Natural selection without survival of the fittest

Susan Mills and John Beatty proposed a propensity interpretation of fitness (1979) to show that Darwinian explanations are not circular, but they did not address the critics' chief complaint that the principle of the survival of the fittest is either tautological or untestable. I show that the propensity interpretation cannot rescue the principle from the critics' charges. The critics, however, incorrectly assume that there is nothing more to Darwin's theory than the survival of the fittest. While Darwinians all scoff at this assumption, they do not agree about what role, if any, this principle plays in Darwin's theory of natural selection. I argue that the principle has no place in Darwin's theory. His theory does include the idea that some organisms are fitter than others. But greater reproductive success is simply inferred from higher fitness. There is no reason to embody this inference in the form of a special principle of the survival of the fittest.I would like to thank John Beatty, Ron Giere, Philip Kitcher and John Winnie for detailed and helpful criticisms of an earlier draft of this paper.     

Origin of symbol-using systems: speech,but not sign,without the semantic urge

Natural language—spoken and signed—is a multichannel phenomenon, involving facial and body expression, and voice and visual intonation that is often used in the service of a social urge to communicate meaning. Given that iconicity seems easier and less abstract than making arbitrary connections between sound and meaning, iconicity and gesture have often been invoked in the origin of language alongside the urge to convey meaning. To get a fresh perspective, we critically distinguish the origin of a system capable of evolution from the subsequent evolution that system becomes capable of. Human language arose on a substrate of a system already capable of Darwinian evolution; the genetically supported uniquely human ability to learn a language reflects a key contact point between Darwinian evolution and language. Though implemented in brains generated by DNA symbols coding for protein meaning, the second higher-level symbol-using system of language now operates in a world mostly decoupled from Darwinian evolutionary constraints. Examination of Darwinian evolution of vocal learning in other animals suggests that the initial fixation of a key prerequisite to language into the human genome may actually have required initially side-stepping not only iconicity, but the urge to mean itself. If sign languages came later, they would not have faced this constraint.     

Darwin and the linguists: the coevolution of mind and language, part 2. The language-thought relationship

This paper examines Charles Darwin's idea that language-use and humanity's unique cognitive abilities reinforced each other's evolutionary emergence-an idea Darwin sketched in his early notebooks, set forth in his Descent of man (1871), and qualified in Descent's second (1874) edition. Darwin understood this coevolution process in essentially Lockean terms, based on John Locke's hints about the way language shapes thinking itself. Ironically, the linguist Friedrich Max Müller attacked Darwin's human descent theory by invoking a similar thesis, the German romantic notion of an identity between language and thought. Although Darwin avoided outright contradiction, when he came to defend himself against Müller's attacks, he undercut some of his own argumentation in favor of the coevolution idea. That is, he found it difficult to counter Müller's argument while also making a case for coevolution. Darwin's efforts in this area were further complicated by British and American writers who held a naturalistic view of speech origins yet still taught that language had been invented by fully evolved homo sapiens, thus denying coevolution.     

"Curiously parallel": analogies of language and race in Darwin's Descent of man. A reply to Gregory Radick

In the second chapter of The descent of man (1871), Charles Darwin interrupted his discussion of the evolutionary origins of language to describe ten ways in which the formation of languages and of biological species were 'curiously' similar. I argue that these comparisons served mainly as analogies in which linguistic processes stood for aspects of biological evolution. Darwin used these analogies to recapitulate themes from On the origin of species (1859), including common descent, genealogical classification, the struggle for existence, and natural selection, among others. Skeptical of this interpretation, Gregory Radick sees the naturalistic account of language formation in the Descent comparisons as reinforcing Darwin's idea that languages and the races of mankind have both undergone progressive development. (The opposite view was that modern-day primitive peoples had degenerated from an originally civilized condition.) Yet the details of Darwin's language-species comparisons, as well as the polemical context in which they appear, show that they were not aimed at so limited a function. Rather, they addressed issues related to species transmutation in general.     

Darwin's laws

There is widespread agreement among contemporary philosophers of biology and philosophically-minded biologists that Darwin's insights about the intrusion of chance processes into biological regularities undermines the possibility of there being biological laws. Darwin made references to "designed laws." He also freely described some laws as having exceptions. This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the notion of scientific laws that was dominant in Darwin's time, and in all probability the one which he inherited. The analysis of laws is then used to show how it could have been natural for Darwin to believe in designed laws that had exceptions, and to highlight the continuity between the metaphysics of pre-Darwinian, Darwinian, and contemporary biological science. One important result is the removal of one motivation for the anti-laws sentiment in philosophy and biology.     

Built for speed,not for comfort. Darwinian theory and human culture

Darwin believed that his theory of evolution would stand or fall on its ability to account for human behavior. No species could be an exception to his theory without imperiling the whole edifice. The ideas in the Descent of Man were widely discussed by his contemporaries although they were far from being the only evolutionary theories current in the late nineteenth century. Darwin's specific evolutionary ideas and those of his main followers had very little impact on the social sciences as they emerged as separate disciplines in the early Twentieth Century. Not until the late twentieth century were concerted, sophisticated efforts made to apply Darwinian theory to human behavior. Why such a long delay? We argue that Darwin's theory was rather modern in respects that conflicted with Victorian sensibilities and that he and his few close followers failed to influence any of the social sciences. The late Twentieth Century work takes up almost exactly where James Baldwin left off at the turn of the century.     

Darwin was a teleologist

It is often claimed that one of Darwin's chief accomplishments was to provide biology with a non-teleological explanation of adaptation. A number of Darwin's closest associates, however, and Darwin himself, did not see it that way. In order to assess whether Darwin's version of evolutionary theory does or does not employ teleological explanation, two of his botanical studies are examined. The result of this examination is that Darwin sees selection explanations of adaptations as teleological explanations. The confusion in the nineteenth century about Darwin's attitude to teleology is argued to be a result of Darwin's teleological explanations not conforming to either of the dominant philosophical justifications of teleology at that time. Darwin's explanatory practices conform well, however, to recent defenses of the teleological character of selection explanations.I would like to thank John Beatty, David Hull and one of this journal's readers for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Darwin's artificial selection as an experiment

Darwin used artificial selection (ASN) extensively and variedly in his theorizing. Darwin used ASN as an analogy to natural selection; he compared artificial to natural varieties, hereditary variation in nature to that in the breeding farm; and he also compared the overall effectiveness of the two processes. Most historians and philosophers of biology have argued that ASN worked as an analogical field in Darwin's theorizing. I will argue rather that this provides a limited and somewhat muddled view of Darwinian science. I say "limited" because I will show that Darwin also used ASN as a complex experimental field. And I say "muddled" because, if we concentrate on the analogical role exclusively, we conceive Darwinian science as rather disconnected from contemporary conceptions of "good science". I will argue that ASN should be conceived as a multifaceted experiment. As a traditional experiment, ASN established the efficacy of Darwin's preferred cause: natural selection. As a non-traditional experiment, ASN disclosed the nature of a crucial element in Darwin's evolutionary mechanics: the nature of hereditary variation. Finally, I will argue that the experiment conception should help us make sense of Darwin's comments regarding the "monstrous" nature of domestic breeds traditionally considered to be problematic.     

Extending and expanding the Darwinian synthesis: the role of complex systems dynamics

Darwinism is defined here as an evolving research tradition based upon the concepts of natural selection acting upon heritable variation articulated via background assumptions about systems dynamics. Darwin's theory of evolution was developed within a context of the background assumptions of Newtonian systems dynamics. The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis, or neo-Darwinism, successfully joined Darwinian selection and Mendelian genetics by developing population genetics informed by background assumptions of Boltzmannian systems dynamics. Currently the Darwinian Research Tradition is changing as it incorporates new information and ideas from molecular biology, paleontology, developmental biology, and systems ecology. This putative expanded and extended synthesis is most perspicuously deployed using background assumptions from complex systems dynamics. Such attempts seek to not only broaden the range of phenomena encompassed by the Darwinian Research Tradition, such as neutral molecular evolution, punctuated equilibrium, as well as developmental biology, and systems ecology more generally, but to also address issues of the emergence of evolutionary novelties as well as of life itself.     

Universal Principles in the Repair of Communication Problems

There would be little adaptive value in a complex communication system like human language if there were no ways to detect and correct problems. A systematic comparison of conversation in a broad sample of the world’s languages reveals a universal system for the real-time resolution of frequent breakdowns in communication. In a sample of 12 languages of 8 language families of varied typological profiles we find a system of ‘other-initiated repair’, where the recipient of an unclear message can signal trouble and the sender can repair the original message. We find that this system is frequently used (on average about once per 1.4 minutes in any language), and that it has detailed common properties, contrary to assumptions of radical cultural variation. Unrelated languages share the same three functionally distinct types of repair initiator for signalling problems and use them in the same kinds of contexts. People prefer to choose the type that is the most specific possible, a principle that minimizes cost both for the sender being asked to fix the problem and for the dyad as a social unit. Disruption to the conversation is kept to a minimum, with the two-utterance repair sequence being on average no longer that the single utterance which is being fixed. The findings, controlled for historical relationships, situation types and other dependencies, reveal the fundamentally cooperative nature of human communication and offer support for the pragmatic universals hypothesis: while languages may vary in the organization of grammar and meaning, key systems of language use may be largely similar across cultural groups. They also provide a fresh perspective on controversies about the core properties of language, by revealing a common infrastructure for social interaction which may be the universal bedrock upon which linguistic diversity rests.     

Bayesian phylogenetic analysis supports an agricultural origin of Japonic languages

Languages, like genes, evolve by a process of descent with modification. This striking similarity between biological and linguistic evolution allows us to apply phylogenetic methods to explore how languages, as well as the people who speak them, are related to one another through evolutionary history. Language phylogenies constructed with lexical data have so far revealed population expansions of Austronesian, Indo-European and Bantu speakers. However, how robustly a phylogenetic approach can chart the history of language evolution and what language phylogenies reveal about human prehistory must be investigated more thoroughly on a global scale. Here we report a phylogeny of 59 Japonic languages and dialects. We used this phylogeny to estimate time depth of its root and compared it with the time suggested by an agricultural expansion scenario for Japanese origin. In agreement with the scenario, our results indicate that Japonic languages descended from a common ancestor approximately 2182 years ago. Together with archaeological and biological evidence, our results suggest that the first farmers of Japan had a profound impact on the origins of both people and languages. On a broader level, our results are consistent with a theory that agricultural expansion is the principal factor for shaping global linguistic diversity.     

God's magnificent law: The bad influence of theistic metaphysics on Darwin's estimation of natural selection

Conclusion It is natural for us — living after the Darwinian Revolution and the neo-Darwinian synthesis — to consider the adoption of evolution by natural selection as unconditionally rational, because it now seems the best theory or explanation of many phenomena. Nonetheless, if we take historical inquiry seriously, as allowing us to probe into the ground of our knowledge, the roots of even this rational Darwinism might be unearthed. Darwinian doctrine betrays a deceptive desire for unity and simplicity of principle, and belief that the mechanistic aspect of nature is of the highest significance. Such crucial but questionable presuppositions are more easily discerned historically, insofar as they chronologically preceded Darwin's particular theoretical conviction and were even set off as a metaphysics of divine law.We have seen how Darwin's teaching about nature emerged within that theistic metaphysics. It emerged in a prior metaphysical debate in his mind between the contemporary belief in special creations and the belief in a designed hierarchy of physical laws. One can hardly deny that Darwin favored the superior side in this contest; but the contest was a narrow one whose basic premises he never clearly criticized. On the one hand, of course, his conviction about a lawful genesis inspired him to take a broad view of things and to seek out important general phenomena. But, on the other hand, it ensured that his new empirical notions would be easily drawn into the preferred cosmology. Historically, this seems to have occurred in Darwin's adoption of Malthus' principle of population and his extension of it to the whole account of descent: Malthusianism was readily attached to an ultimate scheme of things. Consequently, the key concepts that Darwin developed out of his Malthusian views — perfect adaptation and selection — reflect his cosmological prepossession, his desire to express a total and teleological process of creation. Perhaps our most valuable, and most undervalued, token of Darwin's metaphysical orientation is his reliance on a human technique (selective breeding) to explain Nature's way. In sum, to understand Darwin's faith in his grand view of life, we should not ignore the metaphysics that preceded and structured it, the metaphysics that linked the principles of contemporary science to primordial creation. Nor should we fail to see that such a metaphysics leads natural philosophy into a shadowy realm, where system can come to look like science, and one insight like an absolute.     

Historical linguistics as a sequence optimization problem: the evolution and biogeography of Uto‐Aztecan languages

Language origins and diversification are vital for mapping human history. Traditionally, the reconstruction of language trees has been based on cognate forms among related languages, with ancestral protolanguages inferred by individual investigators. Disagreement among competing authorities is typically extensive, without empirical grounds for resolving alternative hypotheses. Here, we apply analytical methods derived from DNA sequence optimization algorithms to Uto‐Aztecan languages, treating words as sequences of sounds. Our analysis yields novel relationships and suggests a resolution to current conflicts about the Proto‐Uto‐Aztecan homeland. The techniques used for Uto‐Aztecan are applicable to written and unwritten languages, and should enable more empirically robust hypotheses of language relationships, language histories, and linguistic evolution.     

Phylogenetic inertia and Darwin's higher law

The concept of 'phylogenetic inertia' is routinely deployed in evolutionary biology as an alternative to natural selection for explaining the persistence of characteristics that appear sub-optimal from an adaptationist perspective. However, in many of these contexts the precise meaning of 'phylogenetic inertia' and its relationship to selection are far from clear. After tracing the history of the concept of 'inertia' in evolutionary biology, I argue that treating phylogenetic inertia and natural selection as alternative explanations is mistaken because phylogenetic inertia is, from a Darwinian point of view, simply an expected effect of selection. Although Darwin did not discuss 'phylogenetic inertia,' he did assert the explanatory priority of selection over descent. An analysis of 'phylogenetic inertia' provides a perspective from which to assess Darwin's view.     

A case reopened: teleology and its consequences for the units of selection discussion.

Darwinian explanations for teleology are often imprecise, and justify the occurrence of teleological features by referring to natural selection in a vague and unspecified sense. In this paper, the Darwinian account for teleology is further analyzed. It is argued that in theory only a specific form of teleology--teleology that is caused by and directed towards the preservation of the genetic program--can be explained in a naturalistic way by employing Darwin's theory of natural selection. This observation links teleology with the units of selection discussion, as for both discussions the end-direction of teleological processes and behavior is of elementary importance. According to Dawkins' analysis, the unit of selection is an active germ-like replicator with a sufficient degree of longevity-fecundity-copying fidelity. From the teleological point of view, the unit of selection should additionally incorporate the genetic program in order to naturalize teleology. It is shown that within sexually reproducing species these two requirements cannot be met. Dawkins' concept of genic selectionism cannot be maintained without violating the naturalistic claims on teleology, and none of the other frequently proposed unit of selection candidates can adequately meet the demands as developed by Dawkins and those developed in the light of teleology.     

The spread of language around the pacific rim

The spread of humans around the Pacific rim, ultimately to colonize the Pacific and the New World, began about 50,000 years ago. The languages of Australasia and the New World are a reservoir of potential clues to the chronology, origins, and process of human colonization, and linguists are seeking methods to tap this reservoir. Standard linguistic comparative-historical method is unable to reach back in time more than about 8,000 years because regular grammar change and vocabulary loss gradually remove its most important evidence. The oldest well-established and reconstructable language families are about 6,000 years old. Therefore, tracing those families ever farther back in time is not a possible way of recovering deep linguistic prehistory. Rather, it is the very discretness of the nearly 300 distinct language families on earth that makes it possible to define populations, map the distribution of diagnostic structural features in language, and thereby trace the spread of languages and colonization around the Pacific rim to their origins in the upper Paleolithic.     

The evolutionary sequence: origin and emergences

The evolutionary sequence is being reexamined experimentally from a "Big Bang"origin to the protocell and from the emergence of protocell and variety of species to Darwin's mental power (mind) and society (The Descent of Man). A most fundamentally revisionary consequence of experiments is an emphasis on endogenous ordering. This principle, seen vividly in ordered copolymerization of amino acids, has had new impact on the theory of Darwinian evolution and has been found to apply to the entire sequence. Herein, I will discuss some problems of dealing with teaching controversial subjects.     

Unity and diversity in human language

Human language is both highly diverse-different languages have different ways of achieving the same functional goals-and easily learnable. Any language allows its users to express virtually any thought they can conceptualize. These traits render human language unique in the biological world. Understanding the biological basis of language is thus both extremely challenging and fundamentally interesting. I review the literature on linguistic diversity and language universals, suggesting that an adequate notion of 'formal universals' provides a promising way to understand the facts of language acquisition, offering order in the face of the diversity of human languages. Formal universals are cross-linguistic generalizations, often of an abstract or implicational nature. They derive from cognitive capacities to perceive and process particular types of structures and biological constraints upon integration of the multiple systems involved in language. Such formal universals can be understood on the model of a general solution to a set of differential equations; each language is one particular solution. An explicit formal conception of human language that embraces both considerable diversity and underlying biological unity is possible, and fully compatible with modern evolutionary theory.     

Historical perspective on the development and evolution of eyes and photoreceptors

The development and evolution of eyes is an "old problem" in biology, which required a special treatment in Charles Darwin's "Origin of the species" (1882) under the heading of "Difficulties of the theory". Darwin postulated a simple and imperfect eye, as a prototype, which can vary and evolve under natural selection into more complex and perfect eyes. Based upon morphological criteria and the different modes of development of the different kinds of eyes, neodarwinists have postulated that the various eye-types are polyphyletic in origin and that the eyes have evolved independently in the various animal phyla. Recent developmental genetic experiments and molecular phylogenetic analyses cast serious doubts on this interpretation and argue strongly for a monophyletic origin of the eyes from a Darwinian prototype and subsequent divergent, parallel and convergent evolution leading to the various eye-types.     

The Invisible Hand of Natural Selection, and Vice Versa

Building on work by Popper, Schweber, Nozick, Sober, and others in a still-growing literature, I explore here the conceptual kinship (not the hackneyed ideological association) between Adam Smith's 'invisible hand' and Darwinian natural selection. I review the historical ties, and examine Ullman-Margalit's 'constraints' on invisible-hand accounts, which I later re-apply to natural selection, bringing home the close relationship. These theories share a 'parent' principle, itself neither biological no politico-economic, that collective order and well-being can emerge parsimoniously from the dispersed (inter)action of individuals. The invisible hand operates on 'memes' the way natural selection operates on genes. Like Darwin's concept, it brings together traditional opposites, 'nature' and 'selection,' forming a saltation-mitigating transition between biological instinct and full-blown conscious design. Herschel's criterion of confirmation, which Darwin long strove to satisfy, is itself an invisible hand-like meme – a 'Midas effect' revealing and rewarding the fittest theories, Darwin's and Smith's emphatically among them.