Density-Dependent Natal Dispersal Patterns in a Leopard Population Recovering from Over-Harvest

Natal dispersal enables population connectivity, gene flow and metapopulation dynamics. In polygynous mammals, dispersal is typically male-biased. Classically, the ‘mate competition’, ‘resource competition’ and ‘resident fitness’ hypotheses predict density-dependent dispersal patterns, while the ‘inbreeding avoidance’ hypothesis posits density-independent dispersal. In a leopard (Panthera pardus) population recovering from over-harvest, we investigated the effect of sex, population density and prey biomass, on age of natal dispersal, distance dispersed, probability of emigration and dispersal success. Over an 11-year period, we tracked 35 subadult leopards using VHF and GPS telemetry. Subadult leopards initiated dispersal at 13.6 ± 0.4 months. Age at commencement of dispersal was positively density-dependent. Although males (11.0 ± 2.5 km) generally dispersed further than females (2.7 ± 0.4 km), some males exhibited opportunistic philopatry when the population was below capacity. All 13 females were philopatric, while 12 of 22 males emigrated. Male dispersal distance and emigration probability followed a quadratic relationship with population density, whereas female dispersal distance was inversely density-dependent. Eight of 12 known-fate females and 5 of 12 known-fate male leopards were successful in settling. Dispersal success did not vary with population density, prey biomass, and for males, neither between dispersal strategies (philopatry vs. emigration). Females formed matrilineal kin clusters, supporting the resident fitness hypothesis. Conversely, mate competition appeared the main driver for male leopard dispersal. We demonstrate that dispersal patterns changed over time, i.e. as the leopard population density increased. We conclude that conservation interventions that facilitated local demographic recovery in the study area also restored dispersal patterns disrupted by unsustainable harvesting, and that this indirectly improved connectivity among leopard populations over a larger landscape.     

Invasion dynamics and attractor inheritance

 We study the dynamics of a population of residents that is being invaded by an initially rare mutant. We show that under relatively mild conditions the sum of the mutant and resident population sizes stays arbitrarily close to the initial attractor of the monomorphic resident population whenever the mutant has a strategy sufficiently similar to that of the resident. For stochastic systems we show that the probability density of the sum of the mutant and resident population sizes stays arbitrarily close to the stationary probability density of the monomorphic resident population. Attractor switching, evolutionary suicide as well as most cases of ``the resident strikes back' in systems with multiple attractors are possible only near a bifurcation point in the strategy space where the resident attractor undergoes a discontinuous change. Away from such points, when the mutant takes over the population from the resident and hence becomes the new resident itself, the population stays on the same attractor. In other words, the new resident ``inherits' the attractor from its predecessor, the former resident. Received: 10 December 2000 / Revised version: 14 September 2001 / Published online: 17 May 2002     

Evolutionary dynamics in structured populations

Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.     

A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win–win outcomes

Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game ‘institutional evolution’ with the more familiar within-game ‘behavioural evolution’. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on ‘attractor’ games. Agents use their ‘institutional preferences'' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between neighbouring games. We use this framework to pose a pressing question: what kinds of games does institutional evolution select for; what is in the attractors? After computing institutional change trajectories over the two-player space, we find that attractors have disproportionately fair outcomes, even though the agents who produce them are strictly self-interested and indifferent to fairness. This seems to occur because game fairness co-occurs with the self-serving features these agents do actually prefer. We thus present institutional evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among small groups of inherently selfish agents, without space, reputation, repetition, or other more familiar mechanisms. Game space trajectories provide a flexible, testable formalism for modelling the interdependencies of behavioural and institutional evolutionary processes, as well as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.     

The Effects of Extra-Somatic Weapons on the Evolution of Human Cooperation towards Non-Kin

Human cooperation and altruism towards non-kin is a major evolutionary puzzle, as is ‘strong reciprocity’ where no present or future rewards accrue to the co-operator/altruist. Here, we test the hypothesis that the development of extra-somatic weapons could have influenced the evolution of human cooperative behaviour, thus providing a new explanation for these two puzzles. Widespread weapons use could have made disputes within hominin groups far more lethal and also equalized power between individuals. In such a cultural niche non-cooperators might well have become involved in such lethal disputes at a higher frequency than cooperators, thereby increasing the relative fitness of genes associated with cooperative behaviour. We employ two versions of the evolutionary Iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma (IPD) model – one where weapons use is simulated and one where it is not. We then measured the performance of 25 IPD strategies to evaluate the effects of weapons use on them. We found that cooperative strategies performed significantly better, and non-cooperative strategies significantly worse, under simulated weapons use. Importantly, the performance of an ‘Always Cooperate’ IPD strategy, equivalent to that of ‘strong reciprocity’, improved significantly more than that of all other cooperative strategies. We conclude that the development of extra-somatic weapons throws new light on the evolution of human altruistic and cooperative behaviour, and particularly ‘strong reciprocity’. The notion that distinctively human altruism and cooperation could have been an adaptive trait in a past environment that is no longer evident in the modern world provides a novel addition to theory that seeks to account for this major evolutionary puzzle.     

Friendly-rivalry solution to the iterated n-person public-goods game

Repeated interaction promotes cooperation among rational individuals under the shadow of future, but it is hard to maintain cooperation when a large number of error-prone individuals are involved. One way to construct a cooperative Nash equilibrium is to find a ‘friendly-rivalry’ strategy, which aims at full cooperation but never allows the co-players to be better off. Recently it has been shown that for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma in the presence of error, a friendly rival can be designed with the following five rules: Cooperate if everyone did, accept punishment for your own mistake, punish defection, recover cooperation if you find a chance, and defect in all the other circumstances. In this work, we construct such a friendly-rivalry strategy for the iterated n-person public-goods game by generalizing those five rules. The resulting strategy makes a decision with referring to the previous m = 2n − 1 rounds. A friendly-rivalry strategy for n = 2 inherently has evolutionary robustness in the sense that no mutant strategy has higher fixation probability in this population than that of a neutral mutant. Our evolutionary simulation indeed shows excellent performance of the proposed strategy in a broad range of environmental conditions when n = 2 and 3.     

Within-Host Stochastic Emergence Dynamics of Immune-Escape Mutants

Predicting the emergence of new pathogenic strains is a key goal of evolutionary epidemiology. However, the majority of existing studies have focussed on emergence at the population level, and not within a host. In particular, the coexistence of pre-existing and mutated strains triggers a heightened immune response due to the larger total pathogen population; this feedback can smother mutated strains before they reach an ample size and establish. Here, we extend previous work for measuring emergence probabilities in non-equilibrium populations, to within-host models of acute infections. We create a mathematical model to investigate the emergence probability of a fitter strain if it mutates from a self-limiting strain that is guaranteed to go extinct in the long-term. We show that ongoing immune cell proliferation during the initial stages of infection causes a drastic reduction in the probability of emergence of mutated strains; we further outline how this effect can be accurately measured. Further analysis of the model shows that, in the short-term, mutant strains that enlarge their replication rate due to evolving an increased growth rate are more favoured than strains that suffer a lower immune-mediated death rate (‘immune tolerance’), as the latter does not completely evade ongoing immune proliferation due to inter-parasitic competition. We end by discussing the model in relation to within-host evolution of human pathogens (including HIV, hepatitis C virus, and cancer), and how ongoing immune growth can affect their evolutionary dynamics.     

A Novel Quantitative Approach to Women’s Reproductive Strategies

The patterned way in which individuals allocate finite resources to various components of reproduction (e.g. mating effort, reproductive timing and parental investment) is described as a reproductive strategy. As energy is limited, trade-offs between and within aspects of reproductive strategies are expected. The first aim of this study was to derive aspects of reproductive strategies using complete reproductive histories from 718 parous Western Australian women. Factor analysis using a subset of these participants resulted in six factors that represented ‘short-term mating strategy’, ‘early onset of sexual activity’, ‘reproductive output’, ‘timing of childbearing’, ‘breastfeeding’, and ‘child spacing’. This factor structure was internally validated by replication using a second independent subset of the data. The second aim of this study examined trade-offs between aspects of reproductive strategies derived from aim one. Factor scores calculated for each woman were incorporated in generalised linear models and interaction terms were employed to examine the effect of mating behaviour on the relationships between reproductive timing, parental investment and overall reproductive success. Early sexual activity correlates with early reproductive onset for women displaying more long-term mating strategies. Women with more short-term mating strategies exhibit a trade-off between child quantity and child quality not observed in women with a long-term mating strategy. However, women with a short-term mating strategy who delay reproductive timing exhibit levels of parental investment (measured as breastfeeding duration per child) similar to that of women with long-term mating strategies. Reproductive delay has fitness costs (fewer births) for women displaying more short-term mating strategies. We provide empirical evidence that reproductive histories of contemporary women reflect aspects of reproductive strategies, and associations between these strategic elements, as predicted from life history theory.     

The excuse principle can maintain cooperation through forgivable defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma game

Reciprocal altruism describes a situation in which an organism acts in a manner that temporarily reduces its fitness while increasing another organism''s fitness, but there is an ultimate fitness benefit based on an expectation that the other organism will act in a similar manner at a later time. It creates the obvious dilemma in which there is always a short-term benefit to cheating, therefore cooperating individuals must avoid being exploited by non-cooperating cheaters. This is achieved by following various decision rules, usually variants of the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy. The strength of TFT, however, is also its weakness—mistakes in implementation or interpretation of moves, or the inability to cooperate, lead to a permanent breakdown in cooperation. We show that pied flycatchers (Ficedula hypoleuca) use a TFT with an embedded ‘excuse principle’ to forgive the neighbours that were perceived as unable to cooperate during mobbing of predators. The excuse principle dramatically increases the stability of TFT-like behavioural strategies within the Prisoner''s Dilemma game.     

Social structure of primate interaction networks facilitates the emergence of cooperation

Animal cooperation has puzzled biologists for a long time as its existence seems to contravene the basic notion of evolutionary biology that natural selection favours ‘selfish’ genes that promote only their own well-being. Evolutionary game theory has shown that cooperators can prosper in populations of selfish individuals if they occur in clusters, interacting more frequently with each other than with the selfish. Here we show that social networks of primates possess the necessary social structure to promote the emergence of cooperation. By simulating evolutionary dynamics of cooperative behaviour on interaction networks of 70 primate groups, we found that for most groups network reciprocity augmented the fixation probability for cooperation. The variation in the strength of this effect can be partly explained by the groups’ community modularity—a network measure for the groups’ heterogeneity. Thus, given selective update and partner choice mechanisms, network reciprocity has the potential to explain socially learned forms of cooperation in primate societies.     

Evolution of Conformity in Social Dilemmas

People often deviate from their individual Nash equilibrium strategy in game experiments based on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game and the public goods game (PGG), whereas conditional cooperation, or conformity, is supported by the data from these experiments. In a complicated environment with no obvious “dominant” strategy, conformists who choose the average strategy of the other players in their group could be able to avoid risk by guaranteeing their income will be close to the group average. In this paper, we study the repeated PD game and the repeated m-person PGG, where individuals’ strategies are restricted to the set of conforming strategies. We define a conforming strategy by two parameters, initial action in the game and the influence of the other players’ choices in the previous round. We are particularly interested in the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, which is the well-known conforming strategy in theoretical and empirical studies. In both the PD game and the PGG, TFT can prevent the invasion of non-cooperative strategy if the expected number of rounds exceeds a critical value. The stability analysis of adaptive dynamics shows that conformity in general promotes the evolution of cooperation, and that a regime of cooperation can be established in an AllD population through TFT-like strategies. These results provide insight into the emergence of cooperation in social dilemma games.     

Chaotic Red Queen coevolution in three-species food chains

Coevolution between two antagonistic species follows the so-called ‘Red Queen dynamics’ when reciprocal selection results in an endless series of adaptation by one species and counteradaptation by the other. Red Queen dynamics are ‘genetically driven’ when selective sweeps involving new beneficial mutations result in perpetual oscillations of the coevolving traits on the slow evolutionary time scale. Mathematical models have shown that a prey and a predator can coevolve along a genetically driven Red Queen cycle. We found that embedding the prey–predator interaction into a three-species food chain that includes a coevolving superpredator often turns the genetically driven Red Queen cycle into chaos. A key condition is that the prey evolves fast enough. Red Queen chaos implies that the direction and strength of selection are intrinsically unpredictable beyond a short evolutionary time, with greatest evolutionary unpredictability in the superpredator. We hypothesize that genetically driven Red Queen chaos could explain why many natural populations are poised at the edge of ecological chaos. Over space, genetically driven chaos is expected to cause the evolutionary divergence of local populations, even under homogenizing environmental fluctuations, and thus to promote genetic diversity among ecological communities over long evolutionary time.     

The hawk–dove game in a sexually reproducing species explains a colourful polymorphism of an endangered bird

The hawk–dove game famously introduced strategic game theory thinking into biology and forms the basis of arguments for limited aggression in animal populations. However, aggressive ‘hawks’ and peaceful ‘doves’, with strategies inherited in a discrete manner, have never been documented in a real animal population. Thus, the applicability of game-theoretic arguments to real populations might be contested. Here, we show that the head-colour polymorphism of red and black Gouldian finches (Erythrura gouldiae) provides a real-life example. The aggressive red morph is behaviourally dominant and successfully invades black populations, but when red ‘hawks’ become too common, their fitness is severely compromised (via decreased parental ability). We also investigate the effects of real-life deviations, particularly sexual reproduction, from the simple original game, which assumed asexual reproduction. A protected polymorphism requires mate choice to be sufficiently assortative. Assortative mating is adaptive for individuals because of genetic incompatibilities affecting hybrid offspring fitness, but by allowing red ‘hawks’ to persist, it also leads to significantly reduced population sizes. Because reductions in male contributions to parental care are generally known to lead to lower population productivity in birds, we expect zero-sum competition to often have wide ranging population consequences.     

A dominant allele controls development into female mimic male and diminutive female ruffs

Maintaining polymorphisms for genes with effects of ecological significance may involve conflicting selection in males and females. We present data from a captive population of ruffs (Philomachus pugnax) showing that a dominant allele controls development into both small, ‘female mimic’ males (‘faeders’), and a previously undescribed class of small ‘female faeders’. Most male ruffs have elaborate breeding plumage and display behaviour, but 0.5–1.5% are faeders, which lack both. Females from a captive population previously lacking faeders were bred with two founder faeder males and their faeder sons. The faeders’ offspring had a quadrimodal size distribution comprising normal-sized males and females, faeders and atypically small females. By contrast, ornamented males fathered only normal-sized offspring. We conclude that both founding faeders were heterozygous for a faeder allele absent from the original population. This allele is dominant to previously described genes that determine development into independent versus satellite ornamented males. Unlike those genes, the faeder allele is clearly expressed in females. Small body size is a component of the male faeder mating strategy, but provides no obvious benefit to females. Bisexual expression of the gene provides the opportunity to quantify the strength of sexually antagonistic selection on a Mendelian trait.     

Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation

We consider evolutionary game dynamics in a finite population subdivided into two demes with both unequal deme sizes and different migration rates. Assuming viability differences in the population according to a linear game within each deme as a result of pairwise interactions, we specify conditions for weak selection favoring a mutant strategy to go to fixation, under the structured-coalescent assumptions, and their connections with evolutionary stability concepts. In the framework of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with strategy ‘tit-for-tat’ as mutant strategy and ‘always defect’ as resident strategy, we deduce a condition under which the emergence of cooperation is favored by selection, when the game matrix is the same in both demes. We show how this condition extends the one-third law for a panmictic population and when an asymmetry in the spatial structure of a two-deme population facilitates the emergence of the cooperative tit-for-tat strategy in comparison with both its symmetric and panmictic population structure counterparts. We find that the condition is less stringent in the asymmetric scenario versus the symmetric scenario if both the fraction of the population in the deme where the mutant was initially introduced, and the expected proportion of migrant offspring in this deme among all migrant offspring after population regulation, are smaller than, or equal to, , provided they are not too small. On the other hand, the condition is less stringent than the one-third law, which holds in the panmictic case, if the latter proportion remains not too close to 1.     

The evolution of sex-specific grandparental harm

Recent empirical studies indicate that grandparents favour some categories of grandchildren over others. Here, we expand the previous theoretical foundation for this finding and show that grandchild-harming phenotypes are predicted to evolve by ‘sexually antagonistic zygotic drive (SA-zygotic drive) of the sex chromosomes’. We use the logic of Hamilton''s rule to develop a new ‘no-cost-to-self nepotism rule’ that greatly simplifies the determination of the invasion criteria for mutations that cause grandparents to harm grandchildren. We use this theory to generate predictions that distinguish SA-zygotic drive from theory based solely on paternity assurance. The major diagnostic prediction is that grandmothers, and to a lesser degree grandfathers, will evolve grandson-harming phenotypes that reduce the level of sib competition experienced by their more closely related granddaughters, especially in their sons'' families. This prediction is supported by data from recent studies showing (i) grandmothers invest more in granddaughters than grandsons, and counterintuitively, (ii) paternal grandmothers reduce the survival of their grandsons. We conclude that SA-zygotic drive is plausibly operating in humans via sexually antagonistic grandparental care.     

Biological trade and markets

Cooperation between organisms can often be understood, like trade between merchants, as a mutually beneficial exchange of services, resources or other ‘commodities’. Mutual benefits alone, however, are not sufficient to explain the evolution of trade-based cooperation. First, organisms may reject a particular trade if another partner offers a better deal. Second, while human trade often entails binding contracts, non-human trade requires unwritten ‘terms of contract’ that ‘self-stabilize’ trade and prevent cheating even if all traders strive to maximize fitness. Whenever trading partners can be chosen, market-like situations arise in nature that biologists studying cooperation need to account for. The mere possibility of exerting partner choice stabilizes many forms of otherwise cheatable trade, induces competition, facilitates the evolution of specialization and often leads to intricate forms of cooperation. We discuss selected examples to illustrate these general points and review basic conceptual approaches that are important in the theory of biological trade and markets. Comparing these approaches with theory in economics, it turns out that conventional models—often called ‘Walrasian’ markets—are of limited relevance to biology. In contrast, early approaches to trade and markets, as found in the works of Ricardo and Cournot, contain elements of thought that have inspired useful models in biology. For example, the concept of comparative advantage has biological applications in trade, signalling and ecological competition. We also see convergence between post-Walrasian economics and biological markets. For example, both economists and biologists are studying ‘principal–agent’ problems with principals offering jobs to agents without being sure that the agents will do a proper job. Finally, we show that mating markets have many peculiarities not shared with conventional economic markets. Ideas from economics are useful for biologists studying cooperation but need to be taken with caution.     

Adaptive Dynamics of Extortion and Compliance

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. For the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, a new class of strategies has recently been described, the so-called zero-determinant strategies. Using such a strategy, a player can unilaterally enforce a linear relationship between his own payoff and the co-player’s payoff. In particular the player may act in such a way that it becomes optimal for the co-player to cooperate unconditionally. In this way, a player can manipulate and extort his co-player, thereby ensuring that the own payoff never falls below the co-player’s payoff. However, using a compliant strategy instead, a player can also ensure that his own payoff never exceeds the co-player’s payoff. Here, we use adaptive dynamics to study when evolution leads to extortion and when it leads to compliance. We find a remarkable cyclic dynamics: in sufficiently large populations, extortioners play a transient role, helping the population to move from selfish strategies to compliance. Compliant strategies, however, can be subverted by altruists, which in turn give rise to selfish strategies. Whether cooperative strategies are favored in the long run critically depends on the size of the population; we show that cooperation is most abundant in large populations, in which case average payoffs approach the social optimum. Our results are not restricted to the case of the prisoners dilemma, but can be extended to other social dilemmas, such as the snowdrift game. Iterated social dilemmas in large populations do not lead to the evolution of strategies that aim to dominate their co-player. Instead, generosity succeeds.     

The Art of War: Beyond Memory-one Strategies in Population Games

We show that the history of play in a population game contains exploitable information that can be successfully used by sophisticated strategies to defeat memory-one opponents, including zero determinant strategies. The history allows a player to label opponents by their strategies, enabling a player to determine the population distribution and to act differentially based on the opponent’s strategy in each pairwise interaction. For the Prisoner’s Dilemma, these advantages lead to the natural formation of cooperative coalitions among similarly behaving players and eventually to unilateral defection against opposing player types. We show analytically and empirically that optimal play in population games depends strongly on the population distribution. For example, the optimal strategy for a minority player type against a resident TFT population is ALLC, while for a majority player type the optimal strategy versus TFT players is ALLD. Such behaviors are not accessible to memory-one strategies. Drawing inspiration from Sun Tzu’s the Art of War, we implemented a non-memory-one strategy for population games based on techniques from machine learning and statistical inference that can exploit the history of play in this manner. Via simulation we find that this strategy is essentially uninvadable and can successfully invade (significantly more likely than a neutral mutant) essentially all known memory-one strategies for the Prisoner’s Dilemma, including ALLC (always cooperate), ALLD (always defect), tit-for-tat (TFT), win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS), and zero determinant (ZD) strategies, including extortionate and generous strategies.     

Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations

Fixation processes in evolutionary game dynamics in finite diploid populations are investigated. Traditionally, frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics is modeled as deterministic replicator dynamics. This implies that the infinite size of the population is assumed implicitly. In nature, however, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic processes in finite populations have been introduced in order to study finite size effects in evolutionary game dynamics. One of the most significant studies on evolutionary dynamics in finite populations was carried out by Nowak et al. which describes “one-third law” [Nowak, et al., 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646-650]. It states that under weak selection, if the fitness of strategy α is greater than that of strategy β when α has a frequency , strategy α fixates in a β-population with selective advantage. In their study, it is assumed that the inheritance of strategies is asexual, i.e. the population is haploid. In this study, we apply their framework to a diploid population that plays a two-strategy game with two ESSs (a bistable game). The fixation probability of a mutant allele in this diploid population is derived. A “three-tenth law” for a completely recessive mutant allele and a “two-fifth law” for a completely dominant mutant allele are found; other cases are also discussed.