The ‘physical prophet’ and the powers of the imagination. Part I: a case-study on prophecy,vapours and the imagination (1685–1710)

I argue that the imagination was a crucial concept for the understanding of marvellous phenomena, divination and magic in general. Exploring a debate on prophecy at the turn of the seventeenth century, I show that four explanatory categories (God, demons, nature and fraud) were consistently evoked and I elucidate the role of the imagination in each of them. I introduce the term ‘floating concept’ to conceptualise the different ways in which the imagination and the related ‘animal spirits’ were understood in diverse discourses. My argument is underpinned with a general discussion of the imagination, after which I focus on a (now little known) unorthodox tradition which attributed special powers to this internal faculty. Many physicians had explained psychosomatic phenomena by referring to the influence of the imagination on the human body; but some philosophers held that the imagination could also exert power over external objects. During the renaissance these theories acquired negative associations and became linked with illicit magic. Furthermore, I show that the relation between both animal spirits and imagination, and the power of the latter over external bodies, points to the importance of a ‘history of vapours’; and this suggests an adjustment to Keith Hutchison’s argument on occult qualities in mechanical philosophy. The accompanying paper (Vermeir, 2005) gives more evidence of these claims and elaborates on the relation between the natural and the moral.     

Moral Philosophy,Moral Expertise,and the Argument from Disagreement

Several recent articles have weighed in on the question of whether moral philosophers can be counted as moral experts. One argument denying this has been rejected by both sides of the debate. According to this argument, the extent of disagreement in modern moral philosophy prevents moral philosophers from being classified as moral experts. Call this the Argument From Disagreement (AD). In this article, I defend a version of AD. Insofar as practical issues in moral philosophy are characterized by disagreement between moral philosophers who are more or less equally well credentialed on the issue, non‐philosophers have no good reasons to defer to their views.     

ARE MORAL PHILOSOPHERS MORAL EXPERTS?

In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain – within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory – that moral philosophers are ‘semi‐experts’.     

For an anthropology of the demoralized: state pay,mock‐labour,and unfreedom in a Serbian firm

Recently, the leitmotif of much anthropological writing became that of the virtue of precarity: the belief that people continue to exercise their ethical imagination in the most trying circumstances. While refreshingly non‐deterministic, the Foucauldian approach to freedom that guides this vision neglects those situations in which people see their ability to be moral as irreparable, and structurally compromised. Such is the case of a Serbian firm selling spare car parts, where policies of financing unprofitable employment gradually involved workers in everyday, ritualized performances of productivity for the state – what I call mock‐labour. Unable either to meaningfully fulfil or to renounce the ethos of work, workers remain in an affective blend of nonchalance and failure, experiencing mock‐labour as both a source of material security and an abandonment of their creative capacities – a mocking of moral self. I call for a reconciliation of the anthropologies of ethics and precarity through the notion of demoralization, as a state in which the deficits of structural agency and the limits of reflective freedom overlap.     

Vapour–phase activities of essential oils against antibiotic sensitive and resistant bacteria including MRSA

Aims:  To determine whether essential oil (EO) vapours could reduce surface and airborne levels of bacteria including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA).
Methods and Results:  The antibacterial activity of geranium and lemongrass EO individually and blended were evaluated over a range of concentrations by direct contact and vapour diffusion. The EO were tested in vitro against a selection of antibiotic-sensitive and -resistant bacteria, including MRSA, vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE), Acinetobacter baumanii and Clostridium difficile . An EO blend containing lemongrass and geranium was used to formulate BioScent^TM that was dispersed into the environment using the ST Pro^TM machine. The effects were variable depending on the methods used. In a sealed box environment, MRSA growth on seeded plates was reduced by 38% after 20 h exposure to BioScent^TM vapour. In an office environment, the ST Pro^TM machine dispersing BioScent^TM effected an 89% reduction of airborne bacteria in 15 h, when operated at a constant output of 100%.
Conclusions:  EO vapours inhibited growth of antibiotic-sensitive and -resistant bacteria in vitro and reduced surface and airborne levels of bacteria.
Significance and Impact of the Study:  Results suggest that EO vapours, particularly Bioscent^TM, could be used as a method of air disinfection.     

Germline genome editing versus preimplantation genetic diagnosis: Is there a case in favour of germline interventions?

CRISPR is widely considered to be a disruptive technology. However, when it comes to the most controversial topic, germline genome editing (GGE), there is no consensus on whether this technology has any substantial advantages over existing procedures such as embryo selection after in vitro fertilization (IVF) and preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD). Answering this question, however, is crucial for evaluating whether the pursuit of further research and development on GGE is justified. This paper explores the question from both a clinical and a moral viewpoint, namely whether GGE has any advantages over existing technologies of selective reproduction and whether GGE could complement or even replace them. In a first step, I review an argument of extended applicability. The paper confirms that there are some scenarios in which only germline intervention allows couples to have (biologically related) healthy offspring, because selection will not avoid disease. In a second step, I examine possible moral arguments in favour of genetic modification, namely that GGE could save some embryos and that GGE would provide certain benefits for a future person that PGD does not. Both arguments for GGE have limitations. With regard to the extended applicability of GGE, however, a weak case in favour of GGE should still be made.     

Splitting the Difference? Principled Compromise and Assisted Dying

Compromise on moral matters attracts ambivalent reactions, since it seems at once laudable and deplorable. When a hotly‐contested phenomenon like assisted dying is debated, all‐or‐nothing positions tend to be advanced, with little thought given to the desirability of, or prospects for, compromise. In response to recent articles by Søren Holm and Alex Mullock, in this article I argue that principled compromise can be encouraged even in relation to this phenomenon, provided that certain conditions are present (which I suggest they are). In order to qualify as appropriately principled, the ensuing negotiations require disputants to observe three constraints: they should be suitably reflective, reliable and respectful in their dealings with one another. The product that will result from such a process will also need to split the difference between the warring parties. In assisted dying, I argue that a reduced offence of ‘compassionate killing’ can achieve this. I acknowledge, however, that splitting the difference can induce splitting headaches, as there remain certain questions to be answered. Hopefully, however, sufficient work is done here to defend attempts to occupy the middle ground, whether these relate to assisted dying specifically or to other disputed moral matters.     

Crab antics: the moral and political economy of greed accusations in the submerging Sundarbans delta of India

The livelihood of crab collecting, practised for generations in the Sundarbans forest of India, has undergone a radical moral makeover in recent years. Largely landless crab fishers are now the subject of frequent public denunciations by local authorities for their supposed greed and reckless endangerment of the entire ecosystem. While greed and its related category of need emerge from a local moral ecology of the region, internationally funded conservation campaigns and recent disruptions in the global crab supply chain reveal how accusations are activated and the means through which they play out amidst pre-existing village hierarchies. This article accounts for the political, economic, and moral shifts that underpin these accusations. In counterpoint, I present the defences of the accused, and explore crab collectors’ notions of a sufficient life and the rich moral distinctions they themselves make between greed (lobh), need (aubhav), desire (chahida), and habit (swabhav). I then step back to show the broader political contours that shape the discourse of ‘greedy’ crab collectors. I argue that both the conservation movement and allied state actors have distorted the material and moral resources intended to combat climate change and other environmental threats by scapegoating the politically disenfranchised: local fishers. Powerful stakeholders, as a result of their own political impotency, are deployed in a game of crab antics that fails to address the underlying environmental catastrophe while displacing the psychic burden of greed onto the poor.     

Ape imagination? A sentimentalist critique of Frans de Waal’s gradualist theory of human morality

This essay draws on Adam Smith’s moral sentimentalism to critique primatologist Frans de Waal’s gradualist theory of human morality. De Waal has spent his career arguing for continuity between primate behavior and human morality, proposing that empathy is a primary moral building block evident in primate behavior. Smith’s moral sentimentalism—with its emphasis on the role of sympathy in moral virtue—provides the philosophical framework for de Waal’s understanding of morality. Smith’s notion of sympathy and the imagination involved in sympathy is qualitatively different from animal sympathy. I argue that Smithian sympathy includes the ability to represent propositional attitudes and take into account multiple perspectives which are then synthesized into a singular impartial perspective. Furthermore, Smithian moral judgment requires the capacity for emotion regulation and moral self-cultivation, or the ability to shape and control one’s reactive attitudes. Taken together, these capacities far outstrip the capacities of animals, disrupting de Waal’s gradualism.     

Within a Range of Possibilities: Morality and Ethics in Social Life

Despite its now common currency the anthropological concept of morality remains underdeveloped. One anthropologist who has made several important attempts to work out a more precise theoretical concept of morality is Joel Robbins. In his most recent contribution to this endeavor Robbins addresses the tension in anthropology between what he calls the morality of reproduction and the morality of freedom. In this article, I suggest an alternative solution to the problem of conceiving the distinction between a nonconsciously enacted morality and the conscious awareness of ethical dilemmas and moral questioning. I will support this distinction with ethnographic and life-historical material from my research on the moral lives of some Muscovites.     

Failures of Imagination: Disability and the Ethics of Selective Reproduction

The article addresses the problem of disability in the context of reproductive decisions based on genetic information. It poses the question of whether selective procreation should be considered as a moral obligation of prospective parents. To answer this question, a number of different ethical approaches to the problem are presented and critically analysed: the utilitarian; Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence; the rights‐based. The main thesis of the article is that these approaches fail to provide any appealing principles on which reproductive decisions should be based. They constitute failures of imagination which may result in counter‐intuitive moral judgments about both life with disability and genetic selection. A full appreciation of the ethical significance of recognition in procreative decisions leads to a more nuanced and morally satisfying view than other leading alternatives presented in the article.     

At the Margins of Moral Personhood

In this article I examine the proposition that severe cognitive disability is an impediment to moral personhood. Moral personhood, as I understand it here, is articulated in the work of Jeff McMahan as that which confers a special moral status on a person. I rehearse the metaphysical arguments about the nature of personhood that ground McMahan’s claims regarding the moral status of the “congenitally severely mentally retarded” (CSMR for short). These claims, I argue, rest on the view that only intrinsic psychological capacities are relevant to moral personhood: that is, that relational properties are generally not relevant. In addition, McMahan depends on an argument that species membership is irrelevant for moral consideration and a contention that privileging species membership is equivalent to a virulent nationalism (these will be discussed below). In consequence, the CSMR are excluded from moral personhood and their deaths are less significant as their killing is less wrong than that of persons. To throw doubt on McMahan’s conclusions about the moral status and wrongness of killing the CSMR I question the exclusive use of intrinsic properties in the metaphysics of personhood, the dismissal of the moral importance of species membership, and the example of virulent nationalism as an apt analogy. I also have a lot to say about McMahan’s empirical assumptions about the CSMR.     

The survival of three strains of Arcobacter butzleri in the presence of lemon, orange and bergamot essential oils and their components in vitro and on food

AIMS: To test the effect of oils and vapours of lemon, sweet orange and bergamot and their components against three Arcobacter butzleri strains. METHODS AND RESULTS: The disc diffusion method was used to screen the oils and vapours against three strains of A. butzleri. In vitro bergamot was the most inhibitory essential oil (EO) and both citral and linalool were effective. On cabbage leaf, the water isolate was the least susceptible to bergamot EO, citral and linalool (1-2 log reduction), with the chicken isolate being the most susceptible (6-8 log reduction). However, the latter appeared not to be susceptible to vapours over 24 h although type strain and water isolate populations reduced by 8 logs. On chicken skin, the effectiveness of the oils was reduced compared with that on cabbage leaf. CONCLUSIONS: Bergamot was the most effective of the oils tested and linalool the most effective component. All strains tested were less susceptible in food systems than in vitro. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPACT OF THE STUDY: Arcobacter isolates vary in their response to EO suggesting that the results of type strain studies should be interpreted with caution. Bergamot EO has the potential for the inhibition of this 'emerging' pathogen.     

Influence of sex,maturity and host substances on pheromones in the guts of the bark beetles, Ips paraconfusus and Dendroctonus brevicomis

Pheromones and metabolites of host (ponderosa pine) compounds were found in association with the hindgut of both naturally fed and of non-fed, host vapour-exposed bark beetles, Ips paraconfusus and Dendroctonus brevicomis. Much smaller amounts were found in the corresponding heads and mid guts. Sex-specific differences in content of pheromones were observed as in earlier studies. Exposure of I. paraconfusus to vapours of a pheromone component, ipsenol and other monoterpene alcohols resulted in their accumulation in the hindgut but relatively very low amounts in the head. The possible sites of pheromone biosynthesis are discussed. Exposure of male I. paraconfusus to vapours of host compounds, myrcene and α-pinene, revealed that immature adults do not produce the pheromone components, ipsenol and ipsdienol, as mature adults do while both immature and mature sexes produced another pheromone component, cis-verbenol, as well as trans-verbenol and myrtenol. Immature D. brevicomis adults did not contain pheromones until their exposure to vapours of (?)-α-pinene which caused production of trans-verbenol but only about 10% that of mature adults treated similarly. Verbenone, a male-produced inhibitory pheromone of D. brevicomis, apparently was not synthesized from (?)-α-pinene in females nor was its synthesis in males enhanced by exposure to this host compound.     

Expertise, wisdom and moral philosophers: a response to Gesang

In a recent issue of Bioethics, Bernard Gesang asks whether a moral philosopher possesses greater moral expertise than a non-philosopher, and his answer is a qualified yes, based not so much on his infallible access to the truth, but on the quality of his theoretically-informed moral justifications. I reject Gesang's claim that there is such a thing as moral expertise, although the moral philosopher may well make a valid contribution to the ethics committee as a concerned and educated citizen. I suggest that wisdom is a lot more interesting to examine than moral expertise. Again, however, moral philosophers have no monopoly on wisdom, and the study of philosophy may even impede its cultivation.     

Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?

According to some recent arguments, (Joyce in The evolution of morality, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006; Ruse and Wilson in Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995; Street in Philos Studies 127: 109–166, 2006) if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, (a) the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and (b) the claim (or a certain interpretation of the claim) that natural selection fails to track moral facts. I also argue that natural selection is a process that could track moral facts, albeit imperfectly. I do not argue that we do have moral knowledge. I argue instead that Darwinian considerations provide us with no reason to doubt that we do, and with some reasons to suppose that we might.     

An African theory of bioethics: reply to MacPherson and Macklin

In a prior issue of Developing World Bioethics, Cheryl Macpherson and Ruth Macklin critically engaged with an article of mine, where I articulated a moral theory grounded on indigenous values salient in the sub-Saharan region, and then applied it to four major issues in bioethics, comparing and contrasting its implications with those of the dominant Western moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism. In response to my essay, Macpherson and Macklin have posed questions about: whether philosophical justifications are something with which bioethicists ought to be concerned; why something counts as 'African'; how medicine is a moral enterprise; whether an individual right to informed consent is consistent with sub-Saharan values; and when thought experiments help to establish firm conclusions about moral status. These are important issues for the field, and I use this reply to take discussion of them a step or two farther, defending my initial article from Macpherson's and Macklin's critical questions and objections.     

Moral and nonmoral innate constraints

Charles J. Lumsden and E.O. Wilson, in their writings together and individually, have proposed that human behaviors, whether moral or nonmoral, are governed by innate constraints (which they have termed epigenetic rules). I propose that if a genetic component of moral behavior is to be discovered, some sorting out of specifically moral from nonmoral innate constraints will be necessary. That some specifically moral innate constraits exist is evidenced by virtuous behaviors exhibited in nonhuman mammals, whose behavior is usually granted to be importantly governed by genetic factors. Propensities for such virtuous behaviors may have been passed to humans as highly conserved mammalian genes and continue to influence us. I propose that these constitute at least a rudimentary morality and may account in part for the moral intuitions. But other innate constraints which are nonmoral in nature interact with the specifically moral innate constraints and with culture to yield human moral decisions and actions. Any model which aims to identify the genetic component of moral behaviors or behaviors with moral import must provide not only a delineation of cultural causes but must also distinguish between those genetic causes which may have their origin in innate moral constraints from others which are fundamentally nonmoral because the critical faculty necessary to higher level human morality itself arises in part from innate constraints of a nonmoral type; i.e., the processes of inductive reasoning common to both ethics and science. Finally, humans who could bring the nonmoral evaluative capacities to bear upon whatever moral intuitions might be genetically conserved in mammalian heritage would have an advantage over similar beings who could not.     

Collective narratives,false memories,and the origins of autobiographical memory

Building on Dor’s theory of language as a social technology for the instruction of imagination, I suggest that autobiographical memory evolved culturally as a response to the problems of false memory and deliberate deceit that were introduced by that technology. I propose that sapiens’ linguistic communication about past and future events initially occurred in small groups, and this helped to correct individual memory defects. However, when human groups grew in size and became more socially differentiated, and movement between groups prevented story-verification, misattributions of events became more common. In such conditions individuals with better autobiographical memory had an advantage because they could evaluate their own contents and sources of information, as well as that of others, more accurately; this not only benefitted them directly, but also improved their reliability as social partners. Autobiographical memory thus evolved in the context of human linguistic communication through selection for communicative reliability. However, the advantages of imagination, which enables forward-planning and decision-Making, meant that memory distortions, although controlled and moderated by autobiographical memory, could not be totally eradicated. This may have driven the evolution of additional forms of memory control involving social and linguistic norms. I interpret the language and the social norms of the Pirahã as the outcome of the cultural-evolutionary control of memory distortions. Some ways of testing aspects of this proposal are outlined.