The Effect of Self-Efficacy on Visual Discrimination Sensitivity

Can subjective belief about one''s own perceptual competence change one''s perception? To address this question, we investigated the influence of self-efficacy on sensory discrimination in two low-level visual tasks: contrast and orientation discrimination. We utilised a pre-post manipulation approach whereby two experimental groups (high and low self-efficacy) and a control group made objective perceptual judgments on the contrast or the orientation of the visual stimuli. High and low self-efficacy were induced by the provision of fake social-comparative performance feedback and fictional research findings. Subsequently, the post-manipulation phase was performed to assess changes in visual discrimination thresholds as a function of the self-efficacy manipulations. The results showed that the high self-efficacy group demonstrated greater improvement in visual discrimination sensitivity compared to both the low self-efficacy and control groups. These findings suggest that subjective beliefs about one''s own perceptual competence can affect low-level visual processing.     

Your own action influences how you perceive another person's action

A growing body of neuroimaging and neurophysiology studies has demonstrated the motor system's involvement in the observation of actions, but the functional significance of this is still unclear. One hypothesis suggests that the motor system decodes observed actions. This hypothesis predicts that performing a concurrent action should influence the perception of an observed action. We tested this prediction by asking subjects to judge the weight of a box lifted by an actor while the subject either lifted or passively held a light or heavy box. We found that actively lifting a box altered the perceptual judgment; an observed box was judged to be heavier when subjects were lifting the light box, and it was judged to be lighter when they were lifting the heavy box. This result is surprising because previous studies have found facilitating effects of movement on perceptual judgments and facilitating effects of observed actions on movements, but here we found the opposite. We hypothesize that this effect can be understood in terms of overlapping neural systems for motor control and action-understanding if multiple models of possible observed and performed actions are processed.     

Self-Knowledge Dim-Out: Stress Impairs Metacognitive Accuracy

Modulation of frontal lobes activity is believed to be an important pathway trough which the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis stress response impacts cognitive and emotional functioning. Here, we investigate the effects of stress on metacognition, which is the ability to monitor and control one''s own cognition. As the frontal lobes have been shown to play a critical role in metacognition, we predicted that under activation of the HPA axis, participants should be less accurate in the assessment of their own performances in a perceptual decision task, irrespective of the effect of stress on the first order perceptual decision itself. To test this prediction, we constituted three groups of high, medium and low stress responders based on cortisol concentration in saliva in response to a standardized psycho-social stress challenge (the Trier Social Stress Test). We then assessed the accuracy of participants'' confidence judgments in a visual discrimination task. As predicted, we found that high biological reactivity to stress correlates with lower sensitivity in metacognition. In sum, participants under stress know less when they know and when they do not know.     

If I Were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body Swapping

The concept of an individual swapping his or her body with that of another person has captured the imagination of writers and artists for decades. Although this topic has not been the subject of investigation in science, it exemplifies the fundamental question of why we have an ongoing experience of being located inside our bodies. Here we report a perceptual illusion of body-swapping that addresses directly this issue. Manipulation of the visual perspective, in combination with the receipt of correlated multisensory information from the body was sufficient to trigger the illusion that another person''s body or an artificial body was one''s own. This effect was so strong that people could experience being in another person''s body when facing their own body and shaking hands with it. Our results are of fundamental importance because they identify the perceptual processes that produce the feeling of ownership of one''s body.     

In the Elderly,Failure to Update Internal Models Leads to Over-Optimistic Predictions about Upcoming Actions

Before an action is performed, the brain simulates the body''s dynamic behavior in relation to the environment, estimates the possible outcomes and assesses the feasibility of potential actions. Here, we tested a hypothesis whereby age-related changes in sensorimotor abilities result in failure to update internal models of action in the elderly. Young and older adults were required to judge in advance whether or not they could stand on an inclined plane (Experiment 1). Relative to young adults, elderly adults overestimated their postural capabilities: although the two groups made similar feasibility judgments, elderly participants showed significantly worse postural performance levels. This tendency to overestimate their own ability persisted when elderly adults had to not only estimate the feasibility of an action but also endanger themselves by walking towards an obstacle that was too high for them to clear (Experiment 2). An age-related failure to update internal models may prompt the elderly to make over-optimistic predictions about upcoming actions. In turn, this may favor risky motor decision-making and promote falls.     

Action evaluation is modulated dominantly by internal sensorimotor information and partly by noncausal external cue

Previous studies demonstrated that human motor actions are not always monitored by perceptual awareness and that implicit motor control plays a key role in performing actions. In addition, appropriate evaluation of our own motor behavior is vital for human life. Here we combined a reaching task with a visual backward masking paradigm to induce an implicit motor response that is congruent or incongruent with the visual perception. We used this to investigate (i) how we evaluate such implicit motor response that could be inconsistent with perceptual awareness and (ii) the possible contributions of reaching error, external visual cues, and internal sensorimotor information to this evaluation. Participants were instructed, after each trial, to rate their own reaching performance on a 5-point scale (i.e., smooth-clumsy). They also needed to identify a color presented at a fixation point that could be changed just after the reaching start. The color was linked to the prime-mask congruency (i.e., congruent-green, incongruent-blue) in the practice phase, and then inconsistent pairs (congruent-blue or incongruent-green) were introduced in the test phase. We found early trajectory deviations induced by the invisible prime stimulus, and such implicit motor responses are significantly correlated with the action evaluation score. The results suggest the "conscious" action evaluation is properly monitoring online sensory outcomes derived by implicit motor control. Furthermore, statistical path analyses showed that internal sensorimotor information from the motor behavior modulated by the invisible prime was the predominant cue for the action evaluation, while the color-cue association learned in the practice phase in some cases biases the action evaluation in the test phase.     

The second-agent effect: communicative gestures increase the likelihood of perceiving a second agent

Background

Beyond providing cues about an agent''s intention, communicative actions convey information about the presence of a second agent towards whom the action is directed (second-agent information). In two psychophysical studies we investigated whether the perceptual system makes use of this information to infer the presence of a second agent when dealing with impoverished and/or noisy sensory input.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Participants observed point-light displays of two agents (A and B) performing separate actions. In the Communicative condition, agent B''s action was performed in response to a communicative gesture by agent A. In the Individual condition, agent A''s communicative action was replaced with a non-communicative action. Participants performed a simultaneous masking yes-no task, in which they were asked to detect the presence of agent B. In Experiment 1, we investigated whether criterion c was lowered in the Communicative condition compared to the Individual condition, thus reflecting a variation in perceptual expectations. In Experiment 2, we manipulated the congruence between A''s communicative gesture and B''s response, to ascertain whether the lowering of c in the Communicative condition reflected a truly perceptual effect. Results demonstrate that information extracted from communicative gestures influences the concurrent processing of biological motion by prompting perception of a second agent (second-agent effect).

Conclusions/Significance

We propose that this finding is best explained within a Bayesian framework, which gives a powerful rationale for the pervasive role of prior expectations in visual perception.     

Mirror adaptation in sensory-motor simultaneity

Background

When one watches a sports game, one may feel her/his own muscles moving in synchrony with the player''s. Such parallels between observed actions of others and one''s own has been well supported in the latest progress in neuroscience, and coined “mirror system.” It is likely that due to such phenomena, we are able to learn motor skills just by observing an expert''s performance. Yet it is unknown whether such indirect learning occurs only at higher cognitive levels, or also at basic sensorimotor levels where sensorimotor delay is compensated and the timing of sensory feedback is constantly calibrated.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Here, we show that the subject''s passive observation of an actor manipulating a computer mouse with delayed auditory feedback led to shifts in subjective simultaneity of self mouse manipulation and auditory stimulus in the observing subjects. Likewise, self adaptation to the delayed feedback modulated the simultaneity judgment of the other subjects manipulating a mouse and an auditory stimulus. Meanwhile, subjective simultaneity of a simple visual disc and the auditory stimulus (flash test) was not affected by observation of an actor nor self-adaptation.

Conclusions/Significance

The lack of shift in the flash test for both conditions indicates that the recalibration transfer is specific to the action domain, and is not due to a general sensory adaptation. This points to the involvement of a system for the temporal monitoring of actions, one that processes both one''s own actions and those of others.     

What are you doing? How active and observational experience shape infants' action understanding

From early in life, infants watch other people''s actions. How do young infants come to make sense of actions they observe? Here, we review empirical findings on the development of action understanding in infancy. Based on this review, we argue that active action experience is crucial for infants'' developing action understanding. When infants execute actions, they form associations between motor acts and the sensory consequences of these acts. When infants subsequently observe these actions in others, they can use their motor system to predict the outcome of the ongoing actions. Also, infants come to an understanding of others’ actions through the repeated observation of actions and the effects associated with them. In their daily lives, infants have plenty of opportunities to form associations between observed events and learn about statistical regularities of others’ behaviours. We argue that based on these two forms of experience—active action experience and observational experience—infants gradually develop more complex action understanding capabilities.     

Feeling Bad and Looking Worse: Negative Affect Is Associated with Reduced Perceptions of Face-Healthiness

Some people perceive themselves to look more, or less attractive than they are in reality. We investigated the role of emotions in enhancement and derogation effects; specifically, whether the propensity to experience positive and negative emotions affects how healthy we perceive our own face to look and how we judge ourselves against others. A psychophysical method was used to measure healthiness of self-image and social comparisons of healthiness. Participants who self-reported high positive (N = 20) or negative affectivity (N = 20) judged themselves against healthy (red-tinged) and unhealthy looking (green-tinged) versions of their own and stranger’s faces. An adaptive staircase procedure was used to measure perceptual thresholds. Participants high in positive affectivity were un-biased in their face health judgement. Participants high in negative affectivity on the other hand, judged themselves as equivalent to less healthy looking versions of their own face and a stranger’s face. Affective traits modulated self-image and social comparisons of healthiness. Face health judgement was also related to physical symptom perception and self-esteem; high physical symptom reports were associated a less healthy self-image and high self-reported (but not implicit) self-esteem was associated with more favourable social comparisons of healthiness. Subject to further validation, our novel face health judgement task could have utility as a perceptual measure of well-being. We are currently investigating whether face health judgement is sensitive to laboratory manipulations of mood.     

Looking for Myself: Current Multisensory Input Alters Self-Face Recognition

How do I know the person I see in the mirror is really me? Is it because I know the person simply looks like me, or is it because the mirror reflection moves when I move, and I see it being touched when I feel touch myself? Studies of face-recognition suggest that visual recognition of stored visual features inform self-face recognition. In contrast, body-recognition studies conclude that multisensory integration is the main cue to selfhood. The present study investigates for the first time the specific contribution of current multisensory input for self-face recognition. Participants were stroked on their face while they were looking at a morphed face being touched in synchrony or asynchrony. Before and after the visuo-tactile stimulation participants performed a self-recognition task. The results show that multisensory signals have a significant effect on self-face recognition. Synchronous tactile stimulation while watching another person''s face being similarly touched produced a bias in recognizing one''s own face, in the direction of the other person included in the representation of one''s own face. Multisensory integration can update cognitive representations of one''s body, such as the sense of ownership. The present study extends this converging evidence by showing that the correlation of synchronous multisensory signals also updates the representation of one''s face. The face is a key feature of our identity, but at the same time is a source of rich multisensory experiences used to maintain or update self-representations.     

Visual Experience Determines the Use of External Reference Frames in Joint Action Control

Vision plays a crucial role in human interaction by facilitating the coordination of one''s own actions with those of others in space and time. While previous findings have demonstrated that vision determines the default use of reference frames, little is known about the role of visual experience in coding action-space during joint action. Here, we tested if and how visual experience influences the use of reference frames in joint action control. Dyads of congenitally-blind, blindfolded-sighted, and seeing individuals took part in an auditory version of the social Simon task, which required each participant to respond to one of two sounds presented to the left or right of both participants. To disentangle the contribution of external—agent-based and response-based—reference frames during joint action, participants performed the task with their respective response (right) hands uncrossed or crossed over one another. Although the location of the auditory stimulus was completely task-irrelevant, participants responded overall faster when the stimulus location spatially corresponded to the required response side than when they were spatially non-corresponding: a phenomenon known as the social Simon effect (SSE). In sighted participants, the SSE occurred irrespective of whether hands were crossed or uncrossed, suggesting the use of external, response-based reference frames. Congenitally-blind participants also showed an SSE, but only with uncrossed hands. We argue that congenitally-blind people use both agent-based and response-based reference frames resulting in conflicting spatial information when hands are crossed and, thus, canceling out the SSE. These results imply that joint action control functions on the basis of external reference frames independent of the presence or (transient/permanent) absence of vision. However, the type of external reference frames used for organizing motor control in joint action seems to be determined by visual experience.     

Exploring Responses to Art in Adolescence: A Behavioral and Eye-Tracking Study

Adolescence is a peculiar age mainly characterized by physical and psychological changes that may affect the perception of one''s own and others'' body. This perceptual peculiarity may influence the way in which bottom-up and top-down processes interact and, consequently, the perception and evaluation of art. This study is aimed at investigating, by means of the eye-tracking technique, the visual explorative behavior of adolescents while looking at paintings. Sixteen color paintings, categorized as dynamic and static, were presented to twenty adolescents; half of the images represented natural environments and half human individuals; all stimuli were displayed under aesthetic and movement judgment tasks. Participants'' ratings revealed that, generally, nature images are explicitly evaluated as more appealing than human images. Eye movement data, on the other hand, showed that the human body exerts a strong power in orienting and attracting visual attention and that, in adolescence, it plays a fundamental role during aesthetic experience. In particular, adolescents seem to approach human-content images by giving priority to elements calling forth movement and action, supporting the embodiment theory of aesthetic perception.     

Influence of Action-Effect Associations Acquired by Ideomotor Learning on Imitation

According to the ideomotor theory, actions are represented in terms of their perceptual effects, offering a solution for the correspondence problem of imitation (how to translate the observed action into a corresponding motor output). This effect-based coding of action is assumed to be acquired through action-effect learning. Accordingly, performing an action leads to the integration of the perceptual codes of the action effects with the motor commands that brought them about. While ideomotor theory is invoked to account for imitation, the influence of action-effect learning on imitative behavior remains unexplored. In two experiments, imitative performance was measured in a reaction time task following a phase of action-effect acquisition. During action-effect acquisition, participants freely executed a finger movement (index or little finger lifting), and then observed a similar (compatible learning) or a different (incompatible learning) movement. In Experiment 1, finger movements of left and right hands were presented as action-effects during acquisition. In Experiment 2, only right-hand finger movements were presented during action-effect acquisition and in the imitation task the observed hands were oriented orthogonally to participants’ hands in order to avoid spatial congruency effects. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that imitative performance was improved after compatible learning, compared to incompatible learning. In Experiment 2, although action-effect learning involved perception of finger movements of right hand only, imitative capabilities of right- and left-hand finger movements were equally affected. These results indicate that an observed movement stimulus processed as the effect of an action can later prime execution of that action, confirming the ideomotor approach to imitation. We further discuss these findings in relation to previous studies of action-effect learning and in the framework of current ideomotor approaches to imitation.     

Action understanding requires the left inferior frontal cortex

Numerous studies have established that inferior frontal cortex is active when hand actions are planned, imagined, remembered, imitated, and even observed. Furthermore, it has been proposed that these activations reflect a process of simulating the observed action to allow it to be understood and thus fully perceived. However, direct evidence for a perceptual role for left inferior frontal cortex is rare, and linguistic or motor contributions to the reported activations have not been ruled out. We used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) over inferior frontal gyrus during a perceptual weight-judgement task to test the hypothesis that this region contributes to action understanding. rTMS at this site impaired judgments of the weight of a box lifted by a person, but not judgements of the weight of a bouncing ball or of stimulus duration, and rTMS at control sites had no impact. This demonstrates that the integrity of left inferior frontal gyrus is necessary to make accurate perceptual judgments about other people's actions.     

Your unconscious knows your name

One''s own name constitutes a unique part of conscious awareness – but does this also hold true for unconscious processing? The present study shows that the own name has the power to bias a person''s actions unconsciously even in conditions that render any other name ineffective. Participants judged whether a letter string on the screen was a name or a non-word while this target stimulus was preceded by a masked prime stimulus. Crucially, the participant''s own name was among these prime stimuli and facilitated reactions to following name targets whereas the name of another, yoked participant did not. Signal detection results confirmed that participants were not aware of any of the prime stimuli, including their own name. These results extend traditional findings on “breakthrough” phenomena of personally relevant stimuli to the domain of unconscious processing. Thus, the brain seems to possess adroit mechanisms to identify and process such stimuli even in the absence of conscious awareness.     

Am I seeing my hand? Visual appearance and knowledge of controllability both contribute to the visual capture of a person's own body

When confronted with complex visual scenes in daily life, how do we know which visual information represents our own hand? We investigated the cues used to assign visual information to one''s own hand. Wrist tendon vibration elicits an illusory sensation of wrist movement. The intensity of this illusion attenuates when the actual motionless hand is visually presented. Testing what kind of visual stimuli attenuate this illusion will elucidate factors contributing to visual detection of one''s own hand. The illusion was reduced when a stationary object was shown, but only when participants knew it was controllable with their hands. In contrast, the visual image of their own hand attenuated the illusion even when participants knew that it was not controllable. We suggest that long-term knowledge about the appearance of the body and short-term knowledge about controllability of a visual object are combined to robustly extract our own body from a visual scene.     

Motor Contagion during Human-Human and Human-Robot Interaction

Motor resonance mechanisms are known to affect humans'' ability to interact with others, yielding the kind of “mutual understanding” that is the basis of social interaction. However, it remains unclear how the partner''s action features combine or compete to promote or prevent motor resonance during interaction. To clarify this point, the present study tested whether and how the nature of the visual stimulus and the properties of the observed actions influence observer''s motor response, being motor contagion one of the behavioral manifestations of motor resonance. Participants observed a humanoid robot and a human agent move their hands into a pre-specified final position or put an object into a container at various velocities. Their movements, both in the object- and non-object- directed conditions, were characterized by either a smooth/curvilinear or a jerky/segmented trajectory. These trajectories were covered with biological or non-biological kinematics (the latter only by the humanoid robot). After action observation, participants were requested to either reach the indicated final position or to transport a similar object into another container. Results showed that motor contagion appeared for both the interactive partner except when the humanoid robot violated the biological laws of motion. These findings suggest that the observer may transiently match his/her own motor repertoire to that of the observed agent. This matching might mediate the activation of motor resonance, and modulate the spontaneity and the pleasantness of the interaction, whatever the nature of the communication partner.     

Disrupting the experience of control in the human brain: pre-supplementary motor area contributes to the sense of agency

The feeling of controlling events through one''s actions is fundamental to human experience, but its neural basis remains unclear. This ‘sense of agency’ (SoA) can be measured quantitatively as a temporal linkage between voluntary actions and their external effects. We investigated the brain areas underlying this aspect of action awareness by using theta-burst stimulation to locally and reversibly disrupt human brain function. Disruption of the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), a key structure for preparation and initiation of a voluntary action, was shown to reduce the temporal linkage between a voluntary key-press action and a subsequent electrocutaneous stimulus. In contrast, disruption of the sensorimotor cortex, which processes signals more directly related to action execution and sensory feedback, had no significant effect. Our results provide the first direct evidence of a pre-SMA contribution to SoA.     

Simulating My Own or Others Action Plans? – Motor Representations,Not Visual Representations Are Recalled in Motor Memory

Action plans are not generated from scratch for each movement, but features of recently generated plans are recalled for subsequent movements. This study investigated whether the observation of an action is sufficient to trigger plan recall processes. Participant dyads performed an object manipulation task in which one participant transported a plunger from an outer platform to a center platform of different heights (first move). Subsequently, either the same (intra-individual task condition) or the other participant (inter-individual task condition) returned the plunger to the outer platform (return moves). Grasp heights were inversely related to center target height and similar irrespective of direction (first vs. return move) and task condition (intra- vs. inter-individual). Moreover, participants'' return move grasp heights were highly correlated with their own, but not with their partners'' first move grasp heights. Our findings provide evidence that a simulated action plan resembles a plan of how the observer would execute that action (based on a motor representation) rather than a plan of the actually observed action (based on a visual representation).