Sexual conflict over care: antagonistic effects of clutch desertion on reproductive success of male and female penduline tits

A fundamental tenet of sexual conflict theory is that one sex may increase its reproductive success (RS) even if this harms the other sex. Several studies supported this principle by showing that males benefit from reduced paternal care whereas females suffer from it. By investigating penduline tits Remiz pendulinus in nature, we show that parental conflict may be symmetric between sexes. In this small passerine a single female (or male) cares for the offspring, whereas about 30% of clutches are deserted by both parents. Deserting parents enhance their RS by obtaining multiple mates, and they reduce the RS of their mates due to increased nest failure. Unlike most other species, however, the antagonistic interests are symmetric in penduline tits, because both sexes enhance their own RS by deserting, whilst harming the RS of their mates. We argue that the strong antagonistic interests of sexes explain the high frequency of biparental desertion.     

An experimental test on time constraint and sexual conflict over parental care

Because parental care is costly, a sexual conflict between parents over parental investment is expected to arise. Parental care behavior is an adaptive decision, involving trade‐offs between remating, and consequently desertion of the brood, and continuing parental effort. If the main advantage of desertion is remating, then this will be a time constraint, because the deserting individual will require a certain minimum period of time to breed again in the same breeding season. So, a short breeding season should force certain individuals to desert the first brood to have enough time to successfully complete their second breeding attempt. The rock sparrow, Petronia petronia, is an unusual species in which brood desertion can occur in both sexes and the breeding season is quite short so it is a good species to investigate the role of time constraint on brood desertion. For 3 years, I investigated the brood desertion modality of the rock sparrow. Then, for 2 years, I removed a group of experimental nest boxes during the autumn. Later, I re‐installed the experimental nest boxes after the start of the breeding season (2 weeks after the first egg was laid), mimicking a shortening of the breeding season for the (experimental) pairs that used experimental nest boxes. I found that in the experimental pairs, the percentage of deserting individuals was significantly higher than in the control groups, and the deserting individuals were older females. This experiment adds to our knowledge of timing of reproduction effects on individual decisions to desert by showing that a short and delayed breeding season may have different effects on males and females. To my knowledge, this is the first experimental study that demonstrates a direct link between time constraint and brood desertion.     

Adaptive dynamics of cooperation may prevent the coexistence of defectors and cooperators and even cause extinction

It has recently been demonstrated that ecological feedback mechanisms can facilitate the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in public goods interactions: the replicator dynamics of defectors and cooperators can result, for example, in the ecological coexistence of cooperators and defectors. Here we show that these results change dramatically if cooperation strategy is not fixed but instead is a continuously varying trait under natural selection. For low values of the factor with which the value of resources is multiplied before they are shared among all participants, evolution will always favour lower cooperation strategies until the population falls below an Allee threshold and goes extinct, thus evolutionary suicide occurs. For higher values of the factor, there exists a unique evolutionarily singular strategy, which is convergence stable. Because the fitness function is linear with respect to the strategy of the mutant, this singular strategy is neutral against mutant invasions. This neutrality disappears if a nonlinear functional response in receiving benefits is assumed. For strictly concave functional responses, singular strategies become uninvadable. Evolutionary branching, which could result in the evolutionary emergence of cooperators and defectors, can occur only with locally convex functional responses, but we illustrate that it can also result in coevolutionary extinction.     

Levels of extra‐pair paternity are associated with parental care in penduline tits (Remizidae)

In most passerine birds, individuals attempt to maximize their fitness by providing parental care while also mating outside their pair bond. A sex‐specific trade‐off between these two behaviours is predicted to occur, as the fitness benefits of extra‐pair mating differ between the sexes. We use nest observations and parentage analysis to reveal a negative association between male care and the incidence of extra‐pair paternity across three species of penduline tit (Remizidae). This provides evidence of a trade‐off between these two behaviours, possibly due to the devaluing of paternal care by extra‐pair offspring.     

Sexual conflict over parental care promotes the evolution of sex differences in care and the ability to care

Strong asymmetries in parental care, with one sex providing more care than the other, are widespread across the animal kingdom. At present, two factors are thought to ultimately cause sex differences in care: certainty of parentage and sexual selection. By contrast, we here show that the coevolution of care and the ability to care can result in strong asymmetries in both the ability to care and the level of care, even in the absence of these factors. While the coevolution of care and the ability to care does not predict which sex evolves to care more than the other, once other factors give rise to even the slightest differences in the cost and benefits of care between the sexes (e.g. differences in certainty in parentage), a clear directionality emerges; the sex with the lower cost or higher benefit of care evolves both to be more able to care and to provide much higher levels of care than the other sex. Our findings suggest that the coevolution of levels of care and the ability to care may be a key factor underlying the evolution of sex differences in care.     

Offspring desertion and parental care in the Whiskered Tern Chlidonias hybrida

In species with biparental care, a conflict of interest can arise if one mate tries to maximize its own reproductive success at the expense of the other's. One of the mates can desert the brood to accrue a number of benefits to enhance its own fitness, leaving parental care to the remaining parent. This study is the first to describe the desertion pattern in a tern species (Sternidae). We investigated offspring desertion in the Whiskered Tern Chlidonias hybrida, a species with semi‐precocial chicks. Offspring desertion was recorded in 52% of nests prior to fledging (n = 131 nests). Females also deserted during the post‐fledging period. Of the deserters, 97% were females. Desertions started when chicks were 5 days old and no longer required intense brooding. Desertions before fledging did not affect fledging success. Provisioning rates between pair members differed, and females supplied much less food than males. Female provisioning rate affected the chances of nest desertion significantly: daily desertion rates were lower when females supplied more food. After females had deserted, males increased their provisioning rates but compensated for the loss of female care only partly in two‐ and three‐chick broods. Only in small (one‐chick) broods was compensation full. We conclude that male and female Whiskered Terns adopt different reproductive strategies in the population studied here. Females invest much less in parental care than males, providing less food and deserting more frequently. Given the ready availability of food and low predation pressure, benefits appear to accrue to females that desert; selection forces may therefore not be acting against female desertion.     

The risks of parenthood II. Parent-offspring conflict

Summary Previous work has demonstrated the value of dynamic programming models for the analysis of parental decision making. In the present paper we extend this approach to analyse conflicts between parents and their offspring, and develop a dynamic ESS model of feeding and fledging of nestling birds. In order to simplify the formulation and solution of the dynamic ESS model, we adopt an assumption of alternating decisions: in each time period the parent first decides whether to continue provisioning the nestling, after which the nestling decides whether to leave the nest. The model takes into account numerous tradeoffs involved in parent-offspring decisions, including differential growth and mortality rates for offspring in and out of the nest, risk of fledging, relation between long-term survival and post-breeding mass of offspring, and parental mortality risk associated with provisioning of offspring. Depending on assumed parameter values, the model is capable of predicting a wide range of feeding-fledging behaviour. The model is applied specifically to the juvenile life history of dovekies (Alle alle), and provides a behavioural explanation for the phenomenon of pre-fledging mass recession in this species.     

Correlated evolution of male and female morphologles in water striders

Sexually antagonistic coevolution may be an important force in the evolution of sexual dimorphism. We undertake a comparative study of correlated evolution of male and female morphologies in a clade of 15 water strider species in the genus Gerris (Heteroptera: Gerridae). Earlier studies have shown that superfluous matings impose costs on females, including increased energetic expenditure and predation risk, and females therefore resist males with premating struggles. Males of some species possess grasping structures and females of some species exhibit distinct antigrasping structures, which are used to further the interests of each sex during these premating struggles. We use this understanding, combined with coevolutionary theory, to derive a series of a priori predictions concerning both the types of traits in the two sexes that are expected to coevolve and the coevolutionary dynamics of these traits expected under sexually antagonistic coevolution. We then assess the actual pattern of correlated evolution in this clade with new morphometric methods combined with standard comparative techniques. The results were in agreement with the a priori predictions. The level of armament (different abdominal structures in the two sexes) was closely correlated between the sexes across species. Males are well adapted to grasping females in species in which females are well adapted to thwart harassing males and vice versa. Furthermore, our comparative analyses supports the prediction that correlated evolution of armament in the two sexes should be both rapid and bidirectional.     

Gametophytic vs. sporophytic control of pollen aperture number: A generational conflict

In flowering plants, the haploid phase is reduced to the pollen grain and embryo sac. These reproductive tissues (gametophytes) are actually distinct individuals that have a different genome from the plant (sporophyte), and are more or less independent. The morphology of pollen grains, particularly the openings permitting pollen tube germination (apertures), is crucial for determining the outcome of pollen competition. Many species of flowering plants simultaneously produce pollen grains with different aperture numbers in a single individual (heteromorphism). In this paper, we show that the heteromorphic pollen aperture pattern depends on the genetic control of pollen morphogenesis. This points out a conflict of interest between genes expressed in the sporophyte and genes expressed in the gametophyte. More generally, such a conflict should exist whenever heteromorphism is an ESS resulting from a bet-hedging strategy. For pollen aperture, heteromorphism has been observed in about 40% of angiosperm species, suggesting that conflicting situations are the rule. In this context, the sporo-gametophytic conflict could be one of the factors that led to the reduction of the haploid phase in plants.     

Sexual conflict over parental investment in repeated bouts: negotiation reduces overall care

Understanding the evolution of parental care is complicated by the occurrence of evolutionary conflicts of interest within the family, variation in the quality and state of family members, and repeated bouts of investment in a family of offspring. As a result, family members are expected to negotiate over care. We present a model for the resolution of sexual conflict in which parents negotiate over repeated bouts of care. Negotiation is mediated by parents deciding at the start of each bout how much care to give on the basis of the state (mass) of offspring, which reflects the amount of care previously received. The evolutionarily stable pattern of care depends on whether the parents care together for the whole family, or each cares alone for part of the divided family. When they care together, they provide less care in the first bout, more in the last bout, and less care overall, resulting in lower parental and offspring fitness. Our results emphasize that negotiation over parental care may occur as a means of avoiding exploitation owing to sexual conflict, even in the absence of variation in the quality of either sex of parent, and lead to a reduction in fitness.     

Intra-locus sexual conflict and sexually antagonistic genetic variation in hermaphroditic animals

Intra-locus sexual conflict results when sex-specific selection pressures for a given trait act against the intra-sexual genetic correlation for that trait. It has been found in a wide variety of taxa in both laboratory and natural populations, but the importance of intra-locus sexual conflict and sexually antagonistic genetic variation in hermaphroditic organisms has rarely been considered. This is not so surprising given the conceptual and theoretical association of intra-locus sexual conflict with sexual dimorphism, but there is no a priori reason why intra-locus sexual conflict cannot occur in hermaphroditic organisms as well. Here, I discuss the potential for intra-locus sexual conflict in hermaphroditic animals and review the available evidence for such conflict, and for the existence of sexually antagonistic genetic variation in hermaphrodites. I argue that mutations with asymmetric effects are particularly likely to be important in mediating sexual antagonism in hermaphroditic organisms. Moreover, sexually antagonistic genetic variation is likely to play an important role in inter-individual variation in sex allocation and in transitions to and from gonochorism (separate sexes) in simultaneous hermaphrodites. I also describe how sequential hermaphrodites may experience a unique form of intra-locus sexual conflict via antagonistic pleiotropy. Finally, I conclude with some suggestions for further research.     

Negotiation of parental care when the stakes are high: experimental handicapping of one partner during incubation leads to short-term generosity

1. Most game theoretical models of biparental care predict that a reduction in care by one partner should not be fully compensated by increased work of its mate but this may not be true for incubating birds because a reduction in care could cause the entire brood to fail.
2. I performed the first handicapping experiment of both males and females during incubation, by placing small lead weights on the tails of male and female northern flickers Colaptes auratus , a woodpecker in which males do most of the incubation.
3. Females responded to the acute stressor (handling and handicapping) by tending to abandon more readily than males and staying away from the nest longer in the first incubation bout. Among pairs that persisted, both males and females compensated fully for a handicapped partner, keeping the eggs covered nearly 100% of the time.
4. Partners did not retaliate by forcing their handicapped mate to sit on the eggs with a long incubation bout length subsequent to having a long bout length themselves. Instead, during the 24 h immediately after handicapping, males behaved generously by relieving handicapped females early.
5. Such generosity was probably not energetically sustainable as these male partners took on less incubation in the 72 h following handicapping compared to female partners of handicapped males. Males and females are probably generous in the short-term because of the high cost of nest failure during incubation but maintaining increased work loads in the longer term is probably limited by body condition and abandonment thresholds consistent with game theory models.     

Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation

Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk-Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.     

Negotiation may lead selfish individuals to cooperate: the example of the collective vigilance game

Game-theoretical models have been highly influential in behavioural ecology. However, these models generally assume that animals choose their action before observing the behaviour of their opponents while, in many natural situations, individuals in fact continuously react to the actions of others. A negotiation process then takes place and this may fundamentally influence the individual attitudes and the tendency to cooperate. Here, I use the classical model system of vigilance behaviour to demonstrate the consequences of such behavioural negotiation among selfish individuals, by predicting patterns of vigilance in a pair of animals foraging under threat of predation. I show that the game played by the animals and the resulting vigilance strategies take radically different forms, according to the way predation risk is shared in the pair. In particular, if predators choose their target at random, the prey respond by displaying moderate vigilance and taking turns scanning. By contrast, if the individual that takes flight later in an attack endures a higher risk of being targeted, vigilance increases and there is always at least one sentinel in the pair. Finally, when lagging behind its companion in fleeing from an attacker becomes extremely risky, vigilance decreases again and the animals scan simultaneously.     

Interspecific interactions change the outcome of sexual conflict over prehatching parental investment in the burying beetle Nicrophorus vespilloides

Sexual conflict arises when the optimal reproductive strategy differs for males and females. It is associated with every reproductive stage, yet few studies have considered how the outcome may be changed by interactions with other species. Here, we show that phoretic mites Poecilochirus carabi change the outcome of sexual conflict over the supply of prehatching parental investment in the burying beetle Nicrophorus vespilloides. Burying beetles require a small dead vertebrate for reproduction, which they prepare by shaving it, rolling up the flesh, and burying it. When pairs were given a medium‐sized mouse to prepare (13–16 g), mites changed how the costs of reproduction were divided between the sexes, with males then sustaining greater costs than females. We found no equivalent difference when pairs prepared larger or smaller carcasses. Thus, our experiment shows that the outcome of sexual conflict over prehatching parental investment is changed by interactions with other species during reproduction.     

Evolutionary pathways in shorebird breeding systems: sexual conflict, parental care, and chick development

Sexual selection, mating opportunities, and parental behavior are interrelated, although the specific nature of these relationships is controversial. Two major hypotheses have been suggested. The parental investment hypothesis states that the relative parental investment of the sexes drives the operation of sexual selection. Thus, the sex that invests less in offspring care competes more intensely and monopolizes access to mates. The sexual conflict hypothesis proposes that sexual selection (the competition among both males and females for mates), mating opportunities, and parental behavior are interrelated and predicts a feedback loop between mating systems and parental care. Here we test both hypotheses using a comprehensive dataset of shorebirds, a maximum-likelihood statistical technique, and a recent supertree of extant shorebirds and allies. Shorebirds are an excellent group for these analyses because they display unique variation in parental care and social mating system. First, we show that chick development constrains the evolution of both parental care and mate competition, because transitions toward more precocial offspring preceded transitions toward reduced parental care and social polygamy. Second, changes in care and mating systems respond to one another, most likely because both influenced and are influenced by mating opportunities. Taken together, our results are more consistent with the sexual conflict hypothesis than the parental investment hypothesis.     

Strategic analysis in evolutionary genetics and the theory of games

This paper is written in memory of John Maynard Smith. In a brief survey it discusses essential aspects of how game theory in biology relates to its counterpart in economics, the major transition in game theory initiated by Maynard Smith, the discrepancies between genetic and phenotypic models in evolutionary biology, and a balanced way of reconciling these models. In addition, the paper discusses modern problems in understanding games at the genetic level using the examples of conflict between endosymbionts and their hosts, and the molecular interactions between parasites and the mammalian immune system.     

Evolution of cooperation with shared costs and benefits

The quest to determine how cooperation evolves can be based on evolutionary game theory, in spite of the fact that evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) for most non-zero-sum games are not cooperative. We analyse the evolution of cooperation for a family of evolutionary games involving shared costs and benefits with a continuum of strategies from non-cooperation to total cooperation. This cost-benefit game allows the cooperator to share in the benefit of a cooperative act, and the recipient to be burdened with a share of the cooperator's cost. The cost-benefit game encompasses the Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift game and Partial Altruism. The models produce ESS solutions of total cooperation, partial cooperation, non-cooperation and coexistence between cooperation and non-cooperation. Cooperation emerges from an interplay between the nonlinearities in the cost and benefit functions. If benefits increase at a decelerating rate and costs increase at an accelerating rate with the degree of cooperation, then the ESS has an intermediate level of cooperation. The game also exhibits non-ESS points such as unstable minima, convergent-stable minima and unstable maxima. The emergence of cooperative behaviour in this game represents enlightened self-interest, whereas non-cooperative solutions illustrate the Tragedy of the Commons. Games having either a stable maximum or a stable minimum have the property that small changes in the incentive structure (model parameter values) or culture (starting frequencies of strategies) result in correspondingly small changes in the degree of cooperation. Conversely, with unstable maxima or unstable minima, small changes in the incentive structure or culture can result in a switch from non-cooperation to total cooperation (and vice versa). These solutions identify when human or animal societies have the potential for cooperation and whether cooperation is robust or fragile.