Genetic support for the evolutionary theory of reproductive transactions in social wasps

Recent evolutionary models of reproductive partitioning within animal societies (known as 'optimal skew', 'concessions' or 'transactional' models) predict that a dominant individual will often yield some fraction of the group's reproduction to a subordinate as an incentive to stay in the group and help rear the dominant's offspring. These models quantitatively predict how the magnitude of the subordinate's 'staying incentive' will vary with the genetic relatedness between dominant and subordinate, the overall expected group output and the subordinate's expected output if it breeds solitarily. We report that these predictions accord remarkably well with the observed reproductive partitioning between conesting dominant and subordinate queens in the social paper wasp Polistes fuscatus. In particular, the theory correctly predicts that (i) the dominant's share of reproduction, i.e. the skew, increases as the colony cycle progresses and (ii) the skew is positively associated both with the colony's productivity and with the relatedness between dominant and subordinate. Moreover, aggression between foundresses positively correlated with the skew, as predicted by transactional but not alternative tug-of-war models of societal evolution. Thus, our results provide the strongest (quantitative support yet for a unifying model of social evolution.     

Bordered tug-of-war models are neither general nor predictive of reproductive skew

Models of reproductive skew assume reproductive shares are either conceded, competed over, or both. Previous mathematical evaluations found that simultaneous concessions and contests are evolutionarily unstable. Recently, Shen and Reeve (2010) challenged these conclusions and developed a series of sub-models they argued to be a unified approach to reproductive skew: the general bordered tug-of-war (BTOW). However, BTOW fails as a general model for two reasons: (1) the BTOW strategy cannot invade populations where individuals either only compete for or only concede reproductive shares and (2) contrary to Shen and Reeve’s assertion, BTOW populations are easily invaded by strategies with fewer or no concessions, but competing at lower levels. The failure of BTOW as a general model has major implications for interpreting experiments on reproductive skew. A large number of studies have measured the effects of genetic relatedness and competitive ability on reproductive skew, with a great majority finding no significant correlation between variation in within-group relatedness or competitive ability and across-group differences in skew. No model of reproductive skew except one variant of the BTOW predicts such results. With the rejection of BTOW as a valid general model, it is clear that these results are contradictory to reproductive skew theory rather than supportive of it.     

Reproductive Competition Among Males in Multimale Groups of Primates: Modeling the Costs and Effectiveness of Conflict

Multimale groups of primates are characterized by strong reproductive competition among males, generally resulting in an uneven division of male reproductive success (reproductive skew). The observed patterns of conflict and reproductive skew have often been attributed to the so-called tug-of-war model. We show, however, that two important assumptions of this model are not met in male primates. First, the tug-of-war model assumes that reproductive conflict reduces overall group productivity, but in male primates (and most other vertebrates) conflict likely involves mortality rather than fecundity costs. Second, the tug-of-war model does not account for the possibility that male primates can achieve some reproductive success without engagement in open conflict, such as when a single male cannot guard several receptive females at the same time. We therefore develop a dynamic version of the tug-of-war model, in which reproductive competition causes mortality costs, and in which individuals can gain uncontested shares of reproduction dependent on the degree of female receptive overlap. This model differs substantially from the original tug-of-war model, and derives a new and rich set of comparative predictions. For instance, it predicts that the level of conflict among males declines as the queuing success of subordinate males increases (as survival increases), and also, as their uncontested share of reproduction increases, e.g., as female receptive overlap increases. Our model shows how male–male conflict and female receptive overlap collectively determine the level of reproductive skew among male primates, and illustrates that this relationship is more complex than previously thought.     

Models of reproductive skew: A review and synthesis (Invited Article)

Animal societies vary markedly in reproductive skew, the extent to which breeding is monopolised by dominant individuals. In the last few years, a large number of different models have been developed to explain this variation. Here, I review existing models of reproductive skew, distinguishing between two basic types. Transactional models focus on group stability and the constraints this places on the division of reproduction. Compromise models, by contrast, ignore issues of group stability and view the division of reproduction as the outcome of a conflict in which each group member has a limited or partial ability to enforce its own optimum. I go on to show, however, that the division between transactional and compromise models is somewhat artificial, and that both approaches may be combined in a single, synthetic treatment. Different models of reproductive skew are thus better seen as special cases of a general underlying theory, rather than alternative paradigms. I conclude with a brief discussion of the possibilities and problems of empirically testing this unified theory of skew, and the prospects for future theoretical advances.     

Female control of the distribution of paternity in cooperative breeders

Models of reproductive skew have shed light on why animal societies vary in the partitioning of reproduction among group members. However, their application to cooperative vertebrate societies remains controversial. A particular problem is that previous models assume that skew in paternity is determined by interactions among males and males only. This conflicts with observations from many species that indicate that females exert control over the distribution of paternity. Here we address this shortfall in the current theory by developing two models to explore the expected patterns of skew in three member groups in which a female controls the allocation of paternity among two males. The first "staying incentive" model extends previous "transactional" (or "concession") models to examine the conditions where females will be willing to share reproduction among a dominant and a subordinate male to retain the subordinate in the group. The second "work incentive" model explores patterns of skew where females allocate paternity in order to maximize the amount of care their offspring receive. The models make contrasting predictions about the nature of male-female conflict over reproduction and also about the relationships between skew and relatedness, ecological constraints, the relative quality of the subordinate male, and the relative cost of care for the two males. These divergent predictions provide a schema by which the evolutionary causes of variation in skew among males can be evaluated.     

Transactional skew and assured fitness return models fail to predict patterns of cooperation in wasps

Cooperative breeders often exhibit reproductive skew, where dominant individuals reproduce more than subordinates. Two approaches derived from Hamilton's inclusive fitness model predict when subordinate behavior is favored over living solitarily. The assured fitness return (AFR) model predicts that subordinates help when they are highly likely to gain immediate indirect fitness. Transactional skew models predict dominants and subordinates "agree" on a level of reproductive skew that induces subordinates to join groups. We show the AFR model to be a special case of transactional skew models that assumes no direct reproduction by subordinates. We use data from 11 populations of four wasp species (Polistes, Liostenogaster) as a test of whether transactional frameworks suffice to predict when subordinate behavior should be observed in general and the specific level of skew observed in cooperative groups. The general prediction is supported; in 10 of 11 cases, transactional models correctly predict presence or absence of cooperation. In contrast, the specific prediction is not consistent with the data. Where cooperation occurs, the model accurately predicts highly biased reproductive skew between full sisters. However, the model also predicts that distantly related or unrelated females should cooperate with low skew. This prediction fails: cooperation with high skew is the observed norm. Neither the generalized transactional model nor the special-case AFR model can explain this significant feature of wasp sociobiology. Alternative, nontransactional hypotheses such as parental manipulation and kin recognition errors are discussed.     

Tug-of-war has no borders: it is the missing model in reproductive skew theory

Cooperative breeding often results in unequal reproduction between dominant and subordinate group members. Transactional skew models attempt to predict how unequal reproduction can be before the groups themselves become unstable. A number of variants of transactional models have been developed, with a key difference being whether reproduction is controlled by one party or contested by all. It is shown here that ESS solutions for all situations of contested control over reproduction are given by the original tug-of-war model (TOW). Several interesting results follow. First, TOW can escalate enough to destabilize some types of groups. Particularly vulnerable are those that have low relatedness and gain little from cooperative breeding relative to solitary reproduction. Second, TOW can drastically reduce group productivity and especially the inclusive fitness of dominant individuals. Third, these results contrast strongly with those from variants of TOW models that include concessions to maintain group stability. Such models are shown to be special cases of the general and simpler TOW framework, and to have assumptions that may be biologically suspect. Finally, the overall analysis suggests that there is no mechanism within existing TOW framework that will prevent a costly struggle for reproductive control. Because social species rarely exhibit the high levels of aggression predicted by TOW models, alternative evolutionary mechanisms are considered that can limit conflict and produce more mutually beneficial outcomes. The further development of alternative models to predict patterns of reproductive skew are highly recommended.     

Using social parasitism to test reproductive skew models in a primitively eusocial wasp

Remarkable variation exists in the distribution of reproduction (skew) among members of cooperatively breeding groups, both within and between species. Reproductive skew theory has provided an important framework for understanding this variation. In the primitively eusocial Hymenoptera, two models have been routinely tested: concessions models, which assume complete control of reproduction by a dominant individual, and tug-of-war models, which assume on-going competition among group members over reproduction. Current data provide little support for either model, but uncertainty about the ability of individuals to detect genetic relatedness and difficulties in identifying traits conferring competitive ability mean that the relative importance of concessions versus tug-of-war remains unresolved. Here, we suggest that the use of social parasitism to generate meaningful variation in key social variables represents a valuable opportunity to explore the mechanisms underpinning reproductive skew within the social Hymenoptera. We present a direct test of concessions and tug-of-war models in the paper wasp Polistes dominulus by exploiting pronounced changes in relatedness and power structures that occur following replacement of the dominant by a congeneric social parasite. Comparisons of skew in parasitized and unparasitized colonies are consistent with a tug-of-war over reproduction within P. dominulus groups, but provide no evidence for reproductive concessions.     

Patterns of reproductive skew in the polygynandrous acorn woodpecker

We compared observed levels of reproductive skew in the cooperatively breeding acorn woodpecker (Melanerpes formicivorus) with those predicted by two alternative transactional models. "Concession" models predict the degree to which parentage is shared assuming that a single dominant is in complete control of reproduction. Alternatively, "restraint" models predict reproductive sharing assuming that the dominant controls only whether subordinates remain in the group but does not control its share of reproduction. Reproductive skew is high among males: on average, the most successful male sires more than three times as many offspring as the next most successful male. Females share parentage equally and have lower constraints on dispersal and lower survival rates compared with males, which is consistent with predictions from the concessions model. Also as predicted by the concessions model, yearly variation in opportunities for dispersal before the breeding season correlates positively with skew. However, in contrast to concessions but consistent with the restraint model, skew decreases with relatedness. Thus, neither model consistently predicts patterns of reproductive skew in this species. We suggest that models of reproductive skew will need to include competitive interactions among potential breeders and mate choice before they will adequately predict patterns of reproductive partitioning in most vertebrate societies.     

Clutch-size adjustments and skew models: effects on reproductive partitioning and group stability

Reproductive skew theory seeks to integrate social and ecologicalfactors thought to influence the division of reproduction amonggroup-living animals. However, most reproductive skew modelsonly examine interactions between individuals of the same sex.Here, we suggest that females can influence group stabilityand conflict among males by modifying their clutch size andmay do so if they benefit from the presence of subordinate malehelpers or from reduced conflict. We develop 3 models, basedon concessions-based, restraint, and tug-of-war models, in whichfemale clutch size is variable and ask when females will increasetheir clutch size above that which would be optimal in the absenceof male–male conflict. In concessions-based and restraintmodels, females should increase clutch size above their optimaif the benefits of staying for subordinate males are relativelylow. Relatedness between males has no effect on clutch size.When females do increase clutch size, the division of reproductionbetween males is not influenced by relatedness and does notdiffer between restraint and concessions-based models. Bothof these predictions are in sharp contrast to previous models.In tug-of-war models, clutch size is strongly influenced byrelatedness between males, with the largest clutches, but thefewest surviving offspring, produced when males are unrelated.These 3 models demonstrate the importance of considering third-partyinterests in the decisions of group-living organisms.     

Parental care, cost of reproduction and reproductive skew: a general costly young model

Understanding the mechanisms by which animals resolve conflicts of interest is the key to understanding the basis of cooperation in social species. Conflict over reproductive portioning is the critical type of conflict among cooperative breeders. The costly young model represents an important, but underappreciated, idea about how an individual's intrinsic condition and cost of reproduction should affect the resolution of conflict over the distribution of reproduction within a cooperatively breeding group. However, dominant control in various forms and fixed parental care (offspring fitness dependent solely on total brood size) are assumed in previous versions of costly young models. Here, we develop a general costly young model by relaxing the restrictive assumptions of existing models. Our results show that (1) when the complete-control assumption is relaxed, the costly young model behaves very differently from the original model, and (2) when the fixed parental care assumption is relaxed, the costly young-costly care model displays similar predictions to the tug-of-war model, although the underlying mechanisms causing these similar patterns are different. These results, we believe, help simplify the seemingly divergent predictions of different reproductive skew models and highlight the importance of studying the group members' intrinsic conditions, costs of producing young, and costs of parental care for understanding breeding conflict resolution in cooperatively breeding animals.     

Sex differences in the drivers of reproductive skew in a cooperative breeder

Many cooperatively breeding societies are characterized by high reproductive skew, such that some socially dominant individuals breed, while socially subordinate individuals provide help. Inbreeding avoidance serves as a source of reproductive skew in many high‐skew societies, but few empirical studies have examined sources of skew operating alongside inbreeding avoidance or compared individual attempts to reproduce (reproductive competition) with individual reproductive success. Here, we use long‐term genetic and observational data to examine factors affecting reproductive skew in the high‐skew cooperatively breeding southern pied babbler (Turdoides bicolor). When subordinates can breed, skew remains high, suggesting factors additional to inbreeding avoidance drive skew. Subordinate females are more likely to compete to breed when older or when ecological constraints on dispersal are high, but heavy subordinate females are more likely to successfully breed. Subordinate males are more likely to compete when they are older, during high ecological constraints, or when they are related to the dominant male, but only the presence of within‐group unrelated subordinate females predicts subordinate male breeding success. Reproductive skew is not driven by reproductive effort, but by forces such as intrinsic physical limitations and intrasexual conflict (for females) or female mate choice, male mate‐guarding and potentially reproductive restraint (for males). Ecological conditions or “outside options” affect the occurrence of reproductive conflict, supporting predictions of recent synthetic skew models. Inbreeding avoidance together with competition for access to reproduction may generate high skew in animal societies, and disparate processes may be operating to maintain male vs. female reproductive skew in the same species.     

A Transactional Theory of Within-Group Conflict

Transactional models of social evolution emphasize that dominant members of the society can be favored to donate parcels of reproduction to subordinate members in return for cooperation. I construct a formal theory of intragroup conflict within the framework of transactional models by determining the maximum extent to which colony members can be selfish without destabilizing the group. The difference between the maximum value of the subordinate's fraction of group reproduction that the dominant can tolerate before ejecting the subordinate and the minimum value required by the subordinate to stay and cooperate peacefully in the group defines the "window of selfishness," which in turn predicts the frequency of within-group conflict. The window of selfishness tends to increase with increasing group reproductive output, increasingly harsh ecological constraints on solitary breeding, and, counterintuitively, increasing relatedness between subordinate and dominant. Increasing fighting ability of the subordinate can either widen or narrow the window of selfishness, the latter being most likely when ecological constraints on group living are strong. Although increasing relatedness is predicted to increase the rate of within-group aggression, the mean intensity of an aggressive act should decline, as predicted by the general theory of honest signaling between relatives and the tug-of-war models of within-group selfishness. In the bidding game, in which multiple dominants bid for the services of a subordinate, the window of selfishness is predicted to have zero width. A zero-width window of selfishness and low conflict also are predicted for saturated N-person groups, that is, groups whose total output is a concave function of group size and in which the dominant is not favored to admit additional subordinates. The model's predictions are compared to empirical evidence and to predictions of alternative models of intragroup aggression, including the value-aggression model and the pure tug-of-war model.     

The past,present and future of reproductive skew theory and experiments

A major evolutionary question is how reproductive sharing arises in cooperatively breeding species despite the inherent reproductive conflicts in social groups. Reproductive skew theory offers one potential solution: each group member gains or is allotted inclusive fitness equal to or exceeding their expectation from reproducing on their own. Unfortunately, a multitude of skew models with conflicting predictions has led to confusion in both testing and evaluating skew theory. The confusion arises partly because one set of models (the ‘transactional’ type) answer the ultimate evolutionary question of what ranges of reproductive skew can yield fitness‐enhancing solutions for all group members. The second set of models (‘compromise’) give an evolutionarily proximate, game‐theoretic evolutionarily stable state (ESS) solution that determines reproductive shares based on relative competitive abilities. However, several predictions arising from compromise models require a linear payoff to increased competition and do not hold with non‐linear payoffs. Given that for most species it may be very difficult or impossible to determine the true relationship between effort devoted to competition and reproductive share gained, compromise models are much less predictive than previously appreciated. Almost all skew models make one quantitative prediction (e.g. realized skew must fall within ranges predicted by transactional models), and two qualitative predictions (e.g. variation in relatedness or competitive ability across groups affects skew). A thorough review of the data finds that these three predictions are relatively rarely supported. As a general rule, therefore, the evolution of cooperative breeding appears not to be dependent on the ability of group members to monitor relatedness or competitive ability in order to adjust their behaviour dynamically to gain reproductive share. Although reproductive skew theory fails to predict within‐group dynamics consistently, it does better at predicting quantitative differences in skew across populations or species. This suggests that kin selection can play a significant role in the evolution of sociality. To advance our understanding of reproductive skew will require focusing on a broader array of factors, such as the frequency of mistaken identity, delayed fitness payoffs, and selection pressures arising from across‐group competition. We furthermore suggest a novel approach to investigate the sharing of reproduction that focuses on the underlying genetics of skew. A quantitative genetics approach allows the partitioning of variance in reproductive share itself or that of traits closely associated with skew into genetic and non‐genetic sources. Thus, we can determine the heritability of reproductive share and infer whether it actually is the focus of natural selection. We view the ‘animal model’ as the most promising empirical method where the genetics of reproductive share can be directly analyzed in wild populations. In the quest to assess whether skew theory can provide a framework for understanding the evolution of sociality, quantitative genetics will be a central tool in future research.     

Reproductive control via eviction (but not the threat of eviction) in banded mongooses

Considerable research has focused on understanding variation in reproductive skew in cooperative animal societies, but the pace of theoretical development has far outstripped empirical testing of the models. One major class of model suggests that dominant individuals can use the threat of eviction to deter subordinate reproduction (the ‘restraint’ model), but this idea remains untested. Here, we use long-term behavioural and genetic data to test the assumptions of the restraint model in banded mongooses (Mungos mungo), a species in which subordinates breed regularly and evictions are common. We found that dominant females suffer reproductive costs when subordinates breed, and respond to these costs by evicting breeding subordinates from the group en masse, in agreement with the assumptions of the model. We found no evidence, however, that subordinate females exercise reproductive restraint to avoid being evicted in the first place. This means that the pattern of reproduction is not the result of a reproductive ‘transaction’ to avert the threat of eviction. We present a simple game theoretical analysis that suggests that eviction threats may often be ineffective to induce pre-emptive restraint among multiple subordinates and predicts that threats of eviction (or departure) will be much more effective in dyadic relationships and linear hierarchies. Transactional models may be more applicable to these systems. Greater focus on testing the assumptions rather than predictions of skew models can lead to a better understanding of how animals control each other''s reproduction, and the extent to which behaviour is shaped by overt acts versus hidden threats.     

Predicting the temporal dynamics of reproductive skew and group membership in communal breeders

Reproductive skew models attempt to predict the fraction ofreproduction contributed by each individual that participatesin a communal brood. One potential limitation of these modelsis that individuals make a single, fixed decision about groupmembership and reproductive allocation at the beginning of thebreeding period. While this is appropriate for animals thatreproduce in a synchronous bout, many cooperative breeders produceoffspring over a prolonged period of time. It is likely thatthese species adjust reproductive allocation and group membershipover time in response to temporal shifts in group productivityand ecological constraints. In this paper we adapt transactionalmodels of reproductive skew to a continuous form, generatingtime-dependent functions of reproductive allocation. We derivea general method for predicting temporal changes in group membershipas well as a general expression for reproductive skew acrossthe regions over which a group is stable. Using a linear approximationfor time-dependent reproduction, we derive new expressions forreproductive skew in cases where the subordinate departs duringthe breeding period. In this case we find that the traditionalmodel always overestimates the subordinate's share of reproductionwhen dominants are in control of both reproductive shares andgroup membership (i.e., concessions models). Conversely, wefind that the traditional model always underestimates the subordinate'sshare of reproduction when subordinates are in control of reproductiveshares (i.e., constraint models). We discuss the implicationsof these new calculations in relation to the traditional skewmodels and more recent empirical tests of reproductive skewin animal societies.     

Reproductive sharing among queens in the ant Formica fusca

Reproductive sharing among cobreeders, in which reproductiveshares may vary from equal contribution (low reproductive skew)to reproductive dominance by one individual (high reproductiveskew), is a fundamental feature of animal societies. Recenttheoretical work, the reproductive skew models, has focusedon factors affecting the degree to which reproduction is skewedwithin a society. We used the parameters provided by skew modelsas a guideline to study determinants of reproductive sharingin polygyne ants. As a model system we used two-queen laboratorycolonies of the ant Formica fusca in which the reproductiveshares of each queen was assessed from offspring by using allozymesand DNA microsatellites. We tested how the different variablesincluded in reproductive skew models (queen-queen relatedness,potential fighting ability, productivity, and worker relatednessreflected by queen number in the colony of origin) affect reproductivesharing among queens. The results showed that the relatednessamong queens explained 26% of the variation in reproductiveskew. The size difference between queens (reflecting potentialfighting ability), colony productivity, and worker relatednessdid not have an effect on reproductive partitioning among cobreeders.To our knowledge, this is the first study to test for the effectsof various determinants of skew in an experimental setting.     

Intergenerational and Sibling Conflict Under Patrilocality

Here we argue that models developed to examine cooperation and conflict in communal breeders, using a “tug-of-war” model of reproductive skew generated by incomplete control, are an appropriate way to model human kinship systems. We apply such models to understand the patterns of effort put into competition between father and son and between brothers in conflict over family resources in a patrilineal kinship system. Co-resident kin do not necessarily emerge with equal shares of the cake in terms of reproductive output. The models show that, depending on the efficiency with which they can gain more control of the resource, on the marriage system, and on the relatedness of the partners in conflict, individuals can do better to help their relatives breed rather than fight each other for the resources needed to reproduce. The models show that when a son’s father is still breeding with his mother, sons should not compete for any share of reproduction. However, under polygyny, increased effort is spent on father/son and brother/brother conflict. Fathers will win the majority of reproduction if dominant to sons (in contrast to the finding that daughters-in-law win in conflict over mothers-in-law in patrilocal kinship systems, which has been suggested as explaining the evolution of menopause). Hence who wins in the sharing of reproduction depends not just on which sex disperses but also on the relative competitive ability of all individuals to exploit family resources. Anthropologists have long argued that cultural norms can reduce conflict. These formal evolutionary models help us to quantify the effects of reproductive conflict in families, throwing light on the evolutionary basis not just of patterns of reproductive scheduling, but also human kinship and marriage systems.     

Conflict over the timing of breeder replacement in vertebrate and invertebrate societies

Conflicts over reproduction are common in social groups, where they often result in more or less pronounced reproductive skew. Conflicts are greatest in groups of reproductively totipotent individuals where a single breeder of each sex monopolizes reproduction. Skew models investigate how reproduction is divided among group members, i.e. how the conflict is settled. Here, we investigate the conflict over the timing of breeder replacement.Using a genetic model we show that some non-breeding individuals should challenge the breeder under a wide set of conditions, rather than queue for a breeding vacancy. Consequently, societies of totipotent individuals may be the stage of an almost perpetual conflict between the breeder and helpful reproductives. However, the outcome of this conflict may be determined by non-breeding individuals that are not helpful reproductives (policing behaviours), or constrained by ecological conditions such as high costs of independent breeding or incest avoidance. We discuss our model in the light of skew models and model of matricide, and review the literature of highly skewed vertebrate and invertebrate societies of totipotent individuals (naked and Damaraland mole-rats, African wild dogs, dwarf mongooses, queenless ants, Polistine wasps). This cross-taxonomic review reveals that some non-breeders attempt to replace the breeder or position themselves so as to be able to do so when the opportunity arises, which supports the predictions of the model. Received 12 May 2006; revised 14 July 2006; accepted 21 July 2006.     

Reproductive skew, concessions and limited control

Models of reproductive skew in cooperative and eusocial societies suggest that dominants allow subordinates to breed to induce them to remain peaceably in the group. However, it is not yet clear how widely the assumptions of these models apply to animal societies, and many of the trends that they predict are consistent with the simpler suggestion that there is a struggle for reproduction between dominants and subordinates, whose outcome depends on the potential costs and benefits of the contest to both parties. Models of reproductive skew that incorporate contests of this kind and empirical studies that can discriminate clearly between reproductive concessions and failures of control are now needed.