Spencerism and the Causal Theory of Reference

Spencer’s heritage, while almost a forgotten chapter in the history of biology, lives on in psychology and the philosophy of mind. I particularly discuss externalist views of meaning, on which meaning crucially depends on a notion of reference, and ask whether reference should be thought of as cause or effect. Is the meaning of a word explained by what it refers to, or should we say that what we use a word to refer to is explained by what concept it expresses? I argue for the latter view, which I call ‘Darwinian’, and against the former, ‘Spencerian’ one, assuming conceptual structures in humans to be an instance of adaptive structures, and adaptive relations to an environment to be the effect rather than the cause of evolutionary novelties. I conclude with the deficiency – both empirically and methodologically – of a functionalist study of human concepts and the languages they are embedded in, as it would be undertaken in a paradigm that identifies meaning with reference or that gives reference an explanatory role to play for what concepts we have.     

Problems in the Psychology of Activity

My purpose today is to sum up a number of the postulates concerning activity as it is used in psychology, without introducing any new ones; and I shall do this with the following in mind. Until now I have used a system of concepts I proposed earlier with respect to an analysis of activity; of course, I should like to work out a position, first and foremost my own, on this system, and to reexamine it. On the other hand, I should like to pose a number of questions, such as: Is this system of concepts of any significance, i.e., is it able to work in psychology? Obviously, this system must be developed, which essentially has not been done in recent years. This system of concepts is frozen, without any movement. I personally was quite alone in this respect. All movement takes place with regard to various problems contiguous with the problem of activity, some more, some less; but in my opinion, the concept of activity has been developed highly unsatisfactorily. That is why I thought I should try, today, to sum up very briefly what I think is important.     

How to cut a concept? Review of doing without concepts by Edouard Machery

As the title “Doing without Concepts” suggests Edouard Machery argues that psychologists should stop using the notion of concept because: (1) the only interesting generalizations about concepts can be drawn at the level of types of concepts (prototypes, exemplars and theories) and not the level of concept in general; and (2) competences such as categorization or induction can rely on these different types of concepts (there is not a one to one correspondence between type of concept and competence). I try to make the point that these two elements are not wholly compatible. If several types of concepts are used to perform a given competence (point (2)), then they have to be well regulated (e.g. which type is activated when, which type wins in case of conflict). These regulatory mechanisms can then be the basis for interesting generalizations (against point (1)). On the other hand, it is possible that point (1) applies to competences as well: that there are no interesting generalizations to be drawn about categorization in general. In which case different types of categorization are likely to be underlain by different types of concepts (against point (2)). Even though the arguments laid out in the book are forceful and well supported by empirical evidence, a more positive thesis might have been both more successful rhetorically and more interesting scientifically.     

Ecological units: definitions and application

Concepts of ecological units, such as population, community, and ecosystem, are at the basis of ecological theory and research and have increasingly become the focus of conservation strategies. Concepts of these units still suffer from inconsistencies and confusions over terminology. The different concepts are treated here together as a common "conceptual cluster," with similar ecological functions (roles) and similar problems in their definition and use. An analysis of the multitude of existing terms and concepts that have been developed for these units reveals that they differ with respect to at least four basic criteria: (i) the questions as to whether they are defined statistically or via a network of interactions; (ii) if their boundaries are drawn by topographical or process-related criteria; (iii) how high the required internal relationships are; and (iv) if they are perceived as "real" entities or abstractions by an observer The various definitions cannot be easily sorted into just a few types, but they can be characterized by several independent criteria. I argue that serious problems arise if the different possibilities of defining ecological units are not recognized and if the concepts are perceived as self-evident. The different concepts of ecological units should be defined and used in a philosophically informed manner I propose a dual approach to the use of ecological units. Generic meanings of the main concepts (especially population, community, and ecosystem) should be retained only as heuristically useful perspectives, while specific and "operational" definitions of the concepts as units should be developed, depending on specific purposes of their use. Some thoughts on the basic requirements for such definitions and the domains of their uses are briefly explained.     

On the concept of individual in ecology and evolution

Part of the art of theory building is to construct effective basic concepts, with a large reach and yet powerful as tools for getting at conclusions. The most basic concept of population biology is that of individual. An appropriately reengineered form of this concept has become the basis for the theories of structured populations and adaptive dynamics. By appropriately delimiting individuals, followed by defining their states as well as their environment, it become possible to construct the general population equations that were introduced and studied by Odo Diekmann and his collaborators. In this essay I argue for taking the properties that led to these successes as the defining characteristics of the concept of individual, delegating the properties classically invoked by philosophers to the secondary role of possible empirical indicators for the presence of those characteristics. The essay starts with putting in place as rule for effective concept engineering that one should go for relations that can be used as basis for deductive structure building rather than for perceived ontological essence. By analysing how we want to use it in the mathematical arguments I then build up a concept of individual, first for use in population dynamical considerations and then for use in evolutionary ones. These two concepts do not coincide, and neither do they on all occasions agree with common intuition-based usage.     

How to be a chaste species pluralist-realist: the origins of species modes and the synapomorphic species concept

The biological species (biospecies) concept applies only to sexually reproducing species, which means that until sexual reproduction evolved, there were no biospecies. On the universal tree of life, biospecies concepts therefore apply only to a relatively small number of clades, notably plants andanimals. I argue that it is useful to treat the various ways of being a species (species modes) as traits of clades. By extension from biospecies to the other concepts intended to capture the natural realities of what keeps taxa distinct, we can treat other modes as traits also, and so come to understand that theplurality of species concepts reflects the biological realities of monophyletic groups.We should expect that specialists in different organisms will tend to favour those concepts that best represent the intrinsic mechanisms that keep taxa distinct in their clades. I will address the question whether modes ofreproduction such as asexual and sexual reproduction are natural classes, given that they are paraphyletic in most clades.     

On the nature of the species problem and the four meanings of 'species'

Present-day thought on the notion of species is troubled by a mistaken understanding of the nature of the issue: while the species problem is commonly understood as concerning the epistemology and ontology of one single scientific concept, I argue that in fact there are multiple distinct concepts at stake. An approach to the species problem is presented that interprets the term 'species' as the placeholder for four distinct scientific concepts, each having its own role in biological theory, and an explanation is given of the concepts involved. To illustrate how these concepts are commonly conflated, two widely accepted ideas on species are criticized: species individualism and species pluralism. I argue that by failing to distinguish between the four concepts and their particular roles in contemporary biological theory, these ideas stand in the way of a final resolution of the species problem.     

The nature of species: A rejoinder to Zachos et al.

I argue strongly that the Phylogenetic Species Concept offers the only way of defining species that makes them testable, as any scientific hypothesis should be. The criticisms made by Zachos et al. (in press) are not cogent, and do not offer a means of testing species proposals. Nonetheless, their comments on species concepts in conservation do provide support to the value of the Phylogenetic Species Concept.     

Genes after the human genome project

While the Human Genome Nomenclature Committee (HGNC) concept of the gene can accommodate a wide variety of genomic sequences contributing to phenotypic outcomes, it fails to specify how sequences should be grouped when dealing with complex loci consisting of adjacent/overlapping sequences contributing to the same phenotype, distant sequences shown to contribute to the same gene product, and partially overlapping sequences identified by different techniques. The purpose of this paper is to review recently proposed concepts of the gene and critically assess how well they succeed in addressing the above problems while preserving the degree of generality achieved by the HGNC concept. I conclude that a dynamic interplay between mapping and syntax-based concepts is required in order to satisfy these desiderata.     

Kinetic consequences of a slow substrate binding step in group transferases. Interpretation of product inhibition experiments.

The steady state kinetic properties of a simple model for an enzyme catalyzed group transfer reaction between two substrates have been calculated. One substrate is assumed to bind slowly and the other rapidly to the enzyme. Apparent substrate inhibition or substrate activation by the rapidly binding substrate may result if the slowly binding substrate binds at unequal rates to the free enzyme and to the complex between the enzyme and the rapidly binding substrate. Competitive inhibition by each product with respect to its structurally analogous substrate is to be expected if both substrates are in rapid equilibrium with their enzyme-substrate complexes. This product inhibition pattern, however, may also be observed when one substrate binds slowly. Noncompetitive inhibition with respect to the rapidly binding substrate by its structurally analogous product may result if the slowly binding substrate binds more slowly to the enzyme-product complex than to the free enzyme. Inhibition by substrate analogs which are not products should follow the same rules as inhibition by products. Thus substrate analog inhibition experiments are not particularly informative. The form of inhibition by "transition state analog" inhibitors should reveal which substrate binds slowly. There is no sharp conceptual distinction between ordered and random "kinetic mechanisms". I therefore suggest that the use of these concepts should be abandoned.     

Technology in the teaching of neuroscience: enhanced student learning

The primary motivation for integrating any form of education technology into a particular course or curriculum should always be to enhance student learning. However, it can be difficult to determine which technologies will be the most appropriate and effective teaching tools. Through the alignment of technology-enhanced learning experiences with a clear set of learning objectives, teaching becomes more efficient and effective and learning is truly enhanced. In this article, I describe how I have made extensive use of technology in two neuroscience courses that differ in structure and content. Course websites function as resource centers and provide a forum for student interaction. PowerPoint presentations enhance formal lectures and provide an organized outline of presented material. Some lectures are also supplemented with interactive CD-ROMs, used in the presentation of difficult physiological concepts. In addition, a computer-based physiological recording system is used in laboratory sessions, improving the hands-on experience of group learning while reinforcing the concepts of the research method. Although technology can provide powerful teaching tools, the enhancement of the learning environment is still dependent on the instructor. It is the skill and enthusiasm of the instructor that determines whether technology will be used effectively.     

“整合物种概念”和“分化路上的物种”

已有的各个物种概念对物种的认识类似盲人摸象, 只包含了物种的某一个方面; 而一个分化后期的成熟物种应涵盖了所有的物种概念。但是, 尚未到达分化后期的物种往往又已开始新一轮的物种分化; 自然中存在的多数“物种”处于分化路上。这种循环往复连续分化产生的物种, 存在种间生殖隔离不彻底、基因流频繁发生、网状进化突出等现象。此外, 对于不同的物种对, 最早开始分化的基因以及不同物种概念所要求的条件的分化顺序不是统一的, 而是随机的。定义一个适合所有“分化路上的物种”概念存在较大困难。但是, 应采用尽可能多的物种概念来界定分化路上的物种、发表新种和进行分类处理; 也应承认种间可能广泛存在不完全的生殖隔离和有限的基因流, 即有不属于两个物种群体的杂交或回交个体的存在。这样划分的物种比只依据一个物种概念认定的物种具有更高的客观性和科学性。     

What Should Be Held Steady in a Steady‐State Economy?: Interpreting Daly's Definition at the National Level

Within this article, I investigate a number of the conceptual issues that arise when attempting to translate Herman Daly's definition of a steady‐state economy (SSE) into a set of national biophysical indicators. Although Daly's definition gives a high‐level view of what would be held steady in an SSE, it also leaves many questions unanswered. How should stocks and flows be aggregated? What is the role of international trade? How should nonrenewable resources be treated? And where does natural capital fit in? To help answer these questions, I relate Daly's definition to key concepts and terminology from material and energy flow accounting. I explore topics such as aggregation, international trade, the relevance of throughput, and hidden flows. I conclude that a set of biophysical accounts for an SSE should include three types of indicators (stocks, flows, and scale), track how stocks and flows are changing over a 5‐ to 10‐year period, use aggregated data that measure the quantity of resource use (rather than its quality), measure both total and nonrenewable resource use, adopt a consumption‐based approach, include hidden flows, and exclude indicators that measure characteristics of the stock of natural capital (with the notable exception of indicators that measure the regenerative and assimilative capacities of ecosystems).     

Deconstructing morphology

Scholtz, G. 2010. Deconstructing morphology. —Acta Zoologica (Stockholm) 91 : 44–63 Morphology as the science of form is, in particular, related to the overwhelming diversity of animal forms. Due to its long pre‐Darwinian tradition, organismic morphology is partly burdened by ahistorical typological views. On the other hand, the study of organismic form has always implied concepts of transformation, which helped to pave the way for evolutionary theories. This contradictory history and the fact that we need words to describe organismic form lead in many cases to morphological concepts implying a mixture of structural, functional, developmental, ecological, typological, and evolutionary aspects in current morphological approaches. Because these mixed views lead to contradictory and misleading interpretations of animal form, I stress the need to deconstruct morphological concepts at all levels. I propose a morphology that analyses transformation of animal forms strictly at the structural level in combination with genealogical thinking. Function and other biological aspects of form should be considered in an independent second analytical step. A comparative pattern approach, including developmental patterns, of animal structure in an evolutionary framework allows for the analysis of morphological change, in particular, phylogenetic reconstructions, homology assessment, and the recognition of evolutionary independent morphological units.     

On the relationship between content, ancestor, and ancestry in phylogenetic nomenclature

In this paper I draw attention to the concepts of content and ancestry in phylogenetic nomenclature. I argue that these concepts are tightly linked and that they cannot be separated as suggested by Bryant and Cantino [Biol. Rev. 77 (2002) 39] in their recent response to a critique of phylogenetic nomenclature. In addition, I argue that the basic assumption in phylogenetic nomenclature that a taxon name always refers to the same ancestor or ancestry is questionable.