Popper, falsifiability, and evolutionary biology

First, a brief history is provided of Popper's views on the status of evolutionary biology as a science. The views of some prominent biologists are then canvassed on the matter of falsifiability and its relation to evolutionary biology. Following that, I argue that Popper's programme of falsifiability does indeed exclude evolutionary biology from within the circumference of genuine science, that Popper's programme is fundamentally incoherent, and that the correction of this incoherence results in a greatly expanded and much more realistic concept of what is empirical, resulting in the inclusion of evolutionary biology. Finally, this expanded concept of empirical is applied to two particular problems in evolutionary biology — viz., the species problem and the debate over the theory of punctuated equilibria — and it is argued that both of them are still mainly metaphysical.     

The Use and Abuse of Sir Karl Popper

Karl Popper has been one of the few philosophers of sciences who has influenced scientists. I evaluate Popper's influence on our understanding of evolutionary theory from his earliest publications to the present. Popper concluded that three sorts of statements in evolutionary biology are not genuine laws of nature. I take him to be right on this score. Popper's later distinction between evolutionary theory as a metaphysical research program and as a scientific theory led more than one scientist to misunderstand his position on evolutionary theory as a scientific theory. In his later work Popper also introduced what he took to be improvements of evolutionary theory. Thus far these improvements have had almost no influence on evolutionary biology. I conclude by examining the influence of Popper on the reception of cladistic analysis.     

Approximations, idealizations and 'experiments' at the physics-biology interface

This paper, which is based on recent empirical research at the University of Leeds, the University of Edinburgh, and the University of Bristol, presents two difficulties which arise when condensed matter physicists interact with molecular biologists: (1) the former use models which appear to be too coarse-grained, approximate and/or idealized to serve a useful scientific purpose to the latter; and (2) the latter have a rather narrower view of what counts as an experiment, particularly when it comes to computer simulations, than the former. It argues that these findings are related; that computer simulations are considered to be undeserving of experimental status, by molecular biologists, precisely because of the idealizations and approximations that they involve. The complexity of biological systems is a key factor. The paper concludes by critically examining whether the new research programme of 'systems biology' offers a genuine alternative to the modelling strategies used by physicists. It argues that it does not.     

Six things Popper would like biologists not to ignore: In memoriam, Karl Raimund Popper, 1902–1994

To honour the memory of Sir Karl Popper, I put forward six elements of his philosophy which might be of particular interest to biologists and to philosophers of biology and which I think Popper would like them not to ignore, even if they disagree with him. They are: the primacy of problems; the criticizability of metaphysics (and thus the dubiousness of materialism); how downward causation might be real; how norms should matter to scientists; why dogmatism should be avoided; how genuine science is recognizable. I preface these six things with a brief discussion of Popper's early (but later recanted) mistakes concerning biology.     

Darwin's evolutionary philosophy: The laws of change

The philosophical or metaphysical architecture of Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is analyzed and diflussed. It is argued that natural selection was for Darwin a paradigmatic case of a natural law of change — an exemplar of what Ghiselin (1969) has called selective retention laws. These selective retention laws lie at the basis of Darwin's revolutionary world view. In this essay special attention is paid to the consequences for Darwin's concept of species of his selective retention laws. Although Darwin himself explicity supported a variety of nominalism, implicit in the theory of natural selection is a solution to the dispute between nominalism and realism. It is argued that, although implicit, this view plays a very important role in Darwin's theory of natural selection as the means for the origin of species. It is in the context of these selective retention laws and their philosophical implications that Darwin's method is appraised in the light of recent criticisms, and the conclusion drawn that he successfully treated some philosophical problems by approaching them through natural history. Following this an outline of natural selection theory is presented in which all these philosophical issues are highlighted.     

The changing features of the body-mind problem

The body-mind problem invites scientific study, since mental events are repeated and repeatable and invite testable explanations. They seemed troublesome because of the classical theory of substance that failed to solve its own central problems. These are soluble with the aid of the theory of the laws of nature, particularly in its emergentist version [Bunge, M., 1980. The Body-mind Problem, Pergamon, Oxford] that invites refutable explanations [Popper, K.R., 1959. The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London]. The view of mental properties as emergent is a modification of the two chief classical views, materialism and dualism. As this view invites testable explanations of events of the inner world, it is better than the quasi-behaviorist view of self-awareness as computer-style self-monitoring [Minsky, M., Laske, O., 1992. A conversation with Marvin Minsky. AI Magazine 13 (3), 31-45].     

The unfalsifiability of cladograms and its consequences

Popper's falsificationism provides the normative reference system in recent discussions regarding theory and methodology of systematics. According to Popper, the falsifiability of a hypothesis represents a necessary precondition for its corroborability. It is shown that cladograms, independent of “strict”, “methodological” or “sophisticated” falsification, are not falsifiable in principle. No present observation is prohibited by any tree hypothesis and, thus, no Popperian test of cladograms exists. It is shown that the congruence test, which is commonly said to represent a Popperian test of cladograms, instead tests sets of apomorphy hypotheses. Three different strategies that have been proposed to circumvent this problem are discussed and refuted: (1) referring to Popper's convention to renounce ad hoc maneuvers; (2) referring to Popper's treatment of probability hypotheses; and (3) decoupling corroboration from falsification. As a consequence, within a Popperian framework the unfalsifiability of cladograms implies that cladograms cannot explain any present day observation and, thus, represent metaphysical hypotheses. However, Popper's falsificationism has been criticized and questioned by many philosophers before and it seems to be about time that phylogeneticists develop their own philosophy of phylogenetics that meets their specific requirements of a historical science that is not seeking for universal laws and regularities, but instead reconstructing particular historical events. © The Willi Hennig Society 2007.     

How-possibly explanations as genuine explanations and helpful heuristics: A comment on Forber

Recently, Forber introduced a distinction between two kinds of how-possibly explanation, global and local how-possibly explanation, and argued that both play genuinely explanatory roles in evolutionary biology. In this paper I examine the nature of these two kinds of how-possibly explanations, focusing on the question whether they indeed constitute genuine explanations. I will conclude that one of Forber's kinds of how-possibly explanation may be thought of as a kind of genuine explanation but not as a kind of how-possibly explanation, while the other kind plays a heuristic role and should not be conceived of as a kind of explanation at all.     

Proper names in twin worlds: Monophyly, paraphyly, and the world around us

This paper addresses the theoretical relevance of monophyletic, paraphyletic and polyphyletic groups under the paradigm of sophisticated scientific realism. The doctrine of metaphysical realism is introduced using the philosophy of Karl Popper as an example, which is then contrasted with scientific realism. A discussion of the nature of causal relations presents an account of counterfactual conditionals. The current state of art casts the theory of phylogenetic systematics in a stark contrast of classes (universals) and individuals (particulars). In practice, however, individuals piggyback on classes, or sets. Natural kinds are introduced in order to overcome this deep dichotomy. The theoretical relevance of natural kinds lies in their explanatory value, and that may change with changing context. It is for this reason that non-monophyletic groups can have explanatory value (their members can function as tokens of causally relevant kinds) within certain domains of evolutionary biology. Explanatory value is maximized by integration of the genealogical hierarchy of species and monophyletic taxa with other areas of evolutionary biology.     

Darwin's laws

There is widespread agreement among contemporary philosophers of biology and philosophically-minded biologists that Darwin's insights about the intrusion of chance processes into biological regularities undermines the possibility of there being biological laws. Darwin made references to "designed laws." He also freely described some laws as having exceptions. This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the notion of scientific laws that was dominant in Darwin's time, and in all probability the one which he inherited. The analysis of laws is then used to show how it could have been natural for Darwin to believe in designed laws that had exceptions, and to highlight the continuity between the metaphysics of pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, and contemporary biological science. One important result is the removal of one motivation for the anti-laws sentiment in philosophy and biology.     

Genetic therapy, person-regarding reasons and the determination of identity

It has been argued for example by Ingmar Persson, that genetic therapy performed on a conceptus does not alter the identity of the person that develops from it, even if we are essentially persons. If this claim is true then there can be person-regarding reasons for performing genetic therapy on a conceptus. Here it is argued that such person-regarding reasons obtain only if we are not essentially persons but essentially animals. This conclusion requires the defeat of the origination theory, which says that personal identity is determined by the identity of the foetus from which one originates. It is argued that the origination theory is false in the special case relevant to performing genetic therapy on a conceptus for person-regarding reasons.     

An alien approach to invasive species: objectivity and society in invasion biology

Several authors have recently argued that invasion biologists should adopt a more objective and dispassionate stance towards invasive species. Brown and Sax (Austral Ecol 29:530–536, 2004; Austral Ecol 30:481–483, 2005) assert that invasion biologists risk their objectivity, “commit the naturalist fallacy” or “embark on a slippery slope” with engaged concern about invasive species. Elsewhere, Colautti and MacIsaac (Divers Distrib 10:135–141, 2004) propose a neutral language for invasion biology, one that insulates scientific from popular discussion about invasive species. While there is certainly hyperbole about the effects of some invasive species, the type of objectivity promoted in these papers may often be inappropriate for invasion biology. It implies a policy of non-action that is inconsistent with the conservation values of many invasion biologists. To engage these values, invasion biologists can adopt deliberative methods for environmental problem-solving that involve stakeholders in their research design and which still promote high standards of scientific rigor.     

Zum konzept der »inneren« selektion: Stellungnahme zu einer evolutionstheoretischen kontroverse

Recently the concept of natural selection in Darwin’s sense has been criticized by some authors. It has been argued that this concept does not explain certain phenomena of evolutionary change, especially in the reach of macroevolution. Some biologists, therefore, demanded for evolution a new model of selection which focuses internal factors in phytogeny. — This paper is a brief discussion of some aspects of “internal” selection and its meaning in contemporary evolutionary biology. The argument of the paper is that evolution can only be explained by a theory taking cognizance of interactions between external and internal selective agencies. Such a theory would be a systems theory of evolution.     

Theses on Darwin.

The received view that teleology has been successfully eliminated from the modern scientific worldview is challenged. It is argued that both the theory of natural selection and molecular biology presuppose the existence of natural teleology, and so cannot explain it. A number of other issues in the foundations of biology are briefly examined, while stress is laid throughout on empirical evidence of the rational agency inherent in life. It is urged that teleology be rehabilitated and that the reigning functionalist philosophy be replaced by a realistic view of biological functions as emergent properties of living matter within a broad, selforganization framework.     

Generalizations in Ecology: A Philosophical Taxonomy

There has been a significant amount of uncertainty and controversy over the prospects for general knowledge in ecology. Environmental decision makers have begun to despair of ecology's capacity to provide anything more than case by case guidance for the shaping of environmental policy. Ecologists themselves have become suspicious of the pursuit of the kind of genuine nomothetic knowledge that appears to be the hallmark of other scientific domains. Finally, philosophers of biology have contributed to this retreat from generality by suggesting that there really are no laws in biology. This paper addresses these issues by providing a framework for thinking about general knowledge claims in ecology. It introduces a philosophical taxonomy that classifies generalizations into three broad categories – phenomenological, causal and theoretical. It then turns to the difficult problem of laws, arguing that, while there are probably no laws as that term has been understood in philosophy of science, it doesn't follow that everything in ecology is equally contingent. A mechanism for recognizing degrees of contingency in ecological generalizations is developed. The paper concludes by examining the implications of the analysis for the controversies noted at the outset.     

Culture,biology, and human behavior

Social scientists have not integrated relevant knowledge from the biological sciences into their explanations of human behavior. This failure is due to a longstanding antireductionistic bias against the natural sciences, which follows on a commitment to the view that social facts must be explained by social laws. This belief has led many social scientists into the error of reifying abstract analytical constructs into entities that possess powers of agency. It has also led to a false nature-culture dichotomy that effectively undermines the place of biology in social scientific explanation. Following the principles of methodological individualism, we show how behavioral explanations supported by data and theory from the neurosciences can be used to correct the errors of reificationist thinking in the social sciences. We outline a mechanistic approach to the explanation of human behavior with the hope that the biological sciences will begin to find greater acceptance among social scientists.     

The redoubtable cell

The cell theory—the thesis that all life is made up of one or more cells, the fundamental structural and physiological unit—is one of the most celebrated achievements of modern biological science. And yet from its very inception in the nineteenth century it has faced repeated criticism from some biologists. Why do some continue to criticize the cell theory, and how has it managed nevertheless to keep burying its undertakers? The answers to these questions reveal the complex nature of the cell theory and the cell concept on which it is based. Like other scientific ‘laws’, the assertion that all living things are made of cells purchases its universality at the expense of abstraction. If, however, this law is regarded merely as a widely applicable empirical generalization with notable exceptions, it still remains too important to discard. Debate about whether the cell or the organism standpoint provides the more correct account of anatomical, physiological, and developmental facts illustrates the tension between our attempts to express the truth about reality in conceptual terms conducive to a unified human understanding.     

Confirmation and explaining how possible

Confirmation in evolutionary biology depends on what biologists take to be the genuine rivals. Investigating what constrains the scope of biological possibility provides part of the story: explaining how possible helps determine what counts as a genuine rival and thus informs confirmation. To clarify the criteria for genuine rivalry I distinguish between global and local constraints on biological possibility, and offer an account of how-possibly explanation. To sharpen the connection between confirmation and explaining how possible I discuss the view that formal inquiry can provide a kind of confirmation-theoretic support for evolutionary models, and offer an example of how-possibly explanation interacting with testing practice.