Ambiguities and Asymmetries in Consent and Refusal: Reply to Manson

John Harris claims that is it ‘palpable nonsense’ to suggest that ‘a child (or anyone) might competently consent to a treatment but not be competent to refuse it.’ In ‘Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ Neil Manson aims to explain away the apparent oddness of this asymmetry of consent and refusal, by appealing to the idea of shared normative powers, presenting joint bank accounts as an example. In this article, I will argue that Manson's account fails to explain away the oddness. Rather, I will argue that there are ambiguities to which Manson has not paid sufficient attention. In fact, as odd as it may sound, I argue that Manson actually agrees with Harris (at least in relation to the asymmetry of competence). He fails to recognize that he agrees with Harris because he is not careful enough to distinguish between different asymmetries, which I have labelled the asymmetries of choice, permissibility and competence.     

Plant Domestication and Crop Evolution in the Near East: On Events and Processes

Reconstructing the evolutionary history of crop plants is fundamental for understanding their adaptation profile and the genetic basis of yield-limiting factors, which in turn are critical for future crop improvement. A major topic in this field is the recent claim for a millennia-long ‘protracted’ domestication process. Here we evaluate the evidence for the protracted domestication model in light of published archaeobotanical data, experimental evidence and the biology of the Near Eastern crops and their wild progenitors. The crux of our discussion is the differentiation between events or ‘domestication episodes’ and the later following crop evolutionary processes under domestication (frequently termed ‘crop improvement stage’), which are by definition, still ongoing. We argue that by assuming a protracted millennia-long domestication process, one needlessly opts to operate within an intellectual framework that does not allow differentiating between the decisive (critical) domestication traits and their respective loci, and those that have evolved later during the crop dissemination and improvement following the episodic domestication event. Therefore, in our view, apart from the lack of experimental evidence to support it, the protracted domestication assumption undermines the resolution power of the study of both plant domestication and crop evolution, from the cultural as well as from the biological perspectives.     

The swashbuckling anthropologist: Henrich on The Secret of Our Success

In The Secret of Our Success, Joseph Henrich claims that human beings are unique—different from all other animals—because we engage in cumulative cultural evolution. It is the technological and social products of cumulative cultural evolution, not the intrinsic rationality or ‘smartness’ of individual humans, that enable us to live in a huge range of different habitats, and to dominate most of the creatures who share those habitats with us. We are sympathetic to this general view, the latest expression of the ‘California school’s’ view of cultural evolution, and impressed by the lively and interesting way that Henrich handles evidence from anthropology, economics, and many fields of biology. However, because we think it is time for cultural evolutionists to get down to details, this essay review raises questions about Henrich’s analysis of both the cognitive processes and the selection processes that contribute to cumulative cultural evolution. In the former case, we argue that cultural evolutionists need to make more extensive use of cognitive science, and to consider the evidence that mechanisms of cultural learning are products as well as processes of cultural evolution. In the latter case, we ask whether the California school is really serious about selection, or whether it is offering a merely ‘kinetic’ view of cultural evolution, and, assuming the former, outline four potential models of cultural selection that it would be helpful to distinguish more clearly.     

Talking Pleasures,Writing Dialects. Outlining Research on Schmecka

This text is written in English so that it may reach an international academic audience. However, if all academic research comes to be outlined in English we are to lose a lot. Here, we argue this by presenting the case of schmecka. Drawing on fieldwork done in the Austrian region of Vorarlberg, we suggest that the word schmecka differs from the factual ‘flavour perception’ investigated in physiology; from the culturally informed ‘sensory experiences’ explored by anthropologists and even from the sociological ‘tasting in practice’. For one, schmecka is shared between modest good food and assembled eaters; two, it draws together the English ‘tasting’ and ‘smelling’; and three, it has positive overtones. This means that using schmecka is not just judicious when writing about ‘others’, here the people of Vorarlberg. It also, more interestingly, allows ‘us’ to write in another way: one that foregrounds valuing rather than facting.     

The Meta‐Nudge – A Response to the Claim That the Use of Nudges During the Informed Consent Process is Unavoidable

Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, in Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, assert that rejecting the use nudges is ‘pointless’ because ‘[i]n many cases, some kind of nudge is inevitable’. Schlomo Cohen makes a similar claim. He asserts that in certain situations surgeons cannot avoid nudging patients either toward or away from consenting to surgical interventions. Cohen concludes that in these situations (assuming surgeons believe that surgery is the best option for their patients), nudging patients toward consenting to surgical interventions is (at the very least) uncriticizable or morally permissible. I call this argument: The Unavoidability Argument. In this essay, I will respond to Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument in support of using nudges during the process of informed consent. Specifically, I argue that many so‐called ‘unavoidable nudges’ are, in fact, avoidable. Although my argument is directed toward Cohen's use of the unavoidability argument, it is applicable to the unavoidability argument more generally.     

Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay

I am sceptical as to the contribution that human rights can make to our evaluation of medical law. I will argue here that viewing medical law through a human rights framework provides no greater clarity, insight or focus. If anything, human rights reasoning clouds any bioethical or evaluative analysis. In Section 1 of this article, I outline the general structure of human rights reasoning. I will describe human rights reasoning as (a) reasoning from rights that each person has ‘by virtue of their humanity’, (b) reasoning from rights that provide ‘hard to defeat’ reasons for action and (c) reasoning from abstract norms to specified duties. I will then argue in Section 2 that, unless we (a) re‐conceive of human rights as narrow categories of liberties, it becomes (b) necessary for our human rights reasoning to gauge the normative force of each claim or liberty. When we apply this approach to disputes in medical law, we (in the best case scenario) end up (c) ‘looking straight through’ the human right to the (disagreement about) values and features that each person has by virtue of their humanity.     

The logic of asymmetric contests

A theoretical analysis is made of the evolution of behavioural strategies in contest situations. It is assumed that behaviour will evolve so as to maximize individual fitness. If so, a population will evolve an ‘evolutionarily stable strategy’, or ESS, which can be defined as a strategy such that, if all members of a population adopt it, no ‘mutant’ strategy can do better. A number of simple models of contest situations are analysed from this point of view. It is concluded that in ‘symmetric’ contests the ESS is likely to be a ‘mixed’ strategy; that is, either the population will be genetically polymorphic or individuals will be behaviourally variable. Most real contests are probably asymmetric, either in pay-off to the contestants, or in size or weapons, or in some ‘uncorrelated’ fashion; i.e. in a fashion which does not substantially bias either the pay-offs or the likely outcome of an escalated contest. An example of an uncorrelated asymmetry is that between the ‘discoverer’ of a resource and a ‘late-comer’. It is shown that the ESS in asymmetric contests will usually be to permit the asymmetric cue to settle the contest without escalation. Escalated contests will, however, occur if information to the contestants about the asymmetry is imperfect.     

Adaptation,fitness and the selection-optimality links

We critically examine a number of aspects of Grafen’s ‘formal Darwinism’ project. We argue that Grafen’s ‘selection-optimality’ links do not quite succeed in vindicating the working assumption made by behavioural ecologists and others—that selection will lead organisms to exhibit adaptive behaviour—since these links hold true even in the presence of strong genetic and developmental constraints. However we suggest that the selection-optimality links can profitably be viewed as constituting an axiomatic theory of fitness. Finally, we compare Grafen’s project with Fisher’s ‘fundamental theorem of natural selection’, and we speculate about whether Grafen’s results can be extended to a game-theoretic setting.     

Mutational randomness as conditional independence and the experimental vindication of mutational Lamarckism

The Modern Synthesis enshrined natural selection as the driver of adaptive evolution mainly by eliminating competing explanations. One of the eliminated competitors was Lamarckism, particularly ‘mutational Lamarckism’, a hypothesis according to which mutations may be directed towards producing phenotypes that improve the performance of the organism in a particular environment. Contrary to this hypothesis, the Modern Synthesis' view claims that mutations are ‘random’, even though the precise meaning of the term was never formally explicated. Current evidence seemingly in favour of the existence of legitimate cases of mutational Lamarckism has revitalized interest to seek a clarification of the meaning of the term ‘random’ in this context. Herein we analyse previous definitions of random mutations and show that they are deficient in three ways: either they are too wide, or too narrow, or dyadic. We argue that the linguistic expression ‘random mutation’ refers to a triadic rather than a dyadic relationship, propose a new, formal and precise definition based on the probabilistic concept of conditional independence, and finally provide examples of its application. One important consequence of our analysis is that the genomic specificity of the mutational process is not a necessary condition for the existence of mutational Lamarckism.     

Empathy,social media,and directed altruistic living organ donation

In this article we explore some of the ethical dimensions of using social media to increase the number of living kidney donors. Social media provides a platform for changing non‐identifiable ‘statistical victims’ into ‘real people’ with whom we can identify and feel empathy: the so‐called ‘identifiable victim effect’, which prompts charitable action. We examine three approaches to promoting kidney donation using social media which could take advantages of the identifiable victim effect: (a) institutionally organized campaigns based on historical cases aimed at promoting non‐directed altruistic donation; (b) personal case‐based campaigns organized by individuals aimed at promoting themselves/or someone with whom they are in a relationship as a recipient of directed donation; (c) institutionally organized personal case‐based campaigns aimed at promoting specific recipients for directed donation. We will highlight the key ethical issues raised by these approaches, and will argue that the third option, despite raising ethical concerns, is preferable to the other two.     

Looking for a needle in a haystack: inference about individual fitness components in a heterogeneous population

Studies of wild vertebrates have provided evidence of substantial differences in lifetime reproduction among individuals and the sequences of life history ‘states’ during life (breeding, nonbreeding, etc.). Such differences may reflect ‘fixed’ differences in fitness components among individuals determined before, or at the onset of reproductive life. Many retrospective life history studies have translated this idea by assuming a ‘latent’ unobserved heterogeneity resulting in a fixed hierarchy among individuals in fitness components. Alternatively, fixed differences among individuals are not necessarily needed to account for observed levels of individual heterogeneity in life histories. Individuals with identical fitness traits may stochastically experience different outcomes for breeding and survival through life that lead to a diversity of ‘state’ sequences with some individuals living longer and being more productive than others, by chance alone. The question is whether individuals differ in their underlying fitness components in ways that cannot be explained by observable ‘states’ such as age, previous breeding success, etc. Here, we compare statistical models that represent these opposing hypotheses, and mixtures of them, using data from kittiwakes. We constructed models that accounted for observed covariates, individual random effects (unobserved heterogeneity), first‐order Markovian transitions between observed states, or combinations of these features. We show that individual sequences of states are better accounted for by models incorporating unobserved heterogeneity than by models including first‐order Markov processes alone, or a combination of both. If we had not considered individual heterogeneity, models including Markovian transitions would have been the best performing ones. We also show that inference about age‐related changes in fitness components is sensitive to incorporation of underlying individual heterogeneity in models. Our approach provides insight into the sources of individual heterogeneity in life histories, and can be applied to other data sets to examine the ubiquity of our results across the tree of life.     

The IDIP framework for assessing protein function and its application to the prion protein

The quest to determine the function of a protein can represent a profound challenge. Although this task is the mandate of countless research groups, a general framework for how it can be approached is conspicuously lacking. Moreover, even expectations for when the function of a protein can be considered to be ‘known’ are not well defined. In this review, we begin by introducing concepts pertinent to the challenge of protein function assignments. We then propose a framework for inferring a protein's function from four data categories: ‘inheritance’, ‘distribution’, ‘interactions’ and ‘phenotypes’ (IDIP). We document that the functions of proteins emerge at the intersection of inferences drawn from these data categories and emphasise the benefit of considering them in an evolutionary context. We then apply this approach to the cellular prion protein (PrP^C), well known for its central role in prion diseases, whose function continues to be considered elusive by many investigators. We document that available data converge on the conclusion that the function of the prion protein is to control a critical post-translational modification of the neural cell adhesion molecule in the context of epithelial-to-mesenchymal transition and related plasticity programmes. Finally, we argue that this proposed function of PrP^C has already passed the test of time and is concordant with the IDIP framework in a way that other functions considered for this protein fail to achieve. We anticipate that the IDIP framework and the concepts analysed herein will aid the investigation of other proteins whose primary functional assignments have thus far been intractable.     

Epigenetic effects of infection on the phenotype of host offspring: parasites reaching across host generations

Parasite‐induced changes in host phenotype are now well‐documented from a wide range of taxa. There is a growing body of evidence indicating that parasites can also have trans‐generational consequences, with infection of a host leading to changes in the phenotype of its offspring, though the latter are not parasitised. Several proximate mechanisms have been put forward to explain these ‘maternal’ effects, most involving hormonal or other physiological pathways, ultimately leading to offspring that are pre‐adapted to the parasites they are most likely to encounter based on their mother's experience. Here, we propose that all these trans‐generational effects on offspring phenotype must involve epigenetic phenomena. Epigenetics concerns the appearance and inheritance of seemingly new phenotypic traits without changes in the underlying DNA sequence. Since diet and other environmental factors experienced by a mother can affect gene expression in her offspring by turning genes ‘on’ or ‘off’ (for example, via DNA methylation), why couldn't parasites do it? Although epigenetic effects have not been explicitly invoked to account for trans‐generational impacts of parasites on the phenotype of host offspring, the existing evidence is fully compatible with their involvement. We argue that epigenetic mechanisms must play a central role; we also discuss their evolutionary implications and suggest questions for future investigations in this new and exciting research direction.     

Investment in attending to cues and the evolution of amplifiers

Signals and cues are extensively used in social interactions across diverse communication systems. Here, we extend an existing theoretical framework to explore investment by emitters and perceivers in the fidelity with which cues and signals associated with the former are detected by the latter. Traits of the emitter that improve cue or signal fidelity without adding information are termed ‘amplifiers’. We assume that each party can invest in improving fidelity but that it is increasingly costly the more fidelity is improved. Our model predicts that evolution of amplifier traits of a pre‐existing cue occurs over a broader range of circumstances than evolution of signalling in situations where the emitter offered no pre‐existing cue to the perceiver. It further predicts that the greater the intrinsic informational value of a cue, the more likely it is that the perceiver (and not the emitter) will invest in the fidelity of detecting that cue. A consequence of this predicted asymmetry is that true communication with reciprocal adaptations in emitters and perceivers to improve signal fidelity is likely to occur predominantly for traits of intermediate reliability. The corollary is that uncertainty of the perceiver will then be a key feature of communication. Uncertainty can arise because perceivers misinterpret signals or do not perceive them correctly, but here we argue that uncertainty is more fundamentally at the root of communication because traits that are intrinsically highly informative will induce only the perceiver and not the emitter to invest in improved fidelity of perception of that trait.     

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE TO SOCIO‐ETHICAL DEBATES ON FRESH EMBRYO DONATION FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL RESEARCH

This article is a response to McLeod and Baylis (2007) who speculate on the dangers of requesting fresh ‘spare’ embryos from IVF patients for human embryonic stem cell (hESC) research, particularly when those embryos are good enough to be transferred back to the woman. They argue that these embryos should be frozen instead. We explore what is meant by ‘spare’ embryos. We then provide empirical evidence, from a study of embryo donation and of embryo donors' views, to substantiate some of their speculations about the problems associated with requesting fresh embryos. However, we also question whether such problems are resolved by embryo freezing, since further empirical evidence suggests that this raises other social and ethical problems for patients. There is little evidence that the request for embryos for research, in itself, causes patients distress. We suggest, however, that no requests for fresh embryos should be made in the first cycle of IVF treatment. Deferring the request to a later cycle ensures that potential donors are better informed (by experience and reflection) about the possible destinations of their embryos and about the definition of ‘spare embryos’. Both this article, and that by McLeod and Baylis, emphasize the need to consider the views and experiences of embryo donors when evaluating the ethics of embryo donation for hESC research.     

Empirical research in clinical ethics: The ‘committed researcher’ approach

After the ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics, few specific approaches have been developed for doing clinical ethics research in close connection with clinical decision-making on a daily basis. In this paper we describe the ‘committed researcher’ approach to research in clinical ethics that we have developed over the years. After comparing it to two similar research methodological approaches, the ‘embedded researcher’ and ‘deliberative engagement’, we highlight its main features: it is patient-oriented, it is implemented by collegial and multidisciplinary teams, it uses an ethical grid to build the interview guide, and it is geared towards bringing the results to bear on the public debate surrounding the issue at stake. Finally, we position our methodological approach with respect to the ‘is vs. ought’ distinction. We argue that our ‘commitment researcher’ approach to clinical ethics research takes concerned people’s life-building values as the main data, and compares them to the larger normative framework underlying the medical practice at stake.     

The multiple dimensions of racial mixture in Rio de Janeiro,Brazil: from whitening to Brazilian negritude

Abstract

The notion that racial mixture is a central feature of Latin American societies has been interpreted in different, if not strictly opposite, ways. On the one hand, scholars have presented it as evidence of weaker racial boundaries. On the other, it has been denounced as an expression of the illusion of harmonic racial relations. Relying on 160 interviews with black Brazilians, we argue that the valorization of racial mixture is an important response to stigmatization, but one that has multiple dimensions and different consequences for the maintenance of racial boundaries. We map out these different dimensions – namely, ‘whitening’, ‘Brazilian negritude’, ‘national identification’ and ‘non-essentialist racialism’ – and discuss how these dimensions are combined in different ways by our interviewees according to various circumstances. Exploring these multiple dimensions, we question any simplistic understanding of racial mixture as the blessing or the curse of Latin American racial dynamics.     

Cellular differentiation and individuality in the ‘minor’ multicellular taxa

Biology needs a concept of individuality in order to distinguish organisms from parts of organisms and from groups of organisms, to count individuals and compare traits across taxa, and to distinguish growth from reproduction. Most of the proposed criteria for individuality were designed for ‘unitary’ or ‘paradigm’ organisms: contiguous, functionally and physiologically integrated, obligately sexually reproducing multicellular organisms with a germ line sequestered early in development. However, the vast majority of the diversity of life on Earth does not conform to all of these criteria. We consider the issue of individuality in the ‘minor’ multicellular taxa, which collectively span a large portion of the eukaryotic tree of life, reviewing their general features and focusing on a model species for each group. When the criteria designed for unitary organisms are applied to other groups, they often give conflicting answers or no answer at all to the question of whether or not a given unit is an individual. Complex life cycles, intimate bacterial symbioses, aggregative development, and strange genetic features complicate the picture. The great age of some of the groups considered shows that ‘intermediate’ forms, those with some but not all of the traits traditionally associated with individuality, cannot reasonably be considered ephemeral or assumed transitional. We discuss a handful of recent attempts to reconcile the many proposed criteria for individuality and to provide criteria that can be applied across all the domains of life. Finally, we argue that individuality should be defined without reference to any particular taxon and that understanding the emergence of new kinds of individuals requires recognizing individuality as a matter of degree.     

Interpreting multidimensionality in parasite‐induced phenotypic alterations: panselectionism versus parsimony

The purpose of this note is to provide an alternative to the interpretation of multidimensionality in parasite‐induced phenotypic alterations as a set of effectively‐independent traits produced by adaptive evolution. We propose here that infection with so‐called ‘manipulative parasites’ typically results in an ‘infection syndrome’, characterized by several distinctive symptoms corresponding to the alteration of particular phenotypic traits in infected hosts. Based on the available physiological evidence, we argue that symptoms might actually be the consequence of the dysregulation of some key neuromodulator, arising as a byproduct of the subversion of the host's immune system by the parasite. In that respect, it might be inadequate, from a functional point of view, to separate phenotypic effects that appear to increase trophic transmission from those that do not. We suggest that future research should test the validity of the ‘infection syndrome’ hypothesis through focusing on the mechanisms involved in multidimensionality at the intraspecific level, and through looking for the existence of non‐random associations between symptoms at the interspecific level, across host‐parasite associations.     

On trusting ethnography: serendipity and the reflexive return to the fields of Gujarat

We draw on David Pocock's fieldwork of the 1950s in central Gujarat, India, as a comparative resource to think about social change and anthropological knowledge. Revisiting where Pocock had been through new fieldwork, we were encouraged to think about the ways in which places are accessed and subsequently understood. Against our conscious will, the pathways we were able to take through the field strongly resembled those Pocock took sixty years earlier. The coincidence is such that the material casts shadows of doubt over the potency of terms such as ‘serendipity’ and ‘chance’ to characterize key moments of ethnographic fieldwork. Against the primacy given to the self in much reflexive anthropology, we demonstrate that the personal attributes of the anthropologist might influence the production of ethnographic research less than is generally assumed. The double bind of our ‘reflexive return’ comes from revisiting an anthropological field and experiencing the agency of that field in making what we can know.