The evolution of plant-insect mutualisms

Mutualisms (cooperative interactions between species) have had a central role in the generation and maintenance of life on earth. Insects and plants are involved in diverse forms of mutualism. Here we review evolutionary features of three prominent insect-plant mutualisms: pollination, protection and seed dispersal. We focus on addressing five central phenomena: evolutionary origins and maintenance of mutualism; the evolution of mutualistic traits; the evolution of specialization and generalization; coevolutionary processes; and the existence of cheating. Several features uniting very diverse insect-plant mutualisms are identified and their evolutionary implications are discussed: the involvement of one mobile and one sedentary partner; natural selection on plant rewards; the existence of a continuum from specialization to generalization; and the ubiquity of cheating, particularly on the part of insects. Plant-insect mutualisms have apparently both arisen and been lost repeatedly. Many adaptive hypotheses have been proposed to explain these transitions, and it is unlikely that any one of them dominates across interactions differing so widely in natural history. Evolutionary theory has a potentially important, but as yet largely unfilled, role to play in explaining the origins, maintenance, breakdown and evolution of insect-plant mutualisms.     

Selection for cheating across disparate environments in the legume‐rhizobium mutualism

The primary dilemma in evolutionarily stable mutualisms is that natural selection for cheating could overwhelm selection for cooperation. Cheating need not entail parasitism; selection favours cheating as a quantitative trait whenever less‐cooperative partners are more fit than more‐cooperative partners. Mutualisms might be stabilised by mechanisms that direct benefits to more‐cooperative individuals, which counter selection for cheating; however, empirical evidence that natural selection favours cheating in mutualisms is sparse. We measured selection on cheating in single‐partner pairings of wild legume and rhizobium lineages, which prevented legume choice. Across contrasting environments, selection consistently favoured cheating by rhizobia, but did not favour legumes that provided less benefit to rhizobium partners. This is the first simultaneous measurement of selection on cheating across both host and symbiont lineages from a natural population. We empirically confirm selection for cheating as a source of antagonistic coevolutionary pressure in mutualism and a biological dilemma for models of cooperation.     

Let the right one in: a microeconomic approach to partner choice in mutualisms

One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however, exist without signaling, and the mechanisms by which hosts might select the right partners are unclear. Here we propose a general mechanism of partner choice, "screening," that is similar to the economic theory of mechanism design. Imposing the appropriate costs and rewards may induce the informed individuals to screen themselves according to their types and therefore allow a noninformed individual to establish associations with the correct partners in the absence of signaling. Several types of biological symbioses are good candidates for screening, including bobtail squid, ant-plants, gut microbiomes, and many animal and plant species that produce reactive oxygen species. We describe a series of diagnostic tests for screening. Screening games can apply to the cases where by-products, partner fidelity feedback, or host sanctions do not apply, therefore explaining the evolution of mutualism in systems where it is impossible for potential symbionts to signal their cooperativeness beforehand and where the host does not punish symbiont misbehavior.     

"Ménage à trois": the presence/absence of thyme shapes the mutualistic interaction between the host plant Medicago truncatula (Fabaceae) and its symbiotic bacterium Sinorhizobium meliloti

The long-term maintenance of specialized mutualisms remains an evolutionary puzzle. Recent focus has been on factors governing the stability of these mutualisms, including sanctions by the host, partner choice, and coevolutionary constraint, that is, the genetic correlation (r(G)) between fitness of both partners. So far these studies have been typically carried out in a single environment. Here, we ask if the genetic correlation between fitness of the host plant Medicago truncatula (Fabaceae) and its bacterial symbiont Sinorhizobium meliloti is affected by the presence/absence of a monoterpene (carvacrol) leached into the soil by Thymus vulgaris-a common plant of the Mediterranean vegetation, often co-occuring with Medicago. We show that the presence of carvacrol in the soil dramatically affects fitness of the rhizobial partner and increases the magnitude of r(G) between plant and rhizobia fitness (r(G) = 0.02 ± 0.05 vs. r(G) = 0.57 ± 0.02). This finding emphasizes the importance of heterogeneity in the biotic environment for understanding the evolution of species interactions.     

The evolution of mutualism

Like altruism, mutualism, cooperation between species, evolves only by enhancing all participants' inclusive fitness. Mutualism evolves most readily between members of different kingdoms, which pool complementary abilities for mutual benefit: some of these mutualisms represent major evolutionary innovations. Mutualism cannot persist if cheating annihilates its benefits. In long-term mutualisms, symbioses, at least one party associates with the other nearly all its life. Usually, a larger host harbours smaller symbionts. Cheating is restrained by vertical transmission, as in Buchnera; partner fidelity, as among bull-thorn acacias and protective ants; test-based choice of symbionts, as bobtail squid choose bioluminescent bacteria; or sanctioning nonperforming symbionts, as legumes punish nonperforming nitrogen-fixing bacteria. Mutualisms involving brief exchanges, as among plants and seed-dispersers, however, persist despite abundant cheating. Both symbioses and brief-exchange mutualisms have transformed whole ecosystems. These mutualisms may be steps towards ecosystems which, like Adam Smith's ideal economy, serve their members' common good.     

Parasites may help stabilize cooperative relationships

Background  

The persistence of cooperative relationships is an evolutionary paradox; selection should favor those individuals that exploit their partners (cheating), resulting in the breakdown of cooperation over evolutionary time. Our current understanding of the evolutionary stability of mutualisms (cooperation between species) is strongly shaped by the view that they are often maintained by partners having mechanisms to avoid or retaliate against exploitation by cheaters. In contrast, we empirically and theoretically examine how additional symbionts, specifically specialized parasites, potentially influence the stability of bipartite mutualistic associations. In our empirical work we focus on the obligate mutualism between fungus-growing ants and the fungi they cultivate for food. This mutualism is exploited by specialized microfungal parasites (genus Escovopsis) that infect the ant's fungal gardens. Using sub-colonies of fungus-growing ants, we investigate the interactions between the fungus garden parasite and cooperative and experimentally-enforced uncooperative ("cheating") pairs of ants and fungi. To further examine if parasites have the potential to help stabilize some mutualisms we conduct Iterative Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) simulations, a common framework for predicting the outcomes of cooperative/non-cooperative interactions, which incorporate parasitism as an additional factor.     

Economic game theory for mutualism and cooperation

We review recent work at the interface of economic game theory and evolutionary biology that provides new insights into the evolution of partner choice, host sanctions, partner fidelity feedback and public goods. (1) The theory of games with asymmetrical information shows that the right incentives allow hosts to screen-out parasites and screen-in mutualists, explaining successful partner choice in the absence of signalling. Applications range from ant-plants to microbiomes. (2) Contract theory distinguishes two longstanding but weakly differentiated explanations of host response to defectors: host sanctions and partner fidelity feedback. Host traits that selectively punish misbehaving symbionts are parsimoniously interpreted as pre-adaptations. Yucca-moth and legume-rhizobia mutualisms are argued to be examples of partner fidelity feedback. (3) The theory of public goods shows that cooperation in multi-player interactions can evolve in the absence of assortment, in one-shot social dilemmas among non-kin. Applications include alarm calls in vertebrates and exoenzymes in microbes.     

Population genetic signatures of diffuse co-evolution between leaf-cutting ants and their cultivar fungi

Switching of symbiotic partners pervades most mutualisms, despite mechanisms that appear to enforce partner fidelity. To investigate the interplay of forces binding and dissolving mutualistic pairings, we investigated partner fidelity at the population level in the attine ant-fungal cultivar mutualism. The ants and their cultivars exhibit both broad-scale co-evolution, as well as cultivar switching, with short-term symbiont fidelity maintained by vertical transmission of maternal garden inoculates via dispersing queens and by the elimination of alien cultivar strains. Using microsatellite markers, we genotyped cultivar fungi associated with five co-occurring Panamanian attine ant species, representing the two most derived genera, leaf-cutters Atta and Acromyrmex. Despite the presence of mechanisms apparently ensuring the cotransmission of symbiont genotypes, different species and genera of ants sometimes shared identical fungus garden genotypes, indicating widespread cultivar exchange. The cultivar population was largely unstructured with respect to host ant species, with only 10% of the structure in genetic variance being attributable to partitioning among ant species and genera. Furthermore, despite significant genetic and ecological dissimilarity between Atta and Acromyrmex, generic difference accounted for little, if any, variance in cultivar population structure, suggesting that cultivar exchange dwarfs selective forces that may act to create co-adaptive ant-cultivar combinations. Thus, binding forces that appear to enforce host fidelity are relatively weak and pairwise associations between cultivar lineages and ant species have little opportunity for evolutionary persistence. This implicates that mechanisms other than partner fidelity feedback play important roles in stabilizing the leafcutter ant-fungus mutualism over evolutionary time.     

Coevolutionary dynamics in one-to-many mutualistic systems

“One-to-many” mutualisms are often observed in nature. In this type of mutualism, each host individual can interact with many symbionts, whereas each individual symbiont can interact with only one host individual. Partner choice by the host is a potentially critical mechanism for maintaining such systems; however, its long-term effects on the coevolution between the hosts and symbionts have not been completely explored. In this study, I developed a simple mathematical model to describe the coevolutionary dynamics between hosts and symbionts in a one-to-many mutualism. I assumed that each host chooses a constant number of symbionts from a potential symbiont population, a fraction of which are chosen through preferential choice on the basis of the cooperativeness of the symbionts and the rest are chosen randomly. Using numerical calculations, I found that mutualism is maintained when the preferential choice is not very costly and the mutation rate of symbionts is large. I also found that symbionts that receive benefits from hosts without a return (cheater symbionts) and hosts that do not engage in preferential partner choice (indiscriminator hosts) can coexist with mutualist symbionts and discriminator hosts, respectively. The parameter domain of pure mutualism, i.e., free from cheater symbionts and indiscriminator hosts, can be narrower than the whole domain where the mutualism persists.     

Cheating and the evolutionary stability of mutualisms

Interspecific mutualisms have been playing a central role in the functioning of all ecosystems since the early history of life. Yet the theory of coevolution of mutualists is virtually nonexistent, by contrast with well-developed coevolutionary theories of competition, predator-prey and host-parasite interactions. This has prevented resolution of a basic puzzle posed by mutualisms: their persistence in spite of apparent evolutionary instability. The selective advantage of 'cheating', that is, reaping mutualistic benefits while providing fewer commodities to the partner species, is commonly believed to erode a mutualistic interaction, leading to its dissolution or reciprocal extinction. However, recent empirical findings indicate that stable associations of mutualists and cheaters have existed over long evolutionary periods. Here, we show that asymmetrical competition within species for the commodities offered by mutualistic partners provides a simple and testable ecological mechanism that can account for the long-term persistence of mutualisms. Cheating, in effect, establishes a background against which better mutualists can display any competitive superiority. This can lead to the coexistence and divergence of mutualist and cheater phenotypes, as well as to the coexistence of ecologically similar, but unrelated mutualists and cheaters.     

The impact of transmission mode on the evolution of benefits provided by microbial symbionts

While past work has often examined the effects of transmission mode on virulence evolution in parasites, few studies have explored the impact of horizontal transmission on the evolution of benefits conferred by a symbiont to its host. Here, we identify three mechanisms that create a positive covariance between horizontal transmission and symbiont‐provided benefits: pleiotropy within the symbiont genome, partner choice by the host, and consumption of host waste by‐products by symbionts. We modify a susceptible‐infected model to incorporate the details of each mechanism and examine the evolution of symbiont benefits given variation in either the immigration rate of susceptible hosts or the rate of successful vertical transmission. We find conditions for each case under which greater opportunity for horizontal transmission (higher migration rate) favors the evolution of mutualism. Further, we find the surprising result that vertical transmission can inhibit the evolution of benefits provided by symbionts to hosts when horizontal transmission and symbiont‐provided benefits are positively correlated. These predictions may apply to a number of natural systems, and the results may explain why many mutualisms that rely on partner choice often lack a mechanism for vertical transmission.     

Transmission,relatedness, and the evolution of cooperative symbionts

Cooperative interactions between species, termed mutualisms, play a key role in shaping natural ecosystems, economically important agricultural systems, and in influencing human health. Across different mutualisms, there is significant variation in the benefit that hosts receive from their symbionts. Empirical data suggest that transmission mode can help explain this variation: vertical transmission, where symbionts infect their host's offspring, leads to symbionts that provide greater benefits to their hosts than horizontal transmission, where symbionts leave their host and infect other hosts in the population. However, two different theoretical explanations have been given for this pattern: firstly, vertical transmission aligns the fitness interests of hosts and their symbionts; secondly, vertical transmission leads to increased relatedness between symbionts sharing a host, favouring cooperation between symbionts. We used a combination of analytical models and dynamic simulations to tease these factors apart, in order to compare their separate influences and see how they interact. We found that relatedness between symbionts sharing a host, rather than transmission mode per se, was the most important factor driving symbiont cooperation. Transmission mode mattered mainly because it determined relatedness. We also found evolutionary branching throughout much of our simulation, suggesting that a combination of transmission mode and multiplicity of infections could lead to the stable coexistence of different symbiont strategies.     

Kin selection and the Evolution of Mutualisms between Species

Hamilton's theory of kin selection has revolutionized and inspired fifty years of additional theories and experiments on social evolution. Whereas Hamilton's broader intent was to explain the evolutionary stability of cooperation, his focus on shared genetic history appears to have limited the application of his theory to populations within a single species rather than across interacting species. The evolutionary mechanisms for cooperation between species require both spatial and temporal correlations among interacting partners for the benefits to be not only predictable but of sufficient duration to be reliably delivered. As a consequence when the benefits returned by mutualistic partners are redirected to individuals other than the original donor, cooperation usually becomes unstable and parasitism may evolve. However, theoretically, such redirection of mutualistic benefits may actually reinforce, rather than undermine, mutualisms between species when the recipients of these redirected benefits are genetically related to the original donor. Here, I review the few mathematical models that have used Hamilton's theory of kin selection to predict the evolution of mutualisms between species. I go on to examine the applicability of these models to the most well‐studied case of mutualism, pollinating seed predators, where the role of kin selection may have been previously overlooked. Future detailed studies of the direct, and indirect, benefits of mutualism are likely to reveal additional possibilities for applying Hamilton's theory of kin selection to mutualisms between species.     

Parasites of mutualisms

Cooperation invites cheating, and nowhere is this more apparent than when different species cooperate, known as mutualism. In almost all mutualisms studied, specialist parasites have been identified that purloin the benefits that one mutualist provides another. Explaining how parasites are kept from driving mutualisms extinct remains an unsolved problem because existing theories explaining the maintenance of cooperation do not apply to parasites of mutualisms. Nonetheless, these theories can be summarized in such a way as to suggest how mutualisms can persist in the face of parasites. (1) For cooperation to occur, the recipient of a benefit must reciprocate, and the recriprocated benefit must be captured by the initial giver or its offspring. (2) For cooperation to persist, the mutualism must be re-assembled each generation. Because most mutualisms are of the "by-product' type, broadly defined, the first condition is normally always fulfilled. Thus, the maintenance of mutualism usually requires enforcement of the second condition: reliable re-assembly. Hence, I argue that the persistence of mutualism is best understood by using theories of species coexistence, because each mutualist can be considered a resource for the other, and species coexistence theory explains how multiple taxa (e.g. parasites and mutualists) can stably partition a resource over multiple generations. This approach connects the study of mutualism to theories of population regulation and helps to identify key factors that have promoted the evolution, maintenance and breakdown of mutualism. I discuss how these ideas might apply to and be tested in ant-plant, fig-wasp and yucca-moth mutualisms.     

Weak sinks could cradle mutualistic symbioses – strong sources should harbour parasitic symbioses

Using a population model of selection on an obligate symbiont and its host, we evaluate how demographic differences across geographical landscapes can produce selection mosaics in interacting species. The model assumes that the host populations vary geographically from demographic sources to sinks in the absence of effects by the symbionts, and that a virulent and a relatively avirulent form of the symbiont compete with one another across all habitats. Our results indicate that productivity gradients can create selection mosaics across habitats, resulting in complex fitness landscapes over which evolution occurs. We find that relatively virulent symbionts only persist if they have an advantage over avirulent strains or species in terms of interference (i.e. competition, and/or cross‐transmission) interactions. When such a trade‐off exists, we predict that the more virulent symbiont is most likely to be found in habitats where host population growth is highest, whereas the more avirulent symbiont should tend to persist in more marginal habitats or even habitat sinks for symbiont‐free hosts. Demographic sinks may be the habitats most likely to favour the origin of new mutualisms. Very productive mutualisms can be exploited by hyperparasites or cheaters. We discuss our findings in terms of geographical scenarios for the emergence of mutualisms, and the long‐standing debate about geographical patterns in the maintenance of sex.     

Reciprocity in group‐living animals: partner control versus partner choice

Reciprocity is probably the most debated of the evolutionary explanations for cooperation. Part of the confusion surrounding this debate stems from a failure to note that two different processes can result in reciprocity: partner control and partner choice. We suggest that the common observation that group‐living animals direct their cooperative behaviours preferentially to those individuals from which they receive most cooperation is to be interpreted as the result of the sum of the two separate processes of partner control and partner choice. We review evidence that partner choice is the prevalent process in primates and propose explanations for this pattern. We make predictions that highlight the need for studies that separate the effects of partner control and partner choice in a broader variety of group‐living taxa.     

EXPLAINING MUTUALISM VARIATION: A NEW EVOLUTIONARY PARADOX?

The paradox of mutualism is typically framed as the persistence of interspecific cooperation, despite the potential advantages of cheating. Thus, mutualism research has tended to focus on stabilizing mechanisms that prevent the invasion of low‐quality partners. These mechanisms alone cannot explain the persistence of variation for partner quality observed in nature, leaving a large gap in our understanding of how mutualisms evolve. Studying partner quality variation is necessary for applying genetically explicit models to predict evolution in natural populations, a necessary step for understanding the origins of mutualisms as well as their ongoing dynamics. An evolutionary genetic approach, which is focused on naturally occurring mutualist variation, can potentially synthesize the currently disconnected fields of mutualism evolution and coevolutionary genetics. We outline explanations for the maintenance of genetic variation for mutualism and suggest approaches necessary to address them.     

Co‐evolutionary patterns and diversification of ant–fungus associations in the asexual fungus‐farming ant Mycocepurus smithii in Panama

Partner fidelity through vertical symbiont transmission is thought to be the primary mechanism stabilizing cooperation in the mutualism between fungus‐farming (attine) ants and their cultivated fungal symbionts. An alternate or additional mechanism could be adaptive partner or symbiont choice mediating horizontal cultivar transmission or de novo domestication of free‐living fungi. Using microsatellite genotyping for the attine ant Mycocepurus smithii and ITS rDNA sequencing for fungal cultivars, we provide the first detailed population genetic analysis of local ant–fungus associations to test for the relative importance of vertical vs. horizontal transmission in a single attine species. M. smithii is the only known asexual attine ant, and it is furthermore exceptional because it cultivates a far greater cultivar diversity than any other attine ant. Cultivar switching could permit the ants to re‐acquire cultivars after garden loss, to purge inferior cultivars that are locally mal‐adapted or that accumulated deleterious mutations under long‐term asexuality. Compared to other attine ants, symbiont choice and local adaptation of ant–fungus combinations may play a more important role than partner‐fidelity feedback in the co‐evolutionary process of M. smithii and its fungal symbionts.     

Negotiation, sanctions, and context dependency in the legume-Rhizobium mutualism

Two important questions about mutualisms are how the fitness costs and benefits to the mutualist partners are determined and how these mechanisms affect the evolutionary dynamics of the mutualism. We tackle these questions with a model of the legume-rhizobium symbiosis that regards the mutualism outcome as a result of biochemical negotiations between the plant and its nodules. We explore the fitness consequences of this mechanism to the plant and rhizobia and obtain four main results. First, negotiations permit the plant to differentially reward more-cooperative rhizobia--a phenomenon termed "plant sanctions"--but only when more-cooperative rhizobia also provide the plant with good outside options during negotiations with other nodules. Second, negotiations may result in seemingly paradoxical cases where the plant is worse off when it has a "choice" between two strains of rhizobia than when infected by either strain alone. Third, even when sanctions are effective, they are by themselves not sufficient to maintain cooperative rhizobia in a population: less cooperative strains always have an advantage at the population level. Finally, partner fidelity feedback, together with genetic correlations between a rhizobium strain's cooperativeness and the outside options it provides, can maintain cooperative rhizobia. Our results show how joint control over the outcome of a mutualism through the proximate mechanism of negotiation can affect the evolutionary dynamics of interspecific cooperation.     

Diminishing returns in social evolution: the not-so-tragic commons

A challenge for evolutionary theory is to understand how cooperation can occur in the presence of competition and cheating, a problem known as the tragedy of commons. Here I examine how varying the fitness returns from reproductive competition or cooperation affects the negative impact of competition on a social group. Varying linear returns does not affect the impact of competition. However, diminishing returns, where additional investments in either competition or cooperation give smaller and smaller rewards, reduce the effects of competition on the group. I show that diminishing returns are common in many systems, including social vertebrates, microbes, social insects and mutualisms among species. This suggests that the tragedy of the commons is not so tragic and that the disruptive effects of competition upon social life will often be minor.