利用反向遗传技术产生8基因全禽源流感病毒疫苗候选株

利用反向遗传技术将含有A/Chicken/Shanghai/F/98(H9N2)株禽流感病毒(avian influenza virus,AIV)的6个内部基因与H5N1亚型AIV的2个表面基因HA和NA共转染COS-1细胞,产生了6 2全禽源的重配AIV。将H5N1亚型AIV的HA基因经基因突变致弱,然后将A/Chicken/Shanghai/F/98(H9N2)AIV的6个内部基因的cD-NA和以上致弱的禽源HA基因及NA基因的cDNA分别克隆到转录/表达载体pHW2000中,构建成8个转录/表达质粒。将8个质粒共转染COS-1细胞,24h后收获细胞及上清接种SPF鸡胚,72~90h后鸡胚死亡,收取鸡胚尿囊液进行血凝、血凝抑制试验、序列分析、病毒致病性试验和动物免疫保护试验,最终证实产生了致弱的全禽源AIV疫苗候选株。     

利用8质粒系统拯救A/Chicken/Shanghai/F/98（H9N2）株禽流感病毒

应用反向遗传技术将含有1998年中国大陆分离株H9N2亚型禽流感病毒(Avianinfluenzavirus,AIV)的8个基因片段的质粒共转染COS_1细胞,产生了与野生病毒生物学特性相同的H9N2亚型AIV。将A Chicken Shanghai F 98(CK SH F 98)株H9N2亚型AIV的8个基因组cDNA分别克隆到polⅠ_polⅡ转录 表达载体pHW2 0 0 0中,构建成8个转录表达载体重组质粒。将这8个质粒共转染COS_1细胞,2 4h后收获细胞及上清接种SPF鸡胚,4 8h后收取鸡胚尿囊液继续进行鸡胚传代,产生能致死鸡胚的病毒。经血凝、血凝抑制试验、序列分析和电镜观察,证实产生了CK SH F 98(H9N2 )株AIV。     

H9N2禽流感病毒反向遗传系统转录/表达载体的构建和验证

设计带有BsmBI、BsaⅠ或AarⅠ酶切位点的引物,用RT PCR扩增H9N2亚型禽流感病毒(AIV)的8个基因全长片段,克隆入双向转录/表达载体pHW2000,并在PB2、PB1和NA基因中共引入了3个沉默突变标签.将其2个表面基因(HA和NA基因)加上任意1个内部基因,而其它5个内部基因来自A/WSN/33,进行了6种3+5组合形式的基因重排,把相应组合的转录/表达质粒共转染COS-1细胞,均产生了预期组合、有感染性的H9N2亚型流感病毒,表明亲缘关系遥远的流感病毒可以互相获取基因片段产生重组病毒,提示表面结构基因和单个内部基因不足以限制H9N2 AIV在哺乳动物细胞上的宿主范围,同时也验证了构建的8个转录/表达载体均能有效工作,为进一步研究H9N2亚型AIV基因结构与功能、AIV与宿主之间的关系打下了基础.     

H9N2禽流感病毒反向遗传系统转录／表达载体的构建和验证

设计带有BsmBI、BsaI或AarI酶切位点的引物,用RT-PCR扩增H9N2亚型禽流感病毒(AIV)的8个基因全长片段,克隆入双向转录/表达载体pHW2000,并在PB2、PB1和NA基因中共引入了3个沉默突变标签。将其2个表面基因(HA和NA基因)加上任意1个内部基因,而其它5个内部基因来自A/WSN/33,进行了6种3 5组合形式的基因重排,把相应组合的转录/表达质粒共转染COS-1细胞,均产生了预期组合、有感染性的H9N2亚型流感病毒,表明亲缘关系遥远的流感病毒可以互相获取基因片段产生重组病毒,提示表面结构基因和单个内部基因不足以限制H9N2AIV在哺乳动物细胞上的宿主范围,同时也验证了构建的8个转录/表达载体均能有效工作,为进一步研究H9N2亚型AIV基因结构与功能、AIV与宿主之间的关系打下了基础。     

表达H5N1亚型禽流感病毒HA蛋白的重组鼠白血病病毒的特性

通过反转录 聚合酶链式反应 (RT PCR)扩增了H5N1亚型鹅源禽流感病毒 (AIV)完整的血凝素 (HA)基因并进行了克隆与鉴定。序列测定结果已经登陆GenBank ,登陆号为AY6 394 0 5。序列分析表明所扩增的HA基因开放性阅读框架 (ORF)由170 7个核苷酸组成 ,共编码 5 6 8个氨基酸 ,裂解位点的氨基酸组成为RKKR↓GLF ,含连续的碱性氨基酸 ,具有高致病性AIVHA基因裂解位点的特征。构建了含HA基因的真核表达载体pcDNA HA ,通过与鼠白血病病毒 (MuLV)假病毒构建体系的两种质粒pHIT6 0和pHIT111共转染人胚肾细胞 2 93T ,4 8h后收集假病毒上清 ,超离后通过Western blot证明HA蛋白能够在假病毒颗粒表面表达 ,表明HA能够整合到此病毒粒子表面。通过感染 2 93T、COS 7和NIH3T3三种不同的靶细胞 ,证实所构建的假病毒粒子具有感染性和泛嗜性。本研究成功构建了具有感染性的MuLV HA假病毒体系 ,为研究鹅源禽流感病毒侵入细胞的机理及其组织嗜性的变异提供一种新方法。     

禽流感病毒H7N2血凝素HA1基因在大肠杆菌中的表达

目的　表达H7N2亚型禽流感病毒 (AIV)HA1基因 ,用于感染H7亚型禽流感病毒抗体的检测和HA1蛋白功能研究。方法　采用RT PCR方法对H7N2亚型AIVHA1基因进行扩增 ,将PCR产物克隆于pGEM T Easy载体 ,将该基因插入pGEX 4T 2中构建HA1基因原核表达载体 ,转化BL2 1大肠杆菌后 ,在IPTG诱导下表达HA1蛋白 ,Westernblot鉴定表达HA1蛋白。电洗脱方法纯化表达HA1蛋白 ,建立间接ELISA方法 ,对感染AIVH7、H9、H5亚型AIV阳性血清进行检测。结果　成功克隆H7N2亚型AIV的HA1基因 ,其核苷酸序列长度 96 6bp ,编码 32 2个氨基酸残基。构建HA1基因原核表达载体在大肠杆菌内表达出约 6 1× 10 3的HA1融合蛋白。Westernblot和ELISA方法鉴定表明 :表达HA1蛋白与感染H7亚型AIV鸡血清有反应 ,与H5、H9亚型AIV阳性血清没有反应。结论　本研究在大肠杆菌中成功表达了H7N2亚型AIVHA1基因蛋白 ,具有与感染H7亚型AIV阳性血清反应原性 ,不与H5和H9亚型AIV感染阳性血清发生反应。     

用8质粒病毒拯救系统产生H9N2/WSN重组A型流行性感冒病毒

把禽流行性感冒(流感)病毒A／Chicken／Shanghai／F／98(H9N2)的血凝素(HA)和神经氨酸酶(NA)基因cDNA克隆至polⅠ-pol Ⅱ双向转录和表达载体pHW2000,用这两种质粒与8质粒病毒拯救系统中流感病毒A／WSN／33(H1N1)6个内部基因cDNA的质粒组合(6 2重排),共转染COS-1细胞,产生了能在鸡胚中高滴度增殖的H9N2／、WSN重组病毒。用A／WSN／33的8个基因cDNA质粒作对照,也产生了转染子病毒。经过EID50测定和MDCK感染实验,新基因型H9N2／WSN病毒感染鸡胚的能力强(EID50为10^-11／0．2m1),而且对鸡胚的毒力弱,在不加胰酶的情况下不使MDCK细胞产牛病变。经电镜观察,两个转染子病毒的形态与野生型流感病毒相似。反向遗传操作技术的建立,为对禽流感病毒基因功能和疫苗构建等方面的研究提供了新的手段。     

利用反向遗传学技术构建H5亚型禽流感高产疫苗株

采用RT-PCR技术分别扩增了鹅源高产禽流感病毒的6条内部基因片段,近期分离的H5N1亚型禽流感病毒的血凝素基因以及N3亚型参考毒株的神经氨酸酶基因,分别构建了8个基因的转录与表达载体,利用反向遗传学技术拯救出了全部基因都源于禽源的重组流感病毒疫苗株rH5N3。通过对血凝素蛋白HA1和HA2连接肽处的5个碱性氨基酸(R-R-R-K-K)基因缺失与修饰,从而消除了病毒基因的毒力相关序列,拯救的rH5N3疫苗株对鸡和鸡胚均无致病性,病毒在鸡胚尿囊液和细胞培养上清的HA效价得到极大提高,分别为12048和1512。制备的禽流感疫苗免疫动物后4~5周即可诱导产生高效价的HI抗体,鸡免疫后18周依然保持高水平的HI抗体。重组疫苗不论是对于国内早期分离的禽流感病毒A/Goose/Guangdong/1/96还是近期分离的A/Goose/HLJ/QFY/04都能够产生完全的免疫保护作用,免疫鸡攻毒后不发病、不排毒、不死亡。带有N3鉴别诊断标记禽流感疫苗株的研制为H5N1高致病性禽流感的防治提供了新的技术保障。     

1株含H9N2内部基因的H5N1亚型基因重配禽流感病毒的全基因测序及遗传进化分析

在对华东地区家养水禽中流感病毒的带毒状况的流行病学监测过程中,从表观健康家鸭体内分离到一株H5N1亚型禽流感病毒A/duck/Shandong/009/2008(简称Dk/SD/009/08)。为了解该毒株的基因组构成,对该分离株进行全基因测序。测序结果显示:该毒株HA裂解位点处的氨基酸序列为PLRERRRK-R/GL,符合高致病性禽流感病毒的分子特征,且参照H5N1国际统一命名准则,Dk/SD/009/08的HA基因属于2.3.4进化支。BLAST结果显示,HA、NA、NP及NS基因均与H5N1亚型病毒的核苷酸一致性最高,而RNA聚合酶基因(PB2、PB1、PA)及M基因则与H9N2亚型病毒的亲缘关系最近,故推测该分离株可能是一株天然重组病毒;遗传进化分析进一步表明,流行于华南地区鹌鹑中的G1-like H9N2亚型病毒可能为该分离株提供部分的内部基因。     

一株H5N2亚型鹦鹉源禽流感病毒分子进化分析

2005年在广东进行流行病学调查时分离到一株鹦鹉源禽流感病毒,经鉴定为H5N2亚型禽流感病毒(A/Parrot/Guangdong/268/2005)。该毒株的HA裂解位点附近的氨基酸序列为RETRGLF,只含有一个碱性氨基酸,符合低致病性禽流感病毒的HA裂解位点附近氨基酸序列的分子特征;与H5N2亚型禽流感代表毒株相比,该毒株HA和NA基因的糖基化位点、HA基因的受体结合位点编码区、NA基因的耐药性位点均未发生变异。将该毒株全基因组序列与GenBank已公布的19株H5N2亚型禽流感病毒株的相应序列进行比较分析并绘制系统进化树后发现:其与低致病性禽流感毒株A/Pheasant/NJ/1355/1998(H5N2)-like的亲缘关系最近,位于以A/Chicken/Pennsylvania/1/1983(H5N2)为代表的美洲进化分支。     

一种新发现的流感病毒—H5N1

1997年 5月 ,香港首次分离到一种新的Ａ型流感病毒———Ｈ5Ｎ1[1,2 ] ,至该年底共有 18位患者确诊被Ｈ5Ｎ1感染 ,其中 6人死亡[3 ,4 ] 。这是对人类具强毒性的流感病毒新亚型首次被确定。在呼吸系统疾病的病毒中 ,流感病毒因其有抗原性变异而不同于其它病毒 ,特别是它的表面抗原如血凝素 (ｈｅｍａｇｇｌｕｔｉｎｉｎ ,ＨＡ)和神经氨酸酶 (ｎｅｕ ｒａｍｉｎｉｄａｓｅ ,ＮＡ)。主要有两种类型变异 :抗原性漂离(因编码基因点突变的累积导致少量氨基酸改变 )和抗原性转移 (由于不同Ａ型流感病毒亚型的抗原基因的重配引起表面抗原分子广泛的…     

Evolution and control of H5N1

The evolutionary dynamics of the H5N1 virus present a challenge for conventional control measures. Efforts must consider the regional aspects of endemic H5N1.The H5N1 virus has spread across Asia, Europe and Africa, and has infected birds in several endemic areas, including China, Indonesia, Vietnam and Egypt. H5N1 outbreaks pose a massive threat for the poultry industry and, ultimately, for human health [1]. However, the rapid spread of the virus also offers the opportunity to study and learn from its dynamics in the wild. The insights gained should inform new public health policies and preventive actions against a possible pandemic.Progress in influenza research has been impressive. In particular, the application of reverse genetics has led to the identification of mutations and reassortment changes that determine virus virulence. Perhaps the most significant results come from the two now infamous studies, published in Nature and Science, about the generation of recombinant H5N1 viruses that are transmissible in ferrets [2,3]. These advances show that we are steadily elucidating influenza virus at the molecular level. By contrast, our understanding of the dynamics of highly pathogenic influenza virus in the environment remains limited [4,5].Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) is an important poultry disease. The major reservoir of the virus is wild waterfowl, and infected birds are usually asymptomatic as a result of long-term evolutionary adaptation [1,6]. After transmission from wild waterfowl to poultry, however, avian influenza viruses occasionally become highly pathogenic and can cause mortalities of up to 100% within 48 h of infection. The standard method for controlling an HPAI outbreak is the testing and culling of all infected poultry, and the setting up of a concentric control area around the infected flock.The HPAI H5N1 virus, circulating in Eurasia and Africa, emerged in China around 1997 [1] but it only infected terrestrial birds at the time. Continuous transmission in poultry eventually allowed the virus to evolve, resulting in large outbreaks in China in 2005 with high mortality in wild waterfowl. The virus spread rapidly, probably though migratory birds, to Central Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Such ‘east to west'' movements of H5N1 viruses over comparably long distances have not since been recorded. Moreover, migrating wildfowl have begun to spread the virus intermittently between Asia and Siberia [7]. This H5N1 lineage is the longest-circulating HPAI virus that has been reported, and it has reached epizootic levels in both domestic and wild bird populations.…the challenge is to understand the evolution of H5N1 to better predict new strains that could become a serious threat for human healthOne of the striking characteristics of the H5N1 lineage, in contrast with other HPAI, is its infectivity toward mammals. H5N1 can be directly transmitted from birds to humans and cause severe disease, although it has a significantly lower transmissibility than seasonal influenza viruses [1]. So far, 608 cases of human H5N1 infections have been reported with 59% mortality [5]. Most human infections have resulted from close contact with H5N1-infected poultry or poultry products, and no sustained human–human transmission has as yet been documented. Nonetheless, a potential H5N1 pandemic remains a great concern for public health.The viruses that caused the five influenza pandemics since 1900 arose by two mechanisms: reassortment among avian, human and swine influenza viruses, and accumulation of mutations in an avian influenza virus [1,8]. Triple reassortment between avian H5N1, swine H3N1 and H1N1 viruses, and double reassortment between avian H5N1 and H9N2 viruses has already been reported in Asia, which raises concerns about new reassortment viruses that could infect humans [9,10]. Meanwhile, research has identified some 80 genetic mutations that could increase infectivity of avian influenza viruses in mammals, and thus potentially facilitate avian influenza evolution to generate a pandemic strain [8,11]. H5N1 strains with some of these mutations have often been found in bird populations [5] and in human H5N1 strains [12]. Indeed, specific mutations that could confer switching in receptor-binding specificity were reported in H5N1-infected patients in Thailand [13]. The two controversial studies published in Nature and Science also showed how a handful of mutations might enable the H5N1 virus to be transmitted between humans [2,3]. Pathogenic variants of the H5N1 virus with a higher pandemic potential could naturally evolve; the challenge is to understand the evolution of H5N1 to better predict new strains that could become a serious threat for human health.…continuous replication of H5N1 virus in Egypt has provided a valuable opportunity to study the impact of genetic evolution on phenotypic variation without reassortmentThe evolutionary dynamics of the Egyptian H5N1 strains provide clues to understanding the pandemic potential of H5N1. The virus was introduced only once in Egypt, in early 2006, and spread among a variety of bird species, including chickens, ducks, turkeys, geese and quail [14]. The virus rapidly evolved to form a phylogenetically distinct clade that has since diverged into multiple sublineages [15]. Thus, continuous replication of H5N1 virus in Egypt has provided a valuable opportunity to study the impact of genetic evolution on phenotypic variation without reassortment.After diversification in local bird populations, some new H5 sublineages have emerged in Egypt with a higher affinity for human-type receptors. Indeed, since their emergence in 2008, almost all human H5N1 strains in Egypt have been phylogenetically grouped into these new sublineages, which can be transmitted to humans with a higher efficacy than other avian influenza viruses. This might explain why, since 2009, Egypt has had the highest number of human cases of H5N1 infection, with more than 50% of the cases worldwide [5]. Fortunately, these Egyptian H5N1 sublineages still do not have binding affinity for receptors in the upper respiratory tract and, therefore, do not sustain transmission in humans. However, it increases the risk of H5N1 variants that are better adapted to humans after viral replication in infected patients.…Egypt is regarded as the country with the highest H5N1 pandemic potential worldwideThe Egyptian H5N1 sublineages are also diversifying antigenically in the field, as some are no longer crossreactive to other co-circulating sublineages [15]. Moreover, faint traces of species-specific evolutionary changes have been detected [16], implying a change in their host species. It shows that the H5N1 virus has undergone significant diversification in Egypt during the past seven years. Of greater concern, however, are Egyptian H5N1 strains that carry mammalian influenza virus type PB2 and have lost the N-linked 158 glycosylation site in the top region of haemagglutinin [15,17], both of which can potentially facilitate viral transmission to humans. The genetic diversification of H5N1 virus in Egypt represents an increasing pandemic potential, and Egypt is regarded as the country with the highest H5N1 pandemic potential worldwide [18].A similar situation exists in other geographical areas. Multiple clades and sublineages of H5N1 are co-circulating in Asia, occasionally enabling reassortment events within and beyond the viral subtypes in the field [19,20]. Several H5N1 strains with enhanced binding affinity to human-type receptors have been reported in Indonesia [12]. Similarly, avian and swine H5N1 strains with an altered receptor-binding preference have been isolated sporadically in Indonesia and Laos [21,22]. As in other areas, distinct groups of H5N1 viruses are circulating amongst themselves and with other avian influenza viruses, generating diverse viral phenotypes in nature. The evolutionary dynamics of H5N1 might even accelerate in the wild. H5N1 viruses diverge genetically in ducks [23]; they can transfer the virus over long distances by migration. Thus, the H5N1 virus has established a complex life cycle in nature with accelerated evolutionary dynamics. The pandemic threat of H5N1 remains a serious concern and might be increasing.Control measures based on isolating and culling are still the gold standard for controlling the early phase of an H5N1 outbreak, and worked against the H5N1 outbreaks in Hong Kong in 1997 and in Thailand in 2004 [4]. However, this measure failed in several countries and made H5N1 endemic. Cross-border circulation of H5N1 further complicates implementation of a classical control strategy based on culling in the infected area.In response, public health officials in several countries, including Egypt and Indonesia, advocate poultry vaccination as a preventive or adjunct control measure [1]. Although vaccination does not completely prevent infections, its proper use can help to control avian influenza outbreaks by reducing virus transmission from infected animals. However, it can also increase vaccine-driven evolution among avian influenza viruses. The endemic status of H5N1, which can cause devastating local epidemics, puts pressure on health officers to use a vaccine or a vaccination strategy that might eventually increase selective pressure and thereby accelerate H5N1 evolution. Given the high mutability and diversity of circulating viruses, it seems best to avoid using a vaccine based on a strain from a different geographical area because there would only be a partial antigen match; such a heterologous vaccine would only be effective in the short term compared with a homologous vaccine. During past control of H5N1 epidemics using imported vaccines, escape mutants have emerged within about a year of the start of vaccination, which made the epidemic even worse [14]. When a vaccination strategy is implemented in an endemic area, the vaccine seed strain should be selected from the same geographical area to try to get the longest possible protection. Vaccine seed virus selection must be periodically revised to produce well-matched and efficacious vaccines.Close communication and workshops hold the greatest potential for controlling the H5N1 virusIn most cases, H5 vaccine for an endemic area comes from a foreign supplier. It would be necessary to enable foreign manufacturers to produce customized H5 vaccines based on epidemic strains from different areas. The best approach might be a plasmid-based reverse genetics system to construct vaccine seed viruses [1]. In egg-based production, which is the basis of flu vaccine production, the seed virus needs to be adapted for high growth. This time-consuming step carries the risk of antigenic changes during vaccine production. Yet, advances in influenza reverse genetics have led to the development of cell culture systems to produce recombinant viruses, which would enable rapid genetic mutagenesis and reassortment. Once reverse genetics generates a virus genome that is well adapted to growth in cell culture, the haemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes can be easily interchanged with those of other influenza viruses. In addition, virus growth in cell culture can shorten production time, which increases the probability of selecting a seed virus antigenically appropriate for the upcoming flu season, and enables a rapid increase in production if necessary [24].A control strategy imposed without consideration of regional customs will not be successfulGiven the zoonotic risks of influenza viruses to both humans and animals, the establishment of a vaccine production system applicable to both human and animal infections is an urgent issue. The capacity of vaccine production needs to be flexible for seasonal, pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccines. Advances in genetic engineering facilitate in vitro control of human- and avian-type receptor expression on cultured cells, which should allow both human and avian influenza viruses to grow in the same system. As vaccine production capacity based on cell culture develops, commercial production of H5N1 vaccines tailored to each geographical area should become possible. In addition, emergency vaccination guidelines, such as pre-pandemic vaccine stockpiling, expanding and accelerating vaccine production and setting vaccination priorities, should be formulated in a business–government partnership, to ensure pandemic preparation. There is no guarantee that the H5N1 virus will be the next pandemic influenza strain. However, exploring options for versatile vaccine manufacturing is a key to controlling zoonotic influenza viruses, including H5N1.The complexity of H5N1 ecology also makes control of endemic H5N1 by vaccination a complex task. The problem is that antigenically different groups of viruses, which are not crossreactive, are often co-circulating in endemic areas. Circulation of viruses in each sublineage is not restricted in terms of geography or host species, which complicates efforts to use a vaccine produced against antigens from a single virus strain [15]. Of greater concern, H5N1 virus infects a variety of bird species [1], which means the vaccination targets have expanded. Bird species differ in their optimal vaccination protocol—for example, the single vaccination used routinely in chickens does not induce an adequate immune response in turkeys, which require multi-dose vaccination at an older age [25]. Furthermore, rearing many bird species and their hybrid breeds in uncontrolled confinement is common in H5N1 endemic countries, especially in rural areas. Therefore, the immunogenicity of existing vaccines is probably inadequate to protect all target species with a single vaccination scheme. Endemic H5N1 already forces public health officials to redefine vaccine development policy to improve both vaccine immunogenicity and vaccination regime.Unfortunately, it is unlikely that science will ever produce a clear answer as to when, where and how the next pandemic influenza virus will emergeToday, there are numerous techniques that could overcome these problems by increasing immunogenic potency and crossreactivity. Innovative vaccine formats—multivalent, universal, nasal and synthetic vaccines—possibly coupled with the use of adjuvants, could improve the global vaccine supply [24]. These new technologies should be applied as soon as possible. Nevertheless, no single technique can probably resolve the underlying complexity of H5N1 dynamics. Over-reliance on vaccination might therefore only worsen the situation. Vaccination can help control endemic H5N1 only when administered as part of an integrated control programme that includes surveillance, culling, restricting host movement and enhanced quarantine and biosecurity.The complex evolutionary dynamics of the H5N1 virus are challenging host species barriers and the ecology brings H5N1 into close proximity to humans [1]. The close link between the virus and humans is a multifaceted phenomenon that can affect health in myriad ways. Thus, we need to redefine control strategies to address the nature of H5N1 dynamics. Surveillance is the basis of infection control in the field. Wild birds and their predators should be included as surveillance targets, thereby expanding the H5N1 host species range. Another drawback is the fact that epidemiological studies focus mainly on virus genotyping. Although genetic data is informative, the diversity of H5N1 viruses makes characterization based only on genetic traits difficult. Characterization of viral phenotypes—antigenicity, receptor-binding preference, pathogenicity and transmissibility—is equally important for investigating the evolutionary dynamics of H5N1 viruses in nature. We would need techniques to determine easily viral phenotype, in particular new rapid diagnostic systems that can be used for timely epidemiological investigations and rapid infection control measures [1]. For example, portable kits that can determine virus receptor specificity would allow field testing of whether a particular avian influenza virus strain has adapted to human-type receptors, thereby adding a new dimension for characterizing and assessing H5N1 outbreaks.Our perception of H5N1 control should change from short-term hunting to long-term controlThe large-scale slaughter of all known and suspected infected birds in H5N1 endemic countries is hugely expensive in terms of execution costs and compensation for lost poultry. Financial assistance from international organizations might be needed to promote the thorough implementation of such a policy. However, H5N1 endemic countries are not all poor nations and some have already built a certain level of technology infrastructure. Thus, transfer of epidemiological skills and concepts to local health officers and scientists is a priority. Overseas collaborations between technologically developed countries and their institutions, and H5N1 endemic countries and their institutions, should be established at a functional level. Close communication and workshops hold the greatest potential for controlling the H5N1 virus. Such projects supported by governments and funding agencies would encourage establishment of bilateral and multilateral relationships between developed countries and the developing countries, which are the epicentres of H5N1 outbreaks. Sharing information about risk and risk management is one of the key methods for reducing the threat of future H5N1 epidemics.Globalization has had major benefits for international travel and trade, and sharing of information. The improvements in information technology have dramatically increased the speed and ease of data flow [26]. Intelligence networks facilitate instantaneous sharing of information and enable global warnings about potential hazards as well as problem-solving. Moreover, collaborative research centres, which have been established on reciprocal bases between scientifically advanced countries and institutes and overseas partner countries and institutes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, are important players in information networking—for instance the Institute Pasteur Network, the Mahidol Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit and Japan Initiative for Global Research Network on Infectious Diseases. Linking such laboratory-based networks should be the next step. This would have a profound synergistic effect by maximizing research capacity, human resources and geographic coverage to build a robust global-scale network for infection control.However, regional socio-cultural issues can be a significant concern for virus control wherever accepted values and scientific understanding might differ. Multiple local and regional factors—customs, religion, politics and economics—can affect H5N1 control in an area. Successful implementation of an H5N1 control strategy depends largely on mutual understanding and consideration of local idiosyncrasies.Some examples from Egypt show how regional identity can be closely linked with local public health initiatives. Egypt is an Islamic nation and bird meat is an important source of animal protein, and the only source in some rural areas [14]. A large proportion of Egyptian households in rural areas raise poultry. Although broiler and layer chickens are raised under modern hygienic controls on commercial farms, backyard birds are raised in open uncontrolled farms, leaving them free to interact with other birds (Fig 1A). The poultry meat trade depends mainly on live bird markets in traditional bazaars (Fig 1B), because of a preference for freshly slaughtered poultry. Pigeon towers are built on farms, backyards and roofs throughout villages to raise pigeons for eating. Generally, birds in Egypt are raised in proximity to humans (Fig 1C), which presents an increasing risk of human H5N1 infection in Egypt and establishment of endemic H5N1 in birds nationwide.Open in a separate windowFigure 1Socio-cultural traditions in rearing birds for food in Egypt. (A) Free rearing of backyard birds. (B) Live birds at a downtown market. (C) An example of the intertwined relationship between birds and humans.Such regional identity is inseparable from socio-cultural contexts, making fundamental change virtually impossible. Although there are many scenarios in which a local public health system could be improved by food safety standards and veterinary inspection or short-term closing of live bird markets for virus clearance, H5N1 control measures have to be implemented whilst respecting the intrinsic socio-cultural traditions in the region. A control strategy imposed without consideration of regional customs will not be successful. It is the local health officers and scientists who are best suited to address the enormous complexity and breadth of issues required for H5N1 control. They also experience H5N1 outbreaks in their area on a regular basis and have a great incentive to be involved in infection control. Therefore, it is important to include local expertise in planning and implementing a control strategy.Science in an area such as infectious disease research can no longer be viewed as independent of societal needs…Science is frequently looked at as if it can produce a ‘silver bullet'' to solve every problem. Early success in vaccine and antibiotic development also created a false sense of optimism that scientific methods could eliminate the risk of infection. However, the reality has turned out to be different—some infectious diseases remain uncontrollable and far from eradication. Given the mutable and diversifying nature of avian influenza viruses, there is a significant possibility that different avian influenza subtypes and strains do not follow a single evolutionary pathway. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that science will ever produce a clear answer as to when, where and how the next pandemic influenza virus will emerge. Our perception of H5N1 control should change from short-term hunting to long-term control. The ecology of H5N1 virus brings it into close proximity to humans. The most important strategy is to minimize contact between terrestrial poultry and wild waterfowl to segregate H5N1 in poultry, because H5N1 spread would be uncontrollable if it established a stable equilibrium in waterfowl. For example, H5N1 viruses in Siberia have not been consistently isolated each year from carcasses and faeces of wildfowl migrating from Asia [7]. This implies that H5N1 circulation in the wild still largely depends on occasional introduction from poultry. It is possible that trials to limit H5N1 infection in poultry would lead to a reduction in viral spread and a dwindling evolutionary path in nature. Infection control policy must abandon fixed strategies in favour of flexible ones to keep pace with the evolutionary dynamics of pathogens such as H5N1 (Fig 2).Open in a separate windowFigure 2Changing dynamics of H5N1 virus in the field. Endemic H5N1 virus diversifies in nature, making traditional control measures extremely difficult.Today''s infection control strategy is becoming largely dependent on the reliability and accuracy of information networking. However, the vast flood of scientific information can hide erroneous information and easily mislead the public [26]. Of greater concern, globalization has prompted the centralization of capital and resources, which can lead to an overemphasis on certain research topics. As a consequence, research projects are often short term, without consideration of effects that might have a long-term social impact [27]. This has led to a debate about whether to limit publication of certain types of research or keep scientific information completely accessible. There is probably no easy answer to this. Our global society needs a more mature approach to support research projects that are accurate reflections of societal needs in public health. At the same time, the increasing links between science and society put more pressure on science to play a greater role in society. This is a serious dilemma—how to use science to solve societal problems whilst maintaining its autonomy [27]. Science in an area such as infectious disease research can no longer be viewed as independent of societal needs; we need to establish a balance between the pursuit of independent basic research and its application for solving clinical problems and crises.? Open in a separate windowYohei WatanabeOpen in a separate windowKazuyoshi IkutaOpen in a separate windowMadiha S Ibrahim     

Anti N1 Cross-Protecting Antibodies Against H5N1 Detected in H1N1 Infected People

The A(H5N1) influenza virus pandemic may be the result of avian H5N1 adapting to humans, leading to massive human to human transmission in a context of a lack of pre-existing immunity. As A(H1N1) and A(H5N1) share the same neuraminidase subtype, anti-N1 antibodies subsequent to H1N1 infections or vaccinations may confer some protection against A(H5N1). We analysed, by microneutralization assay, the A/Vietnam/1194/04 (H5N1) anti-N1 cross-protection acquired either during A/NewCaledonia/20/99 (H1N1) infection or vaccination. In cases with documented H1N1 infection, H5N1 cross-protection could be observed only in patients born between 1930 and 1950. No such protection was detected in the sera of vaccinated individuals.     

H5N1 avian influenza in China

H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus was first detected in a goose in Guangdong Province of China in 1996. Multiple genotypes of H5N1 viruses have been identified from apparently healthy waterfowl since 1999. In the years 2004–2008, over 100 outbreaks in domestic poultry occurred in 23 provinces and caused severe economic damage to the poultry industry in China. Beginning from 2004, a culling plus vaccination strategy has been implemented for the control of epidemics. Since then, over 35420000 poultry have been depopulated, and over 55 billion doses of the different vaccines have been used to control the outbreaks. Although it is logistically impossible to vaccinate every single bird in China due to the large poultry population and the complicated rearing styles, there is no doubt that the increased vaccination coverage has resulted in decreased disease epidemic and environmental virus loading. The experience in China suggests that vaccination has played an important role in the protection of poultry from H5N1 virus infection, the reduction of virus load in the environment, and the prevention of H5N1 virus transmission from poultry to humans. Supported by the Key Animal Infectious Disease Control Program of the Ministry of Agriculture, the Chinese National S&T Plan(Grant No. 2004BA519A-57), National Key Basic Research and Development Program of China (Grant Nos: 2005CB523005, 2005CB523200).     

Newcastle Disease Virus-Vectored H7 and H5 Live Vaccines Protect Chickens from Challenge with H7N9 or H5N1 Avian Influenza Viruses

Sporadic human infections by a novel H7N9 virus occurred over a large geographic region in China. In this study, we show that Newcastle disease virus (NDV)-vectored H7 (NDV-H7) and NDV-H5 vaccines are able to induce antibodies with high hemagglutination inhibition (HI) titers and completely protect chickens from challenge with the novel H7N9 or highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses, respectively. Notably, a baculovirus-expressed H7 protein failed to protect chickens from H7N9 virus infection.