Partner Choice Drives the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity potentially provides an important means for generating cooperation based on helping those who help others. However, the use of ‘image scores’ to summarize individuals’ past behaviour presents a dilemma: individuals withholding help from those of low image score harm their own reputation, yet giving to defectors erodes cooperation. Explaining how indirect reciprocity could evolve has therefore remained problematic. In all previous treatments of indirect reciprocity, individuals are assigned potential recipients and decide whether to cooperate or defect based on their reputation. A second way of achieving discrimination is through partner choice, which should enable individuals to avoid defectors. Here, I develop a model in which individuals choose to donate to anyone within their group, or to none. Whereas image scoring with random pairing produces cycles of cooperation and defection, with partner choice there is almost maximal cooperation. In contrast to image scoring with random pairing, partner choice results in almost perfect contingency, producing the correlation between giving and receiving required for cooperation. In this way, partner choice facilitates much higher and more stable levels of cooperation through image scoring than previously reported and provides a simple mechanism through which systems of helping those who help others can work.     

欺骗,契约,合作的ESS

动物竞争中的欺骗、契约、合作现象是极为常见的。本文就论述与此有关的ESS。一、欺骗某些动物竞争时信号a后跟随发生行为A,如一个体不出现A则为欺骗。欺骗是相对真实     

A Hidden Pitfall in the Preparation of Agar Media Undermines Microorganism Cultivability

Microbiologists have been using agar growth medium for over 120 years. It revolutionized microbiology in the 1890s when microbiologists were seeking effective methods to isolate microorganisms, which led to the successful cultivation of microorganisms as single clones. But there has been a disparity between total cell counts and cultivable cell counts on plates, often referred to as the “great plate count anomaly,” that has long been a phenomenon that still remains unsolved. Here, we report that a common practice microbiologists have employed to prepare agar medium has a hidden pitfall: when phosphate was autoclaved together with agar to prepare solid growth media (PT medium), total colony counts were remarkably lower than those grown on agar plates in which phosphate and agar were separately autoclaved and mixed right before solidification (PS medium). We used a pure culture of Gemmatimonas aurantiaca T-27^T and three representative sources of environmental samples, soil, sediment, and water, as inocula and compared colony counts between PT and PS agar plates. There were higher numbers of CFU on PS medium than on PT medium using G. aurantiaca or any of the environmental samples. Chemical analysis of PT agar plates suggested that hydrogen peroxide was contributing to growth inhibition. Comparison of 454 pyrosequences of the environmental samples to the isolates revealed that taxa grown on PS medium were more reflective of the original community structure than those grown on PT medium. Moreover, more hitherto-uncultivated microbes grew on PS than on PT medium.     

An Evolutionary Model of Cooperation,Fairness and Altruistic Punishment in Public Good Games

We identify and explain the mechanisms that account for the emergence of fairness preferences and altruistic punishment in voluntary contribution mechanisms by combining an evolutionary perspective together with an expected utility model. We aim at filling a gap between the literature on the theory of evolution applied to cooperation and punishment, and the empirical findings from experimental economics. The approach is motivated by previous findings on other-regarding behavior, the co-evolution of culture, genes and social norms, as well as bounded rationality. Our first result reveals the emergence of two distinct evolutionary regimes that force agents to converge either to a defection state or to a state of coordination, depending on the predominant set of self- or other-regarding preferences. Our second result indicates that subjects in laboratory experiments of public goods games with punishment coordinate and punish defectors as a result of an aversion against disadvantageous inequitable outcomes. Our third finding identifies disadvantageous inequity aversion as evolutionary dominant and stable in a heterogeneous population of agents endowed initially only with purely self-regarding preferences. We validate our model using previously obtained results from three independently conducted experiments of public goods games with punishment.     

Impaired Nuclear Nrf2 Translocation Undermines the Oxidative Stress Response in Friedreich Ataxia

Background

Friedreich ataxia originates from a decrease in mitochondrial frataxin, which causes the death of a subset of neurons. The biochemical hallmarks of the disease include low activity of the iron sulfur cluster-containing proteins (ISP) and impairment of antioxidant defense mechanisms that may play a major role in disease progression.

Methodology/Principal Findings

We thus investigated signaling pathways involved in antioxidant defense mechanisms. We showed that cultured fibroblasts from patients with Friedreich ataxia exhibited hypersensitivity to oxidative insults because of an impairment in the Nrf2 signaling pathway, which led to faulty induction of antioxidant enzymes. This impairment originated from previously reported actin remodeling by hydrogen peroxide.

Conclusions/Significance

Thus, the defective machinery for ISP synthesis by causing mitochondrial iron dysmetabolism increases hydrogen peroxide production that accounts for the increased susceptibility to oxidative stress.     

Reciprocity of agonistic support in ravens

Cooperative behaviour through reciprocation or interchange of valuable services in primates has received considerable attention, especially regarding the timeframe of reciprocation and its ensuing cognitive implications. Much less, however, is known about reciprocity in other animals, particularly birds. We investigated patterns of agonistic support (defined as a third party intervening in an ongoing conflict to attack one of the conflict participants, thus supporting the other) in a group of 13 captive ravens, Corvus corax. We found support for long-term, but not short-term, reciprocation of agonistic support. Ravens were more likely to support individuals who preened them, kin and dominant group members. These results suggest that ravens do not reciprocate on a calculated tit-for-tat basis, but aid individuals from whom reciprocated support would be most useful and those with whom they share a good relationship. Additionally, dyadic levels of agonistic support and consolation (postconflict affiliation from a bystander to the victim) correlated strongly with each other, but we found no evidence to suggest that receiving agonistic support influences the victim's likelihood of receiving support (consolation) after the conflict ends. Our findings are consistent with an emotionally mediated form of reciprocity in ravens and provide additional support for convergent cognitive evolution in birds and mammals.     

Deception and the origin of honest signals

Deceptive signals are a challenge to explain because on average, signals should be reliable. When being deceived is costly to the receiver, a coevolutionary struggle between senders and receivers can ensue. Recent work by Macías Garcia and Ramirez raises the intriguing possibility that through such a coevolutionary process, cheats can become honest.     

Joint Effects of Asymmetric Payoff and Reciprocity Mechanisms on Collective Cooperation in Water Sharing Interactions: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas distinguish themselves from general public good problems by encompassing both social and physical features. This paper examines how a physical mechanism, namely asymmetric payoff; and a social mechanism, reciprocity; simultaneously affect collective cooperation in theoretical water sharing interactions. We present an iterative N-person game theoretic model to investigate the joint effects of these two mechanisms in a linear fully connected river system under three information assumptions. From a simple evolutionary perspective, this paper quantitatively addresses the conditions for Nash Equilibrium in which collective cooperation might be established. The results suggest that direct reciprocity increases every actor’s motivation to contribute to the collective good of the river system. Meanwhile, various upstream and downstream actors manifest individual disparities as a result of the direct reciprocity and asymmetric payoff mechanisms. More specifically, the downstream actors are less willing to cooperate unless there is a high probability that long-term interactions are ensured; however, a greater level of asymmetries is likely to increase upstream actors’ incentives to cooperate even though the interactions could quickly end. The upstream actors also display weak sensitivity to an increase in the total number of actors, which generally results in a reduction in the other actors’ motivation for cooperation. It is also shown that the indirect reciprocity mechanism relaxes the overall conditions for cooperative Nash Equilibrium.     

Weak Compliance Undermines the Success of No-Take Zones in a Large Government-Controlled Marine Protected Area

The effectiveness of marine protected areas depends largely on whether people comply with the rules. We quantified temporal changes in benthic composition, reef fish biomass, and fishing effort among marine park zones (including no-take areas) to assess levels of compliance following the 2005 rezoning of the government-controlled Karimunjawa National Park (KNP), Indonesia. Four years after the rezoning awareness of fishing regulations was high amongst local fishers, ranging from 79.5±7.9 (SE) % for spatial restrictions to 97.7±1.2% for bans on the use of poisons. Despite this high awareness and strong compliance with gear restrictions, compliance with spatial restrictions was weak. In the four years following the rezoning reef fish biomass declined across all zones within KNP, with >50% reduction within the no-take Core and Protection Zones. These declines were primarily driven by decreases in the biomass of groups targeted by local fishers; planktivores, herbivores, piscivores, and invertivores. These declines in fish biomass were not driven by changes in habitat quality; coral cover increased in all zones, possibly as a result of a shift in fishing gears from those which can damage reefs (i.e., nets) to those which cause little direct damage (i.e., handlines and spears). Direct observations of fishing activities in 2009 revealed there was limited variation in fishing effort between zones in which fishing was allowed or prohibited. The apparent willingness of the KNP communities to comply with gear restrictions, but not spatial restrictions is difficult to explain and highlights the complexities of the social and economic dynamics that influence the ecological success of marine protected areas. Clearly the increased and high awareness of fishery restrictions following the rezoning is a positive step. The challenge now is to understand and foster the conditions that may facilitate compliance with spatial restrictions within KNP and marine parks worldwide.     

Game Theoretical Analysis on Cooperation Stability and Incentive Effectiveness in Community Networks

Community networks, the distinguishing feature of which is membership admittance, appear on P2P networks, social networks, and conventional Web networks. Joining the network costs money, time or network bandwidth, but the individuals get access to special resources owned by the community in return. The prosperity and stability of the community are determined by both the policy of admittance and the attraction of the privileges gained by joining. However, some misbehaving users can get the dedicated resources with some illicit and low-cost approaches, which introduce instability into the community, a phenomenon that will destroy the membership policy. In this paper, we analyze on the stability using game theory on such a phenomenon. We propose a game-theoretical model of stability analysis in community networks and provide conditions for a stable community. We then extend the model to analyze the effectiveness of different incentive policies, which could be used when the community cannot maintain its members in certain situations. Then we verify those models through a simulation. Finally, we discuss several ways to promote community network’s stability by adjusting the network’s properties and give some proposal on the designs of these types of networks from the points of game theory and stability.     

Discourses of Deception: Cheating in Professional Running1

Cheating, it is claimed, is anathema to sport. But is this the case? In this paper it is argued that cheating is integral to modern sport, that the model of sport as ‘fair play’ is simply an ideological guise of amateurism. The paper focuses on the sport of professional running which, since its origins in the eighteenth century, has been a gambling sport. Strategies involving cheating to manipulate wins, or losses, have featured in this sport as ways of increasing the probability of striking successful wagers. Such strategies are an accepted part of professional running: participants anticipate and expect others to be playing it in this way. However, a distinction is made between what is referred to in the paper as ‘clean’ cheating and ‘dirty’ cheating. The former is an accepted way of the sport, the latter occurs but is deprecated. The paper explores these different forms of cheating and the athletes' responses to them. Through a focus on the discourses of success in capitalist society, a model of cheating is developed to interpret such practices. Within the context of professional running, a working class sport, it is argued that, given the habitus of its practitioners, ‘success’ may be measured in terms of monetary gains and the ‘kick‐on’ in life that these might provide. Cheating practices may serve to enhance the probability of success and social mobility. Given the relatively short career spans of sports people and the costs involved in developing the requisite skills, cheating may promote success and establish a financial base for post‐sport careers. The paper concludes that cheating in sport can be anticipated as a feature of an acquisitive capitalist society.     

Reciprocity in the activation of geotropism in oat coleoptiles grown on clinostats

Summary The activation of geotropism in oat coleoptiles, grown on horizonta clinostats, i.e., without the tropic influence of gravity, shows a reciprocal relationship between force and time. Two methods were used to approximate geotropic presentation time. In one, this parameter was estimated by extrapolation to zero response from the linear relationship, response = a+b log stimulation time. In the other, stimulation times of very short as well as longer durations were used; under these conditions, the response curve shows two distinct rates, with the lower rate for stimuli of brief duration. The intersection of the two rate-segments of the response curve was taken as the presentation time. Both methods show reciprocity for the activation of geotropism, but yield significantly different reciprocity constants. The ability of the coleoptile to sense gravity is not affected by gravity compensation. With agar as a growth medium, the magnitude of response to gravity is greater than with sand. However, coleoptiles grown in sand are more sensitive to geotropic activation.Work supported by the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.     

Reciprocity Versus Rhythmicity in Spontaneous Alternations of Nasal Airflow

Active anterior rhinomanometry was used to observe nasal airflow in five men and four women (ages 18-30). Measurements were obtained for each nasal passage every 5 min throughout an uninterrupted 8-hr session. Facial skin temperature from the left and right side of the face was recorded simultaneously from thermocouples. Observations were made during the months of May and June; subjects were allowed to maintain their routine diurnally active schedules prior to observation. Airflow in the two passages showed a significant negative correlation (i.e. Was reciprocal) in 44% of subjects (N= 9). Autocorrelation and spectral analysis of the airflow data found evidence of periodicity in 39% of individual nostrils and 56% of subjects. Mean estimated period was 4.5 ± 1.0 hr (range 3.5-6.0 hr). Only 22% of subjects showed statistical evidence of periodicity in both nostrils (i.e. a “nasal cycle”). Left- and right-side facial skin temperatures changed in parallel rather than reciprocally, but showed evidence of periodicity in 50% of hemifacial time series (56% of subjects), with an estimated period of 3.8 ± 1.0 hr (range 2.3-5.0).     

有无反馈对欺骗过程的神经机制的调控作用

欺骗行为会导致欺骗结果的产生,欺骗结果又会直接影响欺骗行为的发生及其内在机制.虽然有研究表明,欺骗结果会对相应的欺骗过程产生调控作用,但对这一调控作用的机制并不清楚.本研究采用功能核磁共振技术,对两组被试分别使用有、无反馈(欺骗结果)的GKT范式并记录两组被试在进行诚实反应和欺骗反应时的大脑激活模式.结果发现,有反馈组与无反馈组相比,有反馈组的诚实反应和欺骗反应都导致了左侧顶叶皮层、左背部前扣带皮层、左侧脑岛、双侧视皮层和右侧小脑的更大激活;对两组而言,欺骗反应和诚实反应都导致了右腹外侧前额区域、双侧缘上回、左侧脑岛、右后内侧额叶、右侧颞中回和右侧纹状体的更大激活;此外,与无反馈组相比,有反馈组的欺骗反应与诚实反应在双侧纹状体和左侧脑岛上的激活差异更加明显.这些结果表明,有无欺骗结果对欺骗过程的神经机制具有调控作用,当需要面临欺骗结果时,欺骗过程将更大程度地涉及到奖赏预期和风险厌恶过程的参与.     

Firefly Femmes Fatales: A Case Study in the Semiotics of Deception

Mimicry and deception are two important issues in studies about animal communication. The reliability of animal signs and the problem of the benefits of deceiving in sign exchanges are interesting topics in the evolution of communication. In this paper, we intend to contribute to an understanding of deception by studying the case of aggressive signal mimicry in fireflies, investigated by James Lloyd. Firefly femmes fatales are specialized in mimicking the mating signals of other species of fireflies with the purpose of attracting responding males to become their prey. These aggressive mimics are a major factor in the survival and reproduction of both prey and predator. It is a case of deception through active falsification of information that leads to efficient predation by femmes fatales fireflies and triggered evolutionary processes in their preys’ communicative behaviors. There are even nested coevolutionary interactions between these fireflies, leading to a remarkable system of deceptive and counterdeceptive signaling behaviors. We develop here a semiotic model of firefly deception and also consider ideas advanced by Lloyd about the evolution of communication, acknowledging that deception can be part of the explanation of why communication evolves towards increasing complexity. Increasingly complex sign exchanges between fireflies evolve in an extremely slow pace. Even if deceptive maneuvers are played out time and time again between particular firefly individuals, the evolution of the next level of complexity—and thus the next utterance in the dialogue between species—is likely to take an immense amount of generations.