Multiple realization in comparative perspective

Arguments for multiple realization depend on the idea that the same kind of function is realized by different kinds of structures. It is important to such arguments that we know the kinds used in the arguments have been individuated properly. In the philosophical literature, though, claims about how to individuate kinds are frequently decided on intuitive grounds. This paper criticizes this way of approaching kinds by considering how practicing researchers think about the matter. I will consider several examples in which the practice of researchers on comparative vision conflicts with the standard account of these issues.

Objects limit human comprehension

This paper demonstrates that the human visual system, the primary sensory conduit for primates, processes ambient energy in a way that obligatorily constructs the objects that we ineluctably perceive. And since our perceptual apparatus processes information only in terms of objects (along with the properties and movements of objects), we are limited in our ability to comprehend ‘what is’ when we move beyond our ordinary world of midsize objects—as, for example, when we address the micro microworld of quantum physics.

Functional homology and homology of function: biological concepts and philosophical consequences

“Functional homology” appears regularly in different areas of biological research and yet it is apparently a contradiction in terms—homology concerns identity of structure regardless of form and function. I argue that despite this conceptual tension there is a legitimate conception of ‘homology of function’, which can be recovered by utilizing a distinction from pre-Darwinian physiology (use versus activity) to identify an appropriate meaning of ‘function’. This account is directly applicable to molecular developmental biology and shares a connection to the theme of hierarchy in homology. I situate ‘homology of function’ within existing definitions and criteria for structural assessments of homology, and introduce a criterion of ‘organization’ for judging function homologues, which focuses on hierarchically interconnected interdependencies (similar to relative position and connection for skeletal elements in structural homology). This analysis of biological concepts has at least three broad philosophical consequences: (1) it provides the grounds for the study of behavior and psychological categories as homologues; (2) it demonstrates that philosophers who take selected effect function as primary effectively ignore large portions of comparative, structural, and experimental research, thereby misconstruing biological reasoning and knowledge; and, (3) it underwrites causal generalizations, which illuminates inferences made from model organisms in experimental biology.

Is it a revolution?

Jablonka and Lamb's claim that evolutionary biology is undergoing a ‘revolution’ is queried. But the very concept of revolutionary change has uncertain application to a field organized in the manner of contemporary biology. The explanatory primacy of sequence properties is also discussed.

Do Students See the “Selection” in Organic Evolution? A Critical Review of the Causal Structure of Student Explanations

This paper critically reviews and characterizes the student's causal-explanatory understanding; this is done as a step toward explicating the problematic of evolution education as it concerns the cognitive difficulties in understanding Darwin's theory of natural selection. The review concludes that the student's understanding is fundamentally different from Darwin's, for the student understands evolutionary change as necessary individual transformation caused by the transformative action of various physical and behavioral factors. This is in complete contrast to Darwin's (and even the Darwinian's, for that matter) understanding of evolutionary change as a change caused by accumulative selection. Hence, to understand natural selection, the student has to learn to “see” how the accumulative selection causes evolutionary change.

Spandrels and a pervasive problem of evidence

Evolutionary biology, indeed any science that attempts to reconstruct prehistory, faces practical limitations on available data. These limitations create the problem of contrast failure: specific observations may fail to discriminate between rival evolutionary hypotheses. Assessing the risk of contrast failure provides a way to evaluate testing protocols in evolutionary science. Here I will argue that part of the methodological critique in the Spandrels paper involves diagnosing contrast failure problems. I then distinguish the problem of contrast failure from the more familiar philosophical problem of underdetermination, and demonstrate how contrast failure arises in scientific practice with an investigation into Lewontin and White’s (Evolution 14:116–129, 1960) estimation of an adaptive landscape.

Typology now: homology and developmental constraints explain evolvability

By linking the concepts of homology and morphological organization to evolvability, this paper attempts to (1) bridge the gap between developmental and phylogenetic approaches to homology and to (2) show that developmental constraints and natural selection are compatible and in fact complementary. I conceive of a homologue as a unit of morphological evolvability, i.e., as a part of an organism that can exhibit heritable phenotypic variation independently of the organism’s other homologues. An account of homology therefore consists in explaining how an organism’s developmental constitution results in different homologues/characters as units that can evolve independently of each other. The explanans of an account of homology is developmental, yet the very explanandum is an evolutionary phenomenon: evolvability in a character-by-character fashion, which manifests itself in phylogenetic patterns as recognized by phylogenetic approaches to homology. While developmental constraints and selection have often been viewed as antagonistic forces, I argue that both are complementary as they concern different parts of the evolutionary process. Developmental constraints, conceived of as the presence of the same set of homologues across phenotypic change, pertain to how heritable variation can be generated in the first place (evolvability), while natural selection operates subsequently on the produced variation.

Managing Plant Resources: How Intensive Can it be?

Previous studies have shown there is a wide spectrum of incipient management practices between gathering and agriculture, that include resources commonly considered “wild.” Based on the study of 20 species used as foodstuffs in the community of Santa María Tecomavaca (Mexico), we evaluated nonagricultural management forms such as gathering, incipient nonselective management, incipient selective management and occasional ex situ cultivation to learn if they represent a gradient in the intensity of manipulation of a resource. The way in which the intensity of manipulation of a resource can vary as a function of cultural importance and the species’ biology was also analyzed. Using an index that measures the intensity of management of a resource, it has been established that the degree of intensity depends on: the specialization of the practices directed to the environment as well as to the individuals; the number of persons performing these practices; and the number of different practices taking place. The degree of management intensity is also a consequence of the joint action of cultural importance and of species’ biology.

Changes in Pyrenean woodlands as a result of the intensity of human exploitation: 2,000 years of metallurgy in Vallferrera, northeast Iberian Peninsula

This research is based on the discovery of a large number of charcoal kiln sites and abandoned iron mines in Vallferrera (Axial Pyrenees, northeastern Spain). The study reveals that this region has been affected by the metal mining and smelting industry for at least 2,000 years, with maximum intensity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, followed by abandonment of the activity. The region’s woodland dendrochronology and historical records indicate that exploitation of wood charcoal for metalworking affected the past vegetation in the area and impeded the development of mature woodland. Our findings suggest that the greatest changes in vegetation and landscape history occurred at times of particular specialization in socioeconomic activities.

Biosemiotic Questions

This paper examines the biosemiotic approach to the study of life processes by fashioning a series of questions that any worthwhile semiotic study of life should ask. These questions can be understood simultaneously as: (1) questions that distinguish a semiotic biology from a non-semiotic (i.e., reductionist–physicalist) one; (2) questions that any student in biosemiotics should ask when doing a case study; and (3) still currently unanswered questions of biosemiotics. In addition, some examples of previously undertaken biosemiotic case studies are examined so as to suggest a broad picture of how such a biosemiotic approach to biology might be done.

Realistic threshold policy with hysteresis to control predator–prey continuous dynamics

This paper introduces a threshold policy with hysteresis (TPH) for the control of one-predator one-prey models. The models studied are the Lotka–Volterra and Rosenzweig–MacArthur two species density-dependent predator–prey models and the Arditi–Ginzburg nondimensional ratio-dependent model. The proposed policy (TPH) changes the dynamics of the system in such a way that a bounded oscillation is achieved confined to a region that does not allow extinction of either species. The policy can be designed by a suitable choice of so called virtual equilibrium points in a simple and intuitive manner.

Forty Years of ‘The Strategy’: Levins on Model Building and Idealization

This paper is an interpretation and defense of Richard Levins’ “The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology,” which has been extremely influential among biologists since its publication 40 years ago. In this article, Levins confronted some of the deepest philosophical issues surrounding modeling and theory construction. By way of interpretation, I discuss each of Levins’ major philosophical themes: the problem of complexity, the brute-force approach, the existence and consequence of tradeoffs, and robustness analysis. I argue that Levins’ article is concerned, at its core, with justifying the use of multiple, idealized models in population biology.

Assessing the fitness landscape revolution

According to Pigliucci and Kaplan, there is a revolution underway in how we understand fitness landscapes. Recent models suggest that a perennial problem in these landscapes—how to get from one peak across a fitness valley to another peak—is, in fact, non-existent. In this paper I assess the structure and the extent of Pigliucci and Kaplan’s proposed revolution and argue for two points. First, I provide an alternative interpretation of what underwrites this revolution, motivated by some recent work on model-based science. Second, I show that the implications of this revolution need to carefully assessed depending on question being asked, for peak-shifting is not central to all evolutionary questions that fitness landscapes have been used to explore.

Adaptationism and the adaptive landscape

Debates over adaptationism can be clarified and partially resolved by careful consideration of the ‘grain’ at which evolutionary processes are described. The framework of ‘adaptive landscapes’ can be used to illustrate and facilitate this investigation. We argue that natural selection may have special status at an intermediate grain of analysis of evolutionary processes. The cases of sickle-cell disease and genomic imprinting are used as case studies.

Sophisticated selectionism as a general theory of knowledge

Human knowledge is a phenomenon whose roots extend from the cultural, through the neural and the biological and finally all the way down into the Precambrian “primordial soup.” The present paper reports an attempt at understanding this Greater System of Knowledge (GSK) as a hierarchical nested set of selection processes acting concurrently on several different scales of time and space. To this end, a general selection theory extending mainly from the work of Hull and Campbell is introduced. The perhaps most drastic change from previous similar theories is that replication is revealed as a composite function consisting of what is referred to as memory and synthesis. This move is argued to drastically improve the fit between theory and human-related knowledge systems. The introduced theory is then used to interpret the subsystems of the GSK and their interrelations. This is done to the end of demonstrating some of the new perspectives offered by this view.

Salal Harvester Local Ecological Knowledge, Harvest Practices and Understory Management on the Olympic Peninsula, Washington

Despite growing interest in traditional and local ecological knowledge for conservation and resource management, the role of migrant resource users is largely unexplored. Challenging many assumptions about what constitutes “local knowledge,” migrant and immigrant harvesters of non-timber forest products on the Olympic Peninsula, Washington possess useful ecological knowledge of overstory–understory relationships and how forestry practices affect understory biological and commercial production. Harvesters of salal (Gaultheria shallon), a shrub used in the multi-million dollar floral greens industry, were interviewed in Mason County, Washington in 2001–2003. Interviews revealed that harvesters possess different kinds of resource management knowledge depending on whether they are experienced harvesters or more recent newcomers to the area. These differences may also correlate with differences in their harvesting practices. Understanding how resource management knowledge differs between experienced and newcomer harvesters can inform forest managers in their efforts to develop effective management and permitting policies for floral greens and other non-timber forest resources in the Pacific Northwest of the United States.

Is convergence more than an analogy? Homoplasy and its implications for macroevolutionary predictability

A number of authors have pointed to “convergent evolution” as evidence for the central role of natural selection in shaping predictable trajectories of macroevolution. However, there are numerous conceptual and empirical difficulties that arise in broadly appealing to the frequency of homoplasy as evidence for a non-contingently constrained adaptational design space. Most important is the need to distinguish between convergent (externally constrained) and parallel (internally constrained) evolution, and to consider how the respective frequencies of these significantly different sources of homoplasy affect a strong adaptationist view of life. In this paper, I critically evaluate Simon Conway Morris’s use of the homoplasy literature to support his argument for a non-contingent, counterfactually stable account of macroevolutionary pattern. In so doing, I offer a conception of parallelism which avoids the charge that it differs from convergence merely in degree and not in kind. I argue that although organisms sharing a homoplastic trait will also share varying degrees of homology, it is the underlying developmental homology with respect to the generators directly causally responsible for the homoplastic event that defines parallel evolution and non-arbitrarily distinguishes it from convergence. The notion of “screening-off” is used to distinguish the proximal generators of a homoplastic trait from its more distal genetic causes (such as a master control gene).