亲缘关系与啮齿类动物的社会行为

在漫长的进化过程中 ,动物除了在形态结构、生理生化以及遗传等方面适应周围环境之外 ,也产生了与环境相适应的行为 ,其中种内个体社会联系的行为称为社会行为。由于自然选择提高了个体的生存价值和广义适合度 (ｉｎｃｌｕｓｉｖｅｆｉｔｎｅｓｓ) ,所以如果个体间亲缘程度不同 ,在自然选择的作用下必然会产生不同的结果。亲缘关系与社会行为的研究源于行为生态学 ,其中以Ｈａｍｉｌｔｏｎ[32 ] 提出的亲缘选择和广义适合度理论为代表 ,将亲缘关系和自然选择联系起来 ,扩展了达尔文自然选择理论的范围 ,较好地解释了利他行为 (ａｌｔｒｕｓ…     

浅谈灵长类动物群体中的生物市场现象

在灵长类动物社会群体中,不具亲缘关系的个体存在着利他行为,如通过相互理毛换取互惠理毛、婴儿照顾、交配权、食物资源或攻击支持等．由此科学家提出了生物市场理论及逐步提高投资策略和等价回馈策略来解释这些行为。灵长类动物这些互惠利他的经济行为,为群体的生存发展提供了重要保证。通过对灵长类动物交换资源与服务的研究．可以更好地了解人类经济行为的演化史。     

合作行为的进化

达尔文在<物种起源>中阐释了生物体的竞争进化.但是合作行为和利他行为的发现却给了自然选择学说致命一击.20世纪60年代开始,进化生物学家开始重视对合作行为的研究.一方面,这些行为的本质至关重要,而且与基因学的观点相悖.另一方面,对合作行为和利他行为,尤其是实验室控制条件下行为的研究非常困难.阐述了合作行为进化发展的方式.同时综述了合作行为模式的框架,简要解释了这些模式的进化机制,以期为进一步理解合作行为的进化及其模式奠定基础.     

暂时与群体分离的个体藏马鸡的反捕食警戒

通过与同伴分担捕食风险 ,生活在稳定群体中的个体动物可以获得长期的适合度利益 ,但同时它们不得不承担食物竞争所带来的潜在代价。这种代价常常取决于食物资源的类型。当好的食物资源出现时 ,一些个体可以离开群体而独享这种资源。了解这些临时游离者如何组织其反捕食行为 ,在进化生态学上是有意义的。藏马鸡 (Crossoptilonharmani)是西藏雅鲁藏布江中游高山灌丛植被的一种典型的非繁殖季节集群鸟类。野外观察表明 ,为了独享好的食物资源 ,一些个体常常远离当前群体的活动范围。分离事件更可能发生于大的群体 ,但其发生率与参与者的数量呈负相关 ;而参与分离的个体愈多 ,分离持续的时间就愈长。分离者的个体警惕水平随着临时群体大小的增加而下降 ,遵从在其它自然大小鸟类群体所发现的一般性规律。分离行为的发生和持续时间被认为是个体对当前食物回报和捕食风险进行权衡的结果。这种利益 -代价权衡也可以解释藏马鸡所具有的强烈集群行为     

行为生态学（二十三）：动物的生殖合作（2）

帮手及其行为的科学解释一个动物发育成熟以后留在出生群中当帮手和离开出生群去进行独立生殖,显然是两种完全不同的对策,为了给帮手及其利他行为的存在以科学的解释,我们必须对这两种对策加以比较研究。从进化和自然选择的角度看,一个个体当帮手时的适合度一定会大于进行独立生殖时的适合度,至少两者的适合度也要相等,否则就无法解释为什么一个个体成熟后不去繁殖自己的后代。     

动物行为学知识简介(六)——进化稳定策略(ESS)

动物最终是要让自己的基因流传下去。为此,它的各类行为,如双亲行为、竞争行为、利他行为,以及相互的通讯等行为,处于最适宜程度。这种适应过程是通过长期自然选择的途径实现的。动物行为怎样达到最适宜程度呢?举例来说,雌粪蝇(Scatophage stercorana)喜欢在新鲜的牛粪上产卵。由于不新鲜的牛粪表面会结成     

雄性黄山短尾猴(Macaca thibetana)攻击支持雌性以换取交配回报

生物市场理论认为动物个体之间通过某种协定交换有价值的商品,使双方均受益。该研究采用目标动物法、行为取样法和连续记录法,对浮溪黄山野生猴谷鱼鳞坑短尾猴(Macaca thibetana)A1群(YA1群)和A2群(YA2群)成年个体在非繁殖季节(2011年8月—12月)和繁殖季节(2012年2月—5月)的雄性攻击支持雌性行为和交配行为进行研究,探讨雄性攻击支持雌性与交配之间的关系。两猴群在繁殖季节和非繁殖季节雄性攻击支持雌性与交配行为均呈显著正相关;YA2群繁殖季节与非繁殖季节攻击支持后交配频次均显著高于随机交配;YA1群在繁殖季节攻击支持后交配频次与随机交配频次差异不显著,但在非繁殖季节攻击支持后交配频次显著高于随机交配,说明短尾猴成年雄性攻击支持雌性可以换取与该雌性个体的交配回报。本研究验证了生物市场理论中社会行为存在交换,首次证明了雄性攻击支持可以换取雌性的交配回报,为进一步研究雄性性竞争与雌性选择提供了实例。     

黄猄蚁对大蜜蜂的捕食行为及其潜在影响

捕食作用会对访花昆虫的种群、行为以及植物适合度产生影响,是植物与传粉者相互关系研究中常被忽视的因素.本文报道了黄猄蚁对大蜜蜂的捕食行为,并模拟捕食的关键环节研究了捕食过程对重要访花昆虫行为的影响.结果表明,黄猄蚁能够利用局部环境主动攻击猎物,利用群体合作捕获采集过程中的体型较大的大蜜蜂,捕食威胁是其影响植物-访花者关系的重要机制.大蜜蜂具有感知花上危险的能力,模拟处理的个体会逃离危险的花或植株并在花上留下标记,将危险信息传递给其它个体.其它拜访者对具有危险信号花的采集频次明显减少,采集时间缩短;模拟处理的影响会随时间推移而较快地消失.此外,该实验没有发现大蜜蜂在花上停留采集过程中具有明显的防御行为.     

非人灵长类早期发育阶段行为偏侧的研究进展

婴幼儿阶段是个体发育的第一个阶段,也是与其照顾者相互作用最为重要的阶段。对个体早期发育阶段行为偏侧的调查,可以帮助我们探索大脑两半球功能偏侧的形成和调控机制,在大脑功能偏侧研究中具有重要意义。本文全面梳理了非人灵长类早期发育阶段所涉及到的3种主要偏侧行为（包括肢体偏好、吸乳偏好和头部转向偏好）以及影响个体偏侧行为的多个潜在影响因子和相关假说,全文以人类相关研究为起点,引出非人灵长类研究现状,以深入了解两者在行为偏侧研究中的异同,为非人灵长类早期发育阶段行为偏侧的研究提供借鉴和参考。     

雄性大熊猫对化学信息行为反应的年龄差异

化学通讯对哺乳动物的生存和繁殖起着重要作用。研究了雄性大熊猫(Ailuropoda melanoleuca)对同伴个体尿液气味行为反应的发育模式。结果显示,在成年雌性个体的尿液气味刺激下,雄性个体表现显著多的嗅闻行为和嗅闻/舔舐环境行为,但是嘶咬气味刺激物的行为明显减少。在雌性个体的尿液气味刺激下,不同年龄段的雄性个体行为表现不同,成年雄性个体表现较亚成年和幼年个体显著多的舔舐行为。此外,成年个体和亚成年个体均表现较多的嗅闻/舔舐环境行为,而幼年个体则无该行为表现。幼年个体较成年和亚成年个体表现显著多的气味涂抹行为,而且嘶咬气味刺激物的时间较亚成年个体显著多。幼年个体和亚成年个体对雌性和雄性个体尿液气味刺激的行为反应不存在显著差异。研究结果表明,雄性大熊猫对同种个体尿液中化学信息的行为反应呈现出年龄差异。     

The donation game with roles played between relatives

We consider a social game with two choices, played between two relatives, where roles are assigned to individuals so that the interaction is asymmetric. Behaviour in each of the two roles is determined by a separate genetic locus. Such asymmetric interactions between relatives, in which individuals occupy different behavioural contexts, may occur in nature, for example between adult parents and juvenile offspring. The social game considered is known to be equivalent to a donation game with non-additive payoffs, and has previously been analysed for the single locus case, both for discrete and continuous strategy traits. We present an inclusive fitness analysis of the discrete trait game with roles and recover equilibrium conditions including fixation of selfish or altruistic behaviour under both behavioural contexts, or fixation of selfish behaviour under one context and altruistic behaviour under the other context. These equilibrium solutions assume that the payoff matrices under each behavioural context are identical. The equilibria possible do depend crucially, however, on the deviation from payoff additivity that occurs when both interacting individuals act altruistically.     

Evolution and the classification of social behavior

Recent studies in the evolution of cooperation have shifted focus from altruistic to mutualistic cooperation. This change in focus is purported to reveal new explanations for the evolution of prosocial behavior. We argue that the common classification scheme for social behavior used to distinguish between altruistic and mutualistic cooperation is flawed because it fails to take into account dynamically relevant game-theoretic features. This leads some arguments about the evolution of cooperation to conflate dynamical scenarios that differ regarding the basic conditions on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We use the tools of evolutionary game theory to increase the resolution of the classification scheme and analyze what evolutionary inferences classifying social behavior can license.     

Human altruism: economic, neural, and evolutionary perspectives

Human cooperation represents a spectacular outlier in the animal world. Unlike other creatures, humans frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. Experimental evidence and evolutionary models suggest that strong reciprocity, the behavioral propensity for altruistic punishment and altruistic rewarding, is of key importance for human cooperation. Here, we review both evidence documenting altruistic punishment and altruistic cooperation and recent brain imaging studies that combine the powerful tools of behavioral game theory with neuroimaging techniques. These studies show that mutual cooperation and the punishment of defectors activate reward related neural circuits, suggesting that evolution has endowed humans with proximate mechanisms that render altruistic behavior psychologically rewarding.     

Kin Selection in Primate Groups

Altruism poses a problem for evolutionary biologists because natural selection is not expected to favor behaviors that are beneficial to recipients, but costly to actors. The theory of kin selection, first articulated by Hamilton (1964), provides a solution to the problem. Hamilton's well-known rule (br > c) provides a simple algorithm for the evolution of altruism via kin selection. Because kin recognition is a crucial requirement of kin selection, it is important to know whether and how primates can recognize their relatives. While conventional wisdom has been that primates can recognize maternal kin, but not paternal kin, this view is being challenged by new findings. The ability to recognize kin implies that kin selection may shape altruistic behavior in primate groups. I focus on two cases in which kin selection is tightly woven into the fabric of social life. For female baboons, macaques, and vervets maternal kinship is an important axis of social networks, coalitionary activity, and dominance relationships. Detailed studies of the patterning of altruistic interactions within these species illustrate the extent and limits of nepotism in their social lives. Carefully integrated analyses of behavior, demography, and genetics among red howlers provide an independent example of how kin selection shapes social organization and behavior. In red howlers, kin bonds shape the life histories and reproductive performance of both males and female. The two cases demonstrate that kin selection can be a powerful source of altruistic activity within primate groups. However, to fully assess the role of kin selection in primate groups, we need more information about the effects of kinship on the patterning of behavior across the Primates and accurate information about paternal kin relationships.     

Children's altruistic behavior in the dictator game

This study examined developmental and socioeconomic status (SES) differences in young children's altruistic behavior in the dictator game (DG). Children aged 4, 6, and 9 years old from six British primary schools played the DG with genetically unrelated individuals using stickers as resource. Results demonstrated that older children and children from higher SES environments behaved more altruistically, although the majority of children displayed altruistic behavior even at the youngest age level. Results buttress conclusions based on studies from diverse cultures and from brain imaging research by providing additional evidence for the fundamental nature of altruistic behavior, as well as for the probable influence of local socialization practices on development.     

Effects of information and group structure on evolution of altruism: analysis of two-score model by covariance and contextual analyses

An altruistic individual has to gamble on cooperation to a stranger because it does not know whether the stranger is trustworthy before direct interaction. Nowak and Sigmund (Nature 393 (1998a) 573; J. Theor. Biol. 194 (1998b) 561) presented a new theoretical framework of indirect reciprocal altruism by image scoring game where all individuals are informed about a partner's behavior from its image score without direct interaction. Interestingly, in a simplified version of the image scoring game, the evolutionarily stability condition for altruism became a similar form of Hamilton's rule, i.e. inequality that the probability of getting correct information is more than the ratio of cost to benefit. Since the Hamilton's rule was derived by evolutionarily stable analysis, the evolutionary meaning of the probability of getting correct information has not been clearly examined in terms of kin and group selection. In this study, we applied covariance analysis to the two-score model for deriving the Hamilton's rule. We confirmed that the probability of getting correct information was proportional to the bias of altruistic interactions caused by using information about a partner's image score. The Hamilton's rule was dependent on the number of game bouts even though the information reduced the risk of cooperation to selfish one at the first encounter. In addition, we incorporated group structure to the two-score model to examine whether the probability of getting correct information affect selection for altruism by group selection. We calculated a Hamilton's rule of group selection by contextual analysis. Group selection is very effective when either the probability of getting correct information or that of future interaction, or both are low. The two Hamilton's rules derived by covariance and contextual analyses demonstrated the effects of information and group structure on the evolution of altruism. We inferred that information about a partner's behavior and group structure can produce flexible pathways for the evolution of altruism.     

AVPR1A variant associated with preschoolers' lower altruistic behavior

The genetic origins of altruism, defined here as a costly act aimed to benefit non-kin individuals, have not been examined in young children. However, previous findings concerning adults pointed at the arginine vasopressin receptor 1A (AVPR1A) gene as a possible candidate. AVPR1A has been associated with a range of behaviors including aggressive, affiliative and altruistic phenotypes, and recently a specific allele (327 bp) of one of its promoter region polymorphisms (RS3) has been singled out in particular. We modeled altruistic behavior in preschoolers using a laboratory-based economic paradigm, a modified dictator game (DG), and tested for association between DG allocations and the RS3 "target allele." Using both population and family-based analyses we show a significant link between lower allocations and the RS3 "target allele," associating it, for the first time, with a lower proclivity toward altruistic behavior in children. This finding helps further the understanding of the intricate mechanisms underlying early altruistic behavior.     

Darwinian selection and “altruism”

Models are proposed for evolution at a single locus affecting altruistic behavior in which genotypic fitnesses are Darwinian and frequency (but not density) dependent. The fitnesses are composed, either in a multiplicative or an additive way, of factors which depend on the receipt and donation of altruistic behavior. The factors are determined from the matrices of conditional probabilities which describe the genotypes of relatives. Since selection occurs, these probabilities are in terms of genotype frequencies. The relationship between the risk to helper and benefit to recipient which allows altruism to evolve is shown to depend on the kinship coefficient between helper and helped, the particular fitness function proposed and the degree of dominance of the altruism. The commonly accepted criteria of W. D. Hamilton [J. Theor. Biol.7 (1964), 1–16, 17–52] apply only in the additive case. A second class of models of social cooperation independent of relationship and its evolutionary dynamics are discussed.     

Family Income Affects Children’s Altruistic Behavior in the Dictator Game

This study aimed to examine how family income and social distance influence young rural Chinese children’s altruistic behavior in the dictator game (DG). A total of 469 four-year-old children from eight rural areas in China, including many children left behind by parents who had migrated to urban areas for work, played the DG. Stickers comprised the resource, while recipients in the game were assumed to be either their friends or strangers, with the social distance (i.e., strangers compared to friends) as a between-subjects variable. Children donated significantly more stickers to their friends than to strangers. Moreover, children from lower income families donated more stickers than children from higher income families. However, no gender and parental migrant status differences in children’s prosocial behaviors were evident in this sample. Findings of this study suggest that children’s altruistic behaviours to peers are influenced by family characteristics since preschool age. The probable influence of local socialization practices on development and the possible adaptive significance were discussed.     

Kin recognition and the evolution of altruism

In 1964, Hamilton formalized the idea of kin selection to explain the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Since then, numerous examples from a diverse array of taxa have shown that seemingly altruistic actions towards close relatives are a common phenomenon. Although many species use kin recognition to direct altruistic behaviours preferentially towards relatives, this important aspect of social biology is less well understood theoretically. I extend Hamilton's classic work by defining the conditions for the evolution of kin-directed altruism when recognizers are permitted to make acceptance (type I) and rejection (type II) errors in the identification of social partners with respect to kinship. The effect of errors in recognition on the evolution of kin-directed altruism depends on whether the population initially consists of unconditional altruists or non-altruists (i.e. alternative forms of non-recognizers). Factors affecting the level of these error rates themselves, their evolution and their long-term stability are discussed.