The Time-Course of Visual Categorizations: You Spot the Animal Faster than the Bird

Background

Since the pioneering study by Rosch and colleagues in the 70s, it is commonly agreed that basic level perceptual categories (dog, chair…) are accessed faster than superordinate ones (animal, furniture…). Nevertheless, the speed at which objects presented in natural images can be processed in a rapid go/no-go visual superordinate categorization task has challenged this “basic level advantage”.

Principal Findings

Using the same task, we compared human processing speed when categorizing natural scenes as containing either an animal (superordinate level), or a specific animal (bird or dog, basic level). Human subjects require an additional 40–65 ms to decide whether an animal is a bird or a dog and most errors are induced by non-target animals. Indeed, processing time is tightly linked with the type of non-targets objects. Without any exemplar of the same superordinate category to ignore, the basic level category is accessed as fast as the superordinate category, whereas the presence of animal non-targets induces both an increase in reaction time and a decrease in accuracy.

Conclusions and Significance

These results support the parallel distributed processing theory (PDP) and might reconciliate controversial studies recently published. The visual system can quickly access a coarse/abstract visual representation that allows fast decision for superordinate categorization of objects but additional time-consuming visual analysis would be necessary for a decision at the basic level based on more detailed representations.     

MM-MDS: A Multidimensional Scaling Database with Similarity Ratings for 240 Object Categories from the Massive Memory Picture Database

Cognitive theories in visual attention and perception, categorization, and memory often critically rely on concepts of similarity among objects, and empirically require measures of “sameness” among their stimuli. For instance, a researcher may require similarity estimates among multiple exemplars of a target category in visual search, or targets and lures in recognition memory. Quantifying similarity, however, is challenging when everyday items are the desired stimulus set, particularly when researchers require several different pictures from the same category. In this article, we document a new multidimensional scaling database with similarity ratings for 240 categories, each containing color photographs of 16–17 exemplar objects. We collected similarity ratings using the spatial arrangement method. Reports include: the multidimensional scaling solutions for each category, up to five dimensions, stress and fit measures, coordinate locations for each stimulus, and two new classifications. For each picture, we categorized the item''s prototypicality, indexed by its proximity to other items in the space. We also classified pairs of images along a continuum of similarity, by assessing the overall arrangement of each MDS space. These similarity ratings will be useful to any researcher that wishes to control the similarity of experimental stimuli according to an objective quantification of “sameness.”     

How Watching Pinocchio Movies Changes Our Subjective Experience of Extrapersonal Space

The way we experience the space around us is highly subjective. It has been shown that motion potentialities that are intrinsic to our body influence our space categorization. Furthermore, we have recently demonstrated that in the extrapersonal space, our categorization also depends on the movement potential of other agents. When we have to categorize the space as “Near” or “Far” between a reference and a target, the space categorized as “Near” is wider if the reference corresponds to a biological agent that has the potential to walk, instead of a biological and non-biological agent that cannot walk. But what exactly drives this “Near space extension”? In the present paper, we tested whether abstract beliefs about the biological nature of an agent determine how we categorize the space between the agent and an object. Participants were asked to first read a Pinocchio story and watch a correspondent video in which Pinocchio acts like a real human, in order to become more transported into the initial story. Then they had to categorize the location ("Near" or "Far") of a target object located at progressively increasing or decreasing distances from a non-biological agent (i.e., a wooden dummy) and from a biological agent (i.e., a human-like avatar). The results indicate that being transported into the Pinocchio story, induces an equal “Near” space threshold with both the avatar and the wooden dummy as reference frames.     

Beyond Shape: How You Learn about Objects Affects How They Are Represented in Visual Cortex

Background

Experience can alter how objects are represented in the visual cortex. But experience can take different forms. It is unknown whether the kind of visual experience systematically alters the nature of visual cortical object representations.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We take advantage of different training regimens found to produce qualitatively different types of perceptual expertise behaviorally in order to contrast the neural changes that follow different kinds of visual experience with the same objects. Two groups of participants went through training regimens that required either subordinate-level individuation or basic-level categorization of a set of novel, artificial objects, called “Ziggerins”. fMRI activity of a region in the right fusiform gyrus increased after individuation training and was correlated with the magnitude of configural processing of the Ziggerins observed behaviorally. In contrast, categorization training caused distributed changes, with increased activity in the medial portion of the ventral occipito-temporal cortex relative to more lateral areas.

Conclusions/Significance

Our results demonstrate that the kind of experience with a category of objects can systematically influence how those objects are represented in visual cortex. The demands of prior learning experience therefore appear to be one factor determining the organization of activity patterns in visual cortex.     

Are All Types of Expertise Created Equal? Car Experts Use Different Spatial Frequency Scales for Subordinate Categorization of Cars and Faces

A much-debated question in object recognition is whether expertise for faces and expertise for non-face objects utilize common perceptual information. We investigated this issue by assessing the diagnostic information required for different types of expertise. Specifically, we asked whether face categorization and expert car categorization at the subordinate level relies on the same spatial frequency (SF) scales. Fifteen car experts and fifteen novices performed a category verification task with spatially filtered images of faces, cars, and airplanes. Images were categorized based on their basic (e.g. “car”) and subordinate level (e.g. “Japanese car”) identity. The effect of expertise was not evident when objects were categorized at the basic level. However, when the car experts categorized faces and cars at the subordinate level, the two types of expertise required different kinds of SF information. Subordinate categorization of faces relied on low SFs more than on high SFs, whereas subordinate expert car categorization relied on high SFs more than on low SFs. These findings suggest that expertise in the recognition of objects and faces do not utilize the same type of information. Rather, different types of expertise require different types of diagnostic visual information.     

Deep Neural Networks Rival the Representation of Primate IT Cortex for Core Visual Object Recognition

The primate visual system achieves remarkable visual object recognition performance even in brief presentations, and under changes to object exemplar, geometric transformations, and background variation (a.k.a. core visual object recognition). This remarkable performance is mediated by the representation formed in inferior temporal (IT) cortex. In parallel, recent advances in machine learning have led to ever higher performing models of object recognition using artificial deep neural networks (DNNs). It remains unclear, however, whether the representational performance of DNNs rivals that of the brain. To accurately produce such a comparison, a major difficulty has been a unifying metric that accounts for experimental limitations, such as the amount of noise, the number of neural recording sites, and the number of trials, and computational limitations, such as the complexity of the decoding classifier and the number of classifier training examples. In this work, we perform a direct comparison that corrects for these experimental limitations and computational considerations. As part of our methodology, we propose an extension of “kernel analysis” that measures the generalization accuracy as a function of representational complexity. Our evaluations show that, unlike previous bio-inspired models, the latest DNNs rival the representational performance of IT cortex on this visual object recognition task. Furthermore, we show that models that perform well on measures of representational performance also perform well on measures of representational similarity to IT, and on measures of predicting individual IT multi-unit responses. Whether these DNNs rely on computational mechanisms similar to the primate visual system is yet to be determined, but, unlike all previous bio-inspired models, that possibility cannot be ruled out merely on representational performance grounds.     

In the eye of the beholder: visual experience and categories in the human brain

How does experience change representations of visual objects in the brain? Do cortical object representations reflect category membership? In this issue of Neuron, Jiang et al. show that category training leads to sharpening of neural responses in high-level visual cortex; in contrast, category boundaries may be represented only in prefrontal cortex.     

Cell groups reveal structure of stimulus space

An important task of the brain is to represent the outside world. It is unclear how the brain may do this, however, as it can only rely on neural responses and has no independent access to external stimuli in order to “decode” what those responses mean. We investigate what can be learned about a space of stimuli using only the action potentials (spikes) of cells with stereotyped—but unknown—receptive fields. Using hippocampal place cells as a model system, we show that one can (1) extract global features of the environment and (2) construct an accurate representation of space, up to an overall scale factor, that can be used to track the animal's position. Unlike previous approaches to reconstructing position from place cell activity, this information is derived without knowing place fields or any other functions relating neural responses to position. We find that simply knowing which groups of cells fire together reveals a surprising amount of structure in the underlying stimulus space; this may enable the brain to construct its own internal representations.     

Good Exemplars of Natural Scene Categories Elicit Clearer Patterns than Bad Exemplars but Not Greater BOLD Activity

Within the range of images that we might categorize as a “beach”, for example, some will be more representative of that category than others. Here we first confirmed that humans could categorize “good” exemplars better than “bad” exemplars of six scene categories and then explored whether brain regions previously implicated in natural scene categorization showed a similar sensitivity to how well an image exemplifies a category. In a behavioral experiment participants were more accurate and faster at categorizing good than bad exemplars of natural scenes. In an fMRI experiment participants passively viewed blocks of good or bad exemplars from the same six categories. A multi-voxel pattern classifier trained to discriminate among category blocks showed higher decoding accuracy for good than bad exemplars in the PPA, RSC and V1. This difference in decoding accuracy cannot be explained by differences in overall BOLD signal, as average BOLD activity was either equivalent or higher for bad than good scenes in these areas. These results provide further evidence that V1, RSC and the PPA not only contain information relevant for natural scene categorization, but their activity patterns mirror the fundamentally graded nature of human categories. Analysis of the image statistics of our good and bad exemplars shows that variability in low-level features and image structure is higher among bad than good exemplars. A simulation of our neuroimaging experiment suggests that such a difference in variance could account for the observed differences in decoding accuracy. These results are consistent with both low-level models of scene categorization and models that build categories around a prototype.     

How Lateral Connections and Spiking Dynamics May Separate Multiple Objects Moving Together

Over successive stages, the ventral visual system of the primate brain develops neurons that respond selectively to particular objects or faces with translation, size and view invariance. The powerful neural representations found in Inferotemporal cortex form a remarkably rapid and robust basis for object recognition which belies the difficulties faced by the system when learning in natural visual environments. A central issue in understanding the process of biological object recognition is how these neurons learn to form separate representations of objects from complex visual scenes composed of multiple objects. We show how a one-layer competitive network comprised of ‘spiking’ neurons is able to learn separate transformation-invariant representations (exemplified by one-dimensional translations) of visual objects that are always seen together moving in lock-step, but separated in space. This is achieved by combining ‘Mexican hat’ functional lateral connectivity with cell firing-rate adaptation to temporally segment input representations of competing stimuli through anti-phase oscillations (perceptual cycles). These spiking dynamics are quickly and reliably generated, enabling selective modification of the feed-forward connections to neurons in the next layer through Spike-Time-Dependent Plasticity (STDP), resulting in separate translation-invariant representations of each stimulus. Variations in key properties of the model are investigated with respect to the network’s ability to develop appropriate input representations and subsequently output representations through STDP. Contrary to earlier rate-coded models of this learning process, this work shows how spiking neural networks may learn about more than one stimulus together without suffering from the ‘superposition catastrophe’. We take these results to suggest that spiking dynamics are key to understanding biological visual object recognition.     

Distinct Visual Working Memory Systems for View-Dependent and View-Invariant Representation

Background

How do people sustain a visual representation of the environment? Currently, many researchers argue that a single visual working memory system sustains non-spatial object information such as colors and shapes. However, previous studies tested visual working memory for two-dimensional objects only. In consequence, the nature of visual working memory for three-dimensional (3D) object representation remains unknown.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Here, I show that when sustaining information about 3D objects, visual working memory clearly divides into two separate, specialized memory systems, rather than one system, as was previously thought. One memory system gradually accumulates sensory information, forming an increasingly precise view-dependent representation of the scene over the course of several seconds. A second memory system sustains view-invariant representations of 3D objects. The view-dependent memory system has a storage capacity of 3–4 representations and the view-invariant memory system has a storage capacity of 1–2 representations. These systems can operate independently from one another and do not compete for working memory storage resources.

Conclusions/Significance

These results provide evidence that visual working memory sustains object information in two separate, specialized memory systems. One memory system sustains view-dependent representations of the scene, akin to the view-specific representations that guide place recognition during navigation in humans, rodents and insects. The second memory system sustains view-invariant representations of 3D objects, akin to the object-based representations that underlie object cognition.     

Attribute Pair-Based Visual Recognition and Memory

Background

In the human visual system, different attributes of an object, such as shape, color, and motion, are processed separately in different areas of the brain. This raises a fundamental question of how are these attributes integrated to produce a unified perception and a specific response. This “binding problem” is computationally difficult because all attributes are assumed to be bound together to form a single object representation. However, there is no firm evidence to confirm that such representations exist for general objects.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Here we propose a paired-attribute model in which cognitive processes are based on multiple representations of paired attributes. In line with the model''s prediction, we found that multiattribute stimuli can produce an illusory perception of a multiattribute object arising from erroneous integration of attribute pairs, implying that object recognition is based on parallel perception of paired attributes. Moreover, in a change-detection task, a feature change in a single attribute frequently caused an illusory perception of change in another attribute, suggesting that multiple pairs of attributes are stored in memory.

Conclusions/Significance

The paired-attribute model can account for some novel illusions and controversial findings on binocular rivalry and short-term memory. Our results suggest that many cognitive processes are performed at the level of paired attributes rather than integrated objects, which greatly facilitates the binding problem and provides simpler solutions for it.     

Fragment-based learning of visual object categories

When we perceive a visual object, we implicitly or explicitly associate it with a category we know. It is known that the visual system can use local, informative image fragments of a given object, rather than the whole object, to classify it into a familiar category. How we acquire informative fragments has remained unclear. Here, we show that human observers acquire informative fragments during the initial learning of categories. We created new, but naturalistic, classes of visual objects by using a novel "virtual phylogenesis" (VP) algorithm that simulates key aspects of how biological categories evolve. Subjects were trained to distinguish two of these classes by using whole exemplar objects, not fragments. We hypothesized that if the visual system learns informative object fragments during category learning, then subjects must be able to perform the newly learned categorization by using only the fragments as opposed to whole objects. We found that subjects were able to successfully perform the classification task by using each of the informative fragments by itself, but not by using any of the comparable, but uninformative, fragments. Our results not only reveal that novel categories can be learned by discovering informative fragments but also introduce and illustrate the use of VP as a versatile tool for category-learning research.     

Within- and Cross-Modal Distance Information Disambiguate Visual Size-Change Perception

Perception is fundamentally underconstrained because different combinations of object properties can generate the same sensory information. To disambiguate sensory information into estimates of scene properties, our brains incorporate prior knowledge and additional “auxiliary” (i.e., not directly relevant to desired scene property) sensory information to constrain perceptual interpretations. For example, knowing the distance to an object helps in perceiving its size. The literature contains few demonstrations of the use of prior knowledge and auxiliary information in combined visual and haptic disambiguation and almost no examination of haptic disambiguation of vision beyond “bistable” stimuli. Previous studies have reported humans integrate multiple unambiguous sensations to perceive single, continuous object properties, like size or position. Here we test whether humans use visual and haptic information, individually and jointly, to disambiguate size from distance. We presented participants with a ball moving in depth with a changing diameter. Because no unambiguous distance information is available under monocular viewing, participants rely on prior assumptions about the ball''s distance to disambiguate their -size percept. Presenting auxiliary binocular and/or haptic distance information augments participants'' prior distance assumptions and improves their size judgment accuracy—though binocular cues were trusted more than haptic. Our results suggest both visual and haptic distance information disambiguate size perception, and we interpret these results in the context of probabilistic perceptual reasoning.     

Explaining the Timing of Natural Scene Understanding with a Computational Model of Perceptual Categorization

Observers can rapidly perform a variety of visual tasks such as categorizing a scene as open, as outdoor, or as a beach. Although we know that different tasks are typically associated with systematic differences in behavioral responses, to date, little is known about the underlying mechanisms. Here, we implemented a single integrated paradigm that links perceptual processes with categorization processes. Using a large image database of natural scenes, we trained machine-learning classifiers to derive quantitative measures of task-specific perceptual discriminability based on the distance between individual images and different categorization boundaries. We showed that the resulting discriminability measure accurately predicts variations in behavioral responses across categorization tasks and stimulus sets. We further used the model to design an experiment, which challenged previous interpretations of the so-called “superordinate advantage.” Overall, our study suggests that observed differences in behavioral responses across rapid categorization tasks reflect natural variations in perceptual discriminability.     

MEG Correlates of Learning Novel Objects Properties in Children

Learning the functional properties of objects is a core mechanism in the development of conceptual, cognitive and linguistic knowledge in children. The cerebral processes underlying these learning mechanisms remain unclear in adults and unexplored in children. Here, we investigated the neurophysiological patterns underpinning the learning of functions for novel objects in 10-year-old healthy children. Event-related fields (ERFs) were recorded using magnetoencephalography (MEG) during a picture-definition task. Two MEG sessions were administered, separated by a behavioral verbal learning session during which children learned short definitions about the “magical” function of 50 unknown non-objects. Additionally, 50 familiar real objects and 50 other unknown non-objects for which no functions were taught were presented at both MEG sessions. Children learned at least 75% of the 50 proposed definitions in less than one hour, illustrating children''s powerful ability to rapidly map new functional meanings to novel objects. Pre- and post-learning ERFs differences were analyzed first in sensor then in source space. Results in sensor space disclosed a learning-dependent modulation of ERFs for newly learned non-objects, developing 500–800 msec after stimulus onset. Analyses in the source space windowed over this late temporal component of interest disclosed underlying activity in right parietal, bilateral orbito-frontal and right temporal regions. Altogether, our results suggest that learning-related evolution in late ERF components over those regions may support the challenging task of rapidly creating new semantic representations supporting the processing of the meaning and functions of novel objects in children.     

Neural representation of objects in space: a dual coding account.

I present evidence on the nature of object coding in the brain and discuss the implications of this coding for models of visual selective attention. Neuropsychological studies of task-based constraints on: (i) visual neglect; and (ii) reading and counting, reveal the existence of parallel forms of spatial representation for objects: within-object representations, where elements are coded as parts of objects, and between-object representations, where elements are coded as independent objects. Aside from these spatial codes for objects, however, the coding of visual space is limited. We are extremely poor at remembering small spatial displacements across eye movements, indicating (at best) impoverished coding of spatial position per se. Also, effects of element separation on spatial extinction can be eliminated by filling the space with an occluding object, indicating that spatial effects on visual selection are moderated by object coding. Overall, there are separate limits on visual processing reflecting: (i) the competition to code parts within objects; (ii) the small number of independent objects that can be coded in parallel; and (iii) task-based selection of whether within- or between-object codes determine behaviour. Between-object coding may be linked to the dorsal visual system while parallel coding of parts within objects takes place in the ventral system, although there may additionally be some dorsal involvement either when attention must be shifted within objects or when explicit spatial coding of parts is necessary for object identification.     

From Sensory Signals to Modality-Independent Conceptual Representations: A Probabilistic Language of Thought Approach

People learn modality-independent, conceptual representations from modality-specific sensory signals. Here, we hypothesize that any system that accomplishes this feat will include three components: a representational language for characterizing modality-independent representations, a set of sensory-specific forward models for mapping from modality-independent representations to sensory signals, and an inference algorithm for inverting forward models—that is, an algorithm for using sensory signals to infer modality-independent representations. To evaluate this hypothesis, we instantiate it in the form of a computational model that learns object shape representations from visual and/or haptic signals. The model uses a probabilistic grammar to characterize modality-independent representations of object shape, uses a computer graphics toolkit and a human hand simulator to map from object representations to visual and haptic features, respectively, and uses a Bayesian inference algorithm to infer modality-independent object representations from visual and/or haptic signals. Simulation results show that the model infers identical object representations when an object is viewed, grasped, or both. That is, the model’s percepts are modality invariant. We also report the results of an experiment in which different subjects rated the similarity of pairs of objects in different sensory conditions, and show that the model provides a very accurate account of subjects’ ratings. Conceptually, this research significantly contributes to our understanding of modality invariance, an important type of perceptual constancy, by demonstrating how modality-independent representations can be acquired and used. Methodologically, it provides an important contribution to cognitive modeling, particularly an emerging probabilistic language-of-thought approach, by showing how symbolic and statistical approaches can be combined in order to understand aspects of human perception.     

Size Constancy in Bat Biosonar? Perceptual Interaction of Object Aperture and Distance

Perception and encoding of object size is an important feature of sensory systems. In the visual system object size is encoded by the visual angle (visual aperture) on the retina, but the aperture depends on the distance of the object. As object distance is not unambiguously encoded in the visual system, higher computational mechanisms are needed. This phenomenon is termed “size constancy”. It is assumed to reflect an automatic re-scaling of visual aperture with perceived object distance. Recently, it was found that in echolocating bats, the ‘sonar aperture’, i.e., the range of angles from which sound is reflected from an object back to the bat, is unambiguously perceived and neurally encoded. Moreover, it is well known that object distance is accurately perceived and explicitly encoded in bat sonar. Here, we addressed size constancy in bat biosonar, recruiting virtual-object techniques. Bats of the species Phyllostomus discolor learned to discriminate two simple virtual objects that only differed in sonar aperture. Upon successful discrimination, test trials were randomly interspersed using virtual objects that differed in both aperture and distance. It was tested whether the bats spontaneously assigned absolute width information to these objects by combining distance and aperture. The results showed that while the isolated perceptual cues encoding object width, aperture, and distance were all perceptually well resolved by the bats, the animals did not assign absolute width information to the test objects. This lack of sonar size constancy may result from the bats relying on different modalities to extract size information at different distances. Alternatively, it is conceivable that familiarity with a behaviorally relevant, conspicuous object is required for sonar size constancy, as it has been argued for visual size constancy. Based on the current data, it appears that size constancy is not necessarily an essential feature of sonar perception in bats.