Spreading disease: a controversy concerning the metaphysics of disease.

This article concerns the metaphysics of disease. Is disease a fixed feature of the world or a social value or preference? I argue that disease is not a value-laden concept and thus debates concerning it differ fundamentally from debates concerning health, harm, or suffering where evaluative judgements are central. I show how the so-called social constructionist view of disease has been motivated both by ethical concerns with medical practices and general theoretical doubts about scientific naturalism. If I can show that ethical concerns about medical treatment can be answered without adopting social constructionism, that leaves only the broader theoretical question of naturalism. I cannot completely answer those theoretical doubts, but I show that the theoretical motivation is less convincing when it is separated from the moral challenge often accompanying it. I conclude that a convincing defense of the non-naturalistic conception of disease is rarely attempted and proves more difficult and counter-intuitive than its proponents assume.     

From whiteness to diversity: crossing the racial threshold in bicentennial Argentina

This article examines recent transformations on the discourses of race and nation in bicentennial Argentina, which have shifted from the notion of a fundamentally white nation to an assertion of its racial and cultural diversity. I examine the production of race in contemporary institutional and non-institutional practices that challenge the discourses of modernity according to which Argentina is a white, homogenous and Europeanized nation. The article focuses on a set of cultural manifestations involving Japanese Argentines that – as non-traditional actors in the racial and national stages and as ‘desirable’ immigrants – reveal some inherent fissures in the current official narrative that ostensibly progresses from homogeneity to diversity, and from exclusion to inclusion. By observing the performativity of race and a non-constructivist understanding of race embedded within these cultural manifestations, I argue that the newly multicultural nation continues to inherit its mechanisms of racial production from the modern nation.     

Biosocial criminology and the mismeasure of race

This article examines biosocial criminology’s partial social constructionism of race, that is a logic of difference that attempts to accommodate both a social and biological interpretation of race. We focus on the way biosocial criminologists operationalize race to outline the sociological consequences of what we see as a renewed commitment to the bio-criminalization of race. Biosocial criminologists do not reject that race is socially constructed, but in practice they disregard the main consequences and raison d’être of this postulate. Though biosocial criminologists praise the incorporation of cutting-edge science into criminology, the research programme’s actual findings concerning race do not necessarily align with views from genetic and neuroscientific research. Instead, we argue that biosocial criminology solicits social constructionism as a shield to re-insert antiquated biologic notions of race through a guise of bio-sociality.     

What are we to make of the concept of race?: Thoughts of a philosopher–scientist

Discussions about the biological bases (or lack thereof) of the concept of race in the human species seem to be never ending. One of the latest rounds is represented by a paper by Neven Sesardic, which attempts to build a strong scientific case for the existence of human races, based on genetic, morphometric and behavioral characteristics, as well as on a thorough critique of opposing positions. In this paper I show that Sesardic’s critique falls far short of the goal, and that his positive case is exceedingly thin. I do this through a combination of analysis of the actual scientific findings invoked by Sesardic and of some philosophical unpacking of his conceptual analysis, drawing on a dual professional background as an evolutionary biologist and a philosopher of science.     

And you thought we had moved beyond all that: biological race returns to the social sciences

Recently, sociologists have argued in high-profile journals that racial categories are linked to genetically distinct clusters within the human population. They propose theorizing race as a socially constructed categorization system that is related to biological groupings within our species. This work overlooks, however, the extent to which statistically inferred genetic clusters are themselves socially constructed, making it impossible to juxtapose ‘subjective’ social categories with ‘objective’ biological ones. This editorial urges social scientists to take a critical look at claims about the genetic underpinnings of race, and to contribute their insights to ongoing debates about the nature of race.     

Janus-faced race: Is race biological,social, or mythical?

As belief in the reality of race as a biological category among U.S. anthropologists has fallen, belief in the reality of race as a social category has risen in its place. The view that race simply does not exist—that it is a myth—is treated with suspicion. While racial classification is linked to many of the worst evils of recent history, it is now widely believed to be necessary to fight back against racism. In this article, I argue that race is indeed a biological fiction, but I critique the claim that race is socially real. I defend a form of anti-realist reconstructionism about race, which says that there are no races, only racialized groups—groups mistakenly believed to be races. I argue that this is the most attractive position about race from a metaphysical perspective, and that it is also the position most conductive to public understanding and social justice.     

Is there a racial order? Comments on Emirbayer and Desmond

ABSTRACT

Emirbayer and Desmond’s THE RACIAL ORDER is a heroic but ultimately quixotic effort. The work relies upon an attempted synthesis of Deweyan pragmatism and Bourdieuian social capital theory. Emirbayer and Desmond deploy an uneasy combination of approaches, insisting upon ‘reflexivity’ in sociological study of race and racism (the pragmatism dimension), and crafting a dubious taxonomy of sociological ‘fields’ where racial conflict takes shape, and in which sociologists study race as well (the social capital dimension). A chapter on ‘racial reconstruction’ proposes to apply their understanding to concrete political struggles, in pursuit of an augmented ‘racial democracy’. While the book is tremendously erudite theoretically and provides a valuable literature review, it does not advance racial theory very much. The authors are distracted by Bourdieu’s scientism and obsession with classification. Although ‘racial order’ is revealed to be a chimera, there is still much to be learned here.     

Racialized political shock: Arab American racial formation and the impact of political events

This article explores significant factors influencing the process of Arab American racial formation. I bring into conversation theories of racial formation and ‘political shock’ in social movement scholarship to develop the notion of ‘racialized political shock’ as an important factor in how racial and ethnic groups mobilize and organize. Many moments of political shock are highly racialized and have the potential to reorder the racial and ethnic landscape in ways that can open opportunities or introduce constraints to mobilizations around racial formation. Drawing on existing studies of Arab Americans, this paper highlights how Arab American racial formation has been galvanized during moments of racialized political shock. In the Arab American case, these moments have led to a call for recognition outside the category of white. I conclude by outlining ways forward in the study of Arab Americans, who have been overlooked in studies of race and ethnicity in the US.     

A white side of black Britain: The concept of racial literacy

Opposition to transracial adoption on both sides of the Atlantic, has been based, in part, on the assumption that white parents cannot understand race or racism and thus cannot properly prepare children of multiracial heritage to cope with racism. In this article I draw on a seven-year ethnographic study to offer an intensive case study of white transracial birth parents that counters this racial logic. I draw on a subset of data collected from field research and in-depth interviews with 102 members of black-white interracial families in England. I provide an analysis of three practices that I discovered among white transracial birth parents who were attempting to cultivate ‘black’ identities in their children of multiracial heritage. I offer the concept of ‘racial literacy’ to theorize their parental labour as a type of anti-racist project that remains under the radar of conventional sociological analyses of racism and anti-racist social movements.     

The psychological reality of social constructions

This article argues that social constructions have a psychological reality that exists apart from structural conditions. Our thesis is developed in four sections. First, psychological evidence is reviewed that illustrates how people classify and evaluate others on the basis of salient visual or auditory information, such as race, ethnicity or gender. Although this discussion should generalize to the construction of ethnic and gender differences, we concentrate on the Black‐White race relationship in the United States. Secondly, we briefly survey the debate between constructionists and essentialists within psychology, and address how social psychological findings may contribute to constructionist theory and sociological research. Thirdly, a psychological defence of the racial construct is given. It is argued that although race is crucial to the full understanding of majority‐minority relations, its usefulness is best seen in conjunction with structural formulations. Finally, an interactive model of race and social structure is submitted. Taking economic class as an example, research is reviewed that suggests how race and social structure jointly influence people's stereotypes within differing historical and cultural contexts. The black middle class is used as a case where analysis requires attention to both race and structure.     

Innovating inequity: if race is a technology,postracialism is the genius bar

ABSTRACT

In this essay I posit race as a kind of technology, one that creates parallel universes and premature death, requiring routine maintenance and upgrade. I suggest that David Theo Goldberg’s Are We Postracial Yet? is a story of innovation that expertly exposes the trade secrets of the social production of race. I argue that not only are technological and social innovation metaphorically linked; technoscience is also one of the most effective conduits for reproducing racial inequality, and so I extend Goldberg’s analysis to address the central role of science and technology in modern statecraft and racecraft. Finally, if postracial innovators are busily refurbishing racism to remake inequality, then those who seek radical transformation in the other direction, towards freedom and justice, must re-examine the default settings, rather than the routine breakdowns, of social life.     

Core values and cultural identity

This article examines racial classifications on United States population census schedules between 1890 and 1990 to provide insights on the changing meanings of race in US society. The analysis uses a sociology of knowledge perspective which assumes that race is an ideological concept that can be interpreted most productively by relating its definition and measurement to the larger social and political context. Four themes are identified and discussed: (i) the historical and continuing importance of skin colour, usually dichotomized into white and non‐white, in defining race and counting racial groups; (ii) a belief in ‘pure’ races that is reflected in a preoccupation with categorizing people into a single or ‘pure’ race; (iii) the role of census categories in creating pan‐ethnic racial groups; and, (iv) the confusing of race and ethnicity in census racial classifications. Each theme demonstrates the potential or actual role of official statistics, exemplified by census racial data, in reflecting and guiding changes to the meaning and social perceptions of race. A detailed examination of racial classifications from the 1980 and 1990 Censuses shows that the influence of political interests on racial statistics is particularly important. The article concludes with a discussion of whether official statistical recorders such as population censuses should categorize and measure race, given the political motivations and non‐scientific character of the classifications used.     

From Puerto Rican to pan-ethnic in New York city

Abstract

The increasing diversity of the US population has stimulated interest in racial identification, which is complex for phenotypically heterogeneous groups such as Puerto Ricans. We overcome several limitations of the empirical literature on racial identification among Puerto Ricans with a study that is grounded in the experience of Puerto Rican women in New York City. Our analysis focuses on two questions: How do Puerto Rican women in New York identify themselves racially? What are the sources of racial identification? The results indicate that most Puerto Rican women in New York conflate race and ethnicity by designating their race as either ‘Puerto Rican’ or ‘Hispanic’. Moreover, the decision to ‘become’ pan-ethnic has complex roots. In particular, the effect of skin tone on pan-ethnic identification is conditioned by socioeconomic and neighbourhood characteristics.     

The legitimacy of elite gatekeeping

Natasha Warikoo’s study of how students at Harvard, Brown, and Oxford Universities view race and fairness highlights the vast differences between the U.S. and Britain with respect to perceptions of meritocracy by these winners in the competition for places in elite institutions. The strict enforcement of uniform standards for admission is seen as critical and legitimate at Oxford, whereas a more holistic approach in the U.S. – one that sees racial diversity as an important and desirable part of the institution’s culture and identity – is seen as critical to a “diversity bargain”. I question the sources of students’ ideas about race and the diversity bargain, suggesting that they may be rooted more in their pre-college experiences than in their life at university. I also raise questions about whether and how an admissions lottery would work to address some of Warikoo’s concerns.     

Can there be a truly systematic and comprehensive theory of race?

ABSTRACT

In this ambitious new book, Mustafa Emirbayer and Matthew Desmond contend that there has never been a truly comprehensive and systematic theory of race. They go on to argue that ‘Much of our best work no longer tells us how to understand or reconstruct racial dynamics but simply gives us concrete proof of their continuing significance’ (3). To what extent does The Racial Order theoretically advance existing theorizing of race? An important contribution – and a central plank in the book – is the way in which a wide variety of cultural and social phenomena is discussed and interwoven into the analysis. The authors draw most heavily on Bourdieu, Dewey, and Durkheim, in their elaboration of the racial order.     

Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity

Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought-styles has been hailed as a pioneer of constructivist science studies and sociology of scientific knowledge. But this consensus ignores an important feature of Fleck’s epistemology. At the core of his account is the ideal of ‘objective truth, clarity, and accuracy’. I begin with Fleck’s account of modern natural science, locating the ideal of scientific objectivity within his general social epistemology. I then draw on Fleck’s view of scientific objectivity to improve upon reflexive accounts of the origin and development of the theory of thought-styles, and reply to objections that Fleck’s epistemological stance is self-undermining or inconsistent. Explicating the role of scientific objectivity in Fleck’s epistemology reveals his view to be an internally consistent alternative to recent social accounts of scientific objectivity by Harding, Daston and Galison. I use these contrasts to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Fleck’s innovative social epistemology, and propose modifications to address the latter. The result is a renewed version of Fleck’s social epistemology, which reconciles commitment to scientific objectivity with integrated sociology, history and philosophy of science.     

WHICH NATURALISM FOR BIOETHICS? A DEFENSE OF MODERATE (PRAGMATIC) NATURALISM

There is a growing interest in various forms of naturalism in bioethics, but there is a clear need for further clarification. In an effort to address this situation, I present three epistemological stances: anti-naturalism, strong naturalism, and moderate pragmatic naturalism. I argue that the dominant paradigm within philosophical ethics has been a form of anti-naturalism mainly supported by a strong 'is' and 'ought' distinction. This fundamental epistemological commitment has contributed to the estrangement of academic philosophical ethics from major social problems and explains partially why, in the early 1980s, 'medicine saved the life of ethics'. Rejection of anti-naturalism, however, is often associated with strong forms of naturalism that commit the naturalistic fallacy and threaten to reduce the normative dimensions of ethics to biological imperatives. This move is rightly dismissed as a pitfall since ethics is, in part, a struggle against the course of nature. Rejection of naturalism has drawbacks, however, such as deterring bioethicists from acknowledging the implicit naturalistic epistemological commitments of bioethics. I argue that a moderate pragmatic form of naturalism represents an epistemological position that best embraces the tension of anti-naturalism and strong naturalism: bioethics is neither disconnected from empirical knowledge nor subjugated to it. The discussion is based upon historical writings in philosophy and bioethics.     

Changing racial boundaries and mixed unions: the case of second-generation Filipino Americans

I examine an understudied topic of intermarriage – nonwhite mixed unions. Drawing on a study of second-generation Filipino Americans, I compare how respondents in inter-ethnic (those partnered with other Asians) and nonwhite interracial (i.e. Latino, black, and non-Asian bi-racial) unions perceive racial boundaries, or their ‘racial schemas’. I argue that mixed unions can change how partners view racial boundaries. Drawing on phenotype, culture, and power position, both inter-ethnically and nonwhite interracially partnered respondents viewed themselves as different from whites. However, they differed in how they constructed nonwhite boundaries. Respondents in inter-ethnic unions drew on their Asian identity to distinguish themselves from Latinos and blacks, while informants in nonwhite interracial unions highlighted their Filipino identity to distance themselves from East Asians and align themselves with Latinos and blacks. These findings show that marriage affects racial boundary development and that mixed unions impact individuals’ racial incorporation.     

How race becomes biology: Embodiment of social inequality

The current debate over racial inequalities in health is arguably the most important venue for advancing both scientific and public understanding of race, racism, and human biological variation. In the United States and elsewhere, there are well-defined inequalities between racially defined groups for a range of biological outcomes—cardiovascular disease, diabetes, stroke, certain cancers, low birth weight, preterm delivery, and others. Among biomedical researchers, these patterns are often taken as evidence of fundamental genetic differences between alleged races. However, a growing body of evidence establishes the primacy of social inequalities in the origin and persistence of racial health disparities. Here, I summarize this evidence and argue that the debate over racial inequalities in health presents an opportunity to refine the critique of race in three ways: 1) to reiterate why the race concept is inconsistent with patterns of global human genetic diversity; 2) to refocus attention on the complex, environmental influences on human biology at multiple levels of analysis and across the lifecourse; and 3) to revise the claim that race is a cultural construct and expand research on the sociocultural reality of race and racism. Drawing on recent developments in neighboring disciplines, I present a model for explaining how racial inequality becomes embodied—literally—in the biological well-being of racialized groups and individuals. This model requires a shift in the way we articulate the critique of race as bad biology. Am J Phys Anthropol 2009. © 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc.