RACIST APPEARANCE STANDARDS AND THE ENHANCEMENTS THAT LOVE THEM: NORMAN DANIELS AND SKIN‐LIGHTENING COSMETICS

Darker skin correlates with reduced opportunities and negative health outcomes. Recent discoveries related to the genes associated with skin tone, and the historical use of cosmetics to conform to racist appearance standards, suggest effective skin‐lightening products may soon become available. This article examines whether medical interventions of this sort should be permitted, subsidized, or restricted, using Norman Daniels's framework for determining what justice requires in terms of protecting health. I argue that Daniels's expansive view of the requirements of justice in meeting health needs offers some support for recognizing a societal obligation to provide this kind of ‘enhancement,’ in light of the strong connections between skin tone and health outcomes. On balance, however, Daniels's framework offers compelling reasons to reject insurance coverage for skin‐lightening medical interventions, including the likely ineffectiveness of such technologies in mitigating racial health disparities, and the danger that covering skin‐lightening enhancements would undermine public support for cooperative schemes that protect health. In fact, justice may require limiting access to these technologies because of their potential to exacerbate the negative effects of racism.     

PALLIATIVE CARE, PUBLIC HEALTH AND JUSTICE: SETTING PRIORITIES IN RESOURCE POOR COUNTRIES

Many countries have not considered palliative care a public health problem. With limited resources, disease-oriented therapies and prevention measures take priority. In this paper, I intend to describe the moral framework for considering palliative care as a public health priority in resource-poor countries. A distributive theory of justice for health care should consider integrative palliative care as morally required as it contributes to improving normal functioning and preserving opportunities for the individual. For patients requiring terminal care , we are guided less by principles of justice and more by the duty to relieve suffering and society's commitment to protecting the professional's obligation to uphold principles of beneficence, compassion and non-abandonment. A fair deliberation process is necessary to allow these strong moral commitments to serve as reasons when setting priorities in resource poor countries.     

Response: Freedom from Pain as a Rawlsian Primary Good

In a recent article in this journal, Carl Knight and Andreas Albertsen argue that Rawlsian theories of distributive justice as applied to health and healthcare fail to accommodate both palliative care and the desirability of less painful treatments. The asserted Rawlsian focus on opportunities or capacities, as exemplified in Normal Daniels’ developments of John Rawls’ theory, results in a normative account of healthcare which is at best only indirectly sensitive to pain and so unable to account for the value of efforts of which the sole purpose is pain reduction. I argue that, far from undermining the Rawlsian project and its application to problems of health, what the authors’ argument at most amounts to is a compelling case for the inclusion of freedom from physical pain within its index of primary goods.     

PROVISION OF COMMUNITY‐WIDE BENEFITS IN PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTION RESEARCH: THE EXPERIENCE OF INVESTIGATORS CONDUCTING RESEARCH IN THE COMMUNITY SETTING IN SOUTH ASIA

Background: This article describes the types of community‐wide benefits provided by investigators conducting public health research in South Asia as well as their self‐reported reasons for providing such benefits. Methods: We conducted 52 in‐depth interviews to explore how public health investigators in low‐resource settings make decisions about the delivery of ancillary care to research subjects. In 39 of the interviews respondents described providing benefits to members of the community in which they conducted their study. We returned to our narrative dataset to find answers to two questions: What types of community‐wide benefits do researchers provide when conducting public health intervention studies in the community setting, and what reasons do researchers give when asked why they provided community‐wide benefits? Findings: The types of community‐wide benefits delivered were directed to the health and well‐being of the population. The most common types of benefits delivered were the facilitation of access to health care for individuals in acute medical need and emergency response to natural disasters. Respondents' self‐reported reasons when asked why they provided such benefits fell into 2 general categories: intrinsic importance and instrumental importance.     

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTIONS IN PHARMACY PRACTICE IN GREAT BRITAIN

Pharmacists who refuse to provide certain services or treatment for reasons of conscience have been criticized for failing to fulfil their professional obligations. Currently, individual pharmacists in Great Britain can withhold services or treatment for moral or religious reasons, provided they refer the patient to an alternative source. The most high‐profile cases have concerned the refusal to supply emergency hormonal contraception, which will serve as an example in this article. I propose that the pharmacy profession's policy on conscientious objections should be altered slightly. Building on the work of Brock and Wicclair, I argue that conscientious refusals should be acceptable provided that the patient is informed of the service, the patient is redirected to an alternative source, the refusal does not cause an unreasonable burden to the patient, and the reasons for the refusal are based on the core values of the profession. Finally, I argue that a principled categorical refusal by an individual pharmacist is not morally permissible. I claim that, contrary to current practice, a pharmacist cannot legitimately claim universal exemption from providing a standard service, even if that service is available elsewhere.     

Health as Normal Function: a Weak Link in Daniels's Theory of Just Health Distribution

Drawing on Christopher Boorse's Biostatistical Theory (BST), Norman Daniels contends that a genuine health need is one which is necessary to restore normal functioning – a supposedly objective notion which he believes can be read from the natural world without reference to potentially controversial normative categories. But despite his claims to the contrary, this conception of health harbors arbitrary evaluative judgments which make room for intractable disagreement as to which conditions should count as genuine health needs and therefore which needs should be met. I begin by offering a brief summary of Boorse's BST, the theory to which Daniels appeals for providing the conception of health as normal functioning upon which his overall distributive scheme rests. Next, I consider what I call practical objections to Daniels's use of Boorse's theory. Finally I recount Elseljin Kingma's theoretical objection to Boorse's BST and discuss its impact on Daniels's overall theory. Though I conclude that Boorse's view, so weakened, will no longer be able to sustain the judgments which Daniels's theory uses it to reach, in the end, I offer Daniels an olive branch by briefly sketching an alternative strategy for reaching suitably objective conclusions regarding the health and/or disease status of various conditions.     

Standard of Care,Professional Obligations,and Distributive Justice

The problem of standard‐of‐care in clinical research concerns the level of care that investigators ought to provide to research subjects in the control arm of their clinical trials. Commentators differ sharply on whether subjects in trials conducted in lower income countries should be provided with the same level of care as subjects in trials conducted in higher income countries. I consider an argument that commentators have employed on both sides of this debate: professional role arguments. These arguments claim to justify a conclusion to the standard‐of‐care problem solely by appeal to the professional obligations that investigators possess. I argue that prominent versions of professional role arguments cannot justify a solution to the problem of standard‐of‐care that is both determinate and reasonable simply by appeal to the professional obligations of investigators. Instead, to do so, one must also (1) determine the level of care or types of treatment that individuals are entitled to as a matter of distributive justice, and (2) identify which agents possess the duties that correspond to these entitlements. The level of care that investigators owe to subjects in the control arm of their clinical trials is thus in part dependent on the level of care that these subjects are entitled to as a matter of distributive justice, and whether it is the investigators who possess the corresponding distributive obligation to provide them with the care that they are entitled to.     

Global Health Care Justice,Delivery Doctors and Assisted Reproduction: Taking a Note From Catholic Social Teachings

This article will examine the Catholic concept of global justice within a health care framework as it relates to women's needs for delivery doctors in the developing world and women's demands for assisted reproduction in the developed world. I will first discuss justice as a theory, situating it within Catholic social teachings. The Catholic perspective on global justice in health care demands that everyone have access to basic needs before elective treatments are offered to the wealthy. After exploring specific discrepancies in global health care justice, I will point to the need for delivery doctors in the developing world to provide basic assistance to women who hazard many pregnancies as a priority before offering assisted reproduction to women in the developed world. The wide disparities between maternal health in the developing world and elective fertility treatments in the developed world are clearly unjust within Catholic social teachings. I conclude this article by offering policy suggestions for moving closer to health care justice via doctor distribution.     

Moral dilemmas in (not) treating patients who feel they are a burden

Working as clinical ethicists in an academic hospital, we find that practitioners tend to take a principle‐based approach to moral dilemmas when it comes to (not) treating patients who feel like a burden, in which respect for autonomy tends to trump other principles. We argue that this approach insufficiently deals with the moral doubts of professionals with regard to feeling that you are a burden as a motive to decline or withdraw from treatment. Neither does it take into adequately account the specific needs of the patient that might underlie their feeling of being a burden to others. We propose a care ethics approach as an alternative. It focuses on being attentive and responsive to the caring needs of those involved in the care process—which can be much more specific than either receiving or withdrawing from treatment. This approach considers these needs in the context of the patient's identity, biography and relationships, and regards autonomy as relational rather than as individual. We illustrate the difference between these two approaches by means of the case of Mrs K. Furthermore, we show that a care ethics approach is in line with interventions that are found to alleviate feeling a burden and maintain that facilitating moral case deliberation among practitioners can supports them in taking a care ethics approach to moral dilemmas in (not) treating patients who feel like a burden.     

Conflicting demands on a modern healthcare service: Can Rawlsian justice provide a guiding philosophy for the NHS and other socialized health services?

We explore whether a Rawlsian approach might provide a guiding philosophy for the development of a healthcare system, in particular with regard to resolving tensions between different groups within it. We argue that an approach developed from some of Rawls’ principles – using his ‘veil of ignorance’ and both the ‘difference’ and ‘just savings’ principles which it generates – provides a compelling basis for policy making around certain areas of conflict. We ask what policies might be made if those making them did not know if one was patient, doctor, nurse or manager – in this generation or the next. We first offer a brief summary of Rawls’ approach and how we intend to extrapolate from it. We examine how this adapted Rawlsian framework could be applied to specific examples of conflict within healthcare; we demonstrate how this framework can be used to develop a healthcare service which is both sustainable (in its training and treatment of staff, and in encouraging research and innovation) and open (to protect the powers and opportunities of those using the health service). We conclude that while Rawls’ approach has previously been rejected as a means to address specific healthcare decisions, an adapted veil of ignorance can be a useful tool for the consideration of how a just health service should be constructed and sustained. Turning the theoretical into the practical (and combining Rawls’ thought experiment with Scanlonian contractarianism), managers, doctors, patients, carers and nurses could come together and debate conflicting issues behind a hypothetical veil.     

ACCESS TO TREATMENT IN HIV PREVENTION TRIALS: PERSPECTIVES FROM A SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNITY

Access to treatment, in HIV vaccine trials (HVTs), remains ethically controversial. In most prevention trials, including in South Africa, participants who seroconvert are referred to publicly funded programmes for treatment. This strategy is problematic when there is inadequate and uneven access to public sector antiretroviral therapy (ART) and support resources. The responsibilities, if any, of researchers, sponsors and public health authorities involved in HVTs has been hotly debated among academics, scholars, representatives of international organizations and sponsors. However, there is little published on community perceptions. Recent guidance asserts that communities should make inputs into treatment and care decisions. This qualitative study explored a South African community's perceptions of who should provide what to HVT participants as well as how and why this should be done. Twenty‐nine adults working at or attending five primary health care clinics in two rural areas in KwaZulu‐Natal participated in in‐depth interviews. Respondents expressed that researchers should ‘help participants to access’ treatment and care ‘because they are in a position to do so’ and ‘are in a relationship with’ trial participants. Respondents suggested that researchers could help by ‘facilitating referral’ until such time that participants can access care and treatment on their own. We highlight a series of implications for researchers in HVTs, including their need to be aware of prospective participants' considerable trust in and respect for researchers, the responsibility that this places on them, and the need for clear communication with communities so as not to erode community trust.     

Future role of neurologists.

Clinical neurologists in the health care system of the future should have a multifaceted role. Advances in the basic understanding of the nervous system and therapeutics of neurologic disease have created, for the first time in human history, an ethical imperative to correctly diagnose neurologic disease. In many situations, the neurologists may function as a consultant and principal physician for patients with primary nervous system disorders including Parkinson''s disease, multiple sclerosis, Alzheimer''s disease, epilepsy, migraine, cerebrovascular disease, movement disorders, and neuromuscular disease. Other important roles for neurologists include the training of future physicians, both neurologists and primary care physicians, the application of cost-effective approaches to care, and the support of health care delivery research and academic programs that link basic research efforts to the development of new therapy. To be successful, future residency training programs should include joint certification opportunities in both neurology and general medicine, and training programs for clinical investigators should be expanded. Despite its threats to specialists, managed care should also provide opportunities for new alliances among neurologists, other specialists, and primary care physicians that will both improve patient care and increase efficiency and cost-effectiveness.     

Opportunities in Reform: Bioethics and Mental Health Ethics

Last year marks the first year of implementation for both the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act in the United States. As a result, healthcare reform is moving in the direction of integrating care for physical and mental illness, nudging clinicians to consider medical and psychiatric comorbidity as the expectation rather than the exception. Understanding the intersections of physical and mental illness with autonomy and self‐determination in a system realigning its values so fundamentally therefore becomes a top priority for clinicians. Yet Bioethics has missed opportunities to help guide clinicians through one of medicine's most ethically rich and challenging fields. Bioethics' distancing from mental illness is perhaps best explained by two overarching themes: 1) An intrinsic opposition between approaches to personhood rooted in Bioethics' early efforts to protect the competent individual from abuses in the research setting; and 2) Structural forces, such as deinstitutionalization, the Patient Rights Movement, and managed care. These two themes help explain Bioethics' relationship to mental health ethics and may also guide opportunities for rapprochement. The potential role for Bioethics may have the greatest implications for international human rights if bioethicists can re‐energize an understanding of autonomy as not only free from abusive intrusions but also with rights to treatment and other fundamental necessities for restoring freedom of choice and self‐determination. Bioethics thus has a great opportunity amid healthcare reform to strengthen the important role of the virtuous and humanistic care provider.     

Palliative Care among Heart Failure Patients in Primary Care: A Comparison to Cancer Patients Using English Family Practice Data

Introduction

Patients with heart failure have a significant symptom burden and other palliative care needs often over a longer period than patients with cancer. It is acknowledged that this need may be unmet but by how much has not been quantified in primary care data at the population level.

Methods

This was the first use of Clinical Practice Research Datalink, the world''s largest primary care database to explore recognition of the need for palliative care. Heart failure and cancer patients who had died in 2009 aged 18 or over and had at least one year of primary care records were identified. A palliative approach to care among patients with heart failure was compared to that among patients with cancer using entry onto a palliative care register as a marker for a palliative approach to care.

Results

Among patients with heart failure, 7% (234/3 122) were entered on the palliative care register compared to 48% (3 669/7 608) of cancer patients. Of heart failure patients on the palliative care register, 29% (69/234) were entered onto the register within a week of their death.

Conclusions

This confirms that the stark inequity in recognition of palliative care needs for people with heart failure in a large primary care dataset. We recommend a move away from prognosis based criteria for palliative care towards a patient centred approach, with assessment of and attention to palliative needs including advance care planning throughout the disease trajectory.     

What Are Physicians' Reasons for Not Referring People with Life-Limiting Illnesses to Specialist Palliative Care Services? A Nationwide Survey

Background

Many people who might benefit from specialist palliative care services are not using them.

Aim

We examined the use of these services and the reasons for not using them in a population in potential need of palliative care.

Methods

We conducted a population-based survey regarding end-of-life care among physicians certifying a large representative sample (n = 6188) of deaths in Flanders, Belgium.

Results

Palliative care services were not used in 79% of cases of people with organ failure, 64% of dementia and 44% of cancer. The most frequently indicated reasons were that 1) existing care already sufficiently addressed palliative and supportive needs (56%), 2) palliative care was not deemed meaningful (26%) and 3) there was insufficient time to initiate palliative care (24%). The reasons differed according to patient characteristics: in people with dementia the consideration of palliative care as not meaningful was more likely to be a reason for not using it; in older people their care needs already being sufficiently addressed was more likely to be a reason. For those patients who were referred the timing of referral varied from a median of six days before death (organ failure) to 16 days (cancer).

Conclusions

Specialist palliative care is not initiated in almost half of the people for whom it could be beneficial, most frequently because physicians deem regular caregivers to be sufficiently skilled in addressing palliative care needs. This would imply that the safeguarding of palliative care skills in this regular ‘general’ care is an essential health policy priority.     

REASONS TO REDEFINE MORAL DISTRESS: A FEMINIST EMPIRICAL BIOETHICS ANALYSIS

There has been increasing debate in recent years about the conceptualization of moral distress. Broadly speaking, two groups of scholars have emerged: those who agree with Jameton’s ‘narrow definition’ that focuses on constraint and those who argue that Jameton’s definition is insufficient and needs to be broadened. Using feminist empirical bioethics, we interviewed critical care nurses in the United Kingdom about their experiences and conceptualizations of moral distress. We provide our broader definition of moral distress and examples of data that both challenge and support our conceptualization. We pre‐empt and overcome three key challenges that could be levelled at our account and argue that there are good reasons to adopt our broader definition of moral distress when exploring prevalence of, and management strategies for, moral distress.     

Evaluation of a palliative care service: problems and pitfalls.

OBJECTIVE--To evaluate a palliative care home support team based on an inpatient unit. DESIGN--Randomised controlled trial with waiting list. Patients in the study group received the service immediately, those in the control group received it after one month. Main comparison point was at one month. SETTING--A city of 300,000 people with a publicly funded home care service and about 200 general practitioners, most of whom provide home care. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES--Pain and nausea levels were measured at entry to trial and at one month, as were quality of life for patients and care givers'' health. RESULTS--Because of early deaths, problems with recruitment, and a low compliance rate for completion of questionnaires, the required sample size was not attained. CONCLUSION--In designing evaluations of palliative care services, investigators should be prepared to deal with the following issues: attrition due to early death, opposition to randomisation by patients and referral sources, ethical problems raised by randomisation of dying patients, the appropriate timing of comparison points, and difficulties of collecting data from sick or exhausted patients and care givers. Investigators may choose to evaluate a service from various perspectives using different methods: controlled trials, qualitative studies, surveys, and audits. Randomised trials may prove to be impracticable for evaluation of palliative care.     

Justice and equal opportunities in health care

The principle that each individual is entitled to an equal opportunity to benefit from any public health care system, and that this entitlement is proportionate neither to the size of their chance of benefitting, nor to the quality of the benefit, nor to the length of lifetime remaining in which that benefit may be enjoyed, runs counter to most current thinking about the allocation of resources for health care. It is my contention that any system of prioritisation of the resources available for healthcare or of rationing such resources must be governed by this principle.
This can have apparently paradoxical conclusions in that it can seem wasteful to give someone with a very slim chance of a lifesaving treatment the same priority as someone with a much better chance. In an important and thoughtful recent paper, Julian Savulescu has concentrated on this apparent weakness and has argued for a particular conception of the good or benefit to be achieved by a healthcare system which purports to demonstrate the inadequacies of an equal opportunities approach to prioritisation and to replace it with an altogether better account. This paper will show that a rational 'reasons based consequentialism' is more in line with the equal opportunities approach, which I defended some time ago in these pages, than with that of Savulescu. I shall then examine more closely the conception of equal opportunities in health care and show that if we give weight to an individual's reasons, and what is expected to be good for them, we will opt for exactly the equality based account of distributive justice that I have recommended.     

Reciprocity and Ethical Tuberculosis Treatment and Control

This paper explores the notion of reciprocity in the context of active pulmonary and laryngeal tuberculosis (TB) treatment and related control policies and practices. We seek to do three things: First, we sketch the background to contemporary global TB care and suggest that poverty is a key feature when considering the treatment of TB patients. We use two examples from TB care to explore the role of reciprocity: isolation and the use of novel TB drugs. Second, we explore alternative means of justifying the use of reciprocity through appeal to different moral and political theoretical traditions (i.e., virtue ethics, deontology, and consequentialism). We suggest that each theory can be used to provide reasons to take reciprocity seriously as an independent moral concept, despite any other differences. Third, we explore general meanings and uses of the concept of reciprocity, with the primary intention of demonstrating that it cannot be simply reduced to other more frequently invoked moral concepts such as beneficence or justice. We argue that reciprocity can function as a mid-level principle in public health, and generally, captures a core social obligation arising once an individual or group is burdened as a result of acting for the benefit of others (even if they derive a benefit themselves). We conclude that while more needs to be explored in relation to the theoretical justification and application of reciprocity, sufficient arguments can be made for it to be taken more seriously as a key principle within public health ethics and bioethics more generally.