Collective Dynamics of Belief Evolution under Cognitive Coherence and Social Conformity

Human history has been marked by social instability and conflict, often driven by the irreconcilability of opposing sets of beliefs, ideologies, and religious dogmas. The dynamics of belief systems has been studied mainly from two distinct perspectives, namely how cognitive biases lead to individual belief rigidity and how social influence leads to social conformity. Here we propose a unifying framework that connects cognitive and social forces together in order to study the dynamics of societal belief evolution. Each individual is endowed with a network of interacting beliefs that evolves through interaction with other individuals in a social network. The adoption of beliefs is affected by both internal coherence and social conformity. Our framework may offer explanations for how social transitions can arise in otherwise homogeneous populations, how small numbers of zealots with highly coherent beliefs can overturn societal consensus, and how belief rigidity protects fringe groups and cults against invasion from mainstream beliefs, allowing them to persist and even thrive in larger societies. Our results suggest that strong consensus may be insufficient to guarantee social stability, that the cognitive coherence of belief-systems is vital in determining their ability to spread, and that coherent belief-systems may pose a serious problem for resolving social polarization, due to their ability to prevent consensus even under high levels of social exposure. We argue that the inclusion of cognitive factors into a social model could provide a more complete picture of collective human dynamics.     

The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas

In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we use evolutionary game theory to study the impact of strategic timing on equilibrium selection. Depending on the risk of catastrophe, we identify three characteristic regimes. For low risks, defection is the only equilibrium, whereas high risks promote equilibria with sufficient contributions. Intermediate risks pose the biggest challenge for cooperation. In this risk regime, the option to interact over time is critical; if individuals can contribute over several rounds, then the group has a higher chance to succeed, and the expected welfare increases. This positive effect of timing is of particular importance in larger groups, where successful coordination becomes increasingly difficult.     

A Model of Human Cooperation in Social Dilemmas

Social dilemmas are situations in which collective interests are at odds with private interests: pollution, depletion of natural resources, and intergroup conflicts, are at their core social dilemmas. Because of their multidisciplinarity and their importance, social dilemmas have been studied by economists, biologists, psychologists, sociologists, and political scientists. These studies typically explain tendency to cooperation by dividing people in proself and prosocial types, or appealing to forms of external control or, in iterated social dilemmas, to long-term strategies. But recent experiments have shown that cooperation is possible even in one-shot social dilemmas without forms of external control and the rate of cooperation typically depends on the payoffs. This makes impossible a predictive division between proself and prosocial people and proves that people have attitude to cooperation by nature. The key innovation of this article is in fact to postulate that humans have attitude to cooperation by nature and consequently they do not act a priori as single agents, as assumed by standard economic models, but they forecast how a social dilemma would evolve if they formed coalitions and then they act according to their most optimistic forecast. Formalizing this idea we propose the first predictive model of human cooperation able to organize a number of different experimental findings that are not explained by the standard model. We show also that the model makes satisfactorily accurate quantitative predictions of population average behavior in one-shot social dilemmas.     

Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas

Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study direct group reciprocity considering the complete set of reactive strategies, where individuals behave conditionally on what they observed in the previous round. We study both analytically and by computer simulations the evolutionary dynamics encompassing this extensive strategy space, witnessing the emergence of a surprisingly simple strategy that we call All-Or-None (AoN). AoN consists in cooperating only after a round of unanimous group behavior (cooperation or defection), and proves robust in the presence of errors, thus fostering cooperation in a wide range of group sizes. The principles encapsulated in this strategy share a level of complexity reminiscent of that found already in 2-person games under direct and indirect reciprocity, reducing, in fact, to the well-known Win-Stay-Lose-Shift strategy in the limit of the repeated 2-person Prisoner''s Dilemma.     

Graded Effects of Social Conformity on Recognition Memory

Previous studies have shown that the opinion of confederates in a group influences recognition memory, but inconsistent results have been obtained concerning the question of whether recognition of items as old and new are affected similarly, possibly because only one or two confederates are present during the recognition phase. Here, we present data from a study where recognition of novel faces was tested in the presence of four confederates. In a long version of this experiment, recognition of items as old and new was similarly affected by group responses. However, in the short version, recognition of old items depended proportionally on the number of correct group responses, while rejection of new items only decreased significantly when all confederates gave an incorrect response. These findings indicate that differential effects of social conformity on recognition of items as old and new occur in situations with an intermediate level of group pressure.     

Time Pressure Increases Cooperation in Competitively Framed Social Dilemmas

What makes people willing to pay costs to benefit others? Does such cooperation require effortful self-control, or do automatic, intuitive processes favor cooperation? Time pressure has been shown to increase cooperative behavior in Public Goods Games, implying a predisposition towards cooperation. Consistent with the hypothesis that this predisposition results from the fact that cooperation is typically advantageous outside the lab, it has further been shown that the time pressure effect is undermined by prior experience playing lab games (where selfishness is the more advantageous strategy). Furthermore, a recent study found that time pressure increases cooperation even in a game framed as a competition, suggesting that the time pressure effect is not the result of social norm compliance. Here, we successfully replicate these findings, again observing a positive effect of time pressure on cooperation in a competitively framed game, but not when using the standard cooperative framing. These results suggest that participants'' intuitions favor cooperation rather than norm compliance, and also that simply changing the framing of the Public Goods Game is enough to make it appear novel to participants and thus to restore the time pressure effect.     

Private and Public Decisions in Social Dilemmas: Evidence from Children's Behavior

Are selfish impulses less likely to be pursued when decisions are publicly observable? Is the presence of peers a potential solution to social dilemmas? In this paper we report data on the self-control decisions of children aged 6 to 11 who participated in games that require one to resist a selfish impulse for several minutes in order to benefit others. In Public Condition children make decisions in public view of the group of other participants, while in Private Condition they have the possibility to decide privately. We find that children aged 9 and higher are better able to resist selfish impulses in public environments. Younger children, however, display no such effect. Further, we find self-control substantially impacted by group size. When decisions are public, self-control is better in larger groups, while in private condition the opposite holds.     

Evolution of Primate Social Systems

We review evolutionary processes and mechanisms that gave rise to the diversity of primate social systems. We define social organization, social structure and mating system as distinct components of a social system. For each component, we summarize levels and patterns of variation among primates and discuss evolutionary determinants of this variation. We conclude that conclusive explanations for a solitary life and pair-living are still lacking. We then focus on interactions among the 3 components in order to identify main targets of selection and potential constraints for social evolution. Social organization and mating system are more closely linked to each other than either one is to social structure. Further, we conclude that it is important to seek a priori measures for the effects of presumed selective factors and that the genetic contribution to social systems is still poorly examined. Finally, we examine the role of primate socio-ecology in current evolutionary biology and conclude that primates are not prominently represented because the main questions asked in behavioral ecology are often irrelevant for primate behavior. For the future, we see a rapprochement of these areas as the role of disease and life-history theory are integrated more fully into primate socio-ecology.     

Group Size Effect on Cooperation in One-Shot Social Dilemmas II: Curvilinear Effect

In a world in which many pressing global issues require large scale cooperation, understanding the group size effect on cooperative behavior is a topic of central importance. Yet, the nature of this effect remains largely unknown, with lab experiments insisting that it is either positive or negative or null, and field experiments suggesting that it is instead curvilinear. Here we shed light on this apparent contradiction by considering a novel class of public goods games inspired to the realistic scenario in which the natural output limits of the public good imply that the benefit of cooperation increases fast for early contributions and then decelerates. We report on a large lab experiment providing evidence that, in this case, group size has a curvilinear effect on cooperation, according to which intermediate-size groups cooperate more than smaller groups and more than larger groups. In doing so, our findings help fill the gap between lab experiments and field experiments and suggest concrete ways to promote large scale cooperation among people.     

The Evolution of Reptilian Social Behavior

Reptiles display a diversity of behavior that is reflectiveof their evolutionary heritage from fish and amphibians andtheir ancestral contribution to the diversity found in birdsand mammals. Much of the behavior observed in reptiles seemsspecific to the ecological setting within which they live. Asa result, a diversity of behavior is found in each of the groupsof modern reptiles. Recent studies on the social behavior oflizards have proved them capable of a variety of behavioralpostures, sequences, and sociality that exceeds that found insome mammals and birds. While many species of lizards are territorial,others are hierarchial and some have harems. For all those territorialspecies studied, crowding results in increased social interaction,increased aggression, and a switch to hierarchial behavior. While smell and sound may be important stimuli for social behaviorin some reptiles, posture, actions, and especially color appearto be most important in diurnal lizards. Temperature and energystudies suggest that the large extinct dinosaurs probably foughtconsiderably less than commonly portrayed in movies and stories,but were also probably much more brightly colored than commonlyshown in reconstructions.     

The Evolution of Social Behavior in Dogs and Wolves

Patterns of social behavior in the Family Canidae appear tobe conservative traits in evolution. Darwin's concept of sexualselection may be broadened to "social selection," includingall factors in the social environment which exert selectionpressure. In a highly social species, the social environmenttends to be stable, generation after generation, accountingfor the stability of social behavioral patterns. The evolutionof social behavior is also related to development, with differentand sometimes opposite selection pressures acting at differentperiods in life. Some myths and misconceptions regarding dog-wolfbehavior are described, and some problems for future researchoutlined.     

Ecology and Evolution of Social Organization in Arctic Sandpipers

A comparative analysis of sandpiper social systems on arcticand subarctic breeding grounds (24 species in the family Scolopacidae,subfamily Calidridinae) shows four major patterns. In a majorityof the species (15), populations are dispersed through a stronglydeveloped territorial system, with strong monogamous pair bondsand only minor yearly fluctuations in numbers. The second patternis seen in three species in which the female of a pair may laytwo sets of eggs in quick succession, one for each member ofthe pair to incubate. This opens opportunities for facultativepolygyny or polyandry (‘serial polygamy’) and forthe evolutionary weakening of the strong pair bond seen in thefirst pattern. The third and fourth patterns are those of polygyny(three species) and promiscuity (three species). These six speciesshow clumped dispersions; their year-to-year fluctuations tendto be strong; the males defend compressible, often small, territories;and high densities can occur locally. It is suggested that thepattern of overdispersion and monogamy represents a conservativemode of adapting to high-latitude environments, while the patternof clumped dispersion with polygyny or promiscuity representsan opportunistic mode in that the birds are concentrated intobreeding areas where and when weather, food, and/or some otherenvironmental factors are particularly favorable. Apparentlyfalling evolutionarily between these two basic patterns areseveral species conservative in their life-styles, but polygamousat least occasionally and showing some features of opportunism.There is thus a striking diversity of social systems in calidridinesandpipers, that is, in the styles of habitat exploitation theyhave evolved in the arctic and subarctic habitats to which theirbreeding is confined. A graphic model suggesting paths of evolutionarydevelopment and of interplay among factors considered criticalin the evolution of these systems is proposed.