Mind and matter as asymptotically disjoint,inequivalent representations with broken time-reversal symmetry

Many philosophical and scientific discussions of topics of mind-matter research make implicit assumptions, in various guises, about the distinction between mind and matter. Currently predominant positions are based on either reduction or emergence, providing either monistic or dualistic scenarios. A more-involved framework of thinking, which can be traced back to Spinoza and Leibniz, combines the two scenarios, dualistic (with mind and matter separated) and monistic (with mind and matter unseparated), in one single picture. Based on such a picture, the transition from a domain with mind and matter unseparated to separate mental and material domains can be viewed as a result of a general kind of symmetry breaking, which can be described formally in terms of inequivalent representations. The possibility of whether this symmetry breaking might be connected to the emergence of temporal directions from temporally non-directed or even non-temporal levels of reality will be discussed. Correlations between mental and material aspects of reality could then be imagined as remnants of such primordial levels. Different conceivable types of inequivalent representations would lead to correlations with different characteristics.     

The philosophical "mind-body problem" and its relevance for the relationship between psychiatry and the neurosciences

Parallel to psychiatry, "philosophy of mind" investigates the relationship between mind (mental domain) and body/brain (physical domain). Unlike older forms of philosophy of mind, contemporary analytical philosophy is not exclusively based on introspection and conceptual analysis, but also draws upon the empirical methods and findings of the sciences. This article outlines the conceptual framework of the "mind-body problem" as formulated in contemporary analytical philosophy and argues that this philosophical debate has potentially far-reaching implications for psychiatry as a clinical-scientific discipline, especially for its own autonomy and its relationship to neurology/neuroscience. This point is illustrated by a conceptual analysis of the five principles formulated in Kandel's 1998 article "A New Intellectual Framework for Psychiatry." Kandel's position in the philosophical mind-body debate is ambiguous, ranging from reductive physicalism (psychophysical identity theory) to non-reductive physicalism (in which the mental "supervenes" on the physical) to epiphenomenalist dualism or even emergent dualism. We illustrate how these diverging interpretations result in radically different views on the identity of psychiatry and its relationship with the rapidly expanding domain of neurology/neuroscience.     

Valéry et l’automatisme psychologique

While the name of Paul Valery is usually associated with that of Leonardo da Vinci or the character, Monsieur Teste, most people are unaware of Valery’s posthumous work, which he considered the most significant of his writings: Cahiers/Notebooks, a voluminous and dense work, in its dimensions (around 30,000 pages) as well as in what it discloses about the daily ponderings of a man who considered himself — in spite of himself — a philosopher. It is a multifaceted work, touching on all fields of thought: history, politics, and the sciences, in all their diversity, from mathematics to physics, and biology to the theory of evolution. Neither philosophy, nor theology, nor linguistics is left in the dark. But he clearly expressed a preference for psychology and, more specifically, the question of mental function: What is it to think? How does the mind link ideas? What is abstraction? What role do feelings play? What is the relationship between the mind and the machine? Must we concede the existence of the unconscious mind. These are some of the questions we address in elucidating the concept of automatism through what makes it work as well as its failings.     

Teleology and its constitutive role for biology as the science of organized systems in nature

'Nothing in biology makes sense, except in the light of teleology'. This could be the first sentence in a textbook about the methodology of biology. The fundamental concepts in biology, e.g. 'organism' and 'ecosystem', are only intelligible given a teleological framework. Since early modern times, teleology has often been considered methodologically unscientific. With the acceptance of evolutionary theory, one popular strategy for accommodating teleological reasoning was to explain it by reference to selection in the past: functions were reconstructed as 'selected effects'. But the theory of evolution obviously presupposes the existence of organisms as organized and regulated, i.e. functional systems. Therefore, evolutionary theory cannot provide the foundation for teleology. The underlying reason for the central methodological role of teleology in biology is not its potential to offer particular forms of (evolutionary) explanations for the presence of parts, but rather an ontological one: organisms and other basic biological entities do not exist as physical bodies do, as amounts of matter with a definite form. Rather, they are dynamic systems in stable equilibrium; despite changes of their matter and form (in metabolism and metamorphosis) they maintain their identity. What remains constant in these kinds of systems is their 'organization', i.e. the causal pattern of interdependence of parts with certain effects of each part being relevant for the working of the system. Teleological analysis consists in the identification of these system-relevant effects and at the same time of the system as a whole. Therefore, the identity of biological systems cannot be specified without teleological reasoning.     

Why mental disorders are just mental dysfunctions (and nothing more): some Darwinian arguments

Mental disorders are often thought to be harmful dysfunctions. Jerome Wakefield has argued that such dysfunctions should be understood as failures of naturally selected functions. This suggests, implicitly, that evolutionary biology and other Darwinian disciplines hold important information for anyone working on answering the philosophical question, 'what is a mental disorder?'. In this article, the author argues that Darwinian theory is not only relevant to the understanding of the disrupted functions, but it also sheds light on the disruption itself, as well as on the harm that attends the disruption. The arguments advanced here are partially based on the view that a core feature of Darwinism is that it stresses the environmental relativity of functions and dysfunctions. These arguments show a very close empirical connection between social judgments (values) and dysfunctions (psychopathology), which is of interest for psychiatric theory. Philosophically, they lead to the conclusion that the concept of mental disorder is identical to the concept of mental dysfunction. Consequently, it is both misleading and redundant to conceptualize mental disorders as 'harmful dysfunctions', and not simply as 'mental dysfunctions'.     

The search for purpose in a post-Darwinian universe: George Bernard Shaw, 'creative evolution', and Shavian eugenics: 'The dark side of the force'

The Irish playwright and socialist George Bernard Shaw has been of marginal concern for historians of biology because his vitalist Lamarckism has been viewed as out of step with contemporary science. However, Julian Huxley and J.B.S. Haldane were certainly of the opinion that Shaw was a man of influence in this regard and took pains to counter his views in their own attempts to engage the public in science. Previously, Shaw's colleague and friend H.G. Wells had also agued with Shaw from his own mechanistic neo-Darwinian perspective. The very public debate between Shaw and Wells, which continued to concern Huxley and Haldane, shows that public concern over the moral implications of Darwinism has a long history. Taking into account the opinions of John Maynard Smith on this matter, I suggest that a consideration of Shaw in this context can give us an understanding of the historical popularity of vitalist teleology as well as of the persistent ambivalence to the non-normative character of Darwinism.     

L’ipséité : son importance en psychopathologie

This paper aims at showing the fecundity of the notion of ipseity or self in the domain of psychopathology. The notions of subject or ego which have been used since Descartes to describe the being of man have led to think it on the model of a substantial and unalterable being. Contemporary philosophy, especially with Heidegger, has on the contrary elaborated a quite other conception of man as an essentially temporal and relational being. What constitutes fundamentally the being of man is not the presence of an invariable nucleus of personality, but it is on the contrary the relations that he is able to establish with the world and the others which defines it in return. The notion of self defines therefore the reflexive character of the being of man. As Paul Ricceur also shows, the identity of the human being is fundamentally a narrative identity, i.e. an identity that constitutes itself through the hazards of a history. What is deeply altered in the different forms of mental diseases is precisely this openness and receptivity that defines the self. What has therefore to be restored by means of therapy is the capacity of the human being to constitute himself as a self in time and to open itself to the unforseeable character of what happens to him.     

THE EVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESSWILLIAM JAMES'S UNRESOLVED PROBLEM

Part I of this article shows that, for different reasons, neither traditional interactionist dualism nor more modern theories of the mind/body relationship — including functional-state identity theory — provide a satisfactory explanation of the evolution of consciousness. Interactionist dualism leaves us with a philosophical impasse; the more modern theories have not yet succeeded in providing adequate answers to the difficulties that were raised by William James in 1879.
Part II of the article disputes Kripke's claim that identity theories are, anyway, untenable because the relevant identities would have to be necessary rather than contingent.     

Adwenhoasem: an Akan theory of mind

This essay explores the way the domain of what English-speakers call the mind – believing, thinking, feeling, and other mental acts – is represented and mapped by Ghana's Akan ethno-linguistic group. It uses several sources of evidence: mind and mind-related words in Fante (an Akan language); the largest Akan (Twi) proverb compendium; longsemi-structured interviews with forty adult Christians and African traditional religion practitioners; and short-term ethnographic fieldwork by a Ghanaian scholar. The work finds four dimensions of what we might call an Akan theory of mind that seem to be shaped by local language and culture. First, the central function of the mind is planning – not identity. Second, one of the most salient qualities of the mind is its moral valence. The ‘bad minds’ of others are an ever-present potential threat to social harmony and personal well-being. Third, the mind is understood to be porous in nature. The minds of all people are vulnerable to supernatural influences, and some spiritually powerful people can exert supernatural power through mental action. Fourth and finally, some elements which English-speakers would imagine as part of the mind (like feeling) are instead identified with the body.     

The uncertain foundation of neo-Darwinism: metaphysical and epistemological pluralism in the evolutionary synthesis

The Evolutionary Synthesis is often seen as a unification process in evolutionary biology, one which provided this research area with a solid common theoretical foundation. As such, neo-Darwinism is believed to constitute from this time onward a single, coherent, and unified movement offering research guidelines for investigations. While this may be true if evolutionary biology is solely understood as centred around evolutionary mechanisms, an entirely different picture emerges once other aspects of the founding neo-Darwinists’ views are taken into consideration, aspects potentially relevant to the elaboration of an evolutionary worldview: the tree of life, the ontological distinctions of the main cosmic entities (inert matter, biological organisms, mind), the inherent properties of self-organizing matter, evolutionary ethics, and so on. Profound tensions and inconsistencies are immediately revealed in the neo-Darwinian movement once this broader perspective is adopted. This pluralism is such that it is possible to identify at least three distinct and quasi-incommensurable epistemological/metaphysical frameworks as providing a proper foundation for neo-Darwinism. The analysis of the views of Theodosius Dobzhansky, Bernhard Rensch, and Ernst Mayr will illustrate this untenable pluralism, one which requires us to conceive of the neo-Darwinian research agenda as being conducted in more than one research programme or research tradition at the same time.     

Physics,biology, and sociology: A reappraisal

To the extent that all biological phenomena are perceivable only through their physical manifestations, it may be justified to assume that all biological phenomena will be eventually represented in terms of physics; perhaps not of present day physics, but of some “extended” form of it. However, even if this should be correct, it must be kept in mind that representing individual biological phenomena in terms of physics is not the same as deducing from known physical laws the necessity of biological phenomena. Drawing an analogy from pure mathematics, it is possible that while every biological phenomenon may be represented in terms of physics, yet biological statements represent a class of “undecidable” statements within the framework of physics. Such a conjecture is reinforced by the history of physics itself and illustrated on several examples. The 19th century physicists tried in vain todeduce electromagnetic phenomena from mechanical ones. A similar situation may exist in regard to biological and social sciences. Quite generally, the possibility of representing a class B phenomena in terms of class A phenomena does not imply that the phenomena of class B can be deduced from those of class A. The consequences of the above on the relation between physics, biology, and sociology are studied. A tentative postulational formulation of basic biological principles are given and some consequences are discussed. It is pointed out that not only can the study of biological phenomena throw light on some physical phenomena, but that the study of social phenomena may be of value for the understanding of the structures and functions of living organisms. The possibility of a sort of “socionics” is indicated.     

Relations and dependencies between morphological characters

In biological classification, a character is a property of a taxon that can distinguish it from other taxa. Characters are not independent, and the relations between characters can arise from structural constraints, developmental pathways or functional constraints. That has lead to famous controversies in the history of biology. In addition, a character as a tool of data analysis has some subjective aspects. In this contribution, I develop algebraic and geometric schemes to address these issues in a mathematical framework.     

Molecular pathways and the contextual explanation of molecular functions

Much of the recent philosophical debate on causation and causal explanation in the biological and biomedical sciences has focused on the notion of mechanism. Mechanisms, their nature and epistemic roles have been tackled by a range of so-called neo-mechanistic theories, and widely discussed. Without denying the merits of this approach, our paper aims to show how lately it has failed to give proper credit to processes, which are central to the field, especially of contemporary molecular biology. Processes can be summed up in the notion of ‘pathway’, which is far from being just equivalent to that of ‘mechanism’ and has a profound epistemological and explanatory relevance. It is argued that an adequate consideration of pathways impels some rethinking of scientific explanation in molecular biology, namely its functional and contextual features. A number of examples are given to suggest that the focus of philosophical attention in this disciplinary field should shift from the notion of mechanism to the notion of pathway.     

The performance of morphological characters in broad-scale phylogenetic analyses

In view of their propositional content (i.e. they can be right or wrong), character statements (i.e. statements that predicate characters of organisms) are treated as low-level hypotheses. The thesis of the present study is that such character statements, as do more complex scientific theories, come with variable scope. The scope of a hypothesis, or theory, is the domain of discourse over which the hypothesis, or theory, ranges. A character statement is initially introduced within the context of a certain domain of discourse that is defined by the scale of the initial phylogenetic analysis. The doctrine of 'total evidence' requires the inclusion of previously introduced characters in subsequent studies. As a consequence, the initial scope of character statements is widened to the extent that the scale of subsequent analyses is broadened. Scope expansion for character statements may result in incomplete characters, in the subdivision of characters, or in ambiguity of reference (indeterminacy of the extension of anatomical terms). Character statements with a wide scope are desirable because they refer to characters with the potential to resolve deep nodes in phylogenetic analyses. Care must be taken to preserve referential unambiguity of anatomical terms if the originally restricted scope of a character statement is expanded to match a broad-scale phylogenetic analysis.  © 2007 The Linnean Society of London, Biological Journal of the Linnean Society , 2007, 92 , 297–308.     

L’éclairage biologique des activités mentales: réduction ou mise en perspective ?

The relationship between the human psychological faculties and their underlying biological foundation is traditionally addressed within the mind-matter philosophical framework and its ethical extension regarding freedom and determinism. Neurobiology represents a new method, reflective of our times, to articulate the relationships between biological and psychological phenomena. The various points of view in this field are often based on implicit ontological presuppositions and, at least sometimes, unconscious epistemological assumptions: monism vs dualism, functionalism, reductionism, eliminativism, type identity and other more or less sophisticated variations. Bearing in mind the pitfalls these create, we can try to determine structural analogies across the different levels of the living being and the mind: the energy imbalance maintained for cell survival; the dynamic and complementary relationship between homeostatic and allostatic functions in living organisms; the tension between essential and complementary cognitive brain processes, such as the processes used to represent an object and those used to locate an object in space. Those phenomena all bear structural analogies, even though they work at different levels.     

浅论性状加权

本文从生物分类学理论的一些基本问题分析入手,论述了性状加权的哲学基础和生物学意义,对不同学派的观点从理论上进行了客观分析,并提出了作者本人的一些新的看法。     

Synthetic biology: a foundation for multi-scale molecular biology

The field of synthetic biology has made rapid progress in a number of areas including method development, novel applications and community building. In seeking to make biology "engineerable," synthetic biology is increasing the accessibility of biological research to researchers of all experience levels and backgrounds. One of the underlying strengths of synthetic biology is that it may establish the framework for a rigorous bottom-up approach to studying biology starting at the DNA level. Building upon the existing framework established largely by the Registry of Standard Biological Parts, careful consideration of future goals may lead to integrated multi- scale approaches to biology. Here we describe some of the current challenges that need to be addressed or considered in detail to continue the development of synthetic biology. Specifically, discussion on the areas of elucidating biological principles, computational methods and experimental construction methodologies are presented.     

The Poverty of Taxonomic Characters

The theory and practice of contemporary comparative biology and phylogeny reconstruction (systematics) emphasizes algorithmic aspects but neglects a concern for the evidence. The character data used in systematics to formulate hypotheses of relationships in many ways constitute a black box, subject to uncritical assessment and social influence. Concerned that such a state of affairs leaves systematics and the phylogenetic theories it generates severely underdetermined, we investigate the nature of the criteria of homology and their application to character conceptualization in the context of transformationist and generative paradigms. Noting the potential for indeterminacy in character conceptualization, we conclude that character congruence (the coherence of character statements) relative to a hierarchy is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for phylogeny reconstruction. Specifically, it is insufficient due to the lack of causal grounding of character hypotheses. Conceptualizing characters as homeostatic property cluster natural kinds is in accordance with the empirical practice of systematists. It also accounts for the lack of sharpness in character conceptualization, yet requires character identification and re-identification to be tied to causal processes.     

On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation

In this paper, we investigate some theoretical grounds for bridging the gap between an organism-centered biology and the chemical basis of biological explanation, as expressed in the prevailing molecular perspective in biological research. First, we present a brief survey of the role of the organism concept in biological thought. We advance the claim that emergentism (with its fundamental tenets: ontological physicalism, qualitative novelty, property emergence, theory of levels, irreducibility of the emergents, and downward causation) can provide a metaphysical basis for a coherent sort of organicism. Downward causation (DC) is the key notion in emergentist philosophy, as shown by the tension between the aspects of dependence and nonreducibility in the concept of supervenience, preferred by many philosophers to emergence as a basis for nonreductive physicalism. As supervenience physicalism does not lead, arguably, to a stable nonreductive physicalist account, we maintain that a philosophical alternative worthy of investigation is that of a combination of supervenience and property emergence in the formulation of such a stance. Taking as a starting-point O’Connor’s definition of an emergent property, we discuss how a particular interpretation of downward causation (medium DC), inspired by Aristotelian causal modes, results in an explanation of property emergence compatible with both physicalism and non-reductionism. In this account of emergence, one may claim that biology, as a science of living organization, is and remains a science of the organism, even if completely explained by the laws of chemistry. We conclude the paper with a new definition of an emergent property.     

Historical laws in modern biology

Several important analyses of the structure of evolutionary explanation have explicitly or implicitly required that historical laws be among the explanans statements. The required historical laws take the form of a generalization which relates some property or event to a developmental sequence of properties or events. The thesis of this paper is that historical laws of this kind are precluded by modern biological theory and, hence, analysis of evolutionary explanation within modern biology that require such laws are defective.