Game Theory,Conditional Preferences,and Social Influence

Neoclassical noncooperative game theory is based on a simple, yet powerful synthesis of mathematical and logical concepts: unconditional and immutable preference orderings and individual rationality. Although this structure has proven useful for characterizing competitive multi-player behavior, its applicability to scenarios involving complex social relationships is problematic. In this paper we directly address this limitation by the introduction of a conditional preference structure that permits players to modulate their preference orderings as functions of the preferences of other players. Embedding this expanded preference structure in a formal and graphical framework provides a systematic approach for characterizing a complex society. The result is an influence network that allows conditional preferences to propagate through the community, resulting in an emergent social model which characterizes all of the social relationships that exist and which leads to solution concepts that account for both group and individual interests. The Ultimatum game is presented as an example of how social influence can be modeled with conditional preferences.     

Testosterone Administration Decreases Generosity in the Ultimatum Game

How do human beings decide when to be selfish or selfless? In this study, we gave testosterone to 25 men to establish its impact on prosocial behaviors in a double-blind within-subjects design. We also confirmed participants'' testosterone levels before and after treatment through blood draws. Using the Ultimatum Game from behavioral economics, we find that men with artificially raised T, compared to themselves on placebo, were 27% less generous towards strangers with money they controlled (95% CI placebo: (1.70, 2.72); 95% CI T: (.98, 2.30)). This effect scales with a man''s level of total-, free-, and dihydro-testosterone (DHT). Men in the lowest decile of DHT were 560% more generous than men in the highest decile of DHT. We also found that men with elevated testosterone were more likely to use their own money punish those who were ungenerous toward them. Our results continue to hold after controlling for altruism. We conclude that elevated testosterone causes men to behave antisocially.     

Empathy Emerges Spontaneously in the Ultimatum Game: Small Groups and Networks

The Ultimatum game, in which one subject proposes how to share a pot and the other has veto power on the proposal, in which case both lose everything, is a paradigmatic scenario to probe the degree of cooperation and altruism in human subjects. It has been shown that if individuals are empathic, i.e., they play the game having in mind how their opponent will react by offering an amount that they themselves would accept, then non-rational large offers well above the smallest possible ones are evolutionarily selected. We here show that empathy itself may be selected and need not be exogenously imposed provided that interactions take place only with a fraction of the total population, and that the role of proposer or responder is randomly changed from round to round. These empathic agents, that displace agents with independent (uncorrelated) offers and proposals, behave far from what is expected rationally, offering and accepting sizable fractions of the amount to be shared. Specific values for the typical offer depend on the details of the interacion network and on the existence of hubs, but they are almost always significantly larger than zero, indicating that the mechanism at work here is quite general and could explain the emergence of empathy in very many different contexts.     

Limbic justice--amygdala involvement in immediate rejection in the Ultimatum Game

Imaging studies have revealed a putative neural account of emotional bias in decision making. However, it has been difficult in previous studies to identify the causal role of the different sub-regions involved in decision making. The Ultimatum Game (UG) is a game to study the punishment of norm-violating behavior. In a previous influential paper on UG it was suggested that frontal insular cortex has a pivotal role in the rejection response. This view has not been reconciled with a vast literature that attributes a crucial role in emotional decision making to a subcortical structure (i.e., amygdala). In this study we propose an anatomy-informed model that may join these views. We also present a design that detects the functional anatomical response to unfair proposals in a subcortical network that mediates rapid reactive responses. We used a functional MRI paradigm to study the early components of decision making and challenged our paradigm with the introduction of a pharmacological intervention to perturb the elicited behavioral and neural response. Benzodiazepine treatment decreased the rejection rate (from 37.6% to 19.0%) concomitantly with a diminished amygdala response to unfair proposals, and this in spite of an unchanged feeling of unfairness and unchanged insular response. In the control group, rejection was directly linked to an increase in amygdala activity. These results allow a functional anatomical detection of the early neural components of rejection associated with the initial reactive emotional response. Thus, the act of immediate rejection seems to be mediated by the limbic system and is not solely driven by cortical processes, as previously suggested. Our results also prompt an ethical discussion as we demonstrated that a commonly used drug influences core functions in the human brain that underlie individual autonomy and economic decision making.     

Kinship,Family, and Gender Effects in the Ultimatum Game

Kinship and reciprocity are two main predictors of altruism. The ultimatum game has been used to study altruism in many small-scale societies. We used the ultimatum game to examine effects of individuals’ family and kin relations on altruistic behavior in a kin-based horticultural community in rural Dominica. Results show sex-specific effects of kin on ultimatum game play. Average coefficient of relatedness to the village was negatively associated with women’s ultimatum game proposals and had little effect on men’s proposals. Number of brothers in the village was positively associated with men’s ultimatum game proposals and negatively associated with women’s proposals. Similarly, presence of father in the village was associated with higher proposals by men and lower proposals by women. We interpret the effect of brothers on men’s proposals as a consequence of local competition among brothers. We speculate that daughter-biased parental care in this community creates a sense of entitlement among women with brothers, which may explain the inverse relation between number of brothers and women’s ultimatum game proposals. The pattern of results may be consistent with how matrifocality affects cultural models of fairness differently along gender and family lines.     

内侧额叶负波受负性情绪下责任感影响：最后通牒任务的ERP研究

采用事件相关电位技术探讨人脑的内侧额叶负波在最后通牒任务中是否受不同情绪状态的影响并且其差异是否与责任感这一人格特质有关.结果发现,相对于负性情绪及公平情境,MFN的波幅在正性情绪和不公平情境中显著较大;相对于正性情绪和公平情境,在负性情绪和不公平情境中责任感人格维度得分越高,MFN波幅越正.结果表明,MFN反映的是对决策情境的认知评价且正性情绪更有利于对决策情境的觉知;责任感通过削弱由不利情境带来的认知反应来压制个体对于决策情境的敏感性,以追求更好的决策结果.这为MFN在真实的社会互动任务中表现出来的差异提供了具有较高生态学效度的神经电理学证据.     

Heartbeat and Economic Decisions: Observing Mental Stress among Proposers and Responders in the Ultimatum Bargaining Game

The ultimatum bargaining game (UBG), a widely used method in experimental economics, clearly demonstrates that motives other than pure monetary reward play a role in human economic decision making. In this study, we explore the behaviour and physiological reactions of both responders and proposers in an ultimatum bargaining game using heart rate variability (HRV), a small and nonintrusive technology that allows observation of both sides of an interaction in a normal experimental economics laboratory environment. We find that low offers by a proposer cause signs of mental stress in both the proposer and the responder; that is, both exhibit high ratios of low to high frequency activity in the HRV spectrum.     

The Role of Cognitive and Emotional Perspective Taking in Economic Decision Making in the Ultimatum Game

We conducted a simple resource allocation game known as the ultimatum game (UG) with preschoolers to examine the role of cognitive and emotional perspective-taking ability on allocation and rejection behavior. A total of 146 preschoolers played the UG and completed a false belief task and an emotional perspective-taking test. Results showed that cognitive perspective taking ability had a significant positive effect on the proposer’s offer and a negative effect on the responder’s rejection behavior, whereas emotional perspective taking ability did not impact either the proposer’s or responder’s behavior. These results imply that the ability to anticipate the responder’s beliefs, but not their emotional state, plays an important role in the proposer’s choice of a fair allocation in an UG, and that children who have not acquired theory of mind still reject unfair offers.     

Fairness Norms and Theory of Mind in an Ultimatum Game: Judgments,Offers, and Decisions in School-Aged Children

The sensitivity to fairness undergoes relevant changes across development. Whether such changes depend on primary inequity aversion or on sensitivity to a social norm of fairness is still debated. Using a modified version of the Ultimatum Game that creates informational asymmetries between Proposer and Responder, a previous study showed that both perceptions of fairness and fair behavior depend upon normative expectations, i.e., beliefs about what others expect one should do in a specific situation. Individuals tend to comply with the norm when risking sanctions, but disregard the norm when violations are undetectable. Using the same methodology with children aged 8–10 years, the present study shows that children''s beliefs and behaviors differ from what is observed in adults. Playing as Proposers, children show a self-serving bias only when there is a clear informational asymmetry. Playing as Responders, they show a remarkable discrepancy between their normative judgment about fair procedures (a coin toss to determine the offer) and their behavior (rejection of an unfair offer derived from the coin toss), supporting the existence of an outcome bias effect. Finally, our results reveal no influence of theory of mind on children''s decision-making behavior.     

Emergent Dynamics of Fairness in the Spatial Coevolution of Proposer and Responder Species in the Ultimatum Game

While spatially local interactions are ubiquitous between coevolving species sharing recourses (e.g., plant-insect interactions), their effects on such coevolution processes of strategies involving the share of a resource are still not clearly understood. We construct a two-dimensional spatial model of the coevolution of the proposer and responder species in the ultimatum game (UG), in which a pair of proposer and responder individuals at each site plays the UG. We investigate the effects of the locality of interactions and the intensity of selection on the emergence of fairness between these species. We show that the lower intensity of selection favors fair strategies in general, and there are no significant differences in the evolution of fairness between the cases with local and global interactions when the intensity of selection is low. However, as the intensity of selection becomes higher, the spatially local interactions contribute to the evolution of fairer strategies more than the global interactions, even though fair strategies become more difficult to evolve. This positive effect of spatial interactions is expected to be due to the mutual benefit of fairness for both proposer and responder species in future generations, which brings about a dynamic evolution process of fairness.     

Individual Choices in Dynamic Networks: An Experiment on Social Preferences

Game-theoretic models of network formation typically assume that people create relations so as to maximize their own outcome in the network. Recent experiments on network formation suggest that the assumption of self-interest might be unwarranted and that social preferences, such as altruism and inequality aversion, play a role in the formation of social networks. We developed an experiment to systematically investigate whether people show preferences for outcomes of others during network formation. We find that such preferences play a role when network decisions degenerate to simple two-person decision tasks. In more complex environments, however, we find little evidence for social preferences as a significant decision criterion. Furthermore, we find some evidence for farsighted behavior in network formation.     

Fast to Forgive,Slow to Retaliate: Intuitive Responses in the Ultimatum Game Depend on the Degree of Unfairness

Evolutionary accounts have difficulty explaining why people cooperate with anonymous strangers they will never meet. Recently models, focusing on emotional processing, have been proposed as a potential explanation, with attention focusing on a dual systems approach based on system 1 (fast, intuitive, automatic, effortless, and emotional) and system 2 (slow, reflective, effortful, proactive and unemotional). Evidence shows that when cooperation is salient, people are fast (system 1) to cooperate, but with longer delays (system 2) they show greed. This is interpreted within the framework of the social heuristic hypothesis (SHH), whereby people overgeneralize potentially advantageous intuitively learnt and internalization social norms to ‘atypical’ situations. We extend this to explore intuitive reactions to unfairness by integrating the SHH with the ‘fast to forgive, slow to anger’ (FFSA) heuristic. This suggests that it is advantageous to be prosocial when facing uncertainty. We propose that whether or not someone intuitively shows prosociality (cooperation) or retaliation is moderated by the degree (certainty) of unfairness. People should intuitively cooperate when facing mild levels of unfairness (fast to forgive) but when given longer to decide about another''s mild level of unfairness should retaliate (slow to anger). However, when facing severe levels of unfairness, the intuitive response is always retaliation. We test this using a series of one-shot ultimatum games and manipulate level of offer unfairness (50:50 60:40, 70:30, 80:20, 90:10) and enforced time delays prior to responding (1s, 2s, 8s, 15s). We also measure decision times to make responses after the time delays. The results show that when facing mildly unfair offers (60:40) people are fast (intuitive) to cooperate but with longer delays reject these mildly unfair offers: ‘fast to forgive, and slow to retaliate’. However, for severely unfair offers (90:10) the intuitive and fast response is to always reject.     

Gender Matters: The Relationship between Social Anxiety and Alcohol-Related Consequences

Background and Objectives

Identification of risk factors for alcohol-related consequences is an important public health concern. Both gender and social anxiety have been associated with alcohol-related consequences broadly, but it is unknown whether these variables are differentially related to specific types of alcohol-related consequences for American college students.

Methods

In the present study, 573 undergraduate students (M _age = 19.86 years, SD = 1.40; range 18 to 25; 68.9% female) completed an on-line assessment of social anxiety, alcohol use, and four types of alcohol-related consequences (personal, social, physical, and role). Poisson regressions were run to examine social anxiety, gender, and the interaction between social anxiety and gender as predictors of each type of alcohol-related consequences.

Results

After controlling for alcohol use, social anxiety was positively associated with all four types of consequences, and females endorsed higher rates of physical, personal, and role consequences. The interaction between social anxiety and gender was statistically significant only for physical consequences, with social anxiety having a stronger effect for males.

Discussion and Conclusions

These findings, which diverge somewhat from those of a prior study with Australian college students, are discussed in the context of a biopsychosocial model of social anxiety and substance use problems.

Scientific Significance

This study highlights the importance of further investigating cultural differences in the relationships among social anxiety, gender, and alcohol-related consequences.     

Women Tend to Defect in a Social Dilemma Game in Southwest China

Cooperation theories assume that interacting individuals can change their strategies under different expected payoffs, depending on their social status or social situations. When looking at sex differences in cooperation, the existing studies have found that the genders cooperate at similar frequencies. However, the majority of the data originate within Western human societies. In this paper, we explore whether there are gender differences in cooperation in China. An Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a punishment option was used to gather data about Southwest Chinese subjects in a culture in which men have a hierarchical advantage over women. Results indicate that men invested into partners significantly more than women did (34% ♂ vs. 24% ♀) while women, in turn, were more likely to defect (65% ♀ vs. 50% ♂). In this region, women have customarily held less economic power and they are used to obtain a payoff typically lower than men. We suggest that the women’s willingness to invest in cooperation has decreased throughout evolutionary time, providing us with an illustration of a culturally-driven shift towards a disparity in gender cooperation interests.     

Fluctuating Asymmetry of Responders Affects Offers in the Ultimatum Game Oppositely According to Attractiveness or Need as Perceived by Proposers

The Ultimatum Game (UG) measures cooperative tendencies in humans. A proposer offers to split a given sum of money between self and a responder, who may accept or reject the offer. If accepted, each receives the proposed split; if rejected, nobody receives anything. We studied the effect of the putative responder's degree of facial symmetry (fluctuating asymmetry, FA) on the offer he/she received in opposite-sexed UGs. Symmetry is an important measure of biological quality so subjects were expected to receive higher offers when symmetrical than asymmetrical. In a sample of Jamaicans, individuals played two UGs with opposite-sexed responders, a symmetrical photo of a Lebanese and an asymmetrical one. Individuals do indeed give more to symmetrical responders (p = 0.032). When subjects are asked their motivation, a striking dichotomy emerges: those who cite 'attractiveness' as a motive, give strongly to symmetrical responders while those citing 'need' invariably give more to asymmetrical ones (p < 0.0001). Females also show a nearly significant tendency to cite need as a motive more often than do males.     

Influences of State and Trait Affect on Behavior,Feedback-Related Negativity,and P3b in the Ultimatum Game

The present study investigates how different emotions can alter social bargaining behavior. An important paradigm to study social bargaining is the Ultimatum Game. There, a proposer gets a pot of money and has to offer part of it to a responder. If the responder accepts, both players get the money as proposed by the proposer. If he rejects, none of the players gets anything. Rational choice models would predict that responders accept all offers above 0. However, evidence shows that responders typically reject a large proportion of all unfair offers. We analyzed participants’ behavior when they played the Ultimatum Game as responders and simultaneously collected electroencephalogram data in order to quantify the feedback-related negativity and P3b components. We induced state affect (momentarily emotions unrelated to the task) via short movie clips and measured trait affect (longer-lasting emotional dispositions) via questionnaires. State happiness led to increased acceptance rates of very unfair offers. Regarding neurophysiology, we found that unfair offers elicited larger feedback-related negativity amplitudes than fair offers. Additionally, an interaction of state and trait affect occurred: high trait negative affect (subsuming a variety of aversive mood states) led to increased feedback-related negativity amplitudes when participants were in an angry mood, but not if they currently experienced fear or happiness. We discuss that increased rumination might be responsible for this result, which might not occur, however, when people experience happiness or fear. Apart from that, we found that fair offers elicited larger P3b components than unfair offers, which might reflect increased pleasure in response to fair offers. Moreover, high trait negative affect was associated with decreased P3b amplitudes, potentially reflecting decreased motivation to engage in activities. We discuss implications of our results in the light of theories and research on depression and anxiety.     

Keep Your Opponents Close: Social Context Affects EEG and fEMG Linkage in a Turn-Based Computer Game

In daily life, we often copy the gestures and expressions of those we communicate with, but recent evidence shows that such mimicry has a physiological counterpart: interaction elicits linkage, which is a concordance between the biological signals of those involved. To find out how the type of social interaction affects linkage, pairs of participants played a turn-based computer game in which the level of competition was systematically varied between cooperation and competition. Linkage in the beta and gamma frequency bands was observed in the EEG, especially when the participants played directly against each other. Emotional expression, measured using facial EMG, reflected this pattern, with the most competitive condition showing enhanced linkage over the facial muscle-regions involved in smiling. These effects were found to be related to self-reported social presence: linkage in positive emotional expression was associated with self-reported shared negative feelings. The observed effects confirmed the hypothesis that the social context affected the degree to which participants had similar reactions to their environment and consequently showed similar patterns of brain activity. We discuss the functional resemblance between linkage, as an indicator of a shared physiology and affect, and the well-known mirror neuron system, and how they relate to social functions like empathy.     

Social Value Induction and Cooperation in the Centipede Game

The Centipede game provides a dynamic model of cooperation and competition in repeated dyadic interactions. Two experiments investigated psychological factors driving cooperation in 20 rounds of a Centipede game with significant monetary incentives and anonymous and random re-pairing of players after every round. The main purpose of the research was to determine whether the pattern of strategic choices observed when no specific social value orientation is experimentally induced—the standard condition in all previous investigations of behavior in the Centipede and most other experimental games—is essentially individualistic, the orthodox game-theoretic assumption being that players are individualistically motivated in the absence of any specific motivational induction. Participants in whom no specific state social value orientation was induced exhibited moderately non-cooperative play that differed significantly from the pattern found when an individualistic orientation was induced. In both experiments, the neutral treatment condition, in which no orientation was induced, elicited competitive behavior resembling behavior in the condition in which a competitive orientation was explicitly induced. Trait social value orientation, measured with a questionnaire, influenced cooperation differently depending on the experimentally induced state social value orientation. Cooperative trait social value orientation was a significant predictor of cooperation and, to a lesser degree, experimentally induced competitive orientation was a significant predictor of non-cooperation. The experimental results imply that the standard assumption of individualistic motivation in experimental games may not be valid, and that the results of such investigations need to take into account the possibility that players are competitively motivated.     

Asymmetries in the Friendship Preferences and Social Styles of Men and Women

Several hypotheses on the form and function of sex differences in social behaviors were tested. The results suggest that friendship preferences in both sexes can be understood in terms of perceived reciprocity potential—capacity and willingness to engage in a mutually beneficial relationship. Divergent social styles may in turn reflect trade-offs between behaviors selected to maintain large, functional coalitions in men and intimate, secure relationships in women. The findings are interpreted from a broad socio-relational framework of the types of behaviors that facilitate selective advertisement and investment of reciprocity potential across individuals and within groups of men and women.