Taking stock of the spectrum of arguments for biodiversity

This paper provides an analysis of the spectrum of arguments associated with the term biodiversity, as expressed in the literature. Through sampling of the grey and peer-review literature, and testing of results through semi-structured interviews, this review presents a total of 31 different instrumental and non-instrumental premises used in arguments for biodiversity. Based on the identified premise statements, this review offers a simple classification by which to understand the complex public discourse associated with arguments for biodiversity, and outlines the current frequency of use of arguments in the literature. Although a wide range of premise statements were identified, the majority of arguments were instrumental with the most frequently used ones putting forward economic perspectives as well as emphasising the role of biodiversity in underpinning ecosystem services. Results from interviews with decision-makers emphasise the need to combine arguments in order to strengthen biodiversity conservation generally, and minimise possible risks associated with individual arguments.     

Arguments for biodiversity conservation: factors influencing their observed effectiveness in European case studies

Making a strong case for biodiversity protection is central to meeting the biodiversity targets in international agreements such as the CBD and achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Effective arguments are needed to convince diverse actors that protection is worthwhile, and can play a crucial role in closing the implementation gap between biodiversity policy targets and outcomes. Drawing on a database of arguments from 11 European case studies, along with additional interview and case study material from all 13 case studies of the BESAFE project, we analysed relationships between potential and observed effectiveness of arguments. Our results show that strong logic, robustness, and timing of arguments are necessary but not sufficient conditions for arguments to be effective. We find that use of multiple and diverse arguments can enhance effectiveness by broadening the appeal to wider audiences, especially when arguments are repeated and refined through constructive dialogue. We discuss the role of framing, bundling and tailoring arguments to audiences in increasing effectiveness. Our results provide further support for the current shift towards recognition of value pluralism in biodiversity science and decision-making. We hope our results will help to demonstrate more convincingly the value of biodiversity to stakeholders in decision processes and thus build better cases for its conservation.     

Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide.     

Ethical Implications of Pharmacogenetics – Do Slippery Slope Arguments Matter?

Pharmacogenetics is a rapidly expanding area of research exploring the relationship between inter-individual genetic variation and drug response, with the goal of developing genetically optimised therapies. Slippery slope arguments claim that a particular action should be rejected (or supported) because it might be the first step onto a slippery slope leading to undesirable (or desirable) consequences. In this article, several slippery slope arguments relevant to the context of pharmacogenetics are evaluated under consideration of underlying reasons for their popularity. The author concludes that although the examined arguments are unconvincing as slippery slope arguments, they do matter in this context. While positive slippery slope arguments serve as a driving force to fuel the development of pharmacogenetics, their negative counterparts play an important role to sensitise policy makers and the public to potential problems.     

Arguing for biodiversity in practice: a case study from the UK

With a web of different local actors, often with different perspectives and interests, turning ideas into practice for biodiversity often involves communicating, negotiating, bargaining and, therefore, argumentation. Within this process arguments are selected by actors, to achieve their goals, with varying levels of effectiveness. We examine the use of arguments in UK national biodiversity policies and at the local level from the perspective of those putting forward and receiving arguments. We assess the positive and negative framings within arguments and the effectiveness of arguments. Using interviews and formal documents as sources of data, we analyse nine argumentative interactions from a case study in the Greater Manchester area in the UK. Our findings highlight differences between arguments in national biodiversity policy and those used at the local level. We also show a link between positive framing and salient arguments that were particularly effective. In more polarised, high conflict situations the credibility of the argument, specifically how well it aligned with policy frameworks, strongly influenced its effectiveness. These findings suggest that selecting arguments that identify common ground at the local level contributes to effective outcomes by highlighting areas of mutual benefit. Where this is not possible, a strong policy framework for the conservation of biodiversity is important. A combination of bottom up and top down approaches is most likely to provide effective arguments for biodiversity.     

Making a better case for biodiversity conservation: the BESAFE project

This Editorial to the BESAFE special issue introduces the project and its approach and case studies. The BESAFE (EC 7th Framework programme) project investigated how the effectiveness of different types of arguments for biodiversity conservation depends on the context in which they are used. Our results show that tailoring of argumentation to audience within the course of decision processes is the main factor determining effectiveness. We consistently found arguments linked to intrinsic value (e.g. moral or ethical obligation arguments) as shared and supported widely, and thus offering common ground between parties. Economic arguments are effective as additional ones, but not as replacements. Next generation biodiversity conservation strategies can probably improve their effectiveness by emphasizing and better explaining the synergies between traditional conservation and especially regulating and cultural services.     

Ethical issues in transgenics

The arguments of critics and concerns of the public on generating transgenic cloned animals are analyzed for the absence or presence of logical structure. Critics' arguments are symbolically compared with "genetic trespassing," "genetic speeding," or "going the wrong way," and responses are provided to these arguments. Scientists will be empowered to participate in the public discussion and to engage the critics on these issues as they consider thoughtful, plausible responses to their concerns. Temporary moratoriums are recognized as a plausible approach to dealing with possible concerns of new scientific advancements.     

The role of theology in current evolutionary reasoning

A remarkable but little studied aspect of current evolutionary theory is the use by many biologists and philosophers of theological arguments for evolution. These can be classed under two heads: imperfection arguments, in which some organic design is held to be inconsistent with God's perfection and wisdom, and homology arguments, in which some pattern of similarity is held to be inconsistent with God's freedom as an artificer. Evolutionists have long contended that the organic world falls short of what one might expect from an omnipotent and benevolent creator. Yet many of the same scientists who argue theologically for evolution are committed to the philosophical doctrine of methodological naturalism, which maintains that theology has no place in science. Furthermore, the arguments themselves are problematical, employing concepts that cannot perform the work required of them, or resting on unsupported conjectures about suboptimality. Evolutionary theorists should reconsider both the arguments and the influence of Darwinian theological metaphysics on their understanding of evolution.     

DOES JUSTICE REQUIRE THAT WE BE AGEIST?

This paper restates some of the principal arguments against an automatic preference for the young as advocated by Kappel and Sandøe, arguments many of which have been extant for over a decade but which Kappel and Sandøe largely ignore. It then goes on to demonstrate that Kappel and Sandøe's "indifference test" fails to do the work required of it because it can be met by unacceptable conceptions of justice. The paper develops a number of new arguments against what I have called "ageist" preferences for the young or for those with long life expectancy. Finally I show that Kappel and Sandøe must believe that murdering older people is less morally wrong than murdering the young and that people relying on arguments such as theirs will have to accept the moral respectability of killing the innocent in order to maximise units of lifetime.     

Trust and the Duty of Organ Donation

Several recent publications in biomedical ethics argue that organ donation is generally morally obligatory and failure to do so is morally indefensible. Arguments for this moral conclusion tend to be of two kinds: arguments from fairness and arguments from easy rescue. While I agree that many of us have a duty to donate, in this article I criticize these arguments for a general duty of organ donation and their application to organ procurement policy. My concern is that these arguments neglect the role that trust plays in contemporary organ transplant policies and in differential rational attitudes toward donation. Recognizing donation as an achievement of trust, and acknowledging the warrant of many people's rational distrust or withheld trust in medicine, I argue, should have significant implications for the ethics of organ procurement.     

Should There Be a Female Age Limit on Public Funding for Assisted Reproductive Technology?

Should there be a female age limit on public funding for assisted reproductive technology (ART)? The question bears significant economic and sociopolitical implications and has been contentious in many countries. We conceptualise the question as one of justice in resource allocation, using three much-debated substantive principles of justice—the capacity to benefit, personal responsibility, and need—to structure and then explore a complex of arguments. Capacity-to-benefit arguments are not decisive: There are no clear cost-effectiveness grounds to restrict funding to those older women who still bear some capacity to benefit from ART. Personal responsibility arguments are challenged by structural determinants of delayed motherhood. Nor are need arguments decisive: They can speak either for or against a female age limit, depending on the conception of need used. We demonstrate how these principles can differ not only in content but also in the relative importance they are accorded by governments. Wide variation in ART public funding policy might be better understood in this light. We conclude with some inter-country comparison. New Zealand and Swedish policies are uncommonly transparent and thus demonstrate particularly well how the arguments we explore have been put into practice.     

The Extension of Belgium’s Euthanasia Law to Include Competent Minors

Following considerable debate, the practice of euthanasia was legalized in Belgium in 2002, thereby making Belgium one of the few places in the world where this practice is legal. In 2014 the law was amended for the first time. The 2014 amendment makes euthanasia legally possible for all minors who repeatedly and voluntarily request euthanasia and who are judged to possess “capacity of discernment” (regardless of their biological age), as well as fulfil a number of other criteria of due care. This extension of the 2002 euthanasia law generated a lot of national and international debate and has been applauded by many and heavily criticized by others. This evolution is clearly of interest to end-of-life debates in the entire world. This paper will therefore describe how this amendment came to get passed using official documents from Belgium's Senate and Chamber of Representatives where this amendment was discussed and subsequently passed. Next, some of the most commonly given arguments in favour of the law are identified, as well as the arguments most often voiced against the amendment. All these arguments will be expanded upon and it will be examined whether they hold up to ethical scrutiny. Analysing the official documents and identifying the most commonly voiced arguments gives valuable insight into how Belgium came to amend its euthanasia law and why it did so in 2014. It also becomes clear that although the current amendment is often seen as far-reaching, more radical ideas were proposed during the drafting of the law. Also, in analysing those arguments in favour of the amendment and those against, it is clear that the validity of some of these is questionable.     

Against the family veto in organ procurement: Why the wishes of the dead should prevail when the living and the deceased disagree on organ donation

The wishes of registered organ donors are regularly set aside when family members object to donation. This genuine overruling of the wishes of the deceased raises difficult ethical questions. A successful argument for providing the family with a veto must (a) provide reason to disregard the wishes of the dead, and (b) establish why the family should be allowed to decide. One branch of justification seeks to reconcile the family veto with important ideas about respecting property rights, preserving autonomy, and preventing harm. These arguments are ultimately unsuccessful. Another branch of arguments is consequentialist, pointing out the negative consequences of removing the veto. Whether construed as concerning family distress or as a potential drop in the organs available, these arguments are unsuccessful; the first fails to recognize the tremendous distress associated with waiting for an organ, while the second has little supporting evidence. A final section considers and rejects whether combining some of the arguments just examined could justify the family veto. We should thus remove the family veto in organ donation.     

Why arguments against infanticide remain convincing: A reply to Räsänen

In ‘Pro‐life arguments against infanticide and why they are not convincing’ Joona Räsänen argues that Christopher Kaczor's objections to Giubilini and Minerva's position on infanticide are not persuasive. We argue that Räsänen's criticism is largely misplaced, and that he has not engaged with Kaczor's strongest arguments against infanticide. We reply to each of Räsänen's criticisms, drawing on the full range of Kaczor's arguments, as well as adding some of our own.     

Righteous modeling: the competence of classical population genetics

In a recent article, ??Wayward Modeling: Population Genetics and Natural Selection,?? Bruce Glymour claims that population genetics is burdened by serious predictive and explanatory inadequacies and that the theory itself is to blame. Because Glymour overlooks a variety of formal modeling techniques in population genetics, his arguments do not quite undermine a major scientific theory. However, his arguments are extremely valuable as they provide definitive proof that those who would deploy classical population genetics over natural systems must do so with careful attention to interactions between individual population members and environmental causes. Glymour??s arguments have deep implications for causation in classical population genetics.     

Reasoning in bioethics

It is striking that some arguments in the bioethical literature seem implausible, counterintuitive, and even ridiculous when reported to competent moral agents. When examined, these arguments bear uncanny resemblances to the discourse of patients with debilitating mental disorders. I examine the kinds of irrationality involved, and discuss the fact that such irrationality is worrying in a discipline that purports to serve as a guide for real-life practical reasoning. I offer some thoughts about correctives that we might use to temper some of the odd opinions that bedevil our subject in the name of ethical analysis. It seems that one ought to be suspicious of neatly rational arguments that produce counterintuitive conclusions, but the alternative seems to be that we explore new constructions of old problems in Bioethics such that our discussion of them does justice to what we regard as of fundamental significance to our lives together as human beings.     

There is a difference between scientific hypothesis and the "phylogenetic presumption" by Rasnitsyn (concerning the paper by I.Ia. Pavlinov, 2005. J. Gen. Biology. V. 66. No 5)

The arguments by Pavlinov against my critical analysis of the concept of the "phylogenetic presumptions" proposed by Rasnitsyn are briefly discussed. It is proved that these arguments are invalid because they are based on the substitution of terms. Instead of the term "phylogenetic presumption" introduced by Rasnitsyn just as an analogue of the presumption of innocence in jurisprudence, Pavlinov considers the presumption in the wider understanding, i.e. as a "preliminary statement".     

Structure,function, and protein taxonomy

This paper considers two recent arguments that structure should not be regarded as the fundamental individuating property of proteins. By clarifying both what it might mean for certain properties to play a fundamental role in a classification scheme and the extent to which structure plays such a role in protein classification, I argue that both arguments are unsound. Because of its robustness, its importance in laboratory practice, and its explanatory centrality, primary structure should be regarded as the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of protein taxonomy.     

Inference problems in population genetics: DNA sequences, restriction endonucleases and ascertainment sampling

A major trend of population genetics theory in the 1970s was the increased emphasis on inductive arguments, based on observed genetic data, rather than on deductive arguments based on theory and models. This occurred in part because the deductive theory had largely fulfilled its role of describing evolution as a genetic process, and in part because of the increasing amounts of data available on the genetic constitution of natural populations. Inference procedures raise difficulties not present in the deductive theory. Often conditional arguments are necessary since the data often must fulfil some condition to be observed. Different inference procedures, having different efficiencies, apply for data from different apparatuses. Care must be taken in deciding what it is that the inference concerns. These problems are illustrated by reference to restriction endonuclease techniques and ascertainment sampling.     

On cloning human beings

The purpose of this paper is to show that arguments for and against cloning fail to make their case because of one or both of the following reasons: 1) they take for granted customary beliefs and assumptions that are far from being unquestionable; 2) they tend to ignore the context in which human cloning is developed. I will analyze some of the assumptions underlying the main arguments that have been offered for and against cloning. Once these assumptions are critically analyzed, arguments both rejecting and supporting human cloning seem to lose weight. I will first briefly present the main arguments that have been proposed against cloning and I will argue that they fail to establish their case. In the next section I will evaluate some of the positive arguments that have been offered supporting such technology. This analysis will show that the case for cloning also fails. Finally, I will maintain that because critics and especially supporters of this technology neglect the context in which human cloning is developed and might be implemented, their arguments are far from compelling.