Domain independence and stability in young and older adults' discounting of delayed rewards

Individual discounting rates for different types of delayed reward are typically assumed to reflect a single, underlying trait of impulsivity. Recently, we showed that discounting rates are orders of magnitude steeper for directly consumable liquid rewards than for monetary rewards (Jimura et al., 2009), raising the question of whether discounting rates for different types of reward covary at the individual level. Accordingly, the present study examined the relation between discounting of hypothetical money and real liquid rewards in young adults (Experiment 1) and older adults (Experiment 2). At the group level, young adults discounted monetary rewards more steeply than the older adults, but there was no significant age difference with respect to liquid rewards. At the individual level, the rates at which young and older participants discounted each reward type were stable over a two- to fifteen-week interval (rs > 70), but there was no significant correlation between the rates at which they discounted the two reward types. These results suggest that although similar decision-making processes may underlie the discounting of different types of rewards, the rates at which individuals discount money and directly consumable rewards may reflect separate, stable traits, rather than a single trait of impulsivity.     

Discounting of sequences of delayed rewards of different amounts

The main purpose of this study was to determine whether the magnitude effect is present in cases where delayed sequences of rewards are discounted. The magnitude effect refers to the inverse relationship between the amount of a reward and the steepness of temporal discounting. This study was conducted with a computer program to estimate the indifference points, which served as indicators of the present subjective value of delayed sequences of small and large rewards. In the indifference point the subjective value of a single, immediate reward was equal to the subjective value of the delayed sequence (or to the value of a single delayed reward). As a control condition, we added an experimental task involving choices between single immediate and single delayed rewards. The experiment showed that the sequences of large rewards are discounted less steeply than are the sequences of small rewards. This finding suggests that the magnitude effect is present within the delayed sequences of rewards. In addition, when outcomes are relatively large, the results suggest that a single reward is discounted less steeply than the sequence of a total nominal value equal to this single reward. However, for relatively small rewards, the difference is not statistically significant. The less steep discounting of sequences of large rewards may explain the reward-bundling effect, which refers to less steep discounting of longer sequences than of shorter ones: longer sequences usually have greater overall nominal value. The present study was conducted on hypothetical rewards, and the results should be validated using real rewards.     

Pathological gambling severity is associated with impulsivity in a delay discounting procedure

Research and clinical expertise indicates that impulsivity is an underlying feature of pathological gambling. This study examined the extent to which impulsive behavior, defined by the rate of discounting delayed monetary rewards, varies with pathological gambling severity, assessed by the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS). Sixty-two pathological gamblers completed a delay discounting task, the SOGS, the Eysenck impulsivity scale, the Addiction Severity Index (ASI), and questions about gambling and substance use at intake to outpatient treatment for pathological gambling. In the delay discounting task, participants chose between a large delayed reward (US $1000) and smaller more immediate rewards (US $1-$999) across a range of delays (6h to 25 years). The rate at which the delayed reward was discounted (k value) was derived for each participant and linear regression was used to identify the variables that predicted k values. Age, gender, years of education, substance abuse treatment history, and cigarette smoking history failed to significantly predict k values. Scores on the Eysenck impulsivity scale and the SOGS both accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in k values. The predictive value of the SOGS was 1.4 times that of the Eysenck scale. These results indicate that of the measures tested, gambling severity was the best single predictor of impulsive behavior in a delay discounting task in this sample of pathological gamblers.     

Will travel for food: spatial discounting in two new world monkeys

Nonhuman animals steeply discount the future, showing a preference for small, immediate over large, delayed rewards. Currently unclear is whether discounting functions depend on context. Here, we examine the effects of spatial context on discounting in cotton-top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and common marmosets (Callithrix jacchus), species known to differ in temporal discounting. We presented subjects with a choice between small, nearby rewards and large, distant rewards. Tamarins traveled farther for the large reward than marmosets, attending to the ratio of reward differences rather than their absolute values. This species difference contrasts with performance on a temporal task in which marmosets waited longer than tamarins for the large reward. These comparative data indicate that context influences choice behavior, with the strongest effect seen in marmosets who discounted more steeply over space than over time. These findings parallel details of each species' feeding ecology. Tamarins range over large distances and feed primarily on insects, which requires using quick, impulsive action. Marmosets range over shorter distances than tamarins and feed primarily on tree exudates, a clumped resource that requires patience to wait for sap to exude. These results show that discounting functions are context specific, shaped by a history of ecological pressures.     

The date-delay framing effect in temporal discounting depends on substance abuse

In the present study, individuals with substance use disorders (n=30) and non-addicted controls (n=30) were presented with a delay-discounting task with time being described either as dates or as temporal intervals. Three main results were obtained. First, in both groups reward size had a large impact on discounting future rewards, with discount rates becoming larger with smaller reward sizes. Second, participants discounted future rewards less strongly when their time of delivery was presented as a date instead of a temporal distance. Third, whereas discount rates of individuals with substance use disorders varied substantially with regard to the presentation of time in the task, the controls changed their choices depending on time presentation only slightly.     

Humans can adopt optimal discounting strategy under real-time constraints

Critical to our many daily choices between larger delayed rewards, and smaller more immediate rewards, are the shape and the steepness of the function that discounts rewards with time. Although research in artificial intelligence favors exponential discounting in uncertain environments, studies with humans and animals have consistently shown hyperbolic discounting. We investigated how humans perform in a reward decision task with temporal constraints, in which each choice affects the time remaining for later trials, and in which the delays vary at each trial. We demonstrated that most of our subjects adopted exponential discounting in this experiment. Further, we confirmed analytically that exponential discounting, with a decay rate comparable to that used by our subjects, maximized the total reward gain in our task. Our results suggest that the particular shape and steepness of temporal discounting is determined by the task that the subject is facing, and question the notion of hyperbolic reward discounting as a universal principle.     

Rats bred for high alcohol drinking are more sensitive to delayed and probabilistic outcomes

Alcoholics and heavy drinkers score higher on measures of impulsivity than nonalcoholics and light drinkers. This may be because of factors that predate drug exposure (e.g. genetics). This study examined the role of genetics by comparing impulsivity measures in ethanol-naive rats selectively bred based on their high [high alcohol drinking (HAD)] or low [low alcohol drinking (LAD)] consumption of ethanol. Replicates 1 and 2 of the HAD and LAD rats, developed by the University of Indiana Alcohol Research Center, completed two different discounting tasks. Delay discounting examines sensitivity to rewards that are delayed in time and is commonly used to assess 'choice' impulsivity. Probability discounting examines sensitivity to the uncertain delivery of rewards and has been used to assess risk taking and risk assessment. High alcohol drinking rats discounted delayed and probabilistic rewards more steeply than LAD rats. Discount rates associated with probabilistic and delayed rewards were weakly correlated, while bias was strongly correlated with discount rate in both delay and probability discounting. The results suggest that selective breeding for high alcohol consumption selects for animals that are more sensitive to delayed and probabilistic outcomes. Sensitivity to delayed or probabilistic outcomes may be predictive of future drinking in genetically predisposed individuals.     

Prefrontal coding of temporally discounted values during intertemporal choice

Reward from a particular action is seldom immediate, and the influence of such delayed outcome on choice decreases with delay. It has been postulated that when faced with immediate and delayed rewards, decision makers choose the option with maximum temporally discounted value. We examined the preference of monkeys for delayed reward in an intertemporal choice task and the neural basis for real-time computation of temporally discounted values in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. During this task, the locations of the targets associated with small or large rewards and their corresponding delays were randomly varied. We found that prefrontal neurons often encoded the temporally discounted value of reward expected from a particular option. Furthermore, activity tended to increase with [corrected] discounted values for targets [corrected] presented in the neuron's preferred direction, suggesting that activity related to temporally discounted values in the prefrontal cortex might determine the animal's behavior during intertemporal choice.     

Delay discounting and probability discounting as related to cigarette smoking status in adults

This study examined relations between adult smokers and non-smokers and the devaluation of monetary rewards as a function of delay (delay discounting, DD) or probability (probability discounting, PD). The extent to which individuals discount value, either as a function of a reward being delayed or probabilistic, has been taken to reflect individual differences in impulsivity. Those who discount most are considered most impulsive. Previous research has shown that adult smokers discount the value of delayed rewards more than adult non-smokers. However, in the one published study that examined probability discounting in adult smokers and non-smokers, the smokers did not discount the value of probabilistic rewards more than the non-smoker controls. From this past research, it was hypothesized that measures of delay discounting would differentiate between smokers and non-smokers but that probability discounting would not. Participants were 54 (25 female) adult smokers (n = 25) and non-smokers (n = 29). The smokers all reported smoking at least 20 cigarettes per day, and the non-smokers reported having never smoked. The results indicated that the smokers discounted significantly more than the non-smokers by both delay and probability. Unlike past findings, these results suggest that both delay and probability discounting are related to adult cigarette smoking; however, it also was determined that DD was a significantly stronger predictor of smoking than PD.     

Estimating the subjective value of future rewards: comparison of adjusting-amount and adjusting-delay procedures

The present study examined whether equivalent discounting of delayed rewards is observed with different experimental procedures. If the underlying decision-making process is the same, then similar patterns of results should be observed regardless of procedure, and similar estimates of the subjective value of future rewards (i.e., indifference points) should be obtained. Two experiments compared discounting on three types of procedure: adjusting-delay (AD), adjusting-immediate-amount (AIA), and adjusting-delayed-amount (ADA). For the two procedures for which discounting functions can be established (i.e., AD and AIA), a hyperboloid provided good fits to the data at both the group and individual levels, and individuals' discounting on one procedure tended to be correlated with their discounting on the other. Notably, the AIA procedure produced the more consistent estimates of the degree of discounting, and in particular, discounting on the AIA procedure was unaffected by the order in which choices were presented. Regardless of which of the three procedures was used, however, similar patterns of results were obtained: Participants systematically discounted the value of delayed rewards, and robust magnitude effects were observed. Although each procedure may have its own advantages and disadvantages, use of all three types of procedure in the present study provided converging evidence for common decision-making processes underlying the discounting of delayed rewards.     

The subjective value of delayed and probabilistic outcomes: Outcome size matters for gains but not for losses

The subjective value of a reward (gain) is related to factors such as its size, the delay to its receipt and the probability of its receipt. We examined whether the subjective value of losses was similarly affected by these factors in 128 adults. Participants chose between immediate/certain gains or losses and larger delayed/probabilistic gains or losses. Rewards of $100 were devalued as a function of their delay (“discounted”) relatively less than $10 gains while probabilistic $100 rewards were discounted relatively more than $10 rewards. However, there was no effect of outcome size on discounting of delayed or probabilistic losses. For delayed outcomes of each size, the degree to which gains were discounted was positively correlated with the degree to which losses were discounted, whereas for probabilistic outcomes, no such correlation was observed. These results suggest that the processes underlying the subjective valuation of losses are different from those underlying the subjective valuation of gains.     

The evolution of delayed dispersal in cooperative breeders.

Why do the young of cooperative breeders--species in which more than two individuals help raise offspring at a single nest--delay dispersal and live in groups? Answering this deceptively simple question involves examining the costs and benefits of three alternative strategies: (1) dispersal and attempting to breed, (2) dispersal and floating, and (3) delayed dispersal and helping. If, all other things being equal, the fitness of individuals that delay dispersal is greater than the fitness of individuals that disperse and breed on their own, intrinsic benefits are paramount to the current maintenance of delayed dispersal. Intrinsic benefits are directly due to living with others and may include enhanced foraging efficiency and reduced susceptibility to predation. However, if individuals that disperse and attempt to breed in high-quality habitat achieve the highest fitness, extrinsic constraints on the ability of offspring to obtain such high-quality breeding opportunities force offspring to either delay dispersal or float. The relevant constraint to independent reproduction has frequently been termed habitat saturation. This concept, of itself, fails to explain the evolution of delayed dispersal. Instead, we propose the delayed-dispersal threshold model as a guide for organizing and evaluating the ecological factors potentially responsible for this phenomenon. We identify five parameters critical to the probability of delayed dispersal: relative population density, the fitness differential between early dispersal/breeding and delayed dispersal, the observed or hypothetical fitness of floaters, the distribution of territory quality, and spatiotemporal environmental variability. A key conclusion from the model is that no one factor by itself causes delayed dispersal and cooperative breeding. However, a difference in the dispersal patterns between two closely related species or populations (or between individuals in the same population in different years) may be attributable to one or a small set of factors. Much remains to be done to pinpoint the relative importance of different ecological factors in promoting delayed dispersal. This is underscored by our current inability to explain satisfactorily several patterns including the relative significance of floating, geographic biases in the incidence of cooperative breeding, sexual asymmetries in delayed dispersal, the relationship between delayed dispersal leading to helping behavior and cooperative polygamy, and the rarity of the co-occurrence of helpers and floaters within the same population. Advances in this field remain to be made along several fronts.(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 400 WORDS)     

Effects of reinforcer magnitude on an animal model of impulsive behavior

The effects of altering sucrose solution concentration on discounting of delayed rewards in rats were examined. Five different delays were used (0, 1, 2, 4, and 8s) and three different sucrose solution concentrations (3, 10, and 30%). It was hypothesized that high value sucrose solution concentrations would be discounted less than low value sucrose solution concentrations. The results indicated that the rats discounted the 30% sucrose solution concentration at a higher rate than the 3 or 10% sucrose solution concentration, a finding that apparently contradicted the hypothesis that higher value sucrose solution concentrations would be discounted less than lower value sucrose solution concentrations. However, a follow up experiment indicated that the 3 and 10% sucrose solution concentrations were preferred over the 30% concentration. Thus the results of Experiment 1 can be interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that high valued sucrose solution concentrations are discounted less than lower valued sucrose solution concentrations.     

Get It While It’s Hot: A Peak-First Bias in Self-Generated Choice Order in Rhesus Macaques

Animals typically must make a number of successive choices to achieve a goal: e.g., eating multiple food items before becoming satiated. However, it is unclear whether choosing the best first or saving the best for last represents the best choice strategy to maximize overall reward. Specifically, since outcomes can be evaluated prospectively (with future rewards discounted and more immediate rewards preferred) or retrospectively (with prior rewards discounted and more recent rewards preferred), the conditions under which each are used remains unclear. On the one hand, humans and non-human animals clearly discount future reward, preferring immediate rewards to delayed ones, suggesting prospective evaluation; on the other hand, it has also been shown that a sequence that ends well, i.e., with the best event or item last, is often preferred, suggesting retrospective evaluation. Here we hypothesized that when individuals are allowed to build the sequence themselves they are more likely to evaluate each item individually and therefore build a sequence using prospective evaluation. We examined the relationship between self-generated choice order and preference in rhesus monkeys in two experiments in which the distinctiveness of options were relatively high and low, respectively. We observed a positive linear relationship between choice order and preference among highly distinct options, indicating that the rhesus monkeys chose their preferred food first: i.e., a peak-first order preference. Overall, choice order depended on the degree of relative preference among alternatives and a peak-first bias, providing evidence for prospective evaluation when choice order is self-generated.     

Insulin,Central Dopamine D2 Receptors,and Monetary Reward Discounting in Obesity

Animal research finds that insulin regulates dopamine signaling and reward behavior, but similar research in humans is lacking. We investigated whether individual differences in body mass index, percent body fat, pancreatic β-cell function, and dopamine D2 receptor binding were related to reward discounting in obese and non-obese adult men and women. Obese (n = 27; body mass index>30) and non-obese (n = 20; body mass index<30) adults were assessed for percent body fat with dual-energy X-ray absorptiometry and for β-cell function using disposition index. Choice of larger, but delayed or less certain, monetary rewards relative to immediate, certain smaller monetary rewards was measured using delayed and probabilistic reward discounting tasks. Positron emission tomography using a non-displaceable D2-specific radioligand, [¹¹C](N-methyl)benperidol quantified striatal D2 receptor binding. Groups differed in body mass index, percent body fat, and disposition index, but not in striatal D2 receptor specific binding or reward discounting. Higher percent body fat in non-obese women related to preference for a smaller, certain reward over a larger, less likely one (greater probabilistic discounting). Lower β-cell function in the total sample and lower insulin sensitivity in obese related to stronger preference for an immediate and smaller monetary reward over delayed receipt of a larger one (greater delay discounting). In obese adults, higher striatal D2 receptor binding related to greater delay discounting. Interestingly, striatal D2 receptor binding was not significantly related to body mass index, percent body fat, or β-cell function in either group. Our findings indicate that individual differences in percent body fat, β-cell function, and striatal D2 receptor binding may each contribute to altered reward discounting behavior in non-obese and obese individuals. These results raise interesting questions about whether and how striatal D2 receptor binding and metabolic factors, including β-cell function, interact to affect reward discounting in humans.     

The combined effects of delay and probability in discounting

Human discounting studies have frequently observed hyperbolic discounting of rewards that are delayed or probabilistic. However, no studies have systematically combined delay and probability in a single discounting procedure. Indifference points of hypothetical money rewards that are both delayed and probabilistic were determined. Probabilities were converted into comparable delays according to the h/k constant of proportionality determined by , and discounting rates were calculated. These data provided a very good fit to the hyperbolic model of discounting, suggesting that delay and probability can be combined into a single metric in studies of discounting. The inclusion of a magnitude condition found the Magnitude Effect commonly found in studies of temporal discounting. A temporal resolution of uncertainty condition found no effect. The present paper offers a novel statistical method, within an established framework, for the analysis of data from studies of discounting that combine delay and probability.     

Reduced sensitivity to immediate reward during decision-making in older than younger adults

We examined whether older adults differ from younger adults in the degree to which they favor immediate over delayed rewards during decision-making. To examine the neural correlates of age-related differences in delay discounting we acquired functional MR images while participants made decisions between smaller but sooner and larger but later monetary rewards. The behavioral results show age-related reductions in delay discounting. Less impulsive decision-making in older adults was associated with lower ventral striatal activations to immediate reward. Furthermore, older adults showed an overall higher percentage of delayed choices and reduced activity in the dorsal striatum than younger adults. This points to a reduced reward sensitivity of the dorsal striatum in older adults. Taken together, our findings indicate that less impulsive decision-making in older adults is due to a reduced sensitivity of striatal areas to reward. These age-related changes in reward sensitivity may result from transformations in dopaminergic neuromodulation with age.     

The Value of Emotion: How Does Episodic Prospection Modulate Delay Discounting?

Background

Humans often show impatience when making intertemporal choice for monetary rewards, preferring small rewards delivered immediately to larger rewards delivered after a delay, which reflects a fundamental psychological principle: delay discounting. However, we propose that episodic prospection humans can vividly envisage exerts a strong and broad influence on individuals'' delay discounting. Specifically, episodic prospection may affect individuals'' intertemporal choice by the negative or positive emotion of prospection.

Methodology/Principal Findings

The present study explored how episodic prospection modulated delay discounting by emotion. Study 1 showed that participants were more inclined to choose the delayed but larger rewards when they imaged positive future events than when they did not image events; Study 2 showed that participants were more inclined to choose the immediate but smaller rewards when they imaged negative future events than when they did not image events; In contrast, study 3 showed that choice preferences of participants when they imaged neutral future events were the same as when they did not image events.

Conclusions/Significance

By manipulating the emotion valence of episodic prospection, our findings suggested that positive emotion made individuals tend to choose delayed rewards, while negative emotion made individuals tend to choose immediate rewards. Only imaging events with neutral emotion did not affect individuals'' choice preference. Thus, the valence of imaged future events'' emotion might play an important role in individuals'' intertemporal choice. It is possible that the valence of emotion may affect the changed direction (promote or inhibit) of individuals'' delay discounting, while the ability to image future events affects the changed degree of individuals'' delay discounting.