Research on dead human bodies: African perspectives on moral status

A useful concept that can be invoked to resolve complex bioethical issues is that of moral status (or, human dignity). In this article, we apply this concept to dead human bodies in order to support our view that research on such bodies is permissible. Instead of drawing from salient Western theories of human dignity that account for it by appeals to autonomy or rationality, we will base our investigation on emerging conceptions in African theories of moral status as articulated by Thaddeus Metz and Munamato Chemhuru. Our conclusion is that neither of these theories of moral status, one secular, and the other religious, can accommodate the intuition that we have direct duties of respect towards such bodies because, in relation to Metz's conception, they lack the capacity to enter into social relationships while on Chemhuru's conception, dead bodies appear not to have any meaningful purpose within the hierarchy that captures the ontological systems that determine such status. Consequently, we argue that our analysis provides support for the use of unclaimed cadavers in training and research in medical institutions.     

Does human genome editing reinforce or violate human dignity?

Germline genome editing is often disapproved of at the international policy level because of its possible threats to human dignity. However, from a critical perspective the relationship between this emerging technology and human dignity is relatively understudied. We explore the main principles that are referred to when ‘human dignity' is invoked in this context; namely, the link with eugenics, the idea of a common genetic heritage, the principle of equal birth and broader equality and justice concerns. Yet the concept is also used in favour of germline genome editing as it might improve the overall well-being of future generations. We conclude that dignity concerns do not justify a complete ban on safe heritable genome editing but should inform the implementation of side constraints to ensure that the value judgements about human traits that are inherent in this practice do not result in a diminished basic respect for those people affected by them.     

HUMAN DIGNITY IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY DOCUMENTS: A USEFUL CRITERION FOR PUBLIC POLICY?

Current developments in biomedicine are presenting us with difficult ethical decisions and raising complex policy questions about how to regulate these new developments. Particularly vexing for governments have been issues related to human embryo experimentation. Because some of the most promising biomedical developments, such as stem cell research and nuclear somatic transfer, involve such experimentation, several international bodies have drafted documents aimed to provide guidance to governments when developing biomedical science policy. Here I focus on two such documents: the Council of Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being and the Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being. I argue that by using human dignity as a criterion to determine the permissibility of particular human embryo research practices, these documents cannot aid in identifying research that would be contrary to human dignity. Thus, they fail to guide public policy on embryo experimentation. Their use of human dignity as a criterion makes their task of offering guidance unfeasible because the concept as used in these documents is too vague and is applied in contradictory ways. I discuss the main goals of these documents and their claims in relation to human embryo research. I then discuss how they have influenced public policy in several countries. Finally, I show that although these Council of Europe treaties attempt to serve as public policy guides in the area of embryo research, they fail to do so.     

CLARIFYING APPEALS TO DIGNITY IN MEDICAL ETHICS FROM AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Over the past few decades the concept of (human) dignity has deeply pervaded medical ethics. Appeals to dignity, however, are often unclear. As a result some prefer to eliminate the concept from medical ethics, whereas others try to render it useful in this context. We think that appeals to dignity in medical ethics can be clarified by considering the concept from an historical perspective. Firstly, on the basis of historical texts we propose a framework for defining the concept in medical debates. The framework shows that dignity can occur in a relational, an unconditional, a subjective and a Kantian form. Interestingly, all forms relate to one concept since they have four features in common: dignity refers, in a restricted sense, to the 'special status of human beings'; it is based on essential human characteristics; the subject of dignity should live up to it; and it is a vulnerable concept, it can be lost or violated. We argue that being explicit about the meaning of dignity will prevent dignity from becoming a conversation-stopper in moral debate. Secondly, an historical perspective on dignity shows that it is not yet time to dispose of dignity in medical ethics. At least Kantian and relational dignity can be made useful in medical ethics.     

An undignified bioethics: there is no method in this madness

In a recent article, Alasdair Cochrane argues for the need to have an undignified bioethics. His is not, of course, a call to transform bioethics into an inelegant, pathetic discipline, or one failing to meet appropriate disciplinary standards. His is a call to simply eliminate the concept of human dignity from bioethical discourse. Here I argue that he fails to make his case. I first show that several of the flaws that Cochrane identifies are not flaws of the conceptions of dignity he discusses but rather flaws of his, often problematic, understanding of such conceptions. Second, I argue that Cochrane's case against the concept of human dignity goes too far. I thus show that were one to agree that these are indeed flaws that require that we discard our ethical concepts, then following Cochrane's recommendations would commit us not only to an undignified bioethics, i.e. a bioethics without dignity, but to a bioethics without much ethics at all.     

The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2)

In my initial critique of the substance view, I raised reductio‐style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among others. In this follow‐up critique, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of this conclusion. I begin by briefly presenting the substance view as well as its defense. (For a more thorough presentation, see the first part of my critique.) I then raise objections to three claims involved in the substance view's defense: the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its potentiality; the claim that the standard human fetus's intrinsic value and moral standing is a function of its essential properties; and the claim that it is the possession of the basic potential for rational moral agency that best accounts for the wrongness of killing the standard human fetus, among others.     

In defense of dignity: Reflections on the moral function of human dignity

This paper defends human dignity in two ways. First, by confronting the criticism that human dignity does not serve an important function in contemporary moral discourse and that its function can be sufficiently performed by other moral terms. It is argued that this criticism invites a danger of moral reductionism, which impoverishes moral discourse. The authority of moral philosophy to correct widely shared moral intuitions, rooted in experiences of grave injustices and wrongs, is questioned. Secondly, dignity is defended by showing what is needed to uphold it, both in theory and practice. It is argued, and demonstrated through examples, that human dignity as a universal value ascribed to human beings and the virtue of dignified action are intimately related. This is fleshed out in terms of Kant’s analysis of respect in the practical sense and of virtue as a commitment to the value of dignity as a constitutive end of our moral order. It is furthermore argued that theoretical attempts to ground respect for dignity in human capacities lead to a moral impasse. It is necessary to act as if every human being is worthy of respect. This practical approach requires institutions and specified moral obligations that are integral to the democratic ethos and the rule of law, which guarantees the equal status of human beings. This practical task requires that we consistently tease out and act on the implications of these principles rather than seek deeper justification for the equal worth of humans, articulated in the term human dignity.     

A Critique of the Enquete Commission's report on gene technology

West Germany's Enquete Commission released its report on the prospects and risks of gene technology, Chancen und Risiken der Gentechnologie, in January 1987. Sass, a philosopher, criticizes the body for confusing ethics with emotion, and moral assessment with deep thinking, in its deliberations. In his words, the Commission's report "is a good case study for both forms of methodological and conceptual moral malpractice in matters of applied ethics." Sass identifies three methodological deficiencies that he believes led the Commission to reject many forms of genetic technology, in particular, germline therapy and research with human embryos: (1) moral assessment is based on the evaluation of worst case scenarios; (2) human life is identified with human persons; and (3) general terms like "human dignity" are applied to concrete situations for which the terms are too blunt and impractical.     

Embryos,The Principle of Proportionality,and the Shaky Ground of Moral Respect

The debate concerning the moral permissibility of using human embryos in human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research has long centred on the question of the embryo's supposed right to life. However, in focussing only on this question, many opponents to hESC research have escaped rigorous scrutiny by making vague and unfounded appeals to the concept of moral respect in order to justify their opposition to certain hESC practices. In this paper, I offer a critical analysis of the concept of moral respect, and its use to support the intuitively appealing principle of proportionality in hESC research. I argue that if proponents of this principle are to justify its adoption by appealing to the concept of moral respect, they must explain two things concerning the nature of the moral respect owed to embryos. First, they must explain which particular aspect of the embryo is morally relevant, and why. Second, they must explain why some uses of embryos in research fail to acknowledge what is morally relevant about the embryo, and thereby involve a violation of the moral respect that they are due. I shall show that providing such explanations may be more difficult than it first appears.     

Human dignity: a guide to policy making in the biotechnology era?

This article explores the ways in which human dignity is used in debates about controversial biotechnologies, including biobanks, human gene patents, stem cell research and human cloning. Increasingly, human dignity is used as a form of general condemnation and as blanket justification for regulatory restraint. However, this use of human dignity marks a significant departure from the traditional, human-rights informed view of human dignity that has dominated bioethics debates for decades. In addition, on its own, it stands as dubious justification for policies that are aimed at constraining controversial biotechnologies.     

The sociological critique of evolutionary psychology: Beyond mass modularity

This paper addresses evolutionary psychology's (EP's) mass modularity account of human intelligence. First, EP is located within 'naturalization of society' discourses. Secondly, the nature and weakness of mass modularity theory is examined. In the third part of the paper, the genetic reductionism of EP is challenged with reference to developmental systems theory (DST). However, in the fourth part, the danger of importing one biological theory to defuse the colonial ambitions of another is highlighted through an examination of sociological systems theory and its relationship with biological systems theory. Nevertheless, DST has stimulated valuable insights in theoretical sociology/anthropology. Modularity is also common in computer models of intelligence as algorithmic computation. EP draws parallels with computer modelling to claim confirmation of its own account. The fifth part of this article challenges the validity of this parallel, drawing upon Harry Collins's sociology of what humans and computers can do. Collins's work highlights the non-modular cultural 'rules' that today's computers cannot follow. In the light of these theoretical and empirical developments I conclude that contemporary sociology offers a valuable and systematic counter to discourses of genetic reductionism and the discourses of technological determination upon which they are parasitic.     

From Ethical Exceptionalism to Ethical Exceptions: The Rule and exception Model and the Changing Meaning of Ethics In German Bioregulation

Germany is an interesting case with respect to the governance of reprogenetics. It has a strong profile in the technosciences and high aims regarding the global bioeconomy, yet her regulation of human genetics, reproductive medicine and embryo research has for a long time been rather restrictive. German biopolitical exceptionalism has often been explained by reference to Catholicism and the legacy of the Nazi past. The Germans, so goes the common story, have learnt the lessons of history and translated them into unconditional respect for human dignity, which in turn translates into unconditional protection of human life, including the human embryo, and the firm repudiation of any eugenic distinction between ‘life worth to live’ and ‘life not worth to live’. This, however, is not the whole story. Alongside deontological strictness we find another strand of governing body politics and reprogenetics in Germany, the rule‐and‐exception model, running from the mid‐1970s abortion law via the 2002 Stem Cell Act to the 2011 regulation of pre‐implantation genetic diagnosis. In contrast to the former, that strongly draws on Kant and his concept of human dignity, the latter bears resemblances to Carl Schmitt's concept of state of exception. The article will show that the rule‐and‐exception model builds the exception into the rule and transforms the meaning and mandate of ethics, namely from safeguarding ethical standards to deciding about the exception. Given that the exception has now tended to become the rule, the question is whether the lessons of history will govern German reprogenetics for much longer.     

Moral Darwinism: Ethical evidence for the descent of man

Could an ethical theory ever play a substantial evidential role in a scientific argument for an empirical hypothesis? InThe Descent of Man, Darwin includes an extended discussion of the nature of human morality, and the ethical theory which he sketches is not simply developed as an interesting ramification of his theory of evolution, but is used as a key part of his evidence for human descent from animal ancestors. Darwin must rebut the argument that, because of our moral nature, humans are essentially different in kind from other animals and so had to have had a different origin. I trace his causal story of how the moral sense could develop out of social instincts by evolutionary mechanisms of group selection, and show that the form of Utilitarianism he proposes involves a radical reduction of the standard of value to the concept of biological fitness. I argue that this causal analysis, although a weakness from a normative standpoint, is a strength when judged for its intended purpose as part of an evidential argument to confirm the hypothesis of human descent.     

Genetic equity

This paper proposes, elaborates and defends a principle of genetic equity. In doing so it articulates, explains and justifies what might be meant by the concept of 'human dignity' in a way that is clear, defensible and consistent with, but by no means the same as, the plethora of appeals to human dignity found in contemporary bioethics, and more particularly in international instruments on bioethics. We propose the following principle of genetic equity: humans are born equal; they are entitled to freedom from discrimination and equality of opportunity to flourish; genetic information may not be used to limit that equality.     

The Indignity of Relative Concepts of Animal Dignity: A Qualitative Study of People Working with Nonhuman Animals

The Swiss animal welfare legislation is considered to be one of the strictest such laws worldwide. One unique feature is the inclusion of the concept of “dignity of the creature” and, more precisely, animal dignity. We interviewed 19 people from Switzerland and Germany about their concepts of animal dignity. Thereby, we investigated whether the very specific concept of the Swiss law is reflected in the minds of those who work with nonhuman animals on a daily basis. The results of our qualitative interviews revealed an awareness of the legal term among Swiss interviewees, but their personal concepts of animal dignity were not based on or similar to the legal definitions. The interviewed participants presented a broad range of concepts, including: similarities to human dignity, replacing concepts such as respect or integrity, and context-dependent, contingent forms of dignity. The applicability or usefulness of animal dignity was questioned by several participants; many judged it to be confusing or difficult. Therefore, we conclude by discussing animal integrity as an alternative concept that reflects the interviewees’ ideas of treating nonhuman animals in a respectful and appropriate way, and at the same time does not have the strongly metaphysical connotations of a concept such as human dignity.     

Potentiality and human embryos

Consideration of the potentiality of human embryos to develop characteristics of personhood, such as intellect and will, has figured prominently in arguments against abortion and the use of human embryos for research. In particular, such consideration was the basis for the call of the US President's Council on Bioethics for a moratorium on stem cell research on human embryos. In this paper, I critique the concept of potentiality invoked by the Council and offer an alternative account. In contrast to the Council's view that an embryo's potentiality is determined by definition and is not affected by external conditions that may prevent certain possibilities from ever being realized, I propose an empirically grounded account of potentiality that involves an assessment of the physical and decisional conditions that may restrict an embryo's possibilities. In my view, some human embryos lack the potentiality to become a person that other human embryos have. Assuming for the sake of argument that the potential to become a person gives a being special moral status, it follows that some human embryos lack this status. This argument is then used to support Gene Outka's suggestion that it is morally permissible to experiment on 'spare' frozen embryos that are destined to be destroyed.     

The Enhancement of Children versus Circumcision: A Case of Double Moral Standards?

The application of enhancement technologies to children and non‐medical infant male circumcision are both topics that enjoy the continuous attention of bioethical research but are usually discussed in isolation from each other. Yet one can show that three major arguments used by opponents of the enhancement of children are also applicable to circumcision. These arguments are based on the insecurity of these procedures, the child's right to an open future, and human nature as a foundation of human dignity. People who reject the enhancement of children because of these arguments but accept circumcision hold mutually inconsistent moral convictions or apply double moral standards to these cases. This is particularly important when legislative systems treat the enhancement of children and circumcision in a considerably different manner, which is true for many contemporary legislative systems. At least three strategies can be adopted in order to avoid such inconsistencies, two of which, however, fail for various reasons. According to a third, more promising strategy, circumcision should be subsumed under human enhancement and treated like other enhancement technologies. This strategy justifies restrictions on, but not the prohibition of circumcision. Furthermore, proponents of circumcision should be prepared for future technologies that provide similar benefits as circumcision but are not as contentious as this intervention, so that, in the future, circumcision could become more and more unacceptable.     

Human Dignity as a Component of a Long-Lasting and Widespread Conceptual Construct

For some decades, the concept of human dignity has been widely discussed in bioethical literature. Some authors think that this concept is central to questions of respect for human beings, whereas others are very critical of it. It should be noted that, in these debates, dignity is one component of a long-lasting and widespread conceptual construct used to support a stance on the ethical question of the moral status of an action or being. This construct has been used from Modernity onward to condemn slavery and torture as violations of human dignity. In spelling it out, we can come to a better understanding of what “dignity” means and become aware that there exists a quite useful place for this notion in our ethical thought, albeit a modest one.     

The pros and cons of human therapeutic cloning in the public debate

Few issues linked to genetic research have raised as much controversial debate as the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer technology to create embryos specifically for stem cell research. Whereas European countries unanimously agree that reproductive cloning should be prohibited there is no agreement to be found on whether or not research into therapeutic cloning should be permitted. Since the UK took the lead and voted in favour of regulations allowing therapeutic cloning the public debate has intensified on the Continent. This debate reflects the wide spectrum of diverse religious and secular moralities that are prevalent in modern multicultural European democratic societies. Arguments range from putting forward strictly utilitarian views that weight the moral issues involved against the potential benefits that embryonic stem cell research may harbour to considering the embryo as a human being, endowed with human dignity and human rights from the moment of its creation, concluding that its use for research is unethical and should be strictly prohibited. Given the current state of dissension among the various European states, it is difficult to predict whether 'non-harmonisation' will prevail or whether in the long run 'harmonisation' of legislation that will allow stem cell research will evolve in the EU.     

In defense of posthuman dignity

Positions on the ethics of human enhancement technologies can be (crudely) characterized as ranging from transhumanism to bioconservatism. Transhumanists believe that human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to themselves, and that parents should normally have the right to choose enhancements for their children-to-be. Bioconservatives (whose ranks include such diverse writers as Leon Kass, Francis Fukuyama, George Annas, Wesley Smith, Jeremy Rifkin, and Bill McKibben) are generally opposed to the use of technology to modify human nature. A central idea in bioconservativism is that human enhancement technologies will undermine our human dignity. To forestall a slide down the slippery slope towards an ultimately debased 'posthuman' state, bioconservatives often argue for broad bans on otherwise promising human enhancements. This paper distinguishes two common fears about the posthuman and argues for the importance of a concept of dignity that is inclusive enough to also apply to many possible posthuman beings. Recognizing the possibility of posthuman dignity undercuts an important objection against human enhancement and removes a distortive double standard from our field of moral vision.