Saving the young before the old -- a reply to John Harris

For a distribution of health care resources to be fair, it should consider the consequences for the whole lives of the affected persons and not just how badly off they are at the present moment. Since, other things being equal, a person is worse off if he dies young than if he dies old, it is fair to give scarce vital health care resources to young rather than to old persons. In the paper this ageist view is restated and defended against a number of objections raised by John Harris. According to Harris' so-called anti-ageist argument the only relevant consideration in the distribution of vital health care resources is people's desire to go on living. On reflection, this is highly counterintuitive. Instead, it is argued that both present desires to go on living and possible future happiness should weigh together with considerations of fairness. Both fairness and possible future happiness will in most cases speak in favour of saving the young before the old. A number of other problems for the ageist view are discussed, and solutions are suggested.     

Just a hypothesis: a reply to Hanski

Hanski's critique of the habitat amount hypothesis (Hanski, 2015, Journal of Biogeography, 42 , 989–993) does not actually constitute a test of the hypothesis, but rather a series of arguments for why he suspects that it is not correct. But the habitat amount hypothesis is exactly that – a hypothesis. It will remain ‘just’ a hypothesis until it has been rigorously tested against empirical data. To facilitate such testing, in Fahrig (2013, Journal of Biogeography, 40 , 1649–1663) I presented specific, testable predictions of the hypothesis. Here, I reiterate the main tests needed, in the hope that some readers will be encouraged to carry them out. I appreciate this opportunity to emphasize that the habitat amount hypothesis needs to be tested against empirical data, and I look forward to seeing the results of such tests.     

The rational design of biological complexity: a deceptive metaphor

Biologists often claim that they follow a rational design strategy when their research is based on molecular knowledge of biological systems. This claim implies that their knowledge of the innumerable causal connections present in biological systems is sufficient to allow them to deduce and predict the outcome of their experimental interventions. The design metaphor is shown to originate in human intentionality and in the anthropomorphic fallacy of interpreting objects, events, and the behavior of all living organisms in terms of goals and purposes. Instead of presenting rational design as an effective research strategy, it would be preferable to acknowledge that advances in biomedicine are nearly always derived from empirical observations based on trial and error experimentation. The claim that rational design is an effective research strategy was tested in the case of current attempts to develop synthetic vaccines, in particular against human immunodeficiency virus. It was concluded that in this field of biomedicine, trial and error experimentation is more likely to succeed than a rational design approach. Current developments in systems biology may give us eventually a better understanding of the immune system and this may enable us in the future to develop improved vaccines.     

The friendship model: a reply to Illingworth

Patricia M.L. Illingworth, in an article in the January 1988 issue of Bioethics, maintained that a friendship model of the physician patient relationship violates the autonomy of patients who do not want to be friends with their physicians and diminishes the autonomy of patients who seek such friendship based on "psychological oppression" stemming from internalization of feelings of inferiority. James contends in this reply that much of Illingworth's critique of the model was beside the point. He argues that trust between doctor and patient is a moral good in the therapeutic relationship and that this trust has enough similarities to trust between friends to make a model which develops these similarities well worth exploring.     

New Caledonian biogeography: a reply to Murienne

This note replies to criticisms raised by Murienne (Journal of Biogeography, 2010, doi: 10.1111/j.1365‐2699.2010.02321.x ). Herein it is argued that assuming distributions in New Caledonia are caused by current environmental factors overlooks the possible importance of regional tectonic history for the biogeography.     

Ectogenesis: a reply to Singer and Wells

The possibility of achieving ectogenesis, or the growing of a human fetus to term in an artificial womb, is approaching reality as a result of advances in treatment of premature newborns and in in vitro fertilization techniques. In their 1984 book, The Reproductive Revolution, issued in North America as Making Babies, Peter Singer and Deane Wells offered several arguments for ectogenesis. James examines their arguments and rejects two of them, that ectogenesis offers a less problematic alternative to surrogate motherhood, and that ectogenesis could make it possible to reconcile fetal rights with the right to abortion on demand. He grants Singer and Wells' argument that the childless have a claim to state support of their desire to nurture, but contends that government-supported ectogenesis should still be rejected because the adoption of unwanted children is a preferable alternative to the use of an exotic, expensive, and still unproven technology.     

The Taung endocast: a reply to Holloway

Indices of rostrality (ir, ir') are developed to assess the extent to which the medial end of the lunate sulcus (L) is rostrally positioned in photographs and figures of lateral views of primate brains and endocasts, and indices are determined for chimpanzees, SK 1585 and the Taung endocast. Ir quantifies the extent of rostrality as it has traditionally been viewed (in A-P projections) while ir' takes dorsal curvature into account. The ir of the feature that I have identified as the lunate sulcus of Taung is within one standard deviation of the mean ir for Pan and its ir' is within 1.5 standard deviations from the mean ir' for Pan. Both findings are compatible with my earlier statement that the medial end of the lunate sulcus of the Taung endocast is in a pongid-like position. Use of stereoplotting to transfer the position of L from chimpanzee endocasts and brains to australopithecine endocasts is critically assessed: Holloway stereoplotted five chimpanzee brains and then transferred their mean coordinates that describe the lunate sulcus to the Taung endocast. If stereoplotting successfully transfers the extent to which L is rostrally located, one would expect the mean L of Pan and its transferred counterpart in Taung to have identical index values of rostrality. However, the ir of the lunate sulcus that Holloway located on Taung is over two standard deviations lower than the mean ir for the five chimpanzees he stereoplotted to determine its angular coordinates, and Holloway's ir' for Taung is one standard deviation lower than the five chimpanzees' mean ir'. These discrepancies are shown to be due to shape differences, and it is concluded that stereoplotting should not be used to transfer sulci between differently shaped endocasts without correcting for these differences. I also reply to Holloway's criticisms of my use of L/H indices, palpation, techniques for sampling endocasts, and illustration of the Taung endocast. It is shown that there is room on the Taung specimen for the lateral end of L, and the pongid-like sulcal pattern of Taung is reaffirmed. Thus, we do not yet know when human-like sulcal patterns first appeared in the hominid fossil record.     

Deconstructing the design of a biological material

By identifying the functional conflicts in its design, the cuticle of arthropods can be shown to cope with IR and UV irradiation in the same manner as our technology-by controlling spectral properties (transmission and reflection). However, the skeletal properties of cuticle are integrated with demands for sensory transmission, movement, etc, by controlling the local properties of the material rather than by changing global parameters (which would be the technical solution). On the basis of this study, the biomimetic similarity of cuticle with technology is only about 20%, suggesting that we can learn from the design of arthropod cuticle.     

The human genome project: a reply to Rosenberg

In this paper we discuss the scientific value of the human genome project. To what extent is the data obtained by sequencing the entire human genome useful in the gene dicovery process? Responding to Alex Rosenberg' skepticism about the value of such data, we maintain that brute sequence data is much more useful than he suggests.     

Total brain death: a reply to Alan Shewmon

D. Alan Shewmon has advanced a well-documented challenge to the widely accepted total brain death criterion for death of the human being. We show that Shewmon’s argument against this criterion is unsound, though he does refute the standard argument for that criterion. We advance a distinct argument for the total brain death criterion and answer likely objections. Since human beings are rational animals--sentient organisms of a specific type--the loss of the radical capacity for sentience (the capacity to sense or to develop the capacity to sense) involves a substantial change, the passing away of the human organism. In human beings total brain death involves the complete loss of the radical capacity for sentience, and so in human beings total brain death is death.