Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations

Fixation processes in evolutionary game dynamics in finite diploid populations are investigated. Traditionally, frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics is modeled as deterministic replicator dynamics. This implies that the infinite size of the population is assumed implicitly. In nature, however, population sizes are finite. Recently, stochastic processes in finite populations have been introduced in order to study finite size effects in evolutionary game dynamics. One of the most significant studies on evolutionary dynamics in finite populations was carried out by Nowak et al. which describes “one-third law” [Nowak, et al., 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 646-650]. It states that under weak selection, if the fitness of strategy α is greater than that of strategy β when α has a frequency , strategy α fixates in a β-population with selective advantage. In their study, it is assumed that the inheritance of strategies is asexual, i.e. the population is haploid. In this study, we apply their framework to a diploid population that plays a two-strategy game with two ESSs (a bistable game). The fixation probability of a mutant allele in this diploid population is derived. A “three-tenth law” for a completely recessive mutant allele and a “two-fifth law” for a completely dominant mutant allele are found; other cases are also discussed.     

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation

We study stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. To this end we extend the classical Moran process to incorporate frequency-dependent selection and mutation. For 2 x 2 games, we give a complete analysis of the long-run behavior when mutation rates are small. For 3 x 3 coordination games, we provide a simple rule to determine which strategy will be selected in large populations. The expected motion in our model resembles the standard replicator dynamics when the population is large, but is qualitatively different when the population is small. Our analysis shows that even in large finite populations the behavior of a replicator-like system can be different from that of the standard replicator dynamics. As an application, we consider selective language dynamics. We determine which language will be spoken in finite large populations. The results have an intuitive interpretation but would not be expected from an analysis of the replicator dynamics.     

Mutation in evolutionary games can increase average fitness at equilibrium

We study game dynamical interactions between two strategies, A and B, and analyse whether the average fitness of the population at equilibrium can be increased by adding mutation from A to B. Classifying all two by two games with payoff matrix [(a,b),(c,d)], we show that mutation from A to B enhances the average fitness of the whole population (i) if both a and d are less than (b + c)/2 and (ii) if c is less than b. Furthermore, we study conditions for maximizing the productivity of strategy A, and we analyse the effect of mutations in both directions. Depending on the biological system, a mutation in an evolutionary game can be interpreted as a genetic alteration, a cellular differentiation, a change in gene expression, an accidental or deliberate modification in cultural transmission, or a learning error. In a cultural context, our results indicate that the equilibrium payoff of the population can be increased if players sometimes choose the strategy with lower payoff. In a genetic context, we have shown that for frequency-dependent selection mutation can enhance the average fitness of the population at equilibrium.     

Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics

Evolutionary game theory is a basis of replicator systems and has applications ranging from animal behavior and human language to ecosystems and other hierarchical network systems. Most studies in evolutionary game dynamics have focused on a single game, but, in many situations, we see that many games are played simultaneously. We construct a replicator equation with plural games by assuming that a reward of a player is a simple summation of the reward of each game. Even if the numbers of the strategies of the games are different, its dynamics can be described in one replicator equation. We here show that when players play several games at the same time, the fate of a single game cannot be determined without knowing the structures of the whole other games. The most absorbing fact is that even if a single game has a ESS (evolutionary stable strategy), the relative frequencies of strategies in the game does not always converge to the ESS point when other games are played simultaneously.     

Evolutionary advantage of small populations on complex fitness landscapes

Recent experimental and theoretical studies have shown that small asexual populations evolving on complex fitness landscapes may achieve a higher fitness than large ones due to the increased heterogeneity of adaptive trajectories. Here, we introduce a class of haploid three-locus fitness landscapes that allow the investigation of this scenario in a precise and quantitative way. Our main result derived analytically shows how the probability of choosing the path of the largest initial fitness increase grows with the population size. This makes large populations more likely to get trapped at local fitness peaks and implies an advantage of small populations at intermediate time scales. The range of population sizes where this effect is operative coincides with the onset of clonal interference. Additional studies using ensembles of random fitness landscapes show that the results achieved for a particular choice of three-locus landscape parameters are robust and also persist as the number of loci increases. Our study indicates that an advantage for small populations is likely whenever the fitness landscape contains local maxima. The advantage appears at intermediate time scales, which are long enough for trapping at local fitness maxima to have occurred but too short for peak escape by the creation of multiple mutants.     

Oscillatory dynamics in evolutionary games are suppressed by heterogeneous adaptation rates of players

Game dynamics in which three or more strategies are cyclically competitive, as represented by the rock-scissors-paper game, have attracted practical and theoretical interests. In evolutionary dynamics, cyclic competition results in oscillatory dynamics of densities of individual strategists. In finite-size populations, it is known that oscillations blow up until all but one strategies are eradicated if without mutation. In the present paper, we formalize replicator dynamics with players who have different adaptation rates. We show analytically and numerically that the heterogeneous adaptation rate suppresses the oscillation amplitude. In social dilemma games with cyclically competing strategies and homogeneous adaptation rates, altruistic strategies are often relatively weak and cannot survive in finite-size populations. In such situations, heterogeneous adaptation rates save coexistence of different strategies and hence promote altruism. When one strategy dominates the others without cyclic competition, fast adaptors earn more than slow adaptors. When not, mixture of fast and slow adaptors stabilizes population dynamics, and slow adaptation does not imply inefficiency for a player.     

Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates

The classical setting of evolutionary game theory, the replicator equation, assumes uniform interaction rates. The rate at which individuals meet and interact is independent of their strategies. Here we extend this framework by allowing the interaction rates to depend on the strategies. This extension leads to non-linear fitness functions. We show that a strict Nash equilibrium remains uninvadable for non-uniform interaction rates, but the conditions for evolutionary stability need to be modified. We analyze all games between two strategies. If the two strategies coexist or exclude each other, then the evolutionary dynamics do not change qualitatively, only the location of the equilibrium point changes. If, however, one strategy dominates the other in the classical setting, then the introduction of non-uniform interaction rates can lead to a pair of interior equilibria. For the Prisoner's Dilemma, non-uniform interaction rates allow the coexistence between cooperators and defectors. For the snowdrift game, non-uniform interaction rates change the equilibrium frequency of cooperators.     

Evolutionary dynamics of tumor progression with random fitness values

Most human tumors result from the accumulation of multiple genetic and epigenetic alterations in a single cell. Mutations that confer a fitness advantage to the cell are known as driver mutations and are causally related to tumorigenesis. Other mutations, however, do not change the phenotype of the cell or even decrease cellular fitness. While much experimental effort is being devoted to the identification of the functional effects of individual mutations, mathematical modeling of tumor progression generally considers constant fitness increments as mutations are accumulated. In this paper we study a mathematical model of tumor progression with random fitness increments. We analyze a multi-type branching process in which cells accumulate mutations whose fitness effects are chosen from a distribution. We determine the effect of the fitness distribution on the growth kinetics of the tumor. This work contributes to a quantitative understanding of the accumulation of mutations leading to cancer.     

Evolutionary games with variable payoffs

Matrix games, defined by a set of strategies and a corresponding matrix of payoffs, are commonly used to model animal populations because they are both simple and generate meaningful results. It is generally assumed that payoffs are independent of time. However, the timing of contests in real populations may have a marked effect on the value of rewards. We consider matrix games where the payoffs are functions of time. Rules are found which hold in this more general situation, and the complexity of possible behaviour is underlined by demonstrating other conditions which do not hold and an illustrative game.     

Evolutionary dynamics of mitochondrial plasmids in natural populations of Silene vulgaris

Although plasmid-like mitochondrial DNA molecules have been investigated in a number of cultivated plant species, knowledge about their occurrence and behavior in natural plant populations is scarce. In the bladder campion, Silene vulgaris, a common weed of northern Europe, mt-plasmids of three different sizes were detected in a survey of S. vulgaris populations in southern Sweden. Two of the three plasmids usually occurred together within individual plants and showed large variation in frequency between populations. From F(ST)-estimates of plasmids, mitochondrial markers, and nuclear markers it was concluded that the plasmids are predominantly maternally inherited in their natural habitat, as observed in greenhouse experiments. The association between mt-plasmids and mitochondrial haplotype was strong, but not complete, in the natural material. These results indicate that the mt-plasmids of S. vulgaris have evolved toward almost strict maternal inheritance.     

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games

Evolutionary game dynamics of two-player asymmetric games in finite populations is studied. We consider two roles in the game, roles α and β. α-players and β-players interact and gain payoffs. The game is described by a pair of matrices, which is called bimatrix. One's payoff in the game is interpreted as its fecundity, thus strategies are subject to natural selection. In addition, strategies can randomly mutate to others. We formulate a stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of bimatrix games as a frequency-dependent Moran process with mutation. We analytically derive the stationary distribution of strategies under weak selection. Our result provides a criterion for equilibrium selection in general bimatrix games.     

The replicator dynamics with n players and population structure

The well-known replicator dynamics is usually applied to 2-player games and random matching. Here we allow for games with n players, and for population structures other than random matching. This more general application leads to a version of the replicator dynamics of which the standard 2-player, well-mixed version is a special case, and which allows us to explore the dynamic implications of population structure. The replicator dynamics also allows for a reformulation of the central theorem in Van Veelen (2009), which claims that inclusive fitness gives the correct prediction for games with generalized equal gains from switching (or, in other words, when fitness effects are additive). If we furthermore also assume that relatedness is constant during selection - which is a reasonable assumption in a setting with kin recognition - then inclusive fitness even becomes a parameter that determines the speed as well as the direction of selection. For games with unequal gains from switching, inclusive fitness can give the wrong prediction. With equal gains however, not only the sign, but also even the value of inclusive fitness becomes meaningful.     

A contribution to the explanation of the larch bud moth cycle,the polymorphic fitness hypothesis

Studies of fluctuating insect populations generally discuss the regulating processes at high insect numbers, but very rarely why a cycling population at low densities switches immediately from the declining phase to the increasing phase of the cycle. A long-term study of the larch bud moth (Zeiraphera diniana Gn) has suggested that the key to recovery is assortative mating of specific phenotypes. Z. diniana exhibits distinct host races living either on the deciduous larch or evergreen pines and spruces. As an adaptation to its hosts Z. diniana is necessarily rather polymorphic in its life history parameters, i.e. developmental rate, fertility and survival. Apart from the direct association of the larva with the host tree, the colouration of the mature larva provides the only readily apparent trait by which the host race can be recognised; the larch form is black and the pine or spruce form has a light orange head capsule, anal plate and body colour. Evidence that frequencies of the colour morphs on larch regularly change from an intermediate colour type to black during the increasing phase of the cycle suggests that the combination of traits, such as earliest larval emergence, largest body size and homozygosity, characteristic of the black morph, constitutes the inherent driving force of population increase.     

Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process

Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations can be described by a frequency dependent, stochastic Wright-Fisher process. We consider a symmetric game between two strategies, A and B. There are discrete generations. In each generation, individuals produce offspring proportional to their payoff. The next generation is sampled randomly from this pool of offspring. The total population size is constant. The resulting Markov process has two absorbing states corresponding to homogeneous populations of all A or all B. We quantify frequency dependent selection by comparing the absorption probabilities to the corresponding probabilities under random drift. We derive conditions for selection to favor one strategy or the other by using the concept of total positivity. In the limit of weak selection, we obtain the 1/3 law: if A and B are strict Nash equilibria then selection favors replacement of B by A, if the unstable equilibrium occurs at a frequency of A which is less than 1/3.     

Mutation-selection equilibrium in games with mixed strategies

We develop a new method for studying stochastic evolutionary game dynamics of mixed strategies. We consider the general situation: there are n pure strategies whose interactions are described by an n×n payoff matrix. Players can use mixed strategies, which are given by the vector (p₁,…,p_n). Each entry specifies the probability to use the corresponding pure strategy. The sum over all entries is one. Therefore, a mixed strategy is a point in the simplex S_n. We study evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed population of finite size. Individuals reproduce proportional to payoff. We consider the case of weak selection, which means the payoff from the game is only a small contribution to overall fitness. Reproduction can be subject to mutation; a mutant adopts a randomly chosen mixed strategy. We calculate the average abundance of every mixed strategy in the stationary distribution of the mutation-selection process. We find the crucial conditions that specify if a strategy is favored or opposed by selection. One condition holds for low mutation rate, another for high mutation rate. The result for any mutation rate is a linear combination of those two. As a specific example we study the Hawk-Dove game. We prove general statements about the relationship between games with pure and with mixed strategies.     

The conflict between natural and artificial selection in finite populations

Summary A single locus model of the interaction between natural selection and artificial selection for a quantitative character in a finite population, assuming heterozygote superiority in natural fitness but additive action on the character, has been studied using transition probability matrices.If natural selection is strong enough to create a selection plateau in which genetic variance declines relatively slowly, then the total response to artificial selection prior to the plateau will be much less than that expected in the absence of natural selection, and the half-life of response will be shorter. Such a plateau is likely to have a large proportion, if not all, of the original genetic variance still present. In selection programmes using laboratory animals, it seems likely that the homozygote favoured by artificial selection must be very unfit before such a plateau will occur. A significant decrease in population fitness as a result of artificial selection does not necessarily imply that the metric character is an important adaptive character.These implications of this model of natural selection are very similar to those derived by James (1962) for the optimum model of natural selection. In fact, there seems to be no aspect of the observable response to artificial selection that would enable anyone to distinguish between these two models of natural selection.     

Existence and stability of equilibria in age-structured population dynamics

The existence of positive equilibrium solutions of the McKendrick equations for the dynamics of an age-structured population is studied as a bifurcation phenomenon using the inherent net reproductive rate n as a bifurcation parameter. The local existence and uniqueness of a branch of positive equilibria which bifurcates from the trivial (identically zero) solution at the critical value n=1 are proved by implicit function techniques under very mild smoothness conditions on the death and fertility rates as functional of age and population density. This first requires the development of a suitable linear theory. The lowest order terms in the Liapunov-Schmidt expansions are also calculated. This local analysis supplements earlier global bifurcation results of the author. The stability of both the trivial and the positive branch equilibria is studied by means of the principle of linearized stability. It is shown that in general the trivial solution losses stability as n increases through one while the stability of the branch solution is stable if and only if the bifurcation is supercritical. Thus the McKendrick equations exhibit, in the latter case, a standard exchange of stability with regard to equilibrium states as they depend on the inherent net reproductive rate. The derived lower order terms in the Liapunov-Schmidt expansions yield formulas which explicitly relate the direction of bifurcation to properties of the age-specific death and fertility rates as functionals of population density. Analytical and numerical results for some examples are given which illustrate these results.     

The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations

Evolutionary theory often resorts to weak selection, where different individuals have very similar fitness. Here, we relate two ways to introduce weak selection. The first considers evolutionary games described by payoff matrices with similar entries. This approach has recently attracted a lot of interest in the context of evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations. The second way to introduce weak selection is based on small distances in phenotype space and is a standard approach in kin-selection theory. Whereas both frameworks are interchangeable for constant fitness, frequency-dependent selection shows significant differences between them. We point out the difference between both limits of weak selection and discuss the condition under which the differences vanish. It turns out that this condition is fulfilled by the popular parametrization of the prisoner's dilemma in benefits and costs. However, for general payoff matrices differences between the two frameworks prevail.     

Backward bifurcations and strong Allee effects in matrix models for the dynamics of structured populations

In nonlinear matrix models, strong Allee effects typically arise when the fundamental bifurcation of positive equilibria from the extinction equilibrium at r=1 (or R₀=1) is backward. This occurs when positive feedback (component Allee) effects are dominant at low densities and negative feedback effects are dominant at high densities. This scenario allows population survival when r (or equivalently R₀) is less than 1, provided population densities are sufficiently high. For r>1 (or equivalently R₀>1) the extinction equilibrium is unstable and a strong Allee effect cannot occur. We give criteria sufficient for a strong Allee effect to occur in a general nonlinear matrix model. A juvenile–adult example model illustrates the criteria as well as some other possible phenomena concerning strong Allee effects (such as positive cycles instead of equilibria).