Attention controls multisensory perception via two distinct mechanisms at different levels of the cortical hierarchy

To form a percept of the multisensory world, the brain needs to integrate signals from common sources weighted by their reliabilities and segregate those from independent sources. Previously, we have shown that anterior parietal cortices combine sensory signals into representations that take into account the signals’ causal structure (i.e., common versus independent sources) and their sensory reliabilities as predicted by Bayesian causal inference. The current study asks to what extent and how attentional mechanisms can actively control how sensory signals are combined for perceptual inference. In a pre- and postcueing paradigm, we presented observers with audiovisual signals at variable spatial disparities. Observers were precued to attend to auditory or visual modalities prior to stimulus presentation and postcued to report their perceived auditory or visual location. Combining psychophysics, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and Bayesian modelling, we demonstrate that the brain moulds multisensory inference via two distinct mechanisms. Prestimulus attention to vision enhances the reliability and influence of visual inputs on spatial representations in visual and posterior parietal cortices. Poststimulus report determines how parietal cortices flexibly combine sensory estimates into spatial representations consistent with Bayesian causal inference. Our results show that distinct neural mechanisms control how signals are combined for perceptual inference at different levels of the cortical hierarchy.

A combination of psychophysics, computational modelling and fMRI reveals novel insights into how the brain controls the binding of information across the senses, such as the voice and lip movements of a speaker.     

Causal Inference for Spatial Constancy across Saccades

Our ability to interact with the environment hinges on creating a stable visual world despite the continuous changes in retinal input. To achieve visual stability, the brain must distinguish the retinal image shifts caused by eye movements and shifts due to movements of the visual scene. This process appears not to be flawless: during saccades, we often fail to detect whether visual objects remain stable or move, which is called saccadic suppression of displacement (SSD). How does the brain evaluate the memorized information of the presaccadic scene and the actual visual feedback of the postsaccadic visual scene in the computations for visual stability? Using a SSD task, we test how participants localize the presaccadic position of the fixation target, the saccade target or a peripheral non-foveated target that was displaced parallel or orthogonal during a horizontal saccade, and subsequently viewed for three different durations. Results showed different localization errors of the three targets, depending on the viewing time of the postsaccadic stimulus and its spatial separation from the presaccadic location. We modeled the data through a Bayesian causal inference mechanism, in which at the trial level an optimal mixing of two possible strategies, integration vs. separation of the presaccadic memory and the postsaccadic sensory signals, is applied. Fits of this model generally outperformed other plausible decision strategies for producing SSD. Our findings suggest that humans exploit a Bayesian inference process with two causal structures to mediate visual stability.     

When correlation implies causation in multisensory integration

Inferring which signals have a common underlying cause, and hence should be integrated, represents a primary challenge for a perceptual system dealing with multiple sensory inputs [1-3]. This challenge is often referred to as the correspondence problem or causal inference. Previous research has demonstrated that spatiotemporal cues, along with prior knowledge, are exploited by the human brain to solve this problem [4-9]. Here we explore the role of correlation between the fine temporal structure of auditory and visual signals in causal inference. Specifically, we investigated whether correlated signals are inferred to originate from the same distal event and hence are integrated optimally [10]. In a localization task with visual, auditory, and combined audiovisual targets, the improvement in precision for combined relative to unimodal targets was statistically optimal only when audiovisual signals were correlated. This result demonstrates that humans use the similarity in the temporal structure of multisensory signals to solve the correspondence problem, hence inferring causation from correlation.     

Converging levels of analysis in the cognitive neuroscience of visual attention.

Experiments using behavioural, lesion, functional imaging and single neuron methods are considered in the context of a neuropsychological model of visual attention. According to this model, inputs compete for representation in multiple visually responsive brain systems, sensory and motor, cortical and subcortical. Competition is biased by advance priming of neurons responsive to current behavioural targets. Across systems competition is integrated such that the same, selected object tends to become dominant throughout. The behavioural studies reviewed concern divided attention within and between modalities. They implicate within-modality competition as one main restriction on concurrent stimulus identification. In contrast to the conventional association of lateral attentional focus with parietal lobe function, the lesion studies show attentional bias to be a widespread consequence of unilateral cortical damage. Although the clinical syndrome of unilateral neglect may indeed be associated with parietal lesions, this probably reflects an assortment of further deficits accompanying a simple attentional imbalance. The functional imaging studies show joint involvement of lateral prefrontal and occipital cortex in lateral attentional focus and competition. The single unit studies suggest how competition in several regions of extrastriate cortex is biased by advance priming of neurons responsive to current behavioural targets. Together, the concepts of competition, priming and integration allow a unified theoretical approach to findings from behavioural to single neuron levels.     

A theory of cortical responses

This article concerns the nature of evoked brain responses and the principles underlying their generation. We start with the premise that the sensory brain has evolved to represent or infer the causes of changes in its sensory inputs. The problem of inference is well formulated in statistical terms. The statistical fundaments of inference may therefore afford important constraints on neuronal implementation. By formulating the original ideas of Helmholtz on perception, in terms of modern-day statistical theories, one arrives at a model of perceptual inference and learning that can explain a remarkable range of neurobiological facts.It turns out that the problems of inferring the causes of sensory input (perceptual inference) and learning the relationship between input and cause (perceptual learning) can be resolved using exactly the same principle. Specifically, both inference and learning rest on minimizing the brain's free energy, as defined in statistical physics. Furthermore, inference and learning can proceed in a biologically plausible fashion. Cortical responses can be seen as the brain's attempt to minimize the free energy induced by a stimulus and thereby encode the most likely cause of that stimulus. Similarly, learning emerges from changes in synaptic efficacy that minimize the free energy, averaged over all stimuli encountered. The underlying scheme rests on empirical Bayes and hierarchical models of how sensory input is caused. The use of hierarchical models enables the brain to construct prior expectations in a dynamic and context-sensitive fashion. This scheme provides a principled way to understand many aspects of cortical organization and responses. The aim of this article is to encompass many apparently unrelated anatomical, physiological and psychophysical attributes of the brain within a single theoretical perspective.In terms of cortical architectures, the theoretical treatment predicts that sensory cortex should be arranged hierarchically, that connections should be reciprocal and that forward and backward connections should show a functional asymmetry (forward connections are driving, whereas backward connections are both driving and modulatory). In terms of synaptic physiology, it predicts associative plasticity and, for dynamic models, spike-timing-dependent plasticity. In terms of electrophysiology, it accounts for classical and extra classical receptive field effects and long-latency or endogenous components of evoked cortical responses. It predicts the attenuation of responses encoding prediction error with perceptual learning and explains many phenomena such as repetition suppression, mismatch negativity (MMN) and the P300 in electroencephalography. In psychophysical terms, it accounts for the behavioural correlates of these physiological phenomena, for example, priming and global precedence. The final focus of this article is on perceptual learning as measured with the MMN and the implications for empirical studies of coupling among cortical areas using evoked sensory responses.     

Multisensory Oddity Detection as Bayesian Inference

A key goal for the perceptual system is to optimally combine information from all the senses that may be available in order to develop the most accurate and unified picture possible of the outside world. The contemporary theoretical framework of ideal observer maximum likelihood integration (MLI) has been highly successful in modelling how the human brain combines information from a variety of different sensory modalities. However, in various recent experiments involving multisensory stimuli of uncertain correspondence, MLI breaks down as a successful model of sensory combination. Within the paradigm of direct stimulus estimation, perceptual models which use Bayesian inference to resolve correspondence have recently been shown to generalize successfully to these cases where MLI fails. This approach has been known variously as model inference, causal inference or structure inference. In this paper, we examine causal uncertainty in another important class of multi-sensory perception paradigm – that of oddity detection and demonstrate how a Bayesian ideal observer also treats oddity detection as a structure inference problem. We validate this approach by showing that it provides an intuitive and quantitative explanation of an important pair of multi-sensory oddity detection experiments – involving cues across and within modalities – for which MLI previously failed dramatically, allowing a novel unifying treatment of within and cross modal multisensory perception. Our successful application of structure inference models to the new ‘oddity detection’ paradigm, and the resultant unified explanation of across and within modality cases provide further evidence to suggest that structure inference may be a commonly evolved principle for combining perceptual information in the brain.     

Stochastic correlative firing for figure-ground segregation

Segregation of sensory inputs into separate objects is a central aspect of perception and arises in all sensory modalities. The figure-ground segregation problem requires identifying an object of interest in a complex scene, in many cases given binaural auditory or binocular visual observations. The computations required for visual and auditory figure-ground segregation share many common features and can be cast within a unified framework. Sensory perception can be viewed as a problem of optimizing information transmission. Here we suggest a stochastic correlative firing mechanism and an associative learning rule for figure-ground segregation in several classic sensory perception tasks, including the cocktail party problem in binaural hearing, binocular fusion of stereo images, and Gestalt grouping in motion perception.     

Causal inference in multisensory perception

Perceptual events derive their significance to an animal from their meaning about the world, that is from the information they carry about their causes. The brain should thus be able to efficiently infer the causes underlying our sensory events. Here we use multisensory cue combination to study causal inference in perception. We formulate an ideal-observer model that infers whether two sensory cues originate from the same location and that also estimates their location(s). This model accurately predicts the nonlinear integration of cues by human subjects in two auditory-visual localization tasks. The results show that indeed humans can efficiently infer the causal structure as well as the location of causes. By combining insights from the study of causal inference with the ideal-observer approach to sensory cue combination, we show that the capacity to infer causal structure is not limited to conscious, high-level cognition; it is also performed continually and effortlessly in perception.     

Multimodal sensory integration in weakly electric fish: a behavioral account.

The ability to integrate multisensory information is a fundamental characteristic of the brain serving to enhance the detection and identification of external stimuli. Weakly electric fish employ multiple senses in their interactions with one another and with their inanimate environment (electric, visual, acoustic, mechanical, chemical, thermal, and hydrostatic pressure) and also generate signals using some of the same stimulus energies (electric, acoustic, visual, mechanical). A brief overview provides background on the sensory and motor channels available to the fish followed by an examination of how weakly electric fish 'benefit' from integrating various stimulus modalities that assist in prey detection, schooling, foraging, courtship, and object location. Depending on environmental conditions, multiple sensory inputs can act synergistically and improve the task at hand, can be redundant or contradictory, and can substitute for one another. Over time, in repeated encounters with familiar surrounds, loss of one modality can be compensated for through learning. Studies of neuronal substrates and an understanding of the computational algorithms that underlie multisensory integration ought to expose the physiological corollaries to widely published concepts such as internal representation, sensory expectation, sensory generalization, and sensory transfer.     

Reshaping sensory representations by task-specific brain states: Toward cortical circuit mechanisms

Perception is internally constructed by integrating brain states with external sensory inputs, a process depending on the topdown modulation of sensory representations. A wealth of earlier studies described task-dependent modulations of sensory cortex corroborating perceptual and behavioral phenomena. But only with recent technological advancements, the underlying circuit-level mechanisms began to be unveiled. We review recent progress along this line of research. It begins to be appreciated that topdown signals can encode various types of task-related information, ranging from task engagement, and category knowledge to decision execution; these signals are transferred via feedback pathways originating from distinct association cortices and interact with sensory cortical circuits. These plausible mechanisms support a broad range of computations from predictive coding to inference making, ultimately form dynamic percepts and endow behavioral flexibility.     

Task-induced neural covariability as a signature of approximate Bayesian learning and inference

Perception is often characterized computationally as an inference process in which uncertain or ambiguous sensory inputs are combined with prior expectations. Although behavioral studies have shown that observers can change their prior expectations in the context of a task, robust neural signatures of task-specific priors have been elusive. Here, we analytically derive such signatures under the general assumption that the responses of sensory neurons encode posterior beliefs that combine sensory inputs with task-specific expectations. Specifically, we derive predictions for the task-dependence of correlated neural variability and decision-related signals in sensory neurons. The qualitative aspects of our results are parameter-free and specific to the statistics of each task. The predictions for correlated variability also differ from predictions of classic feedforward models of sensory processing and are therefore a strong test of theories of hierarchical Bayesian inference in the brain. Importantly, we find that Bayesian learning predicts an increase in so-called “differential correlations” as the observer’s internal model learns the stimulus distribution, and the observer’s behavioral performance improves. This stands in contrast to classic feedforward encoding/decoding models of sensory processing, since such correlations are fundamentally information-limiting. We find support for our predictions in data from existing neurophysiological studies across a variety of tasks and brain areas. Finally, we show in simulation how measurements of sensory neural responses can reveal information about a subject’s internal beliefs about the task. Taken together, our results reinterpret task-dependent sources of neural covariability as signatures of Bayesian inference and provide new insights into their cause and their function.     

Cortical Hierarchies Perform Bayesian Causal Inference in Multisensory Perception

To form a veridical percept of the environment, the brain needs to integrate sensory signals from a common source but segregate those from independent sources. Thus, perception inherently relies on solving the “causal inference problem.” Behaviorally, humans solve this problem optimally as predicted by Bayesian Causal Inference; yet, the underlying neural mechanisms are unexplored. Combining psychophysics, Bayesian modeling, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), and multivariate decoding in an audiovisual spatial localization task, we demonstrate that Bayesian Causal Inference is performed by a hierarchy of multisensory processes in the human brain. At the bottom of the hierarchy, in auditory and visual areas, location is represented on the basis that the two signals are generated by independent sources (= segregation). At the next stage, in posterior intraparietal sulcus, location is estimated under the assumption that the two signals are from a common source (= forced fusion). Only at the top of the hierarchy, in anterior intraparietal sulcus, the uncertainty about the causal structure of the world is taken into account and sensory signals are combined as predicted by Bayesian Causal Inference. Characterizing the computational operations of signal interactions reveals the hierarchical nature of multisensory perception in human neocortex. It unravels how the brain accomplishes Bayesian Causal Inference, a statistical computation fundamental for perception and cognition. Our results demonstrate how the brain combines information in the face of uncertainty about the underlying causal structure of the world.     

Computations in the early visual cortex.

This paper reviews some of the recent neurophysiological studies that explore the variety of visual computations in the early visual cortex in relation to geometric inference, i.e. the inference of contours, surfaces and shapes. It attempts to draw connections between ideas from computational vision and findings from awake primate electrophysiology. In the classical feed-forward, modular view of visual processing, the early visual areas (LGN, V1 and V2) are modules that serve to extract local features, while higher extrastriate areas are responsible for shape inference and invariant object recognition. However, recent findings in primate early visual systems reveal that the computations in the early visual cortex are rather complex and dynamic, as well as interactive and plastic, subject to influence from global context, higher order perceptual inference, task requirement and behavioral experience. The evidence argues that the early visual cortex does not merely participate in the first stage of visual processing, but is involved in many levels of visual computation.     

From Sensory Signals to Modality-Independent Conceptual Representations: A Probabilistic Language of Thought Approach

People learn modality-independent, conceptual representations from modality-specific sensory signals. Here, we hypothesize that any system that accomplishes this feat will include three components: a representational language for characterizing modality-independent representations, a set of sensory-specific forward models for mapping from modality-independent representations to sensory signals, and an inference algorithm for inverting forward models—that is, an algorithm for using sensory signals to infer modality-independent representations. To evaluate this hypothesis, we instantiate it in the form of a computational model that learns object shape representations from visual and/or haptic signals. The model uses a probabilistic grammar to characterize modality-independent representations of object shape, uses a computer graphics toolkit and a human hand simulator to map from object representations to visual and haptic features, respectively, and uses a Bayesian inference algorithm to infer modality-independent object representations from visual and/or haptic signals. Simulation results show that the model infers identical object representations when an object is viewed, grasped, or both. That is, the model’s percepts are modality invariant. We also report the results of an experiment in which different subjects rated the similarity of pairs of objects in different sensory conditions, and show that the model provides a very accurate account of subjects’ ratings. Conceptually, this research significantly contributes to our understanding of modality invariance, an important type of perceptual constancy, by demonstrating how modality-independent representations can be acquired and used. Methodologically, it provides an important contribution to cognitive modeling, particularly an emerging probabilistic language-of-thought approach, by showing how symbolic and statistical approaches can be combined in order to understand aspects of human perception.     

Modulation of visual processing by attention and emotion: windows on causal interactions between human brain regions

Visual processing is not determined solely by retinal inputs. Attentional modulation can arise when the internal attentional state (current task) of the observer alters visual processing of the same stimuli. This can influence visual cortex, boosting neural responses to an attended stimulus. Emotional modulation can also arise, when affective properties (emotional significance) of stimuli, rather than their strictly visual properties, influence processing. This too can boost responses in visual cortex, as for fear-associated stimuli. Both attentional and emotional modulation of visual processing may reflect distant influences upon visual cortex, exerted by brain structures outside the visual system per se. Hence, these modulations may provide windows onto causal interactions between distant but interconnected brain regions. We review recent evidence, noting both similarities and differences between attentional and emotional modulation. Both can affect visual cortex, but can reflect influences from different regions, such as fronto-parietal circuits versus the amygdala. Recent work on this has developed new approaches for studying causal influences between human brain regions that may be useful in other cognitive domains. The new methods include application of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG) measures in brain-damaged patients to study distant functional impacts of their focal lesions, and use of transcranial magnetic stimulation concurrently with fMRI or EEG in the normal brain. Cognitive neuroscience is now moving beyond considering the putative functions of particular brain regions, as if each operated in isolation, to consider, instead, how distinct brain regions (such as visual cortex, parietal or frontal regions, or amygdala) may mutually influence each other in a causal manner.     

Where’s the Noise? Key Features of Spontaneous Activity and Neural Variability Arise through Learning in a Deterministic Network

Even in the absence of sensory stimulation the brain is spontaneously active. This background “noise” seems to be the dominant cause of the notoriously high trial-to-trial variability of neural recordings. Recent experimental observations have extended our knowledge of trial-to-trial variability and spontaneous activity in several directions: 1. Trial-to-trial variability systematically decreases following the onset of a sensory stimulus or the start of a motor act. 2. Spontaneous activity states in sensory cortex outline the region of evoked sensory responses. 3. Across development, spontaneous activity aligns itself with typical evoked activity patterns. 4. The spontaneous brain activity prior to the presentation of an ambiguous stimulus predicts how the stimulus will be interpreted. At present it is unclear how these observations relate to each other and how they arise in cortical circuits. Here we demonstrate that all of these phenomena can be accounted for by a deterministic self-organizing recurrent neural network model (SORN), which learns a predictive model of its sensory environment. The SORN comprises recurrently coupled populations of excitatory and inhibitory threshold units and learns via a combination of spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP) and homeostatic plasticity mechanisms. Similar to balanced network architectures, units in the network show irregular activity and variable responses to inputs. Additionally, however, the SORN exhibits sequence learning abilities matching recent findings from visual cortex and the network’s spontaneous activity reproduces the experimental findings mentioned above. Intriguingly, the network’s behaviour is reminiscent of sampling-based probabilistic inference, suggesting that correlates of sampling-based inference can develop from the interaction of STDP and homeostasis in deterministic networks. We conclude that key observations on spontaneous brain activity and the variability of neural responses can be accounted for by a simple deterministic recurrent neural network which learns a predictive model of its sensory environment via a combination of generic neural plasticity mechanisms.     

Neural processing as causal inference

Perception is about making sense, that is, understanding what events in the outside world caused the sensory observations. Consistent with this intuition, many aspects of human behavior confronting noise and ambiguity are well explained by principles of causal inference. Extending these insights, recent studies have applied the same powerful set of tools to perceptual processing at the neural level. According to these approaches, microscopic neural structures solve elementary probabilistic tasks and can be combined to construct hierarchical predictive models of the sensory input. This framework suggests that variability in neural responses reflects the inherent uncertainty associated with sensory interpretations and that sensory neurons are active predictors rather than passive filters of their inputs. Causal inference can account parsimoniously and quantitatively for non-linear dynamical properties in single synapses, single neurons and sensory receptive fields.     

Behavioural phase change in the Australian plague locust, Chortoicetes terminifera, is triggered by tactile stimulation of the antennae

Density-dependent phase polyphenism is a defining characteristic of the paraphyletic group of acridid grasshoppers known as locusts. The cues and mechanisms associated with crowding that induce behavioural gregarization are best understood in the desert locust, Schistocerca gregaria, and involve a combination of sensory inputs from the head (visual and olfactory) and mechanostimulation of the hind legs, acting via a transient increase in serotonin in the thoracic ganglia. Since behavioural gregarization has apparently arisen independently multiple times within the Acrididae, the important question arises as to whether the same mechanisms have been recruited each time. Here we explored the roles of visual, olfactory and tactile stimulation in the induction of behavioural gregarization in the Australian plague locust, Chortoicetes terminifera. We show that the primary gregarizing input is tactile stimulation of the antennae, with no evidence for an effect of visual and olfactory stimulation or tactile stimulation of the hind legs. Our results show that convergent behavioural responses to crowding have evolved employing different sites of sensory input in the Australian plague locust and the desert locust.     

Forward and Backward Inference in Spatial Cognition

This paper shows that the various computations underlying spatial cognition can be implemented using statistical inference in a single probabilistic model. Inference is implemented using a common set of ‘lower-level’ computations involving forward and backward inference over time. For example, to estimate where you are in a known environment, forward inference is used to optimally combine location estimates from path integration with those from sensory input. To decide which way to turn to reach a goal, forward inference is used to compute the likelihood of reaching that goal under each option. To work out which environment you are in, forward inference is used to compute the likelihood of sensory observations under the different hypotheses. For reaching sensory goals that require a chaining together of decisions, forward inference can be used to compute a state trajectory that will lead to that goal, and backward inference to refine the route and estimate control signals that produce the required trajectory. We propose that these computations are reflected in recent findings of pattern replay in the mammalian brain. Specifically, that theta sequences reflect decision making, theta flickering reflects model selection, and remote replay reflects route and motor planning. We also propose a mapping of the above computational processes onto lateral and medial entorhinal cortex and hippocampus.     

Causal inference regulates audiovisual spatial recalibration via its influence on audiovisual perception

To obtain a coherent perception of the world, our senses need to be in alignment. When we encounter misaligned cues from two sensory modalities, the brain must infer which cue is faulty and recalibrate the corresponding sense. We examined whether and how the brain uses cue reliability to identify the miscalibrated sense by measuring the audiovisual ventriloquism aftereffect for stimuli of varying visual reliability. To adjust for modality-specific biases, visual stimulus locations were chosen based on perceived alignment with auditory stimulus locations for each participant. During an audiovisual recalibration phase, participants were presented with bimodal stimuli with a fixed perceptual spatial discrepancy; they localized one modality, cued after stimulus presentation. Unimodal auditory and visual localization was measured before and after the audiovisual recalibration phase. We compared participants’ behavior to the predictions of three models of recalibration: (a) Reliability-based: each modality is recalibrated based on its relative reliability—less reliable cues are recalibrated more; (b) Fixed-ratio: the degree of recalibration for each modality is fixed; (c) Causal-inference: recalibration is directly determined by the discrepancy between a cue and its estimate, which in turn depends on the reliability of both cues, and inference about how likely the two cues derive from a common source. Vision was hardly recalibrated by audition. Auditory recalibration by vision changed idiosyncratically as visual reliability decreased: the extent of auditory recalibration either decreased monotonically, peaked at medium visual reliability, or increased monotonically. The latter two patterns cannot be explained by either the reliability-based or fixed-ratio models. Only the causal-inference model of recalibration captures the idiosyncratic influences of cue reliability on recalibration. We conclude that cue reliability, causal inference, and modality-specific biases guide cross-modal recalibration indirectly by determining the perception of audiovisual stimuli.