Anthropomorphism and 'mental welfare' of fishes

Anthropomorphism, the use of human characteristics as a foundation for interpreting behavior and mental capacities of animals, is a bias undermining our understanding of other species, especially species as evolutionarily distant from humans as fishes. Anthropomorphism is not justified by allusions to evolutionary continuity among vertebrates, because no living vertebrate was ever a descendant of humans, so none could have inherited human traits. Nonetheless, it has recently been claimed that fishes are capable of conscious experiences of pain and emotional feelings and that mental welfare is an important issue for fishes. This paper shows that the evidence supporting claims for experiences of pain or conscious emotions by fishes is conceptually and methodologically flawed. In addition, the paper shows that the natural history and behavior of diverse fish species is inconsistent with a presumption of human-like awareness. This behavioral evidence is in accord with neurobiological observations showing that fishes are very different from us and are unlikely to have a capacity for awareness of pain or emotional feelings that meaningfully resemble our own. The factors that are detrimental to fish welfare have been well delineated by valid, objective indicators of physiological and behavioral well-being. This knowledge should guide welfare decisions. An empirical and non-anthropomorphic examination of diverse fishes and their adaptations should be the foundation for welfare decisions that would be truly beneficial to fishes and humans alike.     

The Science of Animal Suffering

Can suffering in non‐human animals be studied scientifically? Apart from verbal reports of subjective feelings, which are uniquely human, I argue that it is possible to study the negative emotions we refer to as suffering by the same methods we use in ourselves. In particular, by asking animals what they find positively and negatively reinforcing (what they want and do not want), we can define positive and negative emotional states. Such emotional states may or may not be accompanied by subjective feelings but fortunately it is not necessary to solve the problem of consciousness to construct a scientific study of suffering and welfare. Improvements in animal welfare can be based on the answers to two questions: Q1: Will it improve animal health? and Q2: Will it give the animals something they want? This apparently simple formulation has the advantage of capturing what most people mean by ‘improving welfare’ and so halting a potentially dangerous split between scientific and non‐scientific definitions of welfare. It can also be used to validate other controversial approaches to welfare such as naturalness, stereotypies, physiological and biochemical measures. Health and what animals want are thus not just two of many measures of welfare. They provide the definition of welfare against which others can be validated. They also tell us what research we have to do and how we can judge whether welfare of animals has been genuinely improved. What is important, however, is for this research to be done in situ so that it is directly applicable to the real world of farming, the sea or an animal’s wild habitat. It is here that ethology can make major contributions.     

A History of Animal Welfare Science

Human attitudes to animals have changed as non-humans have become more widely incorporated in the category of moral agents who deserve some respect. Parallels between the functioning of humans and non-humans have been made for thousands of years but the idea that the animals that we keep can suffer has spread recently. An improved understanding of motivation, cognition and the complexity of social behaviour in animals has led in the last 30 years to the rapid development of animal welfare science. Early attempts to define welfare referred to individuals being in harmony with nature but the first usable definition incorporated feelings and health as part of attempts to cope with the environment. Others considered that welfare is only about feelings but it is argued that as feelings are mechanisms that have evolved they are a part of welfare rather than all of it. Most reviews of welfare now start with listing the needs of the animal, including needs to show certain behaviours. This approach has used sophisticated studies of what is important to animals and has replaced the earlier general guidelines described as freedoms. Many measures of welfare are now used and indicate how good or how poor the welfare is. Naturalness is not a part of the definition of welfare but explains why some needs exist. In recent years, welfare has become established as one of various criteria used to decide on whether a system is sustainable because members of the public will not accept systems that cause poor welfare. The study of welfare has become part of the scientific basis upon which important political decisions are made.     

Current issues in fish welfare

Human beings may affect the welfare of fish through fisheries, aquaculture and a number of other activities. There is no agreement on just how to weigh the concern for welfare of fish against the human interests involved, but ethical frameworks exist that suggest how this might be approached. Different definitions of animal welfare focus on an animal's condition, on its subjective experience of that condition and/or on whether it can lead a natural life. These provide different, legitimate, perspectives, but the approach taken in this paper is to focus on welfare as the absence of suffering. An unresolved and controversial issue in discussions about animal welfare is whether non‐human animals exposed to adverse experiences such as physical injury or confinement experience what humans would call suffering. The neocortex, which in humans is an important part of the neural mechanism that generates the subjective experience of suffering, is lacking in fish and non‐mammalian animals, and it has been argued that its absence in fish indicates that fish cannot suffer. A strong alternative view, however, is that complex animals with sophisticated behaviour, such as fish, probably have the capacity for suffering, though this may be different in degree and kind from the human experience of this state. Recent empirical studies support this view and show that painful stimuli are, at least, strongly aversive to fish. Consequently, injury or experience of other harmful conditions is a cause for concern in terms of welfare of individual fish. There is also growing evidence that fish can experience fear‐like states and that they avoid situations in which they have experienced adverse conditions. Human activities that potentially compromise fish welfare include anthropogenic changes to the environment, commercial fisheries, recreational angling, aquaculture, ornamental fish keeping and scientific research. The resulting harm to fish welfare is a cost that must be minimized and weighed against the benefits of the activity concerned. Wild fish naturally experience a variety of adverse conditions, from attack by predators or conspecifics to starvation or exposure to poor environmental conditions. This does not make it acceptable for humans to impose such conditions on fish, but it does suggest that fish will have mechanisms to cope with these conditions and reminds us that pain responses are in some cases adaptive (for example, suppressing feeding when injured). In common with all vertebrates, fish respond to environmental challenges with a series of adaptive neuro‐endocrine adjustments that are collectively termed the stress response. These in turn induce reversible metabolic and behavioural changes that make the fish better able to overcome or avoid the challenge and are undoubtedly beneficial, in the short‐term at least. In contrast, prolonged activation of the stress response is damaging and leads to immuno‐suppression, reduced growth and reproductive dysfunction. Indicators associated with the response to chronic stress (physiological endpoints, disease status and behaviour) provide a potential source of information on the welfare status of a fish. The most reliable assessment of well‐being will be obtained by examining a range of informative measures and statistical techniques are available that enable several such measures to be combined objectively. A growing body of evidence tells us that many human activities can harm fish welfare, but that the effects depend on the species and life‐history stage concerned and are also context‐dependent. For example, in aquaculture, adverse effects related to stocking density may be eliminated if good water quality is maintained. At low densities, bad water quality may be less likely to arise whereas social interactions may cause greater welfare problems. A number of key differences between fish and birds and mammals have important implications for their welfare. Fish do not need to fuel a high body temperature, so the effects of food deprivation on welfare are not so marked. For species that live naturally in large shoals, low rather than high densities may be harmful. On the other hand, fish are in intimate contact with their environment through the huge surface area of their gills, so they are vulnerable to poor water quality and water borne pollutants. Extrapolation between taxa is dangerous and general frameworks for ensuring welfare in other vertebrate animals need to be modified before they can be usefully applied to fish. The scientific study of fish welfare is at an early stage compared with work on other vertebrates and a great deal of what we need to know is yet to be discovered. It is clearly the case that fish, though different from birds and mammals, however, are sophisticated animals, far removed from unfeeling creatures with a 15 s memory of popular misconception. A heightened appreciation of these points in those who exploit fish and in those who seek to protect them would go a long way towards improving fish welfare.     

Limited Company

ABSTRACT

This paper looks at the attitudes that scientists hold toward their use of animals, and at some implications for the welfare of laboratory animals. The framework for this analysis is recent changes in the law regulating the use of animals in British science. We note how ambivalent many scientists are about the way they perceive the animals they use, and the moral dilemmas such use poses. We argue, however, that the legislation itself cannot mediate improvements in animal welfare, as it is inevitably policed by the scientific community itself and thus dependent upon values and social relationships within science. We also argue that debates about the promotion of lab animals' welfare tend to use the distancing stance of science; they focus on scientific studies of welfare and behavior, but ignore the context. An important part of that context is the relationships between humans and animals in the lab, which should be taken into account more fully if animals are to benefit.     

“野生动物”的概念框架和术语定义

“野生动物”(wild animal)一词不止在我国, 在全球的英语使用者中也有不同的含义。通过梳理相关研究、国内法和国际法背景下的定义和适用范围, 结合人类对动物繁殖和生活条件的控制情况, 本文提出了“野生动物”的二维概念框架, 梳理了动物从“野生”到“驯化”的12个连续状态。以下状态即未经中长期人工选择的动物类群应被视为野生动物: (1)其在荒野自然或人工环境(如城市或乡村)中自由生存繁殖, 无论是否存在人工投喂、经救护或辅助生殖后被放归的个体; (2)被捕捉圈养在人工环境中生活, 或源自野外但在圈养条件下出生的个体; (3)直系血亲(《濒危野生动植物种国际贸易公约》解释为世系前四代)仍有野外来源的人工繁育后代; (4)放生、逃逸或引入到自然环境中的人工繁育个体。在野生动物物种保护的目标和语境之下, 经过长期人工选择的驯化动物, 无论其是否在人类控制下生活, 如家养猫狗、家禽家畜或模式实验动物, 以及流浪猫狗、放生禽畜和野化家养动物等都不是“野生动物”。但对于一些经过一定程度的人工选择, 所处人类控制情况和对野外种群的影响各异(如经过多代人工繁育的驯养动物、因人类活动导致的外来动物等), 其是否需被作为野生动物管理, 则需要根据生态安全、物种管理、立法目标等特别设定监管范围。《中华人民共和国野生动物保护法》的保护对象可以考虑为: 受到人类威胁濒临灭绝的, 或者具有重要生态作用的野生动物物种, 其状态可不限于是在野外还是人工控制条件下。其他动物的管理, 可根据遗传资源保护、疫病防控、动物福利和生态安全等需要, 另外设立《动物福利法》《生物安全法》等, 并和已有的法律法规如《动物防疫法》《渔业法》等做好衔接。本文还就《野生动物保护法》可能采用的“野生动物”定义提出建议。     

Ambiguous Mice,Speaking Rats: Crossing and Affirming the Great Divides in Scientific Practice

ABSTRACT

During 2009–10, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork with 31 immunologists, virologists, and neuroscientists working with either rats or mice. I encountered how the conceptual and physical bounds that have traditionally separated nature from culture, specie from specie, human from animal, are crossed, blurred, and reasserted. In this ambiguous zone, a scientific incuriosity about animals themselves persists, in the practice of inquiring into animal bodies and minds to produce insights into human health and its betterment. This privileging of human health bypasses animals themselves in favor of a view of them as human similars and prone objects, wholly available to persons, and affirms the Heideggarian thesis, that science occupies an arrogated position in modernity. Such incurious encounters with animals produced ideas and pronouncements about the close biological and genetic similarities that humans and animals share, that scientists in my study called “biokinship” and “genekinship.” These terms indicate both a close relation between animals and persons, but they also present the terms upon which hierarchical relations between humans and animals might be arrayed. Equally present among the scientists with whom I worked was a curiosity about animals themselves. This manifested in understandings and articulations of animals as beings with whom one might make a relationship in which mutually understood communication was possible. Attendant to this curiosity about animals themselves was an awareness scientists in my study had of what these relationships, or what I have called fleshy kinships with rats and mice, might mean for scientific practice, for good science, and for human–animal relatedness in the laboratory. This ambiguous situation calls for analytic attention to biotic materiality and process, but equally for attention to rodents as beings with whom scientists interact on an everyday basis, and with whom they form communicative relations.     

Aquarium und Museum für Fischzucht, 1906–1937 in Brüssel,Belgien

In the beginning of last century an aquarium opened in Brussels where besides fishes also a collection of amphibians and reptiles was shown to the public. A small museum was also included. This aquarium was started with the aim just to show freshwater fishes but shortly after the opening also marine species were part of the collection.Curious inhabitants of Brussels who wanted to get acquainted with the unknown animal world and people who were interested in the scientific aspects of fishes, pisciculture, marine life and freshwater world found what they were looking for in the small aquarium and museum. Shortly after the inauguration it was described as ‘…a useful aquarium not only for the scientist who looks for information about all facets of live in water but also for the average visitors who want to get new impressions and enjoys the silence but also want to learn something. Families and schools as well have the possibility to let children and students learn about animals in a total new way’. A few renowned specialists and hydro biologists gave support but the aquarium had to face different problems and the interest of the public dropped off. A short time before World War II the aquarium was closed.     

宠物的福利和管理

＂家庭动物＂或＂伴侣动物＂的提法较＂宠物＂而言,更为确切并规范。伴侣动物往往因为种种原因成为城镇的流浪动物,在一定程度上,已经成为社会问题。遗弃宠物的原因尽管多种多样,深层次原因主要还是伦理道德的缺失。流浪动物日益泛滥,正在拷问人类的精神文明,有必要引起全社会的关注。动物福利在当今社会已不仅仅是概念化的一般性号召,一些发达国家出版的动物法典对犬、猫的福利有专题阐述。法典不仅对伴侣动物的各种福利条件作了具体规定,同时还提出了最低标准和最佳方案。本文以犬的食物饲喂、饮水及犬舍的要求为例,逐一介绍。     

Ethical considerations in fish research

Fishes are used in a wide range of scientific studies, from conservation research with potential benefits to the species used to biomedical research with potential human benefits. Fish research can take place in both laboratories and field environments and methods used represent a continuum from non-invasive observations, handling, through to experimental manipulation. While some countries have legislation or guidance regarding the use of fish in research, many do not and there exists a diversity of scientific opinions on the sentience of fish and how we determine welfare. Nevertheless, there is a growing pressure on the scientific community to take more responsibility for the animals they work with through maximising the benefits of their research to humans or animals while minimising welfare or survival costs to their study animals. In this review, we focus primarily on the refinement of common methods used in fish research based on emerging knowledge with the aim of improving the welfare of fish used in scientific studies. We consider the use of anaesthetics and analgesics and how we mark individuals for identification purposes. We highlight the main ethical concerns facing researchers in both laboratory and field environments and identify areas that need urgent future research. We hope that this review will help inform those who wish to refine their ethical practices and stimulate thought among fish researchers for further avenues of refinement. Improved ethics and welfare of fishes will inevitably lead to increased scientific rigour and is in the best interests of both fishes and scientists.     

The Controversy on Fish Pain: A Veterinarian’s Perspective

Fish welfare is still a relatively new field. As such, regulations and protocols to ensure fish welfare are currently limited and vary considerably in different jurisdictions. This is in part because of the ongoing controversy as to whether or not fish feel pain. This controversy has persisted for several years, yet veterinarians have been mostly absent from the discussion so far. This essay aims to address this issue. Here, it is argued that while this controversy has its place, it is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Fish welfare could instead be improved by pursuing more clinically applicable research to increase knowledge of fishes’ behavior and physiology. Such research would assist in learning the optimal environment for their specific needs, as well as compiling some verified indicators of pain in fish. This would then lead to improved studies that could help to determine if and when analgesic drugs can be beneficial in fish, as they are in many other species.     

Understanding Nazi Animal Protection and the Holocaust

Abstract

It is well known that the Nazis treated human beings with extreme cruelty but it less widely recognized that the Nazis also took some pains to develop and pass extensive animal protection laws. How could the Nazis have professed such concern for animals while treating humans so badly? It would be easy to dismiss Nazi proclamations on animals as mere hypocrisy but there may be other explanations for the contradiction. For example, anecdotal reports and psychological evaluations of many prominent Nazis suggest they felt affection for animals but dislike of humans. Second, animal protection measures, whether sincere or not, may have been a legal veil to attack Jews and others considered undesirable. Third, the Nazis blurred moral distinctions between animals and people and tended to treat members of even the Master Race as animals at times. This article argues that at the core of the Nazi treatment of humans and animals was a reconstitution of society's boundaries and margins. All human cultures seek to protect what is perceived to be pure from that which is seen to be dangerous and polluting and most societies establish fairly clear boundaries between people and animals. In Nazi Germany, however, human identity was not contaminated by including certain animal traits but certain peoples were considered to be a very real danger to Aryan purity.     

Review: From human–animal relation practice research to the development of the livestock farmer's activity: an ergonomics–applied ethology interaction

Animal husbandry and working conditions for livestock farmers have changed significantly in recent years as agriculture has been exposed to economic as well as health, environmental and ethical challenges. The idea of interdependent welfare between humans and animals is more relevant now than ever. Here, we innovatively bridge two disciplines—ergonomics and applied ethology—to achieve an in-depth observational understanding of real husbandry practice (by farmers, inseminators, vets) at work. Ergonomics aims to gain a detailed understanding of human activity in its physical, sensitive and cognitive dimensions in relation to a task. It also aims to transform work situations through a systemic approach drawing on multiple levers for change. Here, we examine how this analysis holds up to the inclusion of animals as an integral component of the livestock farmer’s work situation. Applied ethology studies behaviours in animals managed by humans. It aims to understand how these animals perceive their environment, including how they construct their relationship with the livestock farmer. This paper proposes an original conception of the human–animal relationship in animal husbandry that employs core structural concepts from both disciplines. From an ergonomic point of view, we address the human–animal relations by examining the relationship between ‘prescribed’ and real work practices, between work and personal life situation, between professional task and human activity. On the applied ethology side of the equation, the human–animal relationship is a process built through communication and regular interactions between two ‘partners’ who know each other. The goal is to understand how each partner perceives the other according to their multimodal sensory world and their cognitive and emotional capacities, and to predict the outcome of future interactions. We cross-analyse these scientific views to show, based on examples, how and in what way they can intersect to bring better analysis of these human–animal relationships. We reflect on common working hypotheses and situated observational approaches based on indicators (behaviour and animal and human welfare/health). This analysis prompts us to clarify what human–animal relational practice means in animal husbandry work, i.e. a strategy employed by the livestock farmer to work safely and efficiently in a healthy environment, where the animal is treated as a partner in the relationship. In this perspective, the challenge is for the livestock farmer’s activity to co-build a positive relationship and avoid being subject to this one.     

Streptomyces as symbionts: an emerging and widespread theme?

Streptomyces bacteria are ubiquitous in soil, conferring the characteristic earthy smell, and they have an important ecological role in the turnover of organic material. More recently, a new picture has begun to emerge in which streptomycetes are not in all cases simply free-living soil bacteria but have also evolved to live in symbiosis with plants, fungi and animals. Furthermore, much of the chemical diversity of secondary metabolites produced by Streptomyces species has most likely evolved as a direct result of their interactions with other organisms. Here we review what is currently known about the role of streptomycetes as symbionts with fungi, plants and animals. These interactions can be parasitic, as is the case for scab-causing streptomycetes, which infect plants, and the Streptomyces species Streptomyces somaliensis and Streptomyces sudanensis that infect humans. However, in most cases they are beneficial and growth promoting, as is the case with many insects, plants and marine animals that use streptomycete-produced antibiotics to protect themselves against infection. This is an exciting and newly emerging field of research that will become increasingly important as the search for new antibiotics switches to unusual and under-explored environments.     

Reflecting on ethical and legal issues in wildlife disease

Disease in wildlife raises a number of issues that have not been widely considered in the bioethical literature. However, wildlife disease has major implications for human welfare. The majority of emerging human infectious diseases are zoonotic: that is, they occur in humans by cross‐species transmission from animal hosts. Managing these diseases often involves balancing concerns with human health against animal welfare and conservation concerns. Many infectious diseases of domestic animals are shared with wild animals, although it is often unclear whether the infection spills over from wild animals to domestic animals or vice versa. Culling is the standard means of managing such diseases, bringing economic considerations, animal welfare and conservation into conflict. Infectious diseases are also major threatening processes in conservation biology and their appropriate management by culling, vaccination or treatment raises substantial animal ethics issues. One particular issue of great significance in Australia is an ongoing research program to develop genetically modified pathogens to control vertebrate pests including rabbits, foxes and house mice. Release of any self‐replicating GMO vertebrate pathogen gives rise to a whole series of ethical questions. We briefly review current Australian legal responses to these problems. Finally, we present two unresolved problems of general importance that are exemplified by wildlife disease. First, to what extent can or should ‘bioethics’ be broadened beyond direct concerns with human welfare to animal welfare and environmental welfare? Second, how should the irreducible uncertainty of ecological systems be accounted for in ethical decision making?     

“What’s wrong with my monkey?” Ethical perspectives on germline transgenesis in marmosets

The birth of the first transgenic primate to have inherited a transgene from its parents opens the possibility to set up transgenic marmoset colonies, as these monkeys are small and relatively easy to keep and breed in research facilities. The prospect of transgenic marmoset models of human disease, readily available in the way that transgenic laboratory mice are currently, prompts excitement in the scientific community; but the idea of monkeys being bred to carry diseases is also contentious. We structure an ethical analysis of the transgenic marmoset case around three questions: whether it is acceptable to use animals as models of human disease; whether it is acceptable to genetically modify animals; and whether these animals’ being monkeys makes a difference. The analysis considers the prospect of transgenic marmoset studies coming to replace transgenic mouse studies and lesion studies in marmosets in some areas of research. The mainstream, broadly utilitarian view of animal research suggests that such a transition will not give rise to greater ethical problems than those presently faced. It can be argued that using marmosets rather than mice will not result in more animal suffering, and that the benefits of research will improve with a move to a species more similar in phylogenetic terms to humans. The biological and social proximity of monkeys and humans may also benefit the animals by making it easier for scientists and caretakers to recognize signs of suffering and increasing the human motivation to limit it. The animal welfare and research impacts of the transition to marmoset use will depend very much on the extent to which researchers take these issues seriously and seek to minimize animal harm and optimize human benefit.     

In defense of dignity: Reflections on the moral function of human dignity

This paper defends human dignity in two ways. First, by confronting the criticism that human dignity does not serve an important function in contemporary moral discourse and that its function can be sufficiently performed by other moral terms. It is argued that this criticism invites a danger of moral reductionism, which impoverishes moral discourse. The authority of moral philosophy to correct widely shared moral intuitions, rooted in experiences of grave injustices and wrongs, is questioned. Secondly, dignity is defended by showing what is needed to uphold it, both in theory and practice. It is argued, and demonstrated through examples, that human dignity as a universal value ascribed to human beings and the virtue of dignified action are intimately related. This is fleshed out in terms of Kant’s analysis of respect in the practical sense and of virtue as a commitment to the value of dignity as a constitutive end of our moral order. It is furthermore argued that theoretical attempts to ground respect for dignity in human capacities lead to a moral impasse. It is necessary to act as if every human being is worthy of respect. This practical approach requires institutions and specified moral obligations that are integral to the democratic ethos and the rule of law, which guarantees the equal status of human beings. This practical task requires that we consistently tease out and act on the implications of these principles rather than seek deeper justification for the equal worth of humans, articulated in the term human dignity.     

The Difference in Cognition Consistency Between the Sciences and Humanities

It is reasonable that the strict sciences represented by mathematics, physics and chemistry have nearly been a kind of substitutional belief of humans after "the Death of God". To conclude theoretically, the significant attraction or the extremely great power of science is, in a word, the validity of thinking and action. From the viewpoint of human action or prac-     

Expanding the moral circle: farmed fish as objects of moral concern

Until recently fish welfare attracted little attention, but international and national legislation and standards of fish welfare are now emerging and an overview of these developments is presented in this study. Whereas animal welfare legislation is based on public morality, animal ethics does not automatically accept public morality as normative and elaborates arguments regarding the way humans should treat animals (referred to as moral standards). In this study we present the most common animal ethics theories. For most of these, sentience is considered a demarcation line for moral concern: if an animal is sentient, then it should be included in the moral circle, i.e. receive moral consideration in its own right and some basic welfare should be ensured. As for fish, research has revealed that the sensory system of teleosts can detect noxious stimuli, and that some kind of phenomenal consciousness, allowing the fish to feel pain, seems to be present. This raises the ethical question as to how much evidence we need in order to act on such indications of fish sentience. A simple risk analysis shows that the probability that fishes can feel pain is not negligible and that if they do indeed experience pain the consequences in terms of the number of suffering individuals are great. We conclude that farmed fish should be given the benefit of the doubt and we should make efforts that their welfare needs are met as well as possible. Finally, the way forward is briefly discussed: efforts must be made to understand what fish welfare means in practical fish farming. This will involve the development of research and education, greater accountability and transparency, compliance with and control of policies, and quality assurance schemes.