弈分析对煤电产业共生系统演化过程进行了模拟。研究结果表明:(1)煤电产业共生系统的稳定不仅取决于煤电企业进入对方造成的分散力与集聚力之间的较量,还取决于各自在系统内外所取得效益的比较;不仅取决于核心企业的决定性作用,还很大程度上取决于相关企业为进入系统所做出的努力和采取的措施,同时,还与企业的初始产值、竞争力、合作性以及产值增长率等有着密切的关系;(2)煤电产业共生系统要实现长期可持续发展,必须保持产业共生系统互补的共生系统结构以及较高的生产活力。     

Effect of Spatial Dispersion on Evolutionary Stability: A Two-Phenotype and Two-Patch Model

In this paper, we investigate a simple two-phenotype and two-patch model that incorporates both spatial dispersion and density effects in the evolutionary game dynamics. The migration rates from one patch to another are considered to be patch-dependent but independent of individual’s phenotype. Our main goal is to reveal the dynamical properties of the evolutionary game in a heterogeneous patchy environment. By analyzing the equilibria and their stabilities, we find that the dynamical behavior of the evolutionary game dynamics could be very complicated. Numerical analysis shows that the simple model can have twelve equilibria where four of them are stable. This implies that spatial dispersion can significantly complicate the evolutionary game, and the evolutionary outcome in a patchy environment should depend sensitively on the initial state of the patches.     

The impact of friend-or-foe cues and survival pressure on trust in the investment game

Prior research has shown that people place more trust in a counterpart referred to as a “partner” than as an “opponent” in a bargaining game. This is thought to be because the appellations “partner” or “opponent” serve as subtle cues activating a postulated friend-or-foe (FOF) mental module. However, no research has investigated the association between FOF cues and trust in an investment game from an evolutionary perspective. The present research demonstrates the effect of FOF cues on trust among Chinese samples in an actual investment game (Study 1) and in a hypothetical investment game (Study 2), and further demonstrates the moderating role of survival pressure on the association between FOF cues and trust—FOF cues influence trust in a scenario involving survival pressure but not in a scenario lacking survival pressure (Study 3). These findings are consistent with the existence of an adaptive FOF mental mechanism used by human beings to solve survival challenges.     

Acceptor control in model ecosystems

The analysis of models of evolutionary games requires explicit consideration of both evolutionary game rules and mutants which infinitesimally break these rules. For example, the Scotch Auction is an evolutionary game which lacks both a rule-obeying evolutionarily stable strategy and an asymptotically stable polymorphism of rule-obeying strategies. However, an infinitesimal rule-breaking, or cheating, mutant can be found which is an evolutionarily stable strategy against rule-obeying strategies. Such cheating strategies can spread through populations initially playing the Scotch Auction, effectively changing the rules of the game. Moreover, the extent of such rule-change will then tend to increase. Thus, the Scotch Auction is a transient evolutionary game, being the initial point of a seemingly orthogenetic game evolutionary process. This sort of transience suggests that the “progressive” nature of evolution may be due in part to those game features of evolutionary processes which make the success of adaptations relative to the level of extant adaptation among competitors, predators, etc.     

The dynamical attainability of ESS in evolutionary games

In this paper, the attainability of ESS of the evolutionary game among n players under the frequency-independent selection is studied by means of a mathematical model describing the dynamical development and a concept of stability (strongly determined stability). It is assumed that natural selection and small mutations cause the phenotype to change gradually in the direction of fitness increasing. It is shown that (1) the ESS solution is not always evolutionarily attainable in the evolutionary dynamics, (2) in the game where the interaction between two species is completely competitive, the Nash solution is always attainable, and (3) one of two species may attain the state of minimum fitness as a result of evolution. The attainability of ESS is also examined in two game models on the sex ratio of wasps and aphids in light of our criterion of the attainability of ESS.     

基于演化博弈视角的环境正义下重工业区工业碳排放治理机制

探寻生态文明建设背景下重工业区工业碳排放治理机制,对于实现“双碳”目标和环境正义具有重要意义。本研究以辽宁重工业区为例,构建地方政府、工业企业和第三方核查机构三方演化博弈模型,探讨影响工业碳排放策略选择的关键因素,对不同均衡点下三方利益主体的策略选择进行仿真,进而构建工业碳排放治理机制。结果表明: 不同均衡情景下,研究区工业碳排放利益主体策略选择分别符合现实和理想两种情景。在三方利益主体博弈的不同均衡情景中,地方政府和第三方核查机构在不同稳定性均衡情景碳排放策略选择中分别起主导作用。政策补贴、违规行为罚款、减排成本、核查成本和监管成本是研究区工业碳排放三方利益主体演化博弈的关键影响因素。结合工业碳排放的关键影响因素,从创新机制、约束机制、市场机制和倒逼机制4个方面构建研究区工业碳排放治理机制。完善研究区工业碳排放利益均衡分配,促进三方利益主体合作,可实现工业碳排放利益主体博弈下的环境正义。     

Management strategies for agricultural biotechnology in small countries. A case study of Israel

Agricultural biotechnology is concentrated in four major countries. This paper suggests strategies for developing it in small countries, based on analysis of the world trends and the characteristics of small countries. Israel is presented as a specific case study. The main relevant trends are domination by big companies, consumer concerns on genetically modified foods, and focusing on consumer benefits and specific market niches. Small countries' disadvantages include companies that are too small to benefit fully from research, difficulty in raising funds, lack of infrastructures and experienced management personnel, and public sector research organizations that are unsuitable for commercializing research. The recommended strategies include: developing a large number of low-volume products and small market niches, forming partnerships with intermediaries (such as food companies), specializing in intermediate products (such as the seed or the gene patent), and conducting market research and cost-benefit analysis in advance. Additional strategies include developing benefits that are unique to genetically modified foods and focusing on benefits specifically for consumers who accept genetically modified foods, rather than on benefits for the average consumer. A national representative organization could buy and rent out expensive equipment, finance specific projects in return for the commercial rights, and perform collective marketing research and marketing. Israel has the advantages of a successful agricultural sector and complementary scientific research, and should focus on those fruits, vegetables, and flowers for which it already has the experience and infrastructure.     

Evolutionary dynamics of continuous strategy games on graphs and social networks under weak selection

Understanding the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals has been a long-standing puzzle, which has been studied by a variety of game models. Most previous studies presumed that interactions between individuals are discrete, but it seems unrealistic in real systems. Recently, there are increasing interests in studying game models with a continuous strategy space. Existing research work on continuous strategy games mainly focuses on well-mixed populations. Especially, little theoretical work has been conducted on their evolutionary dynamics in a structured population. In the previous work (Zhong et al., BioSystems, 2012), we showed that under strong selection, continuous and discrete strategies have significantly different equilibrium and game dynamics in spatially structured populations. In this paper, we further study evolutionary dynamics of continuous strategy games under weak selection in structured populations. By using the fixation probability based stochastic dynamics, we derive exact conditions of natural selection favoring cooperation for the death–birth updating scheme. We also present a network gain decomposition of the game equilibrium, which might provide a new view of the network reciprocity in a quantitative way. Finally, we make a detailed comparison between games using discrete and continuous strategies. As compared to the former, we find that for the latter (i) the same selection conditions are derived for the general 2 × 2 game; especially, the rule b/c > k in a simplified Prisoner's Dilemma is valid as well; however, (ii) for a coordination game, interestingly, the risk-dominant strategy is disfavored. Numerical simulations have also been conducted to validate our results.     

Evolution of cooperation with shared costs and benefits

The quest to determine how cooperation evolves can be based on evolutionary game theory, in spite of the fact that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for most non-zero-sum games are not cooperative. We analyse the evolution of cooperation for a family of evolutionary games involving shared costs and benefits with a continuum of strategies from non-cooperation to total cooperation. This cost-benefit game allows the cooperator to share in the benefit of a cooperative act, and the recipient to be burdened with a share of the cooperator's cost. The cost-benefit game encompasses the Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift game and Partial Altruism. The models produce ESS solutions of total cooperation, partial cooperation, non-cooperation and coexistence between cooperation and non-cooperation. Cooperation emerges from an interplay between the nonlinearities in the cost and benefit functions. If benefits increase at a decelerating rate and costs increase at an accelerating rate with the degree of cooperation, then the ESS has an intermediate level of cooperation. The game also exhibits non-ESS points such as unstable minima, convergent-stable minima and unstable maxima. The emergence of cooperative behaviour in this game represents enlightened self-interest, whereas non-cooperative solutions illustrate the Tragedy of the Commons. Games having either a stable maximum or a stable minimum have the property that small changes in the incentive structure (model parameter values) or culture (starting frequencies of strategies) result in correspondingly small changes in the degree of cooperation. Conversely, with unstable maxima or unstable minima, small changes in the incentive structure or culture can result in a switch from non-cooperation to total cooperation (and vice versa). These solutions identify when human or animal societies have the potential for cooperation and whether cooperation is robust or fragile.     

Managing private,commercial rangelands for agricultural production and wildlife diversity in Namibia and Zambia

The private game industry has grown across Africa since the mid-20th century. While considerable research has documented wildlife production on commercial land in many eastern and southern African countries, few studies have focused specifically on the integration of livestock and game production in Namibia and Zambia. This paper reports a survey of 43 commercial conservancy members in Namibia and 23 game farmers in Zambia conducted between September 2004 and June 2005. The survey was based on inductive sampling theory and queried farmers on how they have integrated wildlife production into their management practices. Farmers in each country reported considerable integration of wildlife conservation and agricultural production. Namibian farmers reported substantial problems with bush encroachment, whereas none of their Zambian counterparts raised similar complaints. This paper describes the state of rangeland management on commercial farms in Namibia and Zambia and identifies important areas where further research can contribute to the enhancement of this conservation-production system.     

Modeling social and evolutionary games

When game theory was introduced to biology, the components of classic game theory models were replaced with elements more befitting evolutionary phenomena. The actions of intelligent agents are replaced by phenotypic traits; utility is replaced by fitness; rational deliberation is replaced by natural selection. In this paper, I argue that this classic conception of comprehensive reapplication is misleading, for it overemphasizes the discontinuity between human behavior and evolved traits. Explicitly considering the representational roles of evolutionary game theory brings to attention areas of overlap that are often neglected, and so a range of evolutionary possibilities that are often overlooked. The clarifications this analysis provides are well illustrated by-and particularly valuable for-game theoretic treatments of the evolution of social behavior.     

Evolutionary games on cycles

Traditional evolutionary game theory explores frequency-dependent selection in well-mixed populations without spatial or stochastic effects. But recently there has been much interest in studying the evolutionary game dynamics in spatial settings, on lattices and other graphs. Here, we present an analytic approach for the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics on the simplest possible graph, the cycle. For three different update rules, called 'birth-death' (BD), 'death-birth' (DB) and 'imitation' (IM), we derive exact conditions for natural selection to favour one strategy over another. As specific examples, we consider a coordination game and Prisoner's Dilemma. In the latter case, selection can favour cooperators over defectors for DB and IM updating. We also study the case where the replacement graph of evolutionary updating remains a cycle, but the interaction graph for playing the game is a complete graph. In this setting, all three update rules lead to identical conditions in the limit of weak selection, where we find the '1/3-law' of well-mixed populations.     

Chaos and language

Human language is a complex communication system with unlimited expressibility. Children spontaneously develop a native language by exposure to linguistic data from their speech community. Over historical time, languages change dramatically and unpredictably by accumulation of small changes and by interaction with other languages. We have previously developed a mathematical model for the acquisition and evolution of language in heterogeneous populations of speakers. This model is based on game dynamical equations with learning. Here, we show that simple examples of such equations can display complex limit cycles and chaos. Hence, language dynamical equations mimic complicated and unpredictable changes of languages over time. In terms of evolutionary game theory, we note that imperfect learning can induce chaotic switching among strict Nash equilibria.     

Stochastic Fluctuations Through Intrinsic Noise in Evolutionary Game Dynamics

A one-step (birth–death) process is used to investigate stochastic noise in an elementary two-phenotype evolutionary game model based on a payoff matrix. In this model, we assume that the population size is finite but not fixed and that all individuals have, in addition to the frequency-dependent fitness given by the evolutionary game, the same background fitness that decreases linearly in the total population size. Although this assumption guarantees population extinction is a globally attracting absorbing barrier of the Markov process, sample trajectories do not illustrate this result even for relatively small carrying capacities. Instead, the observed persistent transient behavior can be analyzed using the steady-state statistics (i.e., mean and variance) of a stochastic model for intrinsic noise that assumes the population does not go extinct. It is shown that there is good agreement between the theory of these statistics and the simulation results. Furthermore, the ESS of the evolutionary game can be used to predict the mean steady state.     

中国生物科技企业前沿模型的构建与应用研究

综述了前沿模型的产生、发展、分类,并在此基础上根据2004年度中国主要生物科技上市公司样本数据,尝试构建中国生物科技企业前沿模型。分别选用了随机前沿模型、确定性参数前沿模型和确定性统计前沿模型并根据主要统计检验指标进行分析比较,结果发现:2004年度中国主要生物科技企业上市公司样本数据适合于建立确定性统计前沿模型。根据建立的确定性统计前沿模型测定中国主要生物科技企业上市公司技术效果发现:中国主要生科企业普遍存在着技术效率低下、差距大的现状;资本投入对产出的影响大大高于劳动力投入对产出的影响;中国东、中、西部主要生科企业总平均技术效率并无显著差异。     

Influence of Opinion Dynamics on the Evolution of Games

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by observing own or others payoff results but can be also modified after interchanging impressions with other players. In this way, the update of the strategies can become a question that goes beyond simple evolutionary rules based on fitness and become a social issue. In this work, we explore this scenario by coupling a game with an opinion dynamics model. The opinion is represented by a continuous variable that corresponds to the certainty of the agents respect to which strategy is best. The opinions transform into actions by making the selection of an strategy a stochastic event with a probability regulated by the opinion. A certain regard for the previous round payoff is included but the main update rules of the opinion are given by a model inspired in social interchanges. We find that the fixed points of the dynamics of the coupled model are different from those of the evolutionary game or the opinion models alone. Furthermore, new features emerge such as the independence of the fraction of cooperators with respect to the topology of the social interaction network or the presence of a small fraction of extremist players.     

Supply and use of human tissue for research purposes: survey of BATB affiliated tissue banks

This paper describes a survey undertaken to identify the extent of supply and use of human tissue in research by BATB affiliated tissue banks. Approximately one third of tissue banks registered with the BATB are currently supplying samples that are found to be unsuitable for clinical use, for research. These banks all obtain consent for research and all supply tissue for in-house research. Some tissue is transferred to other public and commercial institutions. A harmonised network approach is proposed as the way forward to meet the increasing demand for human tissue in research.     

医药 CRO 专题报告——蓝海市场，强者恒强

随着全球制药企业研发投资成本加大、研发周期变长、研发成功率降低,作为社会分工专业化的产物,CRO 企业凭借其低成本、高效率、 多服务的特点,快速发展,且服务范畴已涵盖药物研发的整个过程,成为医药研发产业链中不可缺少的环节。报告采用文献调研、数据库检索、 数据统计与分析等定性定量研究方法,从发展概况、发展策略、竞争格局、企业布局等角度对国内外医药 CRO 领域进行多角度、多层次的 分析,旨在为相关企业确定产品研发思路、制定市场策略提供线索和参考。