A Bayesian Attractor Model for Perceptual Decision Making

Even for simple perceptual decisions, the mechanisms that the brain employs are still under debate. Although current consensus states that the brain accumulates evidence extracted from noisy sensory information, open questions remain about how this simple model relates to other perceptual phenomena such as flexibility in decisions, decision-dependent modulation of sensory gain, or confidence about a decision. We propose a novel approach of how perceptual decisions are made by combining two influential formalisms into a new model. Specifically, we embed an attractor model of decision making into a probabilistic framework that models decision making as Bayesian inference. We show that the new model can explain decision making behaviour by fitting it to experimental data. In addition, the new model combines for the first time three important features: First, the model can update decisions in response to switches in the underlying stimulus. Second, the probabilistic formulation accounts for top-down effects that may explain recent experimental findings of decision-related gain modulation of sensory neurons. Finally, the model computes an explicit measure of confidence which we relate to recent experimental evidence for confidence computations in perceptual decision tasks.     

Determinants of Dwell Time in Visual Search: Similarity or Perceptual Difficulty?

The present study examined the factors that determine the dwell times in a visual search task, that is, the duration the gaze remains fixated on an object. It has been suggested that an item's similarity to the search target should be an important determiner of dwell times, because dwell times are taken to reflect the time needed to reject the item as a distractor, and such discriminations are supposed to be harder the more similar an item is to the search target. In line with this similarity view, a previous study shows that, in search for a target ring of thin line-width, dwell times on thin linewidth Landolt C's distractors were longer than dwell times on Landolt C's with thick or medium linewidth. However, dwell times may have been longer on thin Landolt C's because the thin line-width made it harder to detect whether the stimuli had a gap or not. Thus, it is an open question whether dwell times on thin line-width distractors were longer because they were similar to the target or because the perceptual decision was more difficult. The present study de-coupled similarity from perceptual difficulty, by measuring dwell times on thin, medium and thick line-width distractors when the target had thin, medium or thick line-width. The results showed that dwell times were longer on target-similar than target-dissimilar stimuli across all target conditions and regardless of the line-width. It is concluded that prior findings of longer dwell times on thin linewidth-distractors can clearly be attributed to target similarity. As will be discussed towards the end, the finding of similarity effects on dwell times has important implications for current theories of visual search and eye movement control.     

The Silent Period of Evidence Integration in Fast Decision Making

In a typical experiment on decision making, one out of two possible stimuli is displayed and observers decide which one was presented. Recently, Stanford and colleagues (2010) introduced a new variant of this classical one-stimulus presentation paradigm to investigate the speed of decision making. They found evidence for “perceptual decision making in less than 30 ms”. Here, we extended this one-stimulus compelled-response paradigm to a two-stimulus compelled-response paradigm in which a vernier was followed immediately by a second vernier with opposite offset direction. The two verniers and their offsets fuse. Only one vernier is perceived. When observers are asked to indicate the offset direction of the fused vernier, the offset of the second vernier dominates perception. Even for long vernier durations, the second vernier dominates decisions indicating that decision making can take substantial time. In accordance with previous studies, we suggest that our results are best explained with a two-stage model of decision making where a leaky evidence integration stage precedes a race-to-threshold process.     

Attention facilitates multiple stimulus features in parallel in human visual cortex

Successfully locating a dangerous or desirable object within a cluttered visual scene is a commonplace yet highly adaptive skill. In the laboratory, this ability is modeled by visual search experiments in which subjects try to find a target item surrounded by an array of distracting stimuli. Under certain conditions, targets that are distinguishable from distractors by virtue of having a particular combination of shared sensory features (e.g., a particular color and orientation) can be found rapidly regardless of the number of distractors. To explain this highly efficient localization of feature-conjunction targets, "guided search" theories propose that attention is directed in parallel to the individual features that define the target, which then stands out from the distractors because of additive facilitation of its feature signals. Here we recorded frequency-tagged potentials evoked in human visual cortex and found that color and orientation features of target stimuli are indeed facilitated by attention in a parallel and additive manner. This additive feature-enhancement mechanism, reported here for the first time, not only enables rapid guided search but also plays a broader role in directing and sustaining attention to multi-feature objects and keeping them perceptually distinct from background clutter.     

Perceived positions determine crowding

Crowding is a fundamental bottleneck in object recognition. In crowding, an object in the periphery becomes unrecognizable when surrounded by clutter or distractor objects. Crowding depends on the positions of target and distractors, both their eccentricity and their relative spacing. In all previous studies, position has been expressed in terms of retinal position. However, in a number of situations retinal and perceived positions can be dissociated. Does retinal or perceived position determine the magnitude of crowding? Here observers performed an orientation judgment on a target Gabor patch surrounded by distractors that drifted toward or away from the target, causing an illusory motion-induced position shift. Distractors in identical physical positions led to worse performance when they drifted towards the target (appearing closer) versus away from the target (appearing further). This difference in crowding corresponded to the difference in perceived positions. Further, the perceptual mislocalization was necessary for the change in crowding, and both the mislocalization and crowding scaled with drift speed. The results show that crowding occurs after perceived positions have been assigned by the visual system. Crowding does not operate in a purely retinal coordinate system; perceived positions need to be taken into account.     

Decision prioritization and causal reasoning in decision hierarchies

From cooking a meal to finding a route to a destination, many real life decisions can be decomposed into a hierarchy of sub-decisions. In a hierarchy, choosing which decision to think about requires planning over a potentially vast space of possible decision sequences. To gain insight into how people decide what to decide on, we studied a novel task that combines perceptual decision making, active sensing and hierarchical and counterfactual reasoning. Human participants had to find a target hidden at the lowest level of a decision tree. They could solicit information from the different nodes of the decision tree to gather noisy evidence about the target’s location. Feedback was given only after errors at the leaf nodes and provided ambiguous evidence about the cause of the error. Despite the complexity of task (with 10⁷ latent states) participants were able to plan efficiently in the task. A computational model of this process identified a small number of heuristics of low computational complexity that accounted for human behavior. These heuristics include making categorical decisions at the branching points of the decision tree rather than carrying forward entire probability distributions, discarding sensory evidence deemed unreliable to make a choice, and using choice confidence to infer the cause of the error after an initial plan failed. Plans based on probabilistic inference or myopic sampling norms could not capture participants’ behavior. Our results show that it is possible to identify hallmarks of heuristic planning with sensing in human behavior and that the use of tasks of intermediate complexity helps identify the rules underlying human ability to reason over decision hierarchies.     

Tuned inhibition in perceptual decision-making circuits can explain seemingly suboptimal confidence behavior

Current dominant views hold that perceptual confidence reflects the probability that a decision is correct. Although these views have enjoyed some empirical support, recent behavioral results indicate that confidence and the probability of being correct can be dissociated. An alternative hypothesis suggests that confidence instead reflects the magnitude of evidence in favor of a decision while being relatively insensitive to the evidence opposing the decision. We considered how this alternative hypothesis might be biologically instantiated by developing a simple neural network model incorporating a known property of sensory neurons: tuned inhibition. The key idea of the model is that the level of inhibition that each accumulator unit receives from units with the opposite tuning preference, i.e. its inhibition ‘tuning’, dictates its contribution to perceptual decisions versus confidence judgments, such that units with higher tuned inhibition (computing relative evidence for different perceptual interpretations) determine perceptual discrimination decisions, and units with lower tuned inhibition (computing absolute evidence) determine confidence. We demonstrate that this biologically plausible model can account for several counterintuitive findings reported in the literature where confidence and decision accuracy dissociate. By comparing model fits, we further demonstrate that a full complement of behavioral data across several previously published experimental results—including accuracy, reaction time, mean confidence, and metacognitive sensitivity—is best accounted for when confidence is computed from units without, rather than units with, tuned inhibition. Finally, we discuss predictions of our results and model for future neurobiological studies. These findings suggest that the brain has developed and implements this alternative, heuristic theory of perceptual confidence computation by relying on the diversity of neural resources available.     

Predicting human perceptual decisions by decoding neuronal information profiles

Perception relies on the response of populations of neurons in sensory cortex. How the response profile of a neuronal population gives rise to perception and perceptual discrimination has been conceptualized in various ways. Here we suggest that neuronal population responses represent information about our environment explicitly as Fisher information (FI), which is a local measure of the variance estimate of the sensory input. We show how this sensory information can be read out and combined to infer from the available information profile which stimulus value is perceived during a fine discrimination task. In particular, we propose that the perceived stimulus corresponds to the stimulus value that leads to the same information for each of the alternative directions, and compare the model prediction to standard models considered in the literature (population vector, maximum likelihood, maximum-a-posteriori Bayesian inference). The models are applied to human performance in a motion discrimination task that induces perceptual misjudgements of a target direction of motion by task irrelevant motion in the spatial surround of the target stimulus (motion repulsion). By using the neurophysiological insight that surround motion suppresses neuronal responses to the target motion in the center, all models predicted the pattern of perceptual misjudgements. The variation of discrimination thresholds (error on the perceived value) was also explained through the changes of the total FI content with varying surround motion directions. The proposed FI decoding scheme incorporates recent neurophysiological evidence from macaque visual cortex showing that perceptual decisions do not rely on the most active neurons, but rather on the most informative neuronal responses. We statistically compare the prediction capability of the FI decoding approach and the standard decoding models. Notably, all models reproduced the variation of the perceived stimulus values for different surrounds, but with different neuronal tuning characteristics underlying perception. Compared to the FI approach the prediction power of the standard models was based on neurons with far wider tuning width and stronger surround suppression. Our study demonstrates that perceptual misjudgements can be based on neuronal populations encoding explicitly the available sensory information, and provides testable neurophysiological predictions on neuronal tuning characteristics underlying human perceptual decisions.     

Paradoxical Interaction between Ocular Activity,Perception, and Decision Confidence at the Threshold of Vision

In humans and some other species perceptual decision-making is complemented by the ability to make confidence judgements about the certainty of sensory evidence. While both forms of decision process have been studied empirically, the precise relationship between them remains poorly understood. We performed an experiment that combined a perceptual decision-making task (identifying the category of a faint visual stimulus) with a confidence-judgement task (wagering on the accuracy of each perceptual decision). The visual stimulation paradigm required steady fixation, so we used eye-tracking to control for stray eye movements. Our data analyses revealed an unexpected and counterintuitive interaction between the steadiness of fixation (prior to and during stimulation), perceptual decision making, and post-decision wagering: greater variability in gaze direction during fixation was associated with significantly increased visual-perceptual sensitivity, but significantly decreased reliability of confidence judgements. The latter effect could not be explained by a simple change in overall confidence (i.e. a criterion artifact), but rather was tied to a change in the degree to which high wagers predicted correct decisions (i.e. the sensitivity of the confidence judgement). We found no evidence of a differential change in pupil diameter that could account for the effect and thus our results are consistent with fixational eye movements being the relevant covariate. However, we note that small changes in pupil diameter can sometimes cause artefactual fluctuations in measured gaze direction and this possibility could not be fully ruled out. In either case, our results suggest that perceptual decisions and confidence judgements can be processed independently and point toward a new avenue of research into the relationship between them.     

Suprathreshold perceptual decisions constrain models of confidence

Perceptual confidence is an important internal signal about the certainty of our decisions and there is a substantial debate on how it is computed. We highlight three confidence metric types from the literature: observers either use 1) the full probability distribution to compute probability correct (Probability metrics), 2) point estimates from the perceptual decision process to estimate uncertainty (Evidence-Strength metrics), or 3) heuristic confidence from stimulus-based cues to uncertainty (Heuristic metrics). These metrics are rarely tested against one another, so we examined models of all three types on a suprathreshold spatial discrimination task. Observers were shown a cloud of dots sampled from a dot generating distribution and judged if the mean of the distribution was left or right of centre. In addition to varying the horizontal position of the mean, there were two sensory uncertainty manipulations: the number of dots sampled and the spread of the generating distribution. After every two perceptual decisions, observers made a confidence forced-choice judgement whether they were more confident in the first or second decision. Model results showed that the majority of observers were best-fit by either: 1) the Heuristic model, which used dot cloud position, spread, and number of dots as cues; or 2) an Evidence-Strength model, which computed the distance between the sensory measurement and discrimination criterion, scaled according to sensory uncertainty. An accidental repetition of some sessions also allowed for the measurement of confidence agreement for identical pairs of stimuli. This N-pass analysis revealed that human observers were more consistent than their best-fitting model would predict, indicating there are still aspects of confidence that are not captured by our modelling. As such, we propose confidence agreement as a useful technique for computational studies of confidence. Taken together, these findings highlight the idiosyncratic nature of confidence computations for complex decision contexts and the need to consider different potential metrics and transformations in the confidence computation.     

Visual search for a target changing in synchrony with an auditory signal

We examined whether the detection of audio-visual temporal synchrony is determined by a pre-attentive parallel process, or by an attentive serial process using a visual search paradigm. We found that detection of a visual target that changed in synchrony with an auditory stimulus was gradually impaired as the number of unsynchronized visual distractors increased (experiment 1), whereas synchrony discrimination of an attended target in a pre-cued location was unaffected by the presence of distractors (experiment 2). The effect of distractors cannot be ascribed to reduced target visibility nor can the increase in false alarm rates be predicted by a noisy parallel processing model. Reaction times for target detection increased linearly with number of distractors, with the slope being about twice as steep for target-absent trials as for target-present trials (experiment 3). Similar results were obtained regardless of whether the audio-visual stimulus consisted of visual flashes synchronized with amplitude-modulated pips, or of visual rotations synchronized with frequency-modulated up-down sweeps. All of the results indicate that audio-visual perceptual synchrony is judged by a serial process and are consistent with the suggestion that audio-visual temporal synchrony is detected by a 'mid-level' feature matching process.     

Synaptic plasticity and connectivity requirements to produce stimulus-pair specific responses in recurrent networks of spiking neurons

Animals must respond selectively to specific combinations of salient environmental stimuli in order to survive in complex environments. A task with these features, biconditional discrimination, requires responses to select pairs of stimuli that are opposite to responses to those stimuli in another combination. We investigate the characteristics of synaptic plasticity and network connectivity needed to produce stimulus-pair neural responses within randomly connected model networks of spiking neurons trained in biconditional discrimination. Using reward-based plasticity for synapses from the random associative network onto a winner-takes-all decision-making network representing perceptual decision-making, we find that reliably correct decision making requires upstream neurons with strong stimulus-pair selectivity. By chance, selective neurons were present in initial networks; appropriate plasticity mechanisms improved task performance by enhancing the initial diversity of responses. We find long-term potentiation of inhibition to be the most beneficial plasticity rule by suppressing weak responses to produce reliably correct decisions across an extensive range of networks.     

Mental fatigue modulates dynamic adaptation to perceptual demand in speeded detection

When stimulus intensity in simple reaction-time tasks randomly varies across trials, detection speed usually improves after a low-intensity trial. With auditory stimuli, this improvement was often found to be asymmetric, being greater on current low-intensity trials. Our study investigated (1) whether asymmetric sequential intensity adaptation also occurs with visual stimuli; (2) whether these adjustments reflect decision-criterion shifts or, rather, a modulation of perceptual sensitivity; and (3) how sequential intensity adaptation and its underlying mechanisms are affected by mental fatigue induced through prolonged performance. In a continuous speeded detection task with randomly alternating high- and low-intensity visual stimuli, the reaction-time benefit after low-intensity trials was greater on subsequent low- than high-intensity trials. This asymmetry, however, only developed with time on task (TOT). Signal-detection analyses showed that the decision criterion transiently became more liberal after a low-intensity trial, whereas observer sensitivity increased when the preceding and current stimulus were of equal intensity. TOT-induced mental fatigue only affected sensitivity, which dropped more on low- than on high-intensity trials. This differential fatigue-related sensitivity decrease selectively enhanced the impact of criterion down-shifts on low-intensity trials, revealing how the interplay of two perceptual mechanisms and their modulation by fatigue combine to produce the observed overall pattern of asymmetric performance adjustments to varying visual intensity in continuous speeded detection. Our results have implications for similar patterns of sequential demand adaptation in other cognitive domains as well as for real-world prolonged detection performance.     

An initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases the likelihood and speed of subsequent changes of mind

We often need to rapidly change our mind about perceptual decisions in order to account for new information and correct mistakes. One fundamental, unresolved question is whether information processed prior to a decision being made (‘pre-decisional information’) has any influence on the likelihood and speed with which that decision is reversed. We investigated this using a luminance discrimination task in which participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli briefly remained on screen, and participants could change their response. Using psychophysical reverse correlation, we examined how moment-to-moment fluctuations in stimulus luminance affected participants’ decisions. This revealed that the strength of even the very earliest (pre-decisional) evidence was associated with the likelihood and speed of later changes of mind. To account for this effect, we propose an extended diffusion model in which an initial ‘snapshot’ of sensory information biases ongoing evidence accumulation.     

The Influence of a Working Memory Task on Affective Perception of Facial Expressions

In a dual-task paradigm, participants performed a spatial location working memory task and a forced two-choice perceptual decision task (neutral vs. fearful) with gradually morphed emotional faces (neutral ∼ fearful). Task-irrelevant word distractors (negative, neutral, and control) were experimentally manipulated during spatial working memory encoding. We hypothesized that, if affective perception is influenced by concurrent cognitive load using a working memory task, task-irrelevant emotional distractors would bias subsequent perceptual decision-making on ambiguous facial expression. We found that when either neutral or negative emotional words were presented as task-irrelevant working-memory distractors, participants more frequently reported fearful face perception - but only at the higher emotional intensity levels of morphed faces. Also, the affective perception bias due to negative emotional distractors correlated with a decrease in working memory performance. Taken together, our findings suggest that concurrent working memory load by task-irrelevant distractors has an impact on affective perception of facial expressions.     

Delayed perceptual awareness in rapid perceptual decisions

The flourishing of studies on the neural correlates of decision-making calls for an appraisal of the relation between perceptual decisions and conscious perception. By exploiting the long integration time of noisy motion stimuli, and by forcing human observers to make difficult speeded decisions--sometimes a blind guess--about stimulus direction, we traced the temporal buildup of motion discrimination capability and perceptual awareness, as assessed trial by trial through direct rating. We found that both increased gradually with motion coherence and viewing time, but discrimination was systematically leading awareness, reaching a plateau much earlier. Sensitivity and criterion changes contributed jointly to the slow buildup of perceptual awareness. It made no difference whether motion discrimination was accomplished by saccades or verbal responses. These findings suggest that perceptual awareness emerges on the top of a developing or even mature perceptual decision. We argue that the middle temporal (MT) cortical region does not confer us the full phenomenic depth of motion perception, although it may represent a precursor stage in building our subjective sense of visual motion.     

The oculomotor distractor effect in normal and hemianopic vision

The present study investigated the inhibitory effect of visual distractors on the latency of saccades made by hemianopic and normal human subjects. The latency of saccades made by hemianopic subjects to stimuli in their intact visual field was not affected by visual distractors presented within their hemianopic field. In contrast, the latency of saccades made by normal subjects was increased significantly under distractor conditions. The latency increase was larger for temporal than nasal distractors. The results are inconsistent with previous proposals that the crossed retinotectal pathway from the nasal hemiretina to the superior colliculus may mediate a blindsight inhibitory effect when distractors appear within a hemianopic temporal visual field. Instead, the distractor effect appears to reflect the normal processes involved in saccade target selection which may be mediated by a circuit involving both cortical and subcortical structures.     

A Multi-Area Stochastic Model for a Covert Visual Search Task

Decisions typically comprise several elements. For example, attention must be directed towards specific objects, their identities recognized, and a choice made among alternatives. Pairs of competing accumulators and drift-diffusion processes provide good models of evidence integration in two-alternative perceptual choices, but more complex tasks requiring the coordination of attention and decision making involve multistage processing and multiple brain areas. Here we consider a task in which a target is located among distractors and its identity reported by lever release. The data comprise reaction times, accuracies, and single unit recordings from two monkeys’ lateral interparietal area (LIP) neurons. LIP firing rates distinguish between targets and distractors, exhibit stimulus set size effects, and show response-hemifield congruence effects. These data motivate our model, which uses coupled sets of leaky competing accumulators to represent processes hypothesized to occur in feature-selective areas and limb motor and pre-motor areas, together with the visual selection process occurring in LIP. Model simulations capture the electrophysiological and behavioral data, and fitted parameters suggest that different connection weights between LIP and the other cortical areas may account for the observed behavioral differences between the animals.     

Motor Cost Influences Perceptual Decisions

Perceptual decision making has been widely studied using tasks in which subjects are asked to discriminate a visual stimulus and instructed to report their decision with a movement. In these studies, performance is measured by assessing the accuracy of the participants’ choices as a function of the ambiguity of the visual stimulus. Typically, the reporting movement is considered as a mere means of reporting the decision with no influence on the decision-making process. However, recent studies have shown that even subtle differences of biomechanical costs between movements may influence how we select between them. Here we investigated whether this purely motor cost could also influence decisions in a perceptual discrimination task in detriment of accuracy. In other words, are perceptual decisions only dependent on the visual stimulus and entirely orthogonal to motor costs? Here we show the results of a psychophysical experiment in which human subjects were presented with a random dot motion discrimination task and asked to report the perceived motion direction using movements of different biomechanical cost. We found that the pattern of decisions exhibited a significant bias towards the movement of lower cost, even when this bias reduced performance accuracy. This strongly suggests that motor costs influence decision making in visual discrimination tasks for which its contribution is neither instructed nor beneficial.     

Causal role of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in human perceptual decision making

The way that we interpret and interact with the world entails making decisions on the basis of available sensory evidence. Recent primate neurophysiology [1-6], human neuroimaging [7-13], and modeling experiments [14-19] have demonstrated that perceptual decisions are based on an integrative process in which sensory evidence accumulates over time until an internal decision bound is reached. Here we used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to provide causal support for the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) in this integrative process. Specifically, we used a speeded perceptual categorization task designed to induce a time-dependent accumulation of sensory evidence through rapidly updating dynamic stimuli and found that disruption of the left DLPFC with low-frequency rTMS reduced accuracy and increased response times relative to a sham condition. Importantly, using the drift-diffusion model, we show that these behavioral effects correspond to a decrease in drift rate, a parameter describing the rate and thereby the efficiency of the sensory evidence integration in the decision process. These results provide causal evidence linking the DLPFC to the mechanism of evidence accumulation during perceptual decision making.