Can conscientious objection lead to eugenic practices against LGBT individuals?

In a recent article in this journal, Abram Brummett argues that new and future assisted reproductive technologies will provide challenging ethical questions relating to lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) persons. Brummett notes that it is likely that some clinicians may wish to conscientiously object to offering assisted reproductive technologies to LGBT couples on moral or religious grounds, and argues that such appeals to conscience should be constrained. We argue that Brummett's case is unsuccessful because he: does not adequately interact with his opponents’ views; equivocates on the meaning of ‘natural’; fails to show that the practice he opposes is eugenic in any non‐trivial sense; and fails to justify and explicate the relevance of the naturalism he proposes. We do not argue that conscience protections should exist for those objecting to providing LGBT people with artificial reproductive technologies, but only show that Brummett's arguments are insufficient to prove that they should not.     

Conscience claims,metaphysics, and avoiding an LGBT eugenic

Novel assisted reproductive technologies (ART) are poised to present our society with strange new ethical questions, such as whether lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) couples should be allowed to produce children biologically related to both parents, or whether trans‐women who want to experience childbirth should be allowed to receive uterine transplants. Clinicians opposed to offering such technologies to LGBT couples on moral grounds are likely to seek legal shelter through the conscience clauses enshrined in U.S. law. This paper begins by briefly discussing some novel ART on the horizon and noting that it is unclear whether current conscience clauses will permit fertility clinics to deny such services to LGBT individuals. A compromise approach to conscience is any view that sees the value of respecting conscience claims within limits. I describe and critique the constraints proposed in the recent work of Wicclair, NeJaime and Siegel as ultimately begging the question. My purpose is to strengthen their arguments by suggesting that in the controversial situations that elicit claims of conscience, bioethicists should engage with the metaphysical claims in play. I argue that conscience claims against LGBT individuals ought to be constrained because the underlying metaphysic—that God has decreed the LGBT lifestyle to be sinful—is highly implausible from the perspective of a naturalized metaphysic, which ought to be the lens through which we evaluate conscience claims.     

TWO STALEMATES IN THE PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATE ABOUT ABORTION AND WHY THEY CANNOT BE RESOLVED USING ANALOGICAL ARGUMENTS

Philosophical debate about the ethics of abortion has reached stalemate on two key issues. First, the claim that foetuses have moral standing that entitles them to protections for their lives has been neither convincingly established nor refuted. Second, the question of a pregnant woman's obligation to allow the gestating foetus the use of her body has not been resolved. Both issues are deadlocked because philosophers addressing them invariably rely on intuitions and analogies, and such arguments have weaknesses that make them unfit for resolving the abortion issue. Analogical arguments work by building a kind of consensus, and such a consensus is virtually unimaginable because (1) intuitions are revisable, and in the abortion debate there is great motive to revise them, (2) one's position on abortion influences judgments about other issues, making it difficult to leverage intuitions about other ethical questions into changing peoples' minds about abortion, and (3) the extent of shared values in the abortion debate is overstated. Arguments by analogy rely on an assumption of the commensurability of moral worldviews. But the abortion debate is currently unfolding in a context of genuinely incommensurable moral worldviews. The article ends by arguing that the default position must be to permit abortion as a consequence of the freedom of conscience protected in liberal societies.     

TRIANGULAR REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM: A CONSCIENCE‐BASED METHOD FOR BIOETHICAL DELIBERATION

Following a discussion of some historical roots of conscience, we offer a systematized version of reflective equilibrium. Aiming at a comprehensive methodology for bioethical deliberation, we develop an expanded variant of reflective equilibrium, which we call ‘triangular reflective equilibrium’ and which incorporates insights from hermeneutics, critical theory and narrative ethics. We focus on a few distinctions, mainly between methods of justification in ethics and the social practice of bioethical deliberation, between coherence in ethical reasoning, personal integrity and consensus formation, and between political and moral deliberation. The ideal of deliberation is explicated as a sharing of conscience within a special commitment to sincerity and openness to persuasion. Personal growth in wisdom is an indirect by‐product of the continuous practice of moral deliberation. This is explicated in the light of Sternberg's balance theory of wisdom and in the context of medicine as a profession embodying altruistic responsibilities of care in democratic and pluralistic societies.     

Doing what the patient orders: maintaining integrity in the doctor-patient relationship

No profession has undergone as much scrutiny in the past several decades as that of medicine. Indeed, one might well argue that no profession has ever undergone so much change in so short a time. An essential part of this change has been the growing insistence that competent, adult patients have the right to decide about the course of their own medical treatment. However, the familiar and widely accepted principle of patient self-determination entails a corollary that has received little attention in the growing literature on the ethics of physician-patient relations: if patients are to direct the course of their own medical treatment, then physicians are at least sometimes to be guided in their actions on behalf of patients by values that are not, and may even be incompatible with, their own values. Unless it is supposed that it would be best if physicians were simply to accommodate any and all patient requests, a possibility I consider and reject in this paper, there are bound to be numerous instances of legitimate moral conflict between the preferences of physicians and patients. In this paper, I examine the implications of this sort of moral conflict from the standpoint of the integrity of the physician....I have also considered the common practice of patient referral from the standpoint of physician integrity, and asked whether a physician who refuses to treat a patient as a matter of conscience can consistently refer the patient to another physician for the same treatment....     

Freedom of Conscience in Health Care: Distinctions and Limits

The widespread emergence of innumerable technologies within health care has complicated the choices facing caregivers and their patients. The escalation of knowledge and technical innovation has been accompanied by an erosion of moral and ethical consensus among health providers that is reflected in the abandonment of the Hippocratic Oath as the immutable bedrock of medical ethics. Ethical conflicts arise when the values of health professionals collide with the expressed wishes of patients or the dictates of regulatory bodies and administrators. Increasing attempts by groups outside of the medical profession to limit freedom of conscience for health providers has raised concern and consternation among some health professionals. The personal and professional impact of health professionals surrendering freedom of conscience and participating in actions they deem malevolent or unethical has not been adequately studied and may not be inconsequential when considering the recognized impact of other circumstances of coerced complicity. We argue that the distinction between the two ways that freedom of conscience is exercised (avoiding a perceived evil and seeking a perceived good) provides a rational basis for a principled limitation of this fundamental freedom.     

Dignity,conscience and religious pluralism in healthcare: An argument for a presumption in favour of respect for religious belief

Religious pluralism in healthcare means that conflicts regarding appropriate treatment can occur because of convictions of patients and healthcare workers alike. This contribution argues for a presumption in favour of respect for religious belief on the basis that such convictions are judgements of conscience, and respect for conscience is core to what it means to respect human dignity. The human person is a subject in relation to all that is. Human dignity refers to the worth of human persons as members of the species with capacities of reason and free choice that enable the realisation of dignity as self-worth through morally good behaviour. Conscience is both a feature of inherent dignity and necessary for acquiring dignity as self-worth. Conscience enables a person to identify objective values and disvalues for human flourishing, the rational capacity to reason about the relative importance of these values and the right way to achieve them and the judgement of the good end and the right means. Human persons are bound to follow their conscience because this is their subjective relationship to objective truth. Religious convictions are decisions of conscience because they are subjective judgements about objective truth. The presumption of respect for religious belief is limited by the normative dimension of human dignity such that a person's beliefs may be overridden if they objectively violate inherent dignity or morally legitimate acquired dignity.     

转化医学研究中生命伦理学辩护的现况分析与前瞻思考

转化医学作为一门新兴学科,运用多学科交叉策略来推动医学发展,从临床实践中发现问题,将其凝练成科学问题进行基础医学研究,再将研究成果应用到疾病诊断、治疗和预防过程中,使其真正发挥作用,是一个从基础医学到临床应用的双向进程。转化医学已逐步融入各个学科,并在干细胞研究、生物标志物、细胞信号转导、药物及器具研发及个体化医学等各个领域发挥重要作用。随着转化医学研究深入,一些临床试验势必对人体存在一定伤害和潜在危险,存在各种伦理问题。虽说科学研究与伦理道德是一对相互冲击的矛盾,但两者在总体上又是一致的,共同决定着社会前进步伐。科研的重大进步必然会对伦理道德提出更高要求,而伦理道德的高标准又规范、引导、促进科学研究朝着正确方向迈进,两者相辅相成。鉴于伦理辩护对于转化医学研究强有力的支撑,建议在转化医学研究中能进一步完善伦理监管体系,发挥机构伦理委员会的功效,持续加大伦理培训的力度,强化研究人员的伦理道德修养,从而为转化医学的发展夯实人文基础。     

Great Expectations: Teaching Ethics to Medical Students in South Africa

Many academic philosophers and ethicists are appointed to teach ethics to medical students. We explore exactly what this task entails. In South Africa the Health Professions Council's curriculum for training medical practitioners requires not only that students be taught to apply ethical theory to issues and be made aware of the legal and regulatory requirements of their profession, it also expects moral formation and the inculcation of professional virtue in students. We explore whether such expectations are reasonable. We defend the claim that physicians ought to be persons of virtuous character, on the grounds of the social contract between society and the profession. We further argue that since the expectations of virtue of health care professionals are reasonable, it is also sound reasoning to expect ethics teachers to try to inculcate such virtues in their students, so far as this is possible. Furthermore, this requires of such teachers that they be suitable role models of ethical practice and virtue, themselves. We claim that this applies to ethics teachers who are themselves not members of the medical profession, too, even though they are not bound by the same social contract as doctors. We conclude that those who accept employment as teachers of ethics to medical students, where as part of their contractual obligation they are expected to inculcate moral values in their students, ought to be prepared to accept their responsibility to be professionally ethical, themselves.     

Looking back, looking beyond: revisiting the ethics of genome generation

This paper will explore some of the ethical imperatives that have shaped strategic and policy frameworks for the use of new genetic technologies and how these play a role in shaping the nature of research and changing attitudes; with an attempt to conceptualize some theories of genetic determinism. I analyse why there is a need to put bioethical principles within a theoretical framework in the context of new technologies, and how, by doing so, their practical applications for agriculture, environment medicine and health care can be legitimized. There are several theories in favour of and against the use of genetic technologies that focus on genes and their role in our existence. In particular the theory of geneticisation is commonly debated. It highlights the conflicting interests of science, society and industry in harnessing genetic knowledge when the use of such knowledge could challenge ethical principles. Critics call it a ‘reductionist’ approach, based on arguments that are narrowed down to genes, often ignoring other factors including biological, social and moral ones. A parallel theory is that there is something special about genes, and it is this “genetic exceptionalism” that creates hopes and myths. Either way, the challenging task is to develop a common ground for understanding the importance of ethical sensitivities. As research agendas become more complex, ethical paradigms will need to be more influential. New principles are needed to answer the complexities of ethical issues as complex technologies develop. This paper reflects on global ethical principles and the tensions between ethical principles in legitimizing genetic technologies at the social and governance level.     

Tu Youyou winning the Nobel Prize: Ethical research on the value and safety of traditional Chinese medicine

In 2015, the Chinese pharmacologist, Tu Youyou, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for the discovery of artemisinin. Traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) was the source of inspiration for Tu's discovery and provides an opportunity for the world to know more about TCM as a source of medical knowledge and practice. In this article, the value of TCM is evaluated from an ethical perspective. The characteristics of ‘jian, bian, yan, lian’ are explored in the way they promote accessibility and economic efficiency for TCM. The article also examines how the increased use and prevalence of TCM reflects the scientific, cultural, and ethical values of TCM and their increasing attraction in meeting major challenges to medicine and health systems currently and in the future. The article discusses safety issues within TCM, which is a controversial area, and also comments on some shortcomings and challenges which pose difficulties for more widespread and greater uptake of TCM-derived clinical or therapeutic interventions. The article concludes that TCM is generally safe if it is used according to TCM theory and where such applications are cognizant of the strengths and weaknesses of TCM. TCM has important bioethical values which may inform potential measures for meeting challenges facing global health care systems and the article argues that it can have an increasing role in improving human health.     

Relativism and the Search for Human Rights

The theory of ethical relativism has been the subject of much misunderstanding. It is argued that the central insight of relativism is enculturation and not tolerance. Relativism is characterized as a metaethical theory about the nature of moral perceptions. As such it is logically consistent, permits moral criticism, and is compatible with cross-cultural universals. The existence of universals may indicate global support for particular human rights.     

Conscientious objection in healthcare: How much discretionary space best supports good medicine?

Daniel Sulmasy has recently argued that good medicine depends on physicians having a wide discretionary space in which they can act on their consciences. The only constraints Sulmasy believes we should place on physicians’ discretionary space are those defined by a form of tolerance he derives from Locke, whereby people can publicly act in accordance with their personal religious and moral beliefs as long as their actions are not destructive to society. Sulmasy also claims that those who would reject physicians’ right to conscientious objection eliminate discretionary space, thus undermining good medicine and unnecessarily limiting religious freedom. I argue that, although Sulmasy is correct that some discretionary space is necessary for good medicine, he is wrong in thinking that proscribing conscientious objection entails eliminating discretionary space. I illustrate this using Julian Savulescu and Udo Schuklenk’s system for restricting conscientious objections as a counter‐example. I then argue that a narrow discretionary space constrained by professional ideals will promote good medicine better than Sulmasy’s wider discretionary space constrained by his conception of tolerance. Sulmasy’s version of discretionary space would have us tolerate actions that are at odds with aspects of good medicine, including aspects that Sulmasy himself explicitly values, such as fiduciary duty. Therefore, if we want the degree of religious freedom in the public sphere that Sulmasy favours then we must decide whether it is worth the cost to the healthcare system.     

Life and Death Decision Making, by Baruch A. Brody

Veatch considers the pluralistic casuistry theory advocated by Baruch Brody in his 1988 book, Life and Death Decision Making, to be an important contribution to the secular medical ethics literature. The casuistic and pluralistic elements of Brody's new model are described as intriguing but controversial because Brody both excludes several ethical appeals (i.e., classical Hippocratic ethics, virtue theory) and/or limits other questionable appeals (i.e., consequences for families and others in society, the virtue of integrity) without accounting for these decisions. Veatch also questions Brody's use of intuitional judgment to determine what ought to be done after examination of various appeals and their significance because Brody's approach raises serious problems about how various appeals are counted. Veatch does affirm the rich assessment of medical ethical problems made possible by Brody's pluralistic approach but notes the difficulties it raises.     

Was bioethics founded on historical and conceptual mistakes about medical paternalism?

Bioethics has a founding story in which medical paternalism, the interference with the autonomy of patients for their own clinical benefit, was an accepted ethical norm in the history of Western medical ethics and was widespread in clinical practice until bioethics changed the ethical norms and practice of medicine. In this paper I show that the founding story of bioethics misreads major texts in the history of Western medical ethics. I also show that a major source for empirical claims about the widespread practice of medical paternalism has been misread. I then show that that bioethics based on its founding story deprofessionalizes medical ethics. The result leaves the sick exposed to the predatory power of medical practitioners and healthcare organizations with only their autonomy-based rights to non-interference, expressed in contracts, to protect them. The sick are stripped of the protection afforded by a professional, fiduciary relationship of physicians to their patients. Bioethics based on its founding story reverts to the older model of a contractual relationship between the sick and medical practitioners not worthy of intellectual or moral trust (because such trust cannot be generated by what I call 'deprofessionalizing bioethics'). On closer examination, bioethics based on its founding story, ironically, eliminates paternalism as a moral category in bioethics, thus causing bioethics to collapse on itself because it denies one of the necessary conditions for medical paternalism. Bioethics based on its founding story should be abandoned.     

Ethical aspects of cryobiology: responsible applications in biomedicine and in clinical practice

This paper focuses on ethical issues in applications of cryobiology to humans, more particularly in the field of human reproduction and cryosurgery. The paper also provides essential ingredients for the interface of bioethics and cryobiology. For instance, since the 1970s bioethicists have developed four principles to guide the moral evaluation of the 'new medicine.' These are: respect for persons, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. In the field of human reproduction major progress was made by the cryopreservation of reproductive material. Still, ethical issues arise whenever partnerships cease to exist (death) or deteriorate (divorce), and decisions have to be made about the disposition of frozen gametes and embryos. Policy-making becomes, then, a prime concern. Examples of regulation in the United States of America, in the United Kingdom, and across Europe are being offered. Cryosurgery remains a field where cryobiologists struggle in their quest for an optimal technique, thus illustrating the need for assessment of safety, efficacy, and benefit to patients. Increasingly, cryobiologists have been joining in the ethical reflection on the use of cryo-technologies. They may further do so by perfecting their ability to identify ethical aspects, by analysing the norms and values at stake, by learning the skill of making the appropriate choices, and by showing their willingness to justify the choices made be it in the inner circle of pairs or publicly.     

The poetics of wisdom divination: renewing the moral imagination

This article makes a critical contribution to interpretive anthropology by recovering its interest in the moral imagination, while linking this to the poetics of wisdom divination, primarily among Tswapong of Botswana and more widely across a vast part of Southern Africa. This mode of divination appeals to imaginative moral reflection and ethical deliberation along with practical wisdom in the quest for well‐being. The esoteric oral literature in wisdom divination is rich in cross‐cultural understandings, transmitted over considerable barriers, and re‐created over centuries. Its evocative praise poetry, having no known author, is archived in the memories of experts, the diviners, and is recited and interpreted selectively during diagnostic séances. Yet anthropologists and literary scholars have not paid serious attention to the oral poetry and its remarkable wide‐ranging archive. Against that, this article documents the acrobatic stylistics of the divinatory poetry and shows how it appeals artfully for reflexivity, for heightened consciousness, and for unmasking the hidden in everyday life. The main analysis carries forward an anthropology of ethics that overcomes the usual division of labour between the study of ethics and aesthetics.     

Medicine and the call for a moral epistemology, part II: constructing a synthesis of values

The demands and needs of an individual patient require diverse value judgments to interpret and apply clinical data. Indeed, objective assessment takes on particular meaning in the context of the social and existential status of the patient, and thereby a complex calculus of values determines therapeutic goals. I have previously formulated how this moral thread of care becomes woven into the epistemological project as a "moral epistemology." Having argued its ethical justification elsewhere, I offer another perspective here: clinical choices employ diverse values directed at an array of goals, some of which are derived from a universal clinical science and others from the particular physiological, psychological, and social needs of the patient. Integrating these diverse elements that determine clinical care requires a complex synthesis of facts and judgments from several domains. This constructivist process relies on clinical facts, as well as on personal judgments and subjective assessments in an ongoing negotiation between patient and doctor. A philosophy of medicine must account for the conceptual basis of this process by identifying and addressing the judgments that govern the complex synthesis of these various elements.     

Medicine and the call for a moral epistemology

For over a century, medicine has prided itself on its scientific orientation and technological accomplishments. But a conceptual crack lies at the foundation of contemporary medicine, one that may be characterized as a conflict between medicine's scientific epistemology and its moral philosophy. Moral refers to value, and more specifically in the clinical setting, to how facts must be ordered by the values attached to them. A "moral epistemology" seeks to bring these two domains into closer proximity. Clinical facts always reside in a complex array of systems that confer specific and often unique meanings to any finding. An integration of unsteady norms and the intuitive inference arising from the individuality of disease expression require that judgments order facts into their proper placement. And beyond this relaxed view of objectivity, clinical care must also incorporate judgments arising from the patient's (as well as the physician's) social and psychological realms that are removed from scientific concerns. Together, these various kinds of value judgments erect the scaffold of clinical care, in which a more complex moral epistemology emerges. A comprehensive biopsychosocial model of illness and its treatment articulates this integrated orientation, but until medicine embraces a philosophy that legitimates the full integration of facts and values, the appeal of such an approach will remain limited and its application ineffective.     

Might there be a medical conscience?

I defend the feasibility of a medical conscience in the following sense: a medical professional can object to the prevailing medical norms because they are incorrect as medical norms. In other words, I provide an account of conscientious objection that makes use of the idea that the conscience can issue true normative claims, but the claims in question are claims about medical norms rather than about general moral norms. I further argue that in order for this line of reasoning to succeed, there needs to be an internal morality of medicine that determines what medical professionals ought to do qua medical professionals. I utilize a constructivist approach to the internal morality of medicine and argue that medical professionals can conscientiously object to providing treatment X, if providing treatment X is not in accordance with norms that would have been constructed, in light of the end of medicine, by the appropriate agents under the appropriate conditions.