The evolution of one-shot cooperation: An experiment

Can people rationally advance their own material interests by cooperating in one-shot prisoner's dilemmas, even when there is no possibility of being punished for defection? We outline a model that describes how such cooperation could evolve if the presence of a cooperative disposition can be discerned by others. We test the model's key assumption with an experiment in which we find that subjects who interacted for thirty minutes before playing one-shot prisoner's dilemmas with two others were substantially more accurate than chance in predicting their partner's decisions.     

Benevolent Characteristics Promote Cooperative Behaviour among Humans

Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they should deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own individual payoff. However, there is typically heterogeneity across subjects: some may cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting cooperation could be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this heterogeneity raises the important question of who these cooperators are. We have conducted a series of experiments to study whether benevolence, defined as a unilateral act of paying a cost to increase the welfare of someone else beyond one''s own, is related to cooperation in a subsequent one-shot anonymous Prisoner''s dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of the widely used inequity aversion models, we find that benevolence does exist and a large majority of people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated with cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and cooperation: priming people to think positively about benevolent behaviour makes them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think malevolently. Thus benevolent people exist and cooperate more.     

Multiple reputation domains and cooperative behaviour in two Latin American communities

Reputations are a ubiquitous feature of human social life, and a large literature has been dedicated to explaining the relationship between prosocial reputations and cooperation in social dilemmas. However, humans form reputations in domains other than prosociality, such as economic competency that could affect cooperation. To date, no research has evaluated the relative effects of multiple reputation domains on cooperation. To bridge this gap, we analyse how prosocial and competency reputations affect cooperation in two Latin American communities (Bwa Mawego, Dominica, and Pucucanchita, Peru) across a number of social contexts (Dominica: labour contracting, labour exchange and conjugal partnership formation; Peru: agricultural and health advice network size). First, we examine the behavioural correlates of prosocial and competency reputations. Following, we analyse whether prosocial, competency, or both reputation domains explain the flow of cooperative benefits within the two communities. Our analyses suggest that (i) although some behaviours affect both reputation domains simultaneously, each reputation domain has a unique behavioural signature; and (ii) competency reputations affect cooperation across a greater number of social contexts compared to prosocial reputations. Results are contextualized with reference to the social markets in which behaviour is embedded and a call for greater theory development is stressed.     

Chimpanzees and children avoid mutual defection in a social dilemma

Cooperation often comes with the temptation to defect and benefit at the cost of others. This tension between cooperation and defection is best captured in social dilemmas like the Prisoner's Dilemma. Adult humans have specific strategies to maintain cooperation during Prisoner's Dilemma interactions. Yet, little is known about the ontogenetic and phylogenetic origins of human decision-making strategies in conflict scenarios. To shed light on this question, we compared the strategies used by chimpanzees and 5-year old children to overcome a social dilemma. In our task, waiting for the partner to act first produced the best results for the subject. Alternatively, they could mutually cooperate and divide the rewards. Our findings indicate that the two species differed substantially in their strategies to solve the task. Chimpanzees became more strategic across the study period by waiting longer to act in the social dilemma. Children developed a more efficient strategy of taking turns to reciprocate their rewards. Moreover, children used specific types of communication to coordinate with their partners. These results suggest that while both species behaved strategically to overcome a conflict situation, only children engaged in active cooperation to solve a social dilemma.     

Defectors Cannot Be Detected during“Small Talk” with Strangers

To account for the widespread human tendency to cooperate in one-shot social dilemmas, some theorists have proposed that cooperators can be reliably detected based on ethological displays that are difficult to fake. Experimental findings have supported the view that cooperators can be distinguished from defectors based on “thin slices” of behavior, but the relevant cues have remained elusive, and the role of the judge''s perspective remains unclear. In this study, we followed triadic conversations among unacquainted same-sex college students with unannounced dyadic one-shot prisoner''s dilemmas, and asked participants to guess the PD decisions made toward them and among the other two participants. Two other sets of participants guessed the PD decisions after viewing videotape of the conversations, either with foreknowledge (informed), or without foreknowledge (naïve), of the post-conversation PD. Only naïve video viewers approached better-than-chance prediction accuracy, and they were significantly accurate at predicting the PD decisions of only opposite-sexed conversation participants. Four ethological displays recently proposed to cue defection in one-shot social dilemmas (arms crossed, lean back, hand touch, and face touch) failed to predict either actual defection or guesses of defection by any category of observer. Our results cast doubt on the role of “greenbeard” signals in the evolution of human prosociality, although they suggest that eavesdropping may be more informative about others'' cooperative propensities than direct interaction.     

Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas

When group interests clash with individual ones, maintaining cooperation poses a problem. However, cooperation can be facilitated by introducing reputational incentives. Through indirect reciprocity, people who cooperate in a social dilemma are more likely to receive cooperative acts from others. Another mechanism that enhances group cooperation is reputation-based partner choice, or competitive altruism. According to this framework, cooperators benefit via increased access to cooperative partners. Our study compared the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity and competitive altruism in re-establishing cooperation after the typical decline found during repeated public goods games. Twenty groups of four participants first played a series of public goods games, which confirmed the expected decline. Subsequently, public goods games were alternated with either indirect reciprocity games (in which participants had an opportunity to give to another individual from whom they would never receive a direct return) or competitive altruism games (in which they could choose partners for directly reciprocal interactions). We found that public goods game contributions increased when interspersed with competitive altruism games; they were also higher than in public goods games interspersed with indirect reciprocity games. Investing in reputation by increasing contributions to public goods was a profitable strategy in that it increased returns in subsequent competitive altruism and indirect reciprocity games. There was also some evidence that these returns were greater under competitive altruism than indirect reciprocity. Our findings indicate that strategic reputation building through competitive altruism provides an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity as a means for restoring cooperation in social dilemmas.     

Fast to Forgive,Slow to Retaliate: Intuitive Responses in the Ultimatum Game Depend on the Degree of Unfairness

Evolutionary accounts have difficulty explaining why people cooperate with anonymous strangers they will never meet. Recently models, focusing on emotional processing, have been proposed as a potential explanation, with attention focusing on a dual systems approach based on system 1 (fast, intuitive, automatic, effortless, and emotional) and system 2 (slow, reflective, effortful, proactive and unemotional). Evidence shows that when cooperation is salient, people are fast (system 1) to cooperate, but with longer delays (system 2) they show greed. This is interpreted within the framework of the social heuristic hypothesis (SHH), whereby people overgeneralize potentially advantageous intuitively learnt and internalization social norms to ‘atypical’ situations. We extend this to explore intuitive reactions to unfairness by integrating the SHH with the ‘fast to forgive, slow to anger’ (FFSA) heuristic. This suggests that it is advantageous to be prosocial when facing uncertainty. We propose that whether or not someone intuitively shows prosociality (cooperation) or retaliation is moderated by the degree (certainty) of unfairness. People should intuitively cooperate when facing mild levels of unfairness (fast to forgive) but when given longer to decide about another''s mild level of unfairness should retaliate (slow to anger). However, when facing severe levels of unfairness, the intuitive response is always retaliation. We test this using a series of one-shot ultimatum games and manipulate level of offer unfairness (50:50 60:40, 70:30, 80:20, 90:10) and enforced time delays prior to responding (1s, 2s, 8s, 15s). We also measure decision times to make responses after the time delays. The results show that when facing mildly unfair offers (60:40) people are fast (intuitive) to cooperate but with longer delays reject these mildly unfair offers: ‘fast to forgive, and slow to retaliate’. However, for severely unfair offers (90:10) the intuitive and fast response is to always reject.     

Social setting,intuition and experience in laboratory experiments interact to shape cooperative decision-making

Recent studies suggest that cooperative decision-making in one-shot interactions is a history-dependent dynamic process: promoting intuition versus deliberation typically has a positive effect on cooperation (dynamism) among people living in a cooperative setting and with no previous experience in economic games on cooperation (history dependence). Here, we report on a laboratory experiment exploring how these findings transfer to a non-cooperative setting. We find two major results: (i) promoting intuition versus deliberation has no effect on cooperative behaviour among inexperienced subjects living in a non-cooperative setting; (ii) experienced subjects cooperate more than inexperienced subjects, but only under time pressure. These results suggest that cooperation is a learning process, rather than an instinctive impulse or a self-controlled choice, and that experience operates primarily via the channel of intuition. Our findings shed further light on the cognitive basis of human cooperative decision-making and provide further support for the recently proposed social heuristics hypothesis.     

How conformity can lead to polarised social behaviour

Learning social behaviour of others strongly influences one’s own social attitudes. We compare several distinct explanations of this phenomenon, testing their predictions using computational modelling across four experimental conditions. In the experiment, participants chose repeatedly whether to pay for increasing (prosocial) or decreasing (antisocial) the earnings of an unknown other. Halfway through the task, participants predicted the choices of an extremely prosocial or antisocial agent (either a computer, a single participant, or a group of participants). Our analyses indicate that participants polarise their social attitude mainly due to normative expectations. Specifically, most participants conform to presumed demands by the authority (vertical influence), or because they learn that the observed human agents follow the norm very closely (horizontal influence).     

Women Tend to Defect in a Social Dilemma Game in Southwest China

Cooperation theories assume that interacting individuals can change their strategies under different expected payoffs, depending on their social status or social situations. When looking at sex differences in cooperation, the existing studies have found that the genders cooperate at similar frequencies. However, the majority of the data originate within Western human societies. In this paper, we explore whether there are gender differences in cooperation in China. An Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a punishment option was used to gather data about Southwest Chinese subjects in a culture in which men have a hierarchical advantage over women. Results indicate that men invested into partners significantly more than women did (34% ♂ vs. 24% ♀) while women, in turn, were more likely to defect (65% ♀ vs. 50% ♂). In this region, women have customarily held less economic power and they are used to obtain a payoff typically lower than men. We suggest that the women’s willingness to invest in cooperation has decreased throughout evolutionary time, providing us with an illustration of a culturally-driven shift towards a disparity in gender cooperation interests.     

Social exchange and reciprocity: confusion or a heuristic?

We propose that a “social exchange heuristic” is as important as the cheater detection mechanism for attaining mutual cooperation in social exchange. The social exchange heuristic prompts people to perceive a mixed-motive situation, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), as an Assurance Game (AG) situation in which cooperation is a personally better choice than defection insofar as the partner is cooperating as well. We demonstrate the operation of the social exchange heuristic through a comparison of the ordinary one-shot, simultaneous PD with the one-shot, sequential PD. Participants in the current experiments, involving a total of 261 volunteers, committed a logical error in the direction of favoring mutual cooperation as the situation involved more serious consequences. This result strongly suggests the operation of a domain specific “bias” that encourages pursuit of mutual cooperation in social exchange.     

How do we decide when (not) to free-ride? Risk tolerance predicts behavioral plasticity in cooperation

In collaborations, group productivity typically increases with more cooperators, but is also often subject to diminishing returns. This pattern provides a different view about cooperation from traditional social dilemmas: defection is not necessarily the dominant strategy. Rather, a frequency-dependent “anti-conformist” strategy (cooperate if many others defect, and vice versa) is often individually rational. This study addresses human cooperation under such marginally diminishing group productivity, focusing on the plasticity of cooperative choices. We conducted a two-part “team foraging” experiment, in which the most- or least-cooperative members in the first part were re-grouped separately for the second part. We observed that cooperating and defecting “types” emerged within a group over time but did not completely persist across groups, with some of the most cooperative members switching to become the least cooperative (and vice versa). Risk attitude was a key factor in this switching behavior: greater risk-takers showed greater behavioral plasticity. These results imply that human cooperation may be more context-dependent and behaviorally plastic than previously thought.     

The Collective Benefits of Feeling Good and Letting Go: Positive Emotion and (dis)Inhibition Interact to Predict Cooperative Behavior

Cooperation is central to human existence, forming the bedrock of everyday social relationships and larger societal structures. Thus, understanding the psychological underpinnings of cooperation is of both scientific and practical importance. Recent work using a dual-process framework suggests that intuitive processing can promote cooperation while deliberative processing can undermine it. Here we add to this line of research by more specifically identifying deliberative and intuitive processes that affect cooperation. To do so, we applied automated text analysis using the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software to investigate the association between behavior in one-shot anonymous economic cooperation games and the presence inhibition (a deliberative process) and positive emotion (an intuitive process) in free-response narratives written after (Study 1, N = 4,218) or during (Study 2, N = 236) the decision-making process. Consistent with previous results, across both studies inhibition predicted reduced cooperation while positive emotion predicted increased cooperation (even when controlling for negative emotion). Importantly, there was a significant interaction between positive emotion and inhibition, such that the most cooperative individuals had high positive emotion and low inhibition. This suggests that inhibition (i.e., reflective or deliberative processing) may undermine cooperative behavior by suppressing the prosocial effects of positive emotion.     

Direct reciprocity under uncertainty does not explain one-shot cooperation,but demonstrates the benefits of a norm psychology

Humans in many societies cooperate in economic experiments at much higher levels than would be expected if their goal was maximizing economic returns, even when their interactions are anonymous and one-shot. This is a puzzle because paying a cost to benefit another in one-shot interactions gives no direct or indirect benefits to the cooperator. This paper explores the logic of two competing evolutionary hypotheses to explain this behavior. The ``norm psychology'' hypothesis holds that a player's choice of strategy reflects socially-learned cultural norms. Its premise is that over the course of human evolutionary history, cultural norms varied considerably across human societies, and through a process of gene-culture co-evolution, humans evolved mechanisms to learn and adopt the norms that are successful in their particular society. The ``mismatch'' hypothesis holds that pro-social preferences evolved genetically in our hunter–gatherer past where one-shot anonymous interactions were rare and these preferences are misapplied in modern laboratory settings. I compare these hypotheses by adopting a well-known model of the mismatch hypothesis and show that selection for one-shot cooperation in the model is an artifact of agents being confined to only two strategies: Tit-for-Tat and Always Defect. Allowing for repentant and forgiving strategies reverses selection away from one-shot cooperation under all environmental parameters. Direct reciprocity does not necessarily lead to cooperation, but instead generates many different normative equilibria depending on a group's idiosyncratic evolutionary history. Therefore, an agent whose behavior is evoked solely from non-cultural environmental cues will be disadvantaged relative to an agent who learns the locally successful norms. Cooperation in one-shot laboratory experiments is thus more easily explained as the result of a psychology evolved for learning social norms than as a genetic mismatch.     

Simulating Irrational Human Behavior to Prevent Resource Depletion

In a situation with a limited common resource, cooperation between individuals sharing the resource is essential. However, people often act upon self-interest in irrational ways that threaten the long-term survival of the whole group. A lack of sustainable or environmentally responsible behavior is often observed. In this study, we examine how the maximization of benefits principle works in a wider social interactive context of personality preferences in order to gain a more realistic insight into the evolution of cooperation. We used time perspective (TP), a concept reflecting individual differences in orientation towards past, present, or future, and relevant for making sustainable choices. We developed a personality-driven agent-based model that explores the role of personality in the outcomes of social dilemmas and includes multiple facets of diversity: (1) The agents have different behavior strategies: individual differences derived by applying cluster analysis to survey data from 22 countries (N = 10,940) and resulting in 7 cross-cultural profiles of TP; (2) The non-uniform distribution of the types of agents across countries; (3) The diverse interactions between the agents; and (4) diverse responses to those interactions in a well-mixed population. As one of the results, we introduced an index of overall cooperation for each of the 22 countries, which was validated against cultural, economic, and sustainability indicators (HDI, dimensions of national culture, and Environment Performance Index). It was associated with higher human development, higher individualism, lower power distance, and better environmental performance. The findings illustrate how individual differences in TP can be simulated to predict the ways people in different countries solve the personal vs. common gain dilemma in the global limited-resource situation. This interdisciplinary approach to social simulation can be adopted to explain the possible causes of global environmental issues and to predict their possible outcomes.     

Prosocial primates: selfish and unselfish motivations

Non-human primates are marked by well-developed prosocial and cooperative tendencies as reflected in the way they support each other in fights, hunt together, share food and console victims of aggression. The proximate motivation behind such behaviour is not to be confused with the ultimate reasons for its evolution. Even if a behaviour is ultimately self-serving, the motivation behind it may be genuinely unselfish. A sharp distinction needs to be drawn, therefore, between (i) altruistic and cooperative behaviour with knowable benefits to the actor, which may lead actors aware of these benefits to seek them by acting cooperatively or altruistically and (ii) altruistic behaviour that offers the actor no knowable rewards. The latter is the case if return benefits occur too unpredictably, too distantly in time or are of an indirect nature, such as increased inclusive fitness. The second category of behaviour can be explained only by assuming an altruistic impulse, which—as in humans—may be born from empathy with the recipient''s need, pain or distress. Empathy, a proximate mechanism for prosocial behaviour that makes one individual share another''s emotional state, is biased the way one would predict from evolutionary theories of cooperation (i.e. by kinship, social closeness and reciprocation). There is increasing evidence in non-human primates (and other mammals) for this proximate mechanism as well as for the unselfish, spontaneous nature of the resulting prosocial tendencies. This paper further reviews observational and experimental evidence for the reciprocity mechanisms that underlie cooperation among non-relatives, for inequity aversion as a constraint on cooperation and on the way defection is dealt with.     

Network fluctuations hinder cooperation in evolutionary games

In this paper we study the influence of random network fluctuations on the behavior of evolutionary games on Barabási-Albert networks. This network class has been shown to promote cooperation on social dilemmas such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games when the population network is fixed. Here we introduce exogenous random fluctuations of the network links through several noise models, and we investigate the evolutionary dynamics comparing them with the known static network case. The results we obtain show that even a moderate amount of random noise on the network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is the same as the agents' strategy revision rate. The results appear to be robust since they are essentially the same whatever the type of the exogenous noise. Besides, it turns out that random network noise is more important than strategy noise in suppressing cooperation. Thus, even in the more favorable situation of accumulated payoff in which links have no cost, the mere presence of random external network fluctuations act as a powerful limitation to the attainment of high levels of cooperation.     

Convergence of speech rate in conversation predicts cooperation

During conversation, interlocutors coordinate their behavior on many levels. Two distinct forms of behavioral coordination have been empirically linked with affiliation and cooperation during or following face-to-face interaction: behavior matching and interpersonal synchrony. Only the latter form constitutes behavioral entrainment involving a coupling between independent oscillators. We present the first study of the association between spontaneously occurring behavioral coordination and post-interaction economic game play. Triads of same-sexed strangers conversed for 10 min, after which each participant played an unannounced one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) toward each co-participant. When dyads had higher language style matching scores (LSM: Gonzales, A.L., Hancock, J.T., & Pennebaker, J.W. (2010). Language style matching as a predictor of social dynamics in small groups. Communication Research, 31, 3–19), the individuals evaluated each other more positively, but they were no more likely to cooperate in the PD. However, when dyads' speech rates (mean syllable duration) converged more strongly from the beginning to the end of the conversation, they were more likely to cooperate in the PD, despite no effect on interpersonal evaluations. Speech rate convergence, a form of rhythmic entrainment, could benefit interlocutors by mutually reducing cognitive processing during interaction. We suggest that spontaneous, temporally based behavioral coordination might facilitate prosocial behavior when the joint cooperative effort is itself perceived as a form of coordination.     

Bioethics,children, and the environment

Queer perspectives have typically emerged from sexual minorities as a way of repudiating flawed views of sexuality, mischaracterized relationships, and objectionable social treatment of people with atypical sexuality or gender expression. In this vein, one commentator offers a queer critique of the conceptualization of children in regard to their value for people's identities and relationships. According to this account, children are morally problematic given the values that make them desirable, their displacement of other beings and things entitled to moral protection, not to mention the damaging environmental effects that follow in the wake of population growth. Objectionable views of children are said even to have colonized the view of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans (LGBT) people who – with the enthusiastic endorsement of bioethics – increasingly turn to assisted reproductive treatments to have children. In the face of these outcomes, it is better – according to this account – that people reconsider their interest in children. This account is not, however, ultimately strong enough to override people's interest in having children, relative to the benefits they confer and relative to the benefits conferred on children themselves. It is certainly not strong enough to justify differential treatment of LGBT people in matters of assisted reproductive treatments. Environmental threats in the wake of population growth might be managed in ways other than devaluing children as such. Moreover, this account ultimately damages the interests of LGBT people in matters of access, equity, and children, which outcome is paradoxical, given the origins of queer perspectives as efforts to assert and defend the social interests of sexual and gender minorities.     

Spatial effects in social dilemmas

Social dilemmas and the evolutionary conundrum of cooperation are traditionally studied through various kinds of game theoretical models such as the prisoner's dilemma, public goods games, snowdrift games or by-product mutualism. All of them exemplify situations which are characterized by different degrees of conflicting interests between the individuals and the community. In groups of interacting individuals, cooperators produce a common good benefitting the entire group at some cost to themselves, whereas defectors attempt to exploit the resource by avoiding the costly contributions. Based on synergistic or discounted accumulation of cooperative benefits a unifying theoretical framework was recently introduced that encompasses all games that have traditionally been studied separately (Hauert, Michor, Nowak, Doebeli, 2005. Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas. J. Theor. Biol., in press.). Within this framework we investigate the effects of spatial structure with limited local interactions on the evolutionary fate of cooperators and defectors. The quantitative effects of space turn out to be quite sensitive to the underlying microscopic update mechanisms but, more general, we demonstrate that in prisoner's dilemma type interactions spatial structure benefits cooperation-although the parameter range is quite limited-whereas in snowdrift type interactions spatial structure may be beneficial too, but often turns out to be detrimental to cooperation.