Historic and functional biology: the inadequacy of a system theory of evolution

In the first half of the 20th century neo-Kantianism in a broad sense proved itself the main conceptual and methodological background of the central European biology. As such it contributed much to the victory on the typological, idealistic-morphological and psycho-vitalistic interpretations of life. On the other hand it could not give tools to the biologists for working out a strictly darwinian evolution theory. Kant's theory of organism was conceived without evolution as a theory of the internal functionality of the organism. There was only some 'play' with the evolutionary differentiation of the species. Since then the disputes around the work of August Weismann, a synthetical evolution theory which is now behind time, arose. This theory developed from coinciding claims, elaborated by geneticists, mathematicians, and by biologists studying development, natural history and systematics. This was done under a strong influence of marxist ideas. Through the interweaving of such different approaches it was possible for this evolutionary synthesis to influence successfully the development of evolution research during more than 40 years. Philosophically speaking modern evolution theory means therefore an aversion, even a positive abolition of Kantian positions. A number of biologists however--as L. von Bertalanffy--refused to adhere to a misinterpreted Kantian methodology and oriented themselves to an approach via system theory, which obtained a place in evolution research. In fact this is a Kantian approach as well. They only repeated the Kantian dilemma of the evolution which can also be found in Lamarck and Hegel. The system theory of the functionality of the organism never reaches to the level of the evolving species, but remains always on the level of epigenetic thinking, because of its philosophical origin. This paper points out the consequences of this still current dilemma. At the same time an all-enclosing reflection on the methodological, epistemological and the important historical questions of evolutionary biology in its scientific context is recommended.     

Does Biology Need an Organism Concept?

Among biologists, there is no general agreement on exactly what entities qualify as ‘organisms’. Instead, there are multiple competing organism concepts and definitions. While some authors think this is a problem that should be corrected, others have suggested that biology does not actually need an organism concept. We argue that the organism concept is central to biology and should not be abandoned. Both organism concepts and operational definitions are useful. We review criteria used for recognizing organisms and conclude that they are not categorical but rather continuously variable. Different organism concepts are useful for addressing different questions, and it is important to be explicit about which is being used. Finally, we examine the origins of the derived state of organismality, and suggest that it may result from positive feedback between natural selection and functional integration in biological entities.     

"Our standpoint different from common ..." (scientific heritage of Alexander Gurwitsch)

The work of prominent Russian biologist Alexander Gavrilovich Gurwitsch (1874-1954) on the theory of organism development are reviewed. Alexander Gurwitsch introduced the concept of embryonic (morphogenetic, biological, and cellular) field and proposed several revisions of it from 1912 to 1944. Although neither of them can be considered as a final theory of development, his the persistent search for the invariant law that allows the shape (spatial structure) to be proposed for each next developmental stage from the previous shape is of imperishable methodological interest. Alexander Gurwitsch anticipated many ideas of the future theory of self-organization. His theoretical constructions are explicit and experiment-oriented but absolutely not esoteric. They represent a highly important and original contribution to theoretical biology and are an essential step to further development of the ontogenetic theory.     

“Our standpoint different from common...” (Scientific heritage of Alexander Gurwitsch)

The work of prominent Russian biologist Alexander Gavrilovich Gurwitsch (1874–1954) on the theory of organism development are reviewed. Alexander Gurwitsch introduced the concept of embryonic (morphogenetic, biological, and cellular) field and proposed several revisions of it from 1912 to 1944. Although neither of them can be considered as a final theory of development, his the persistent search for the invariant law that allows the shape (spatial structure) to be proposed for each next developmental stage from the previous shape is of imperishable methodological interest. Alexander Gurwitsch anticipated many ideas of the future theory of self-organization. His theoretical constructions are explicit and experiment-oriented but absolutely not esoteric. They represent a highly important and original contribution to theoretical biology and are an essential step to further development of the ontogenetic theory.     

What is an organism? An immunological answer

The question, "What is an organism?," formerly considered as essential in biology, has now been increasingly replaced by a larger question, "What is a biological individual?" On the grounds that i) individuation is theory-dependent, and ii) physiology does not offer a theory, biologists and philosophers of biology have claimed that it is the theory of evolution by natural selection that tells us what counts as a biological individual. Here I show that one physiological field, immunology, offers a theory that makes possible a biological individuation based on physiological grounds. I give a new answer to the question of the individuation of an organism by linking together the evolutionary and the immunological approaches to biological individuation.     

A. A. Ukhtomskiĭ and I. P. Pavlov: a controversy or a dialogue?

Pavlov's concept of conditioned reflexes and Ukhtomskii theory of dominanta fall within the biological line in physiology. They unravel the integral adaptive and active nature of the organism behavior in the environment. It is impossible to develop modern concepts about the determinants of goal-directed behavior of animals and voluntary activity of humans without in-depth study of the achievements of these Russian physiological schools which not only formed the methodological basis for the current studies but also directed the way for their further development.     

On some theoretical grounds for an organism-centered biology: Property emergence, supervenience, and downward causation

In this paper, we investigate some theoretical grounds for bridging the gap between an organism-centered biology and the chemical basis of biological explanation, as expressed in the prevailing molecular perspective in biological research. First, we present a brief survey of the role of the organism concept in biological thought. We advance the claim that emergentism (with its fundamental tenets: ontological physicalism, qualitative novelty, property emergence, theory of levels, irreducibility of the emergents, and downward causation) can provide a metaphysical basis for a coherent sort of organicism. Downward causation (DC) is the key notion in emergentist philosophy, as shown by the tension between the aspects of dependence and nonreducibility in the concept of supervenience, preferred by many philosophers to emergence as a basis for nonreductive physicalism. As supervenience physicalism does not lead, arguably, to a stable nonreductive physicalist account, we maintain that a philosophical alternative worthy of investigation is that of a combination of supervenience and property emergence in the formulation of such a stance. Taking as a starting-point O’Connor’s definition of an emergent property, we discuss how a particular interpretation of downward causation (medium DC), inspired by Aristotelian causal modes, results in an explanation of property emergence compatible with both physicalism and non-reductionism. In this account of emergence, one may claim that biology, as a science of living organization, is and remains a science of the organism, even if completely explained by the laws of chemistry. We conclude the paper with a new definition of an emergent property.     

Proteomics and systems biology to tackle biological complexity: Yeast as a case study

In this note we discuss how, by using budding yeast as model organism (as has been done in the past for biochemical, genetics and genomic studies), the integration of "omics" sciences and more specifically of proteomics with systems biology offers a very profitable approach to elucidating regulatory circuits of complex biological functions.     

The integrated phenotype

Proper functioning of complex phenotypes requires that multiple traits work together. Examination of relationships among traits within and between complex characters and how they interact to function as a whole organism is critical to advancing our understanding of evolutionary developmental plasticity. Phenotypic integration refers to the relationships among multiple characters of a complex phenotype, and their relationships with other functional units (modules) in an organism. In this review, I summarize a brief history of the concept of phenotypic integration in plant and animal biology. Following an introduction of concepts, including modularity, I use an empirical case-study approach to highlight recent advance in clarifying the developmental and genomic basis of integration. I end by highlighting some novel approaches to genomic and epigenetic perturbations that offer promise in further addressing the role of phenotypic integration in evolutionary diversification. In the age of the phenotype, studies that examine the genomic and developmental changes in relationships of traits across environments will shape the next chapter in our quest for understanding the evolution of complex characters.     

Ins and Outs of Systems Biology vis-à-vis Molecular Biology: Continuation or Clear Cut?

The comprehension of living organisms in all their complexity poses a major challenge to the biological sciences. Recently, systems biology has been proposed as a new candidate in the development of such a comprehension. The main objective of this paper is to address what systems biology is and how it is practised. To this end, the basic tools of a systems biological approach are explored and illustrated. In addition, it is questioned whether systems biology ‘revolutionizes’ molecular biology and ‘transcends’ its assumed reductionism. The strength of this claim appears to depend on how molecular and systems biology are characterised and on how reductionism is interpreted. Doing credit to molecular biology and to methodological reductionism, it is argued that the distinction between molecular and systems biology is gradual rather than sharp. As such, the classical challenge in biology to manage, interpret and integrate biological data into functional wholes is further intensified by systems biology’s use of modelling and bioinformatics, and by its scale enlargement.     

Biosemiotics Within and Without Biological Holism: A Semio-historical Analysis

On the basis of a comparative analysis of the biosemiotic work of Jakob von Uexküll and of various theories on biological holism, this article takes a look at the question: what is the status of a semiotic approach in respect to a holistic one? The period from 1920 to 1940 was the peak-time of holistic theories, despite the fact that agreement on a unified and accepted set of holistic ideas was never reached. A variety of holisms, dependent on the cultural and disciplinary contexts, is sketched here from the works of Jan Smuts, Adolf Meyer-Abich, John Scott Haldane, Kurt Goldstein, Alfred North Whitehead and Wolfgang Köhler. In contrast with his contemporary holists, who used the model of an organism as a unifying explanatory tool for all levels of reality, Jakob von Uexküll confined himself to disciplinary organicism by extending the borders of the definition of “organism” without any intention to surpass the borders of biology itself. The comparison reveals also a significant difference in the perspectives of Uexküll and his contemporary holists, a difference between a view from a subjective centre in contrast with an all-encompassing structural view. Uexküll’s theories are fairly near to J. S. Haldane’s interpretation of an organism as a coordinative centre, but even here their models do not coincide. Although biosemiotics and holistic biology have different theoretical starting points and research-goals, it is possible nonetheless to place them under one and the same doctrinal roof.     

The challenges for molecular nutrition research 3: comparative nutrigenomics research as a basis for entering the systems level

Human nutrition and metabolism may serve as the paradigm for the complex interplay of the genome with its environment. The concept of nutrigenomics now enables science with new tools and comprehensive analytical techniques to investigate this interaction at all levels of the complexity of the organism. Moreover, nutrigenomics seeks to better define the homeostatic control mechanisms, identify the de-regulation in the early phases of diet-related diseases, and attempts to assess to what extent an individual's sensitizing genotype contributes to the overall health or disease state. In a comparative approach nutrigenomics uses biological systems of increasing complexity from yeast to mammalian models to define the general rules of metabolic and genetic mechanisms in adaptations to the nutritional environment. Powerful information technology, bioinformatics and knowledge management tools as well as new mathematical and computational approaches now make it possible to study these molecular mechanisms at the cellular, organ and whole organism level and take it on to modeling the processes in a "systems biology" approach. This review summarizes some of the concepts of a comparative approach to nutrigenomics research, identifies current lacks and proposes a concerted scientific effort to create the basis for nutritional systems biology.     

Evolutionary Novelty and the Evo-Devo Synthesis: Field Notes

Accounting for the evolutionary origins of morphological novelty is one of the core challenges of contemporary evolutionary biology. A successful explanatory framework requires the integration of different biological disciplines, but the relationships between developmental biology and standard evolutionary biology remain contested. There is also disagreement about how to define the concept of evolutionary novelty. These issues were the subjects of a workshop held in November 2009 at the University of Alberta. We report on the discussion and results of this workshop, addressing questions about (i) how to define evolutionary novelty and understand its significance, (ii) how to interpret evolutionary developmental biology as a synthesis and its relation to neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, and (iii) how to integrate disparate biological approaches in general.     

Theoretical and semantic aspects of the modular physiological adaptation.

Adaptation is a fundamental concept in biology. The use of this notion in physiology presents a special problem, on the one hand, due to its widespread application to practically all physiologic phenomena of organic economy, on the other hand, because there is no formal definition providing a demarcation between adaptive processes and secondary processes without relating them with adaptation. Therefore, the objective of this work is to formalize a modular definition of adaptation that allows a differentiation between adaptive processes and non adaptive ones. I conclude that the use of the concept of 'module' in the definition of adaptation makes it possible to demarcate adaptive processes. Furthermore, the proposed definition lets us eliminate the use of notions such as those of 'features' and 'characteristics' and solve a methodological problem encountered at organizational levels.     

Pattern and process: the early classification of snakes

The empirical nature of the cladistic approach to pattern analysis has been variously supported by reference to pre-evolutionary systematists. This interpretation of pre-evolutionary biology is critically re-examined on the basis of the early classification of snakes. The example demonstrates the dependence of the concept of homology on theoretical and methodological premises as well as the complementarity of pattern versus process.     

蛋白质结构的分形及其与进化关系的研究

本文在应用分形理论对蛋白质分子结构的分形进行研究的基础上,从非线性角度,就蛋白质多肽链的结构与形以及球蛋白三维结构的分形与进化的关系问题,进行了理论探讨和分析。     

Natural decision theory: A general formalism for the analysis of evolved characteristics

Classical Decision Theory, a mature and highly developed theory of rational choice, can be applied within evolutionary biology to the question of what traits an organism ought “rationally” to adopt, given that it wants to maximize its fitness. In this way the powerful formalism of decision theory can be brought to bear on the problem of how to predict which characters will be favored by natural selection, or to explain why certain characters have been so favored.Under some circumstances the classical theory of decision can be applied as it stands to an evolutionary problem simply by substituting an appropriate measure of biological fitness for the decision-theoretic concept of “utility”. Under other circumstances, however, it is necessary to extend the classical rules of decision in certain new directions. The result is a family of decision calculi of which the classical is only one. The name “Natural Decision Theory” is proposed for this extended class of biologically relevant decision methods.The decision tree method of diagramming an evolutionary decision situation is illustrated for the classical and three non-classical decision criteria, and is suggested as a potential means of gaining new insights into evolutionary forces.     

Character identification in evolutionary biology: The role of the organism

Summary In this article we argue that an organismic perspective in character identification can alleviate a structural deficiency of mathematical models in biology relative to the ones in the physical sciences. The problem with many biological theories is that they do not contain the conditions of their validity or a method of identifying objects that are appropriate instances of the models. Here functionally important biological characters are introduced as conceptual abstractions derived within the context of an ontologically prior object, such as a cell or an organism. To illustrate this approach, we present an analytical method of character decomposition based on the notion of the quasi-independence of traits. Two cases are analyzed: context dependent units of inheritance and a model of character identification in adaptive evolution. We demonstrate that in each case the biological process as represented by a mathematical theory entails the conditions for the individualization of characters. Our approach also requires a conceptual re-orientation in the way we build biological models. Rather than defining a set of biological characters a priori, functionally relevant characters are identified in the context of a higher level biological process.