Costly signalling theories: beyond the handicap principle

Two recent overviews of costly signalling theory—Maynard-Smith and Harper (2003) and Searcy and Nowicki (2005)—both refuse to count signals kept honest by punishment of dishonesty, as costly signals, because (1) honest signals must be costly in cases of costly signalling, and (2) punishment of dishonesty itself requires explanation. I argue that both pairs of researchers are mistaken: (2) is not a reason to discount signals kept honest by punishment of dishonesty as cases of costly signalling, and (1) betrays too narrow a focus on certain versions of costly signalling theory. In the course of so arguing, I propose a new schema for classifying signal costs, which suggests productive research questions for future conceptual and empirical work on costly signalling.     

The evolution of queen pheromones in the ant genus Lasius

Queen pheromones are among the most important chemical messages regulating insect societies yet they remain largely undiscovered, hindering research into interesting proximate and ultimate questions. Identifying queen pheromones in multiple species would give new insight into the selective pressures and evolutionary constraints acting on these ubiquitous signals. Here, we present experimental and comparative evidence that 3‐methylalkanes, hydrocarbons present on the queen's cuticle, are a queen pheromone throughout the ant genus Lasius. Interspecific variation in the chemical profile is consistent with 3‐methylalkanes evolving more slowly than other types of hydrocarbons, perhaps due to differential selection or evolutionary constraints. We argue that the sensory ecology of the worker response imposes strong stabilizing selection on queen pheromones relative to other hydrocarbons. 3‐Methylalkanes are also strongly physiologically and genetically coupled with fecundity in at least one Lasius species, which may translate into evolutionary constraints. Our results highlight how honest signalling could minimize evolutionary conflict over reproduction, promoting the evolution and maintenance of eusociality.     

Do aggressive signals evolve towards higher reliability or lower costs of assessment?

It has been suggested that the evolution of signals must be a wasteful process for the signaller, aimed at the maximization of signal honesty. However, the reliability of communication depends not only on the costs paid by signallers but also on the costs paid by receivers during assessment, and less attention has been given to the interaction between these two types of costs during the evolution of signalling systems. A signaller and receiver may accept some level of signal dishonesty by choosing signals that are cheaper in terms of assessment but that are stabilized with less reliable mechanisms. I studied the potential trade‐off between signal reliability and the costs of signal assessment in the corncrake (Crex crex). I found that the birds prefer signals that are less costly regarding assessment rather than more reliable. Despite the fact that the fundamental frequency of calls was a strong predictor of male size, it was ignored by receivers unless they could directly compare signal variants. My data revealed a response advantage of costly signals when comparison between calls differing with fundamental frequencies is fast and straightforward, whereas cheap signalling is preferred in natural conditions. These data might improve our understanding of the influence of receivers on signal design because they support the hypothesis that fully honest signalling systems may be prone to dishonesty based on the effects of receiver costs and be replaced by signals that are cheaper in production and reception but more susceptible to cheating.     

The cost of dishonesty

The handicap principle states that stable biological signals must be honest and costly to produce. The cost of the signal should reflect the true quality of the signaller. Here, it is argued that honest signalling may be maintained although the used signals are not handicaps. A game theoretic model in the form of a game of signalling is presented: all the existing evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) are found. Honest and cheap signalling of male quality is shown to be evolutionarily stable if females divorce the mate if it turns out that he has cheated about his quality. However, for this ESS to apply, the cost of lost time must not be too great. The stability of the honest signalling is based on deceivers being prevented from spreading in the population because they suffer from a cost of divorce. Under some fairly strict conditions, a mixed polymorphism of dishonesty and honesty represents another possible ESS.     

Errors drive the evolution of biological signalling to costly codes

Reduction of costs in biological signalling seems an evolutionary advantage, but recent experiments have shown signalling codes shifted to signals of high cost with an underutilization of low-cost signals. Here I derive a theory for efficient signalling that includes both errors and costs as constraints and I show that errors in the efficient translation of biological states into signals can shift codes to higher costs, effectively performing a quality control. The statistical structure of signal usage is predicted to be of a generalized Boltzmann form that penalizes signals that are costly and sensitive to errors. This predicted distribution of signal usage against signal cost has two main features: an exponential tail required for cost efficiency and an underutilization of the low-cost signals required to protect the signalling quality from the errors. These predictions are shown to correspond quantitatively to the experiments in which gathering signal statistics is feasible as in visual cortex neurons.     

Uncoupling fertility from fertility-associated pheromones in worker honeybees (Apis mellifera)

Fertility-associated pheromones, chemical signals delineating ovarian development, were favourably selected in the course of evolution because it is in the best interest of both the signallers (in recruiting help from other colony members) and the receivers (in assisting them to reach an informed decision of how to maximize fitness). Such signals therefore should constitute honest, deception-proof indicators of ovarian development, suggesting, theoretically, that the processes of ovarian development and signal production are irreversibly coupled. Here we demonstrate that these processes can be uncoupled by treating queenless (QL) honeybee callow workers with methoprene, a juvenile hormone (JH) analog. While methoprene effectively inhibited ovarian development, it neither inhibited Dufour's fertility signal nor the mandibular glands’ dominance signal. In fact, there was even a slight augmentation of both in the methoprene-treated bees. Thus, although fertility and fertility signals are tightly associated, they can be uncoupled by experimental manipulation. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that ovarian development and fertility-associated signal production are triggered by a common event/signal (e.g. queen pheromone disappearance) but comprise different regulatory systems. The evolutionary implication is that these two traits have evolved independently and may have been co-opted to emphasize the reproductive status of workers in the competition for reproduction.     

THE COST OF SEXUAL SIGNALING IN YEAST

The handicap principle holds that costly sexual signals can reliably indicate mate quality. Only individuals of high quality can afford a strong signal—the cost of signaling is relatively lower for high‐quality signalers than for low‐quality signalers. This critical property is difficult to test experimentally because the benefit of signaling on mating success, and cost of signaling on other components of fitness, cannot easily be separated in obligate sexual organisms. We therefore studied the facultatively sexual yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, which produces pheromones to attract potential mates. To precisely measure the cost of signaling, the signal was reduced or removed by deleting one or both copies of the pheromone‐encoding genes and measuring asexual growth rate in competition with a wild‐type signaler. We manipulated signaler quality either by changing the quality of the assay environment or by changing the number of deleterious mutations carried. For both types of treatment, we found that the cost of signaling decreased as the quality of the signaler increased, demonstrating that the yeast pheromone signal has the key property required for selection under the handicap principle. We found that cells of high genetic quality produce stronger signals than low‐quality cells, verifying that the signal is indeed honest.     

Cheap talk when interests conflict

Most evolutionary analyses of animal communication suggest that low-cost signals can evolve only when both the signaller and the recipient rank outcomes in the same order. When there is a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, honest signals must be costly. However, recent work suggests that low-cost signals can be evolutionarily stable, even when the sender and the receiver rank outcomes in different orders, as long as the interest in achieving coordination is sufficiently great. In this paper, we extend this body of work by analysing a game theory model that shows that low-cost signals can evolve when there are conflicts of interest and no interest in coordination, as long as individuals interact repeatedly. We also present an empirical example indicating that female rhesus macaques, Macaca mulatta, use honest, low-cost, vocal signals to facilitate interactions when conflicts of interest exist. Copyright 2000 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour.     

Primate Communication: By Nature Honest, or by Experience Wise?

We review evolutionary views on honesty and deception and their application to studies of nonhuman primate communication. There is evidence that some primate signals are likely to be accurate on the basis of costliness. They appear most often in contexts that include overtly competitive interactions in which unrelated individuals have limited access to information about one another. However, both game theoretic models and most empirical work suggest that costly signals are not often likely to be the basis for honest communication in nonhuman primates. Inexpensive signaling can exist in contexts wherein communication occurs among related animals, something common among many nonhuman primate societies. Another condition in which inexpensive signaling is possible and that is also typical of nonhuman primates, is when sender and receiver both benefit from coordinated interactions. Additionally, when individuals interact repeatedly and can use past interactions to assess the honesty of signals and to modify future response to signals, low-cost signals can evolve. Nonhuman primates appear to deal with the problem of deception via skeptical responding, which can be largely accounted for by learning rules and the fact that they live in stable social groups and can recognize one another and recall past interactions.     

CONSPIRATORIAL WHISPERS AND CONSPICUOUS DISPLAYS: GAMES OF SIGNAL DETECTION

Recent models of signaling have assumed that the expenditure required to ensure detection of a display is negligible and have concentrated instead on the costs that may be necessary to maintain honesty. Such models predict that individuals who share the same interests are likely to communicate using “conspiratorial whispers,” signals that are cheap and inconspicuous. Here, I present a game-theoretical model of signal detection (in a noisy environment, in the presence of potential eavesdroppers), which demonstrates that the idea of conspiratorial whispers is far too simplistic. It is true that in “cooperative” signaling systems (where signalers attempt to elicit responses that are beneficial for receivers), signal cost is not required to maintain honesty. However, some level of expenditure is still needed to ensure that a signal is reliably detected. Moreover, there exists a conflict of interest between signalers and receivers over the division of this expenditure. To predict the stable level of display in such cases, one needs to know how this conflict of interest will be resolved. The model reveals that the outcome may range from a whisper to a conspicuous and costly (though still conspiratorial) display. The more closely related the receiver is to the signaler, the greater the level of signal exaggeration that is expected—the opposite prediction to that of honest signaling models.     

Costly signaling and the handicap principle in hunter‐gatherer research: A critical review

It has been argued that men's hunting in many forager groups is not, primarily, a means of family provisioning but is a costly way of signaling otherwise cryptic qualities related to hunting ability. Much literature concerning the signaling value of hunting draws links to Zahavi's handicap principle and the costly signaling literature in zoology. However, although nominally grounded in the same theoretical paradigm, these literatures have evolved separately. Here I review honest signaling theory in both hunter‐gatherer studies and zoology and highlight three issues with the costly signaling literature in hunter‐gather studies: (a) an overemphasis on the demonstration of realized costs, which are neither necessary nor sufficient to diagnose costly signaling; (b) a lack of clear predictions about what specific qualities hunting actually signals; and (c) an insufficient focus on the broadcast effectiveness of hunting and its value as a heuristics for signal recipients. Rather than signaling hunting prowess, hunting might instead facilitate reputation‐building.     

Queen pheromones in Temnothorax ants: control or honest signal?

Background  

The division of reproductive labor among group members in insect societies is regulated by "queen pheromones". However, it remains controversial whether these are manipulative, i.e., actively suppress worker reproduction, or honestly signal the fertility status of the queen to which workers react in their own interest by refraining from laying eggs. Manipulative queen control is thought to lead to an evolutionary arms race between queens and workers, resulting in complex queen bouquets that diverge strongly among different populations and species. In contrast, honest signals would evolve more slowly and might therefore differ less strongly within and among species.     

Queen pheromone regulates egg production in a termite

In social insects, resource allocation is a key factor that influences colony survival and growth. Optimal allocation to queens and brood is essential for maximum colony productivity, requiring colony members to have information on the total reproductive power in colonies. However, the mechanisms regulating egg production relative to the current labour force for brood care remain poorly known. Recently, a volatile chemical was identified as a termite queen pheromone that inhibits the differentiation of new neotenic reproductives (secondary reproductives developed from nymphs or workers) in Reticulitermes speratus. The same volatile chemical is also emitted by eggs. This queen pheromone would therefore be expected to act as an honest message of the reproductive power about queens. In this study, we examined how the queen pheromone influences the reproductive rate of queens in R. speratus. We compared the number of eggs produced by each queen between groups with and without exposure to artificial queen pheromone. Exposure to the pheromone resulted in a significant decrease in egg production in both single-queen and multiple-queen groups. This is the first report supporting the role of queen pheromones as a signal regulating colony-level egg production, using synthetically derived compounds in a termite.     

The Handicap Principle: how an erroneous hypothesis became a scientific principle

The most widely cited explanation for the evolution of reliable signals is Zahavi's so‐called Handicap Principle, which proposes that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. Here we provide a critical review of the Handicap Principle and its theoretical development. We explain why this idea is erroneous, and how it nevertheless became widely accepted as the leading explanation for honest signalling. In 1975, Zahavi proposed that elaborate secondary sexual characters impose ‘handicaps’ on male survival, not due to inadvertent signalling trade‐offs, but as a mechanism that functions to demonstrate males' genetic quality to potential mates. His handicap hypothesis received many criticisms, and in response, Zahavi clarified his hypothesis and explained that it assumes that signals are wasteful as well as costly, and that they evolve because wastefulness enforces honesty. He proposed that signals evolve under ‘signal selection’, a non‐Darwinian type of selection that favours waste rather than efficiency. He maintained that the handicap hypothesis provides a general principle to explain the evolution of all types of signalling systems, i.e. the Handicap Principle. In 1977, Zahavi proposed a second hypothesis for honest signalling, which received many different labels and interpretations, although it was assumed to be another example of handicap signalling. In 1990, Grafen published models that he claimed vindicated Zahavi's Handicap Principle. His conclusions were widely accepted and the Handicap Principle subsequently became the dominant paradigm for explaining the evolution of honest signalling in the biological and social sciences. Researchers have subsequently focused on testing predications of the Handicap Principle, such as measuring the absolute costs of honest signals (and using energetic and other proximate costs as proxies for fitness), but very few have attempted to test Grafen's models. We show that Grafen's models do not support the handicap hypothesis, although they do support Zahavi's second hypothesis, which proposes that males adjust their investment into the expression of their sexual signals according to their condition and ability to bear the costs (and risks to their survival). Rather than being wasteful over‐investments, honest signals evolve in this scenario because selection favours efficient and optimal investment into signal expression and minimizes signalling costs. This idea is very different from the handicap hypothesis, but it has been widely misinterpreted and equated to the Handicap Principle. Theoretical studies have since shown that signalling costs paid at the equilibrium are neither sufficient nor necessary to maintain signal honesty, and that honesty can evolve through differential benefits, as well as differential costs. There have been increasing criticisms of the Handicap Principle, but they have focused on the limitations of Grafen's model and overlooked the fact that it is not a handicap model. This model is better understood within a Darwinian framework of adaptive signalling trade‐offs, without the added burden and confusing logic of the Handicap Principle. There is no theoretical or empirical support for the Handicap Principle and the time is long overdue to usher this idea into an ‘honorable retirement’.     

Fitness cost of pheromone production in signaling female moths

A secondary sexual character may act as an honest signal of the quality of the individual if the trait bears a cost and if its expression is phenotypically condition dependent. The cost of increasing the trait should be tolerable for individuals in good condition but not for those in a poor condition. The trait thus provides an honest signal of quality that enables the receiver to choose higher quality mates. Evidence for sex pheromones, which play a major role in shaping sexual evolution, inflicting a signaling cost is scarce. Here, we demonstrate that the amount of the major component of the pheromone in glands of Lobesia botrana (Lepidoptera) females at signaling time was significantly greater in large than in small females, that male moths preferred larger females as mates when responding to volatile signals, and small virgin females, but not large ones, exposed to conspecific pheromone, produced, when mated, significantly fewer eggs than nonexposed females. The latter indicates a condition-dependent cost of signaling. These results are in accordance with the predictions of condition-dependent honest signals. We therefore suggest that female signaling for males using sex pheromones bears a cost and thus calling may serve as honest advertisement for female quality.     

Sexual selection: signals to die for

Sexual signals are conspicuous and are typically assumed to be energetically costly, which keeps them honest. A recent study on fireflies has found that signal production is energetically cheap, but signalling remains expensive because of eavesdropping predators.     

Beyond illness: Variation in haemosporidian load explains differences in vocal performance in a songbird

In animal communication, signals are expected to evolve to be honest, so that receivers avoid being manipulated by signalers. One way that signals can evolve to be honest is for them to be costly, with only high‐quality individuals being able to bear the costs of signal expression. It has been proposed that parasites can introduce costs that affect the expression of sexually selected traits, and there is evidence to support the role of parasitism in modulating animal behavior. If host infection status or intensity is found to relate to differences in signal expression, it may indicate a fitness cost that mediates honesty of signals. Birdsong is a good model for testing this, and physically challenging songs representing complex motor patterns provide a good example of sexually selected traits indicating individual condition. We performed a field study to evaluate the relationship between song performance and avian malaria infection in a common songbird. Previous work on this subject has almost always evaluated avian malaria in terms of binary infection status; however, parasitemia—infection intensity—is rarely assessed, even though differences in parasite load may have profound physiological consequences. We estimated parasitemia levels by using real‐time PCR. We found that birds with higher parasitemia displayed lower vocal performance, providing evidence that this song trait is an honest signal of parasitic load of haemosporidian parasites. To our knowledge, this study links parasite load and the expression of a sexually selected trait in a way that has not been addressed in the past. Studies using song performance traits and parasitemia offer an important perspective for understanding evolution of characters via sexual selection.     

Identification of an ant queen pheromone regulating worker sterility

The selective forces that shape and maintain eusocial societies are an enduring puzzle in evolutionary biology. Ordinarily sterile workers can usually reproduce given the right conditions, so the factors regulating reproductive division of labour may provide insight into why eusociality has persisted over evolutionary time. Queen-produced pheromones that affect worker reproduction have been implicated in diverse taxa, including ants, termites, wasps and possibly mole rats, but to date have only been definitively identified in the honeybee. Using the black garden ant Lasius niger, we isolate the first sterility-regulating ant queen pheromone. The pheromone is a cuticular hydrocarbon that comprises the majority of the chemical profile of queens and their eggs, and also affects worker behaviour, by reducing aggression towards objects bearing the pheromone. We further show that the pheromone elicits a strong response in worker antennae and that its production by queens is selectively reduced following an immune challenge. These results suggest that the pheromone has a central role in colony organization and support the hypothesis that worker sterility represents altruistic self-restraint in response to an honest quality signal.     

The evolution of index signals to avoid the cost of dishonesty

Animals often convey useful information, despite a conflict of interest between the signaller and receiver. There are two major explanations for such ‘honest’ signalling, particularly when the size or intensity of signals reliably indicates the underlying quality of the signaller. Costly signalling theory (including the handicap principle) predicts that dishonest signals are too costly to fake, whereas the index hypothesis predicts that dishonest signals cannot be faked. Recent evidence of a highly conserved causal link between individual quality and signal growth appears to bolster the index hypothesis. However, it is not clear that this also diminishes costly signalling theory, as is often suggested. Here, by incorporating a mechanism of signal growth into costly signalling theory, we show that index signals can actually be favoured owing to the cost of dishonesty. We conclude that costly signalling theory provides the ultimate, adaptive rationale for honest signalling, whereas the index hypothesis describes one proximate (and potentially very general) mechanism for achieving honesty.     

Queen signal should be honest to be involved in maintenance of eusociality: chemical correlates of fertility in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Ropalidia marginata</Emphasis>

Queens of many social insect species are known to maintain reproductive monopoly by pheromonal signalling of fecundity. Queens of the primitively eusocial wasp Ropalidia marginata appear to do so using secretions from their Dufour’s glands, whose hydrocarbon composition is correlated with fertility. Solitary nest foundresses of R. marginata are without nestmates; hence expressing a queen signal can be redundant, since there is no one to receive the signal. But if queen pheromone is an honest signal inextricably linked with fertility, it should correlate with fertility and be expressed irrespective of the presence or absence of receivers of the signal, by virtue of being a byproduct of the state of fertility. Hence we compared the Dufour’s gland hydrocarbons and ovaries of solitary foundresses with queens and workers of post-emergence nests. Our results suggest that queen pheromone composition in R. marginata is a byproduct of fertility and hence can honestly signal fertility. This provides important new evidence for the honest signalling hypothesis.